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Abstract 
 
Debate about how populations can be protected from mass atrocities is well-established in 
international affairs. Beset with a raft of ethical, legal, political and normative questions, the 
rapid development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ has been held up as evidence of 
emerging, and even settled, consensus in this area. Indeed, from the perspective of well-
established models of norm construction, notably the “Norm Life Cycle”, R2P’s 
institutionalization in the 2005 World Summit Outcome may signify momentum towards full 
acceptance. However, based upon a detailed tracing of R2P’s path into the Summit 
Outcome, this thesis questions how R2P is increasingly characterized as well as the 
theoretical explanatory frames used by scholars to describe the development and impact of 
international norms. It challenges the twin problems of linearity and norm exogenization 
which distort our understanding, and which are evident in overly optimistic portrayals of 
R2P’s development. With these in mind, the thesis adopts a framework constituted by a 
constructivist-inspired hypothesis and a process-tracing methodology defined by elite-level 
interviews and extensive documentary analysis. It shows how tracing the micro-processes of 
R2P’s development generates a very different story to those derived from broader 
theoretical frames. Indeed, the empirical findings show how and why the agreement was 
possible, and – through an analysis of the complex political negotiations – in what form R2P 
was collectively defined. This leads to the introduction of the concept of the ‘structured 
outcome’ to describe how R2P was propelled towards agreement more by a series of factors 
relating to the design and effect of the negotiation process than by the progressive 
acceptance of states. Accordingly, R2P’s formulation was purposefully limited to navigate 
pronounced dividing-lines and as a political agreement was more cosmetic than 
transformational. Resultantly its normative foundations were far shallower and far less 
significant than oft-rendered in mainstream perception.  
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Introduction 
 
For the first time, they will accept, clearly and unambiguously, that they have a 
collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes  against humanity. They will make clear their willingness to 
take timely and decisive action through the Security Council…They will be pledged to 
act if another Rwanda looms.1  
 
On the 14 September 2005, after months of long torturous, ‘brutal’ negotiations, leaders 
from 150 of the 191 member states descended upon the United Nations for a three-day 
Summit during which they would agree upon a broad reform package known as the World 
Summit Outcome. What had been intended merely as a follow-up to review progress made 
towards the Millennium Development Goals, the 2005 UN World Summit took on a far 
greater degree of significance, as states negotiated over almost every aspect of the UN’s 
work, structure, role and responsibilities.2 Kofi Annan’s description, amidst the damaging 
Iraq debates of 2003, of an international system in ‘crisis’ led him to instigate one of the 
most far-reaching reform processes in the Organization.3 It is regularly said that great 
expectations often lead to great disappointments, and indeed this was the overriding 
perception of a Summit which for many had simply failed to deliver, and in the process had 
tested multilateralism to its limit.   
 
Despite this disappointment, three paragraphs of the Outcome Document – some 300 
words in length – were widely seen as a chink of light, provoking considerable attention and 
even greater praise. The ‘Responsibility to protect’ (“R2P”), claimed as an emerging 
international norm, developed out of the devastating series of humanitarian catastrophes 
which scarred the 1990 with the intention of helping to ensure the ‘protection of 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.4 Its 
agreement was, according to many, ‘one of the few real achievements of the 2005 World 
Summit’.5 Gareth Evans, one of its key advocates, called it a ‘ray of sunshine’ in a ‘desolate 
                                                          
1
 Kofi Annan ‘Statement by the Secretary-General’, A/60/PV.2, 14 September 2005 
2
 The Summit was billed by the UN as the ‘the largest gathering of world leaders in history’ and ‘a once in a 
generation opportunity’, United Nations (2005) ‘The 2005 World Summit: An overview’, July 2005 
3
 See: ‘Transcript of press conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at UNHQ’, SG/SM/8803, 30 July 2003 
4
 United Nations (2005) World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 14 September 2005 
5
 Alex Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, Cambridge: Polity Press, p2 
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week’.6 Oxfam International described it as an ‘historic measure to help prevent future 
genocides’.7 Washington Times journalist Tod Lindberg argued the agreement represented 
‘the completion of no less than a revolution in consciousness in international affairs’,8 while 
Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss – two high-profile academics associated with the 
development of R2P – argue it is ‘possibly the most dramatic normative development of our 
time – comparable to…Nuremburg…and the 1948 Convention on Genocide’.9 
 
Since 2005 interest in R2P has intensified, with a proliferation of R2P-related research, a 
number of challenging and troubling crises, and as a result of on-going efforts by a now well-
developed advocacy coalition.10 Although academia has (and does) consider the pitfalls, 
weaknesses and contestation around the R2P agreement, there has been a significant 
merging of academia and advocacy as focus has shifted towards how an R2P-agenda can be 
‘operationalized’ or ‘implemented’. Key examples include the establishment of the NY-
based Global Centre for the R2P, the complementary establishment of a series of  
geographically-focused ‘Associated Centres’11, and the launch of the journal Global 
Responsibility Protect edited by prominent R2P scholar Alex Bellamy. These developments 
share similar goals. The R2P Centre’s ‘mission’ is to ‘help transform the principle…into a 
cause for action’; the journal’s to ‘promote a universal understanding of R2P and efforts to 
realize it’.12 This amalgamation has run parallel with the more significant effort to 
institutionally develop the agenda within the UN system. With R2P regarded as a ‘signature 
legacy’ issue13, Annan’s successor as UN Secretary-General has led the way in this regard. 
Ban Ki-Moon’s major report ahead of the first GA Plenary debates of R2P in 2009, set the 
                                                          
6
 One World Trust (2005) ‘Governments and NGOs: Their Responsibility to Protect’, 15 September 2005, p1 
7
 Oxfam International (2005) ‘Oxfam welcomes historic anti-genocide move at UN summit’, 23 November 2005 
8
 Tod Lindberg (2005) ‘Protect the people; United Nations takes bold stance’, The Washington Times, 27 
September 2005 (emphasis added). Aside from disputing this characterization it is important to note that 
revolutions can have extremely negative consequences. Future research should thus consider in greater detail 
the ethical implications of a normative development like R2P 
9
 Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss (2009) ‘R2P From Idea to Norm – and Action?’, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, Vol. 1, No. 1, p23 
10
 The origins and development of international advocacy of R2P is analysed in Chapter 4 
11
 Further details can be found at: http://www.globalr2p.org/centres/index.php  
12
 Global Centre for the R2P, ‘Who We Are’: http://www.globalr2p.org/whoweare/ and Global Responsibility to 
Protect, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
13
 The phrase ‘signature legacy’ was used in an internal Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Canada (DFAIT), dated 24 February 2009 
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tone for subsequent developments. Titled ‘Implementing the R2P’14 it attempted to build 
consensus and clarity around the meaning of R2P, and to develop a coherent strategy for its 
practical implementation.15 It also sought to build-on, and further develop, his appointment 
of a Special Adviser on R2P and to strengthen the Office of the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide.16  
 
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong, or unexpected, about this shift towards 
operationalization. The role of advocacy is to continue to build support for new norms (the 
benefits of which advocates are absolutely convinced of) and ultimately to see that states 
act upon them. It would also be foolish not to expect advocates to take the ‘05 agreement 
as the basis for moving…[R2P] forward’. As Bellamy states, ‘for those interested in 
translating [R2P] into practice, the starting point needs to be the summit’s Outcome 
Document’.17 However, this thesis fundamentally questions the extent to which current 
understandings, and associated expectations, accurately reflect the nature of the R2P 
agreement and the process leading to it. As such, the shift to operationalization is of 
particular interest, and a key motivating factor driving this research. What exactly is 
operationalization to be based on? And what kind of behaviour can we expect, and deem as 
compliant, as a result of the 2005 agreement? Indeed, while some will point to its 
unanimous adoption at the World Summit as an indication of its importance, unanimity of 
agreement does not necessarily equate to unanimity in terms meaning, significance or 
application. Despite claims of ‘clear and unambiguous’ acceptance18, evidence prior to, 
during, and since 2005 suggests there is reason to doubt such claims, and ample reason to 
question whether the oft-presented meaning of R2P not only fits with what states signed-up 
                                                          
14
 Ban Ki-Moon (2009) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/677, 
12 January 2009 
15
 The report was in some respects an impressive effort, but in other ways advanced some problematic ideas. 
Most problematic is the apparent desire to define R2P as broadly as possible – particularly to limit its 
association with the use of force. For a short, but well-crafted review see Jennifer Welsh (2009) ‘Implementing 
the ‘responsibility to protect’’, Policy Brief, 1/2009, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict 
16
 The SAR2P was announced 21 February 2008. See also ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the 
implementation of the Five-Point Action Plan and the activities of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General 
on the Prevention of Genocide’, A/HRC/7/37, 18 March 2008 
17
 Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p196: this was emphasized strongly by interviewees closely 
involved in the 2005 negotiation of R2P, see Chapter 5 
18
 Additionally Gareth Evans has recently argued that ‘support for the general principles of R2P…is effectively 
complete’ in (2012) ‘R2P After Libya: The State of Play – And Next Steps’, Notes of Presentation at the Group of 
Friends of R2P Lunch Meeting, Netherlands Mission, 19 January 2012 
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to, but the extent to which even the identifiably more limited core elements of the 
agreement commanded catalytic support of UN members states.19 
 
The Secretary-General’s effort to operationalize R2P was framed around the oft-deployed 
paraphrase ‘an idea whose time has come’.20 Yet every stage of R2P’s development has 
been defined in some way by member state resistance. This was evident in the process 
leading to the unexpected agreement in 2005; in the negotiation and crafting of the specific 
language; and has been underpinned throughout by overstatements of its importance; 
normative and motive-driven contestation; fuelled by misguided/cynical misappropriations 
and by more fundamental ideational disagreement about the nature and direction of 
international society. And though this thesis is bound by an ‘up to 2005’ time-frame, these 
factors have remained prominent in period since.21 Contrary to the idea that R2P’s time has 
come, or that it now commands settled support, the progression of R2P is by no means 
assured. Indeed, there is just as much possibility for regression as there is for normative 
strengthening as demonstrated by debates around recent events in Libya and Syria and as 
global power shifts.  
 
That there is momentum around the phrase is, however, undeniable. R2P has become 
established in mainstream debate and, more importantly, part of diplomatic vocabulary. 
Considering the repeated efforts of advocates; the institutional toe-hold provided by the 
agreement; and the naturally self-evident ethos of the simple, catchy phrase, this 
momentum is perhaps unsurprising – particularly as internal crises precipitating mass 
atrocity crimes have remained an intractable feature of international politics. But 
conversely, the curious feature of this momentum is that it is despite continuing 
contestation, debate and confusion around the meaning, significance and impact of R2P. 
Thus, mirroring R2P’s development into 2005, this subsequent momentum has developed 
out-of-sync with the underlying normative foundations of, and the politics around, R2P.22 To 
put it another way, this momentum – and the concomitant enhanced expectations for 
                                                          
19
 See Chapters 4 and 5 
20
 Ki-Moon (2009) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, A/63/677, 12 January 2009, para.72 
21
 See: Jennifer Welsh (2010) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Where Expectations Meet Reality’, 
Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 24, Number 4 (online edition) 
22
 This argument is most clearly articulated in Chapters 4 and 5 
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dealing with mass atrocities – has occurred despite the adoption of an agreement which in 
many respects changed very little. As Ch5 shows, it did prima facie provide a political 
statement of individual state responsibility expressing clearer acceptance of a conception of 
sovereignty previously contested in international affairs.23 This was certainly potentially 
significant. But beyond that, in terms of the events and crises which provided the impetus 
for its development, the agreement was fundamentally more cosmetic than it was 
transformational. It helped define the parameters and expected authority for responding to 
mass atrocities, but did so in accordance with a series of associated safeguards to limit R2P’s 
international dimension and a series of frames designed to emphasize that R2P represented 
nothing new and was tied to, rather than altered, existing processes and provisions. 
 
Indeed, though the logic of ‘unpacking’ is deployed repeatedly in later chapters for charting 
the negotiations, they also demonstrate why it is a mistake to prioritize the idea of an 
international responsibility to protect at the expense of understanding the significance of 
the idea that individual states have the primary responsibility. The primary state dimension 
was central not only to defining the sequencing of R2P, it was also key to the strength of the 
commitment to the doctrine that emanated from an overwhelming preference to define it 
as a pro-sovereignty agreement. In contrast to the main prevailing interpretations of the 
agreement, the emphasis on primary responsibility served to constrain the character of the 
international dimension. The subtle point is that although this meant affirming a conception 
of sovereignty based upon responsibility – rather than one based explicitly upon non-
intervention – the motive for doing so was about limiting the scope and character of the 
international role in responding to mass atrocity crimes. This was the uneasy grand bargain 
at the heart of the agreement. Accepting primary responsibility would inevitably mean this 
would provide a future framework for justifying international engagement. But at the same 
time, because of this tension, the engagement of the international community would 
remain subject to resistance, contestation and debate about what it might say, and how it 
might impact upon, the development of international relations. Thus, while there are 
certainly practical considerations in terms of how we understand the potential impact of 
                                                          
23
 Prima facie because there is reason to doubt the extent to which many states accept this conception if it 
means increased oversight and interference by the international community, and because the nature of the 
negotiations meant this was, paradoxically, the best way of ensuring the agreement was defined as 
representing ‘nothing new’ in terms of the role of the international community 
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R2P – it is widely accepted, for instance, that R2P did not alter the fact that any form of 
international action would always require political agreement – these are underpinned by 
more fundamental questions relating to the normative characteristics of R2P. The 
described-momentum has created a sense of illusion whereby assumption has it states 
accepted an ‘international-R2P’. Had they done so, the agreement would indeed have been 
normatively transformational. This is not to deny state willingness to acknowledge a 
legitimate role and interest in trying to respond to extreme human rights abuses. But as Ch5 
shows, this is very different from characterizing the agreement in a way which transposes 
upon the international community a responsibility which neither key SC members nor many 
states within the GA were, or still are, willing to accept. 
 
This central proposition – one of many presented throughout this thesis – is likely to 
provoke hostility, even incredulity. But crucially this claim derives from a process-driven 
hypothesis dedicated to understanding how/why R2P was agreed in 2005, and in what form. 
This approach requires a commitment to detail, to methodology, to process, and a matched 
commitment by the reader. As stated above, the process here is time-specific. After a brief 
prehistory below, it tracks the detailed development of R2P through its entrepreneurial, 
advocacy and negotiation stages up to 2005. Underpinned by an important appreciation of 
political context, and of structure and agency, the story is vastly more detailed – and 
complex – than any current account of R2P. However, it is not detail for details sake. Rather 
the presentation of empirical research provides the foundations from which the central 
arguments about the nature and meaning of the agreement were crafted. 
 
But before outlining the hypothesis it is important to recognise that the research logic and 
resulting arguments are not diminished by the time-frame. In fact, they have arguably never 
been more relevant. Current controversy and debates surely demand a more nuanced, 
exhaustive appreciation of the dynamics underpinning the development of R2P just as 
international theory surely requires a deeper, more developed understanding of the 
dynamics of normative change. Both are clearly linked. Indeed, a key finding of later 
chapters is that while R2P’s development involved mechanisms of social construction one 
might expect, the underlying dynamics that propelled it towards agreement were distinct. It 
would be a mistake, for instance, to attempt to fit this development to Finnemore and 
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Sikkink’s widely-cited ‘norm life cycle’ (NLC).24 The NLC may package the relevant 
mechanisms, stages and dynamics in a useful, insightful way, but its emphasis on ‘cascades’ 
and ‘institutionalization’ would provide a misleading and inaccurate sense of the current 
status of R2P. Based upon the Outcome, and the subsequent efforts of the SG, the 
institutionalization of R2P would seem assured, widespread acceptance inevitable. This, 
however, would underestimate the contestation evident today and the extent to which 
much of it relates to how R2P emerged and was negotiated. Indeed, one question it was 
necessary to ask early in the research process was just how it was R2P went from minimal 
political traction even until the end of 2004, to its inclusion in a high-profile Summit 
resolution in 2005? This seemingly obvious question has never been sufficiently answered. 
 
Thus, at the heart of the thesis is a simple but pivotal research question: how can we explain 
the high-level political agreement of R2P in 2005? The theoretical and methodological 
framework for exploring this question is outlined in Chapter 1. This chapter aligns the 
research question with a central hypothesis about the importance of understanding process 
and brings together a series of key conceptual and methodological elements necessary to 
make sense of the empirical chapters which dominate thereafter. But having referenced 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s NLC so early on, it is necessary to emphasize that although the 
research question is explicitly about understanding the development of R2P, it is framed by 
the issue of how we understand the development of international norms. Indeed, the NLC 
provided the initial route for understanding the development of R2P and inspiration for the 
eventual articulation of the theoretical framework, hypothesis and research question. 
However, as the empirical research unfolded it quickly became apparent that the continued 
application of the NLC would render the development of R2P in an insufficient and limited 
way. Some of the mechanisms of social construction it identifies are certainly evident in the 
empirical story in Chapters 3-5, but the crux issue of how R2P rapidly transitioned from a 
lack of political traction to high-level political agreement required an altogether different 
explanation. The underlying dynamics were temporally and substantively distinct from those 
evident in, or implied by, the NLC. The specific problems with the application and rendering 
of the NLC are considered in Chapter 1, but of foremost concern was the implicit linearity 
                                                          
24
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 and herein “NLC” 
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associated with the model and its core concepts and core underlying dynamics. As 
mentioned above, the institutionalization of R2P in the form of the 2005 agreement is just 
one element of understanding its development. The crucial question is how and why that 
institutionalization was possible. In other words, what matters in this case is embedding the 
concepts which are relevant to understanding the development of R2P in their proper 
context. The emphasis of this research – with its detailed empirical tracing of the emergence 
and negotiation of R2P – provides this context without which the picture, as suggested by 
the NLC, would be distorted in an overly optimistic and unrealistic way. At the heart of the 
explanation provided in this thesis is the contention that the propulsion of R2P towards the 
2005 agreement depended on a series of structural factors relating to the 2005 negotiating 
process and the lead-in processes thereto. Normative momentum relating to its desirability 
and acceptability as an international norm was a far less significant dynamic in explaining 
the path to 2005.  
 
As a result, this thesis adopts its own constructivist-influenced theoretical framework for 
understanding the development of R2P. This framework is very much a supporting structure 
designed to ensure the empirical power of the thesis is fully revealed and best understood 
by the reader. Crucially it is not modelled as per the NLC. Rather, it draws together a series 
of relevant concepts to help make sense of the complex empirical processes which 
dominate the thesis. Indeed, it is important to recognise at this juncture that the issues 
which helped define the research question, and concomitant methodological approach, are 
not purely theoretical. Although the R2P literature is broad, and increasingly engaged in a 
critical sense, the need to address weaknesses in key mainstream portrayals of R2P’s 
development and agreement emerged as an equally important necessity considering the 
nature of the empirical findings. Indeed, the two are linked in important ways. In particular, 
a central argument of this thesis challenges the association between R2P’s rapid 
development and the resulting presupposed positive implications thereof for the debate 
about preventing and responding to mass atrocity crimes. Three key snapshots of overly 
optimistic renderings of R2P’s development, laced with an implicit linear narrative, are 
considered in Chapter 1. But for the purposes of foresight, Gareth Evans’ statement that 
R2P was agreed in the ‘mere blink of an eye’ symbolically captures a central problem with 
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how the development of R2P is too often presented25. By contrast, the desire to understand 
the detailed processes of the social construction of R2P allows this thesis to unpack and 
reconstruct the chain of events which led to the 2005 outcome. In so doing it suggests that 
the underlying political dynamics surrounding the idea were largely unchanged during the 
period in question, and that its agreement depended in large part on factors relating to the 
structural characteristics of the negotiation processes.  
 
Indeed, at the very heart of the empirical story of R2P is the assertion that the ‘structuring’ 
of the negotiation process was not only an enabling factor but a causal one in the 
agreement of R2P. This complex figuration is characterized as the ‘structured outcome’ 
logic.26 It meant that rather than based on any catalytic bandwagoning momentum, R2P was 
propelled by a series of factors relating to the design and effect of the negotiation process. 
In many respects, states were compelled to take a position on R2P which they otherwise 
would not have been so willing to make. Because of the scale of the negotiation package; 
the way the process unfolded; and because of a well-mobilized advocacy coalition, the odds 
of some kind of agreement on R2P increased/narrowed dramatically.27 These characteristics 
helped dampen-down R2P’s contentiousness during 2005, but also meant that once the 
factors which helped propel it were removed, the resulting, heavily qualified, agreement 
would be subject to a reawakening of contestation and debate. Moreover, while post-
agreement contestation should always be anticipated, the structured outcome argument 
also leads to the question of whether R2P’s much heralded speed of development is the 
positive characteristic that is often implied, and whether in fact this rapid pace applies to 
the R2P agreement as a whole. The process points to a lack of synchronisation between its 
component parts, and consequently a lack of fit between normative foundations and 
associated expectations. Thus, Thakur’s attempt to frame current problems with R2P in 
terms of ‘the translation of norm to operation’ and ‘not a question of timing’, 
underestimates the importance of the relationship between timing and norm and 
                                                          
25
 Gareth Evans, ''The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come . . . and Gone?'' Lecture to the 
David Davies Memorial Institute, University of Aberystwyth, 23 April 2008 
26
 See Chapters 4 and 5 
27
 The structured outcome is theoretically introduced in Ch1, first empirically introduced in Ch4, and then 
explained and applied in significant detail in Ch5 
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operation.28 Time matters because the temporality of normative change can be an indicator 
of potential compliance, and of norm legitimacy. In this case, the speed of development 
leading to the agreement is not necessarily matched by its corresponding normative 
foundations something which inevitably has implications for its significance and state-
willingness to embrace implementation.29 Thus, the structured outcome logic resides at the 
heart of the thesis’s contribution to the R2P literature and debate. As stated later on, 
understanding the development of R2P in this way does not necessarily render the 
agreement invalid or insignificant, but it should necessarily qualify how we understand R2P’s 
potential impact on the debate relating to mass atrocities. Indeed, in helping to explain how 
the agreement was possible the structured outcome (and the process-driven approach 
more generally) also helps understand why it is argued here that the status of R2P is less 
assured than might be expected.  
 
The remainder of this introduction addresses some of the questions and concerns in this 
regard, particularly in the context of recent events. But beforehand it is important to briefly 
address the issue of causality and particularly its relationship with the structured outcome 
logic. In explaining how R2P transitioned from political stagnation (as most clearly revealed 
in Ch4) to political agreement in 2005 (Ch5) the structured outcome undoubtedly challenges 
the causal story implied by the NLC. The underlying behavioural and political dynamics in 
this case were distinct from the motivations and dominant mechanisms Finnemore and 
Sikkink identify (see Ch1). It is also true that the thesis makes the counterfactual claim that 
without the effects of the structured outcome the likelihood of political agreement would 
have been massively reduced. It does so by posing the question of whether R2P could or 
would have been agreed without the structural characteristics of the negotiation process. 
The implicit suggestion is that it would not. Clearly, therefore, the structured outcome logic 
offers a causal account of that key transition which is such a critical part of R2P’s 
development. But this logic needs to be qualified in some important ways.  
 
                                                          
28
 Interview with Ramesh Thakur (Waterloo, 22 June 2009) 
29
 The phrase ‘embrace implementation’ is from Welsh (2010) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: 
Where Expectations Meet Reality’, online edition 
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First, the structured outcome is a conceptual label which packages a series of complex 
interconnected factors which help explain the path to the 2005 outcome. It is about the 
interplay and interaction of these factors in the context of understanding why R2P was 
agreed. Crucially the why question in respect to the structured outcome is significant 
because it speaks to the factors which operated (implicitly or explicitly) against agreement 
on R2P and which were overcome and mitigated by the structured outcome. Hence the 
reasoning that without the effects of the structured outcome these counteractive factors 
would have been more powerful in ensuing progress towards political agreement was not 
forthcoming.  
 
Second, resulting from this point is the recognition that the structured outcome is not the 
only or singularly deterministic factor in the story of R2P. As the empirical chapters reveal, 
the factors relating to the structured outcome existed in a far broader context and set of 
conditions where other mechanisms and political dynamics shaped both the effects of the 
structured outcome and the formulation of R2P. Indeed, the consistent role of agency, the 
specific ways by which the textual formulation of the R2P paragraphs proceeded, and the 
underlying continuity of member state positions around the issue of humanitarian 
intervention (and subsequently R2P), are just some of the range of factors at play during the 
story of R2P’s development. All contributed in some way to the eventual agreement of R2P, 
but not all were contributory in the sense of supporting the advancement of it. Moreover, 
with the sheer empirical force of the structured outcome revealed in great detail later on, 
what also becomes clear is that it should not be seen, understood or dismissed as simply a 
structural account of the agreement of R2P. Rather, the more appropriate description is that 
the effects it packages relate to the structuring of the process in recognition of the range of 
dynamics at play, the centrality of agency, and the need to embed the effect of the 
structural factors within the 2005 negotiation process. The structural factors certainly 
changed the prospects for the realisation of a political outcome on R2P in 2005, and by 
propelling R2P towards agreement they also inevitably influenced the eventual formulation. 
But these factors cannot singularly explain the overall outcome. They can address the lack of 
political momentum and catalytic state support for R2P pre-2005 and undoubtedly have 
very real implications for how we should understand the nature and significance of the 
agreement, but they need to be understood and contextualized within the complex, 
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multidimensional internal political machinations of the R2P – and broader reform agenda – 
negotiations. 
 
Finally, some additional interrelated points about the structured outcome are worth 
emphasizing and reiterating here. First, the very notion of introducing such a concept to 
help explain how and why R2P was agreed was drawn both from a commitment to 
understanding the detailed processes leading to the 2005 World Summit Outcome and from 
the realisation that the initial theoretical starting-point of the NLC was unable to sufficiently 
render the complex dynamics evident in this case. As explained below, the need to 
understand the micro processes by which norms emerge is a central element of the 
research approach adopted throughout this thesis. Indeed, it was because of this emphasis 
that the insufficiency of the NLC and aspects of the mainstream rendering of the 
development of R2P became clear. On the former it is worth reiterating the point that 
although certain concepts evident in the NLC – like institutionalization – are also evident in 
the story of R2P, without a full understanding of the processes and context would distort 
the picture in terms of R2P’s status and potential impact as an international norm. This is 
fully borne out by the empirical tracing which also raises significant questions about the 
portrayal of R2P by some of the leading R2P advocates and scholars. Crucially, the emphasis 
on detail enabled the identification, exploration and highlighting of specifically where the 
empirical story presented here offered new insights and/or departed from the established 
accounts of R2P’s development. In so doing, the empirical story is able to demonstrate how, 
for instance, the constitutive dynamics of the structured outcome affected the development 
of R2P and why it should affect (and qualify) our understanding of its status, significance and 
potential impact. In this respect, this thesis does more than challenge existing theoretical 
models or certain accounts of R2P. It makes important claims about the importance of 
process, how scholars should adapt their understanding of normative change, and shows 
how the incorporation of a detailed understanding of process can provide a stronger basis 
for engaging with debates about the behavioural impact of norms and such offshoots as the 
political, ethical and normative implications of the agreement. Indeed, one of the resulting 
questions posed by the empirical findings is just how amenable a case like R2P is to 
theoretical modelling like the NLC or any individual causal theory for that matter. The 
empirical findings certainly do not support the reducibility of the process in such a way. It is 
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undeniable, however, that scholars wishing to understand normative developments need to 
continually refine the tools and concepts they use to explain such complex phenomena. The 
concept of the structured outcome is thus one small contribution to this endeavour. Indeed, 
the second additional point relates to the general applicability of the structured outcome. 
The claims in this regard are necessarily qualified. Although Ch1 suggests the concept might 
have explanatory power in other cases or scenarios beyond R2P, the conditions and 
constitutive mechanisms will be context specific and like R2P just one element of the 
explanation.  
 
The most significant point, however, is that the structured outcome helps explain the 
agreement of R2P in a way which a theoretical model like the NLC cannot and in so doing 
has important implications for how we should view the 2005 agreement. Indeed, by 
understanding R2P in this way the structured outcome logic helps to explain why the 
agreement was actually formulated the way it was. The whole thrust of the negotiations 
was to define R2P as a political statement which did not fundamentally alter the scope or 
character of existing international commitments, was tightly and narrowly defined, implied 
no automaticity, and was tied to existing Charter processes and provisions. Specifying the 
language according to these core elements was thus central to the negotiation of R2P. But 
this also has major implications for potential implementation. Even with Ch5’s explanation 
of the linguistic formulation helping to identify a meaning of R2P distinct from how it is 
often described, that the thrust was about defining R2P according to these elements meant 
any prospects for operationalization were always going to be heavily qualified. Each stage of 
addressing an R2P crisis, each caveat, and each of the series of safeguards introduced to 
mitigate member state concerns and dividing-lines would all be subject to, and ultimately 
require, political agreement. One can certainly respond to this in terms of the pragmatism it 
so obviously embraces. Each crisis is distinct and rightly demands individually-tailored 
responses. But with R2P neither as normatively expressive as assumption would have it, and 
less transformational than some would hope, the extent to which it might impact upon 
domestic and international responses to individual crises would always be open to question. 
 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
14 
 
Contrary to the post-2005 tendency to exogenize R2P’s impact,30 questions around impact 
demand a more detailed appreciation of what was agreed in 2005 and what R2P reflected, 
changed or more appropriately, did not change. In particular, there is little reason to believe 
the 2005 agreement has/would fundamentally alter the way crises are dealt with by the 
international community. Indeed, long-standing concerns about the multilateral capacity 
and willingness of states to commit the resources necessary for responding to mass 
atrocities persist.31 The sheer complexity of individual crises means achieving consensus 
around the appropriate use and timing of international involvement remains highly complex 
and highly debatable – whether or not these factors are exploited for political motives. 
Sensitivity around coercive action (up to and including military force) is as acute as ever. 
More problematically, the vexed issue of non-authorized intervention is arguably more likely 
to erupt in the future because collective action was bound so tightly to a P5 which was not 
only adamant about ensuring R2P did not affect its existing prerogatives but which included 
(and still includes) key P5 states highly sceptical of R2P.32  
 
Indeed, such challenges to operationalization were predicable based upon the way the 
negotiations unfolded. Because of scepticism and limitations in terms of what states were 
willing to accept, the design of the agreement built-in a series of questions about how R2P 
might operate in practice. Unsurprisingly these predominately relate to the international 
dimension, or rather the transition to, and extent of, multilateral engagement beyond 
individual state responsibility. This debate is, of course, bound-up with more fundamental 
considerations relating to the kind of international system states wish to see develop. In this 
respect, the long-term place and progression of R2P is by no means assured. Contestation 
around sovereign equality, non-intervention, international responsibility is as animate today 
as it was during the negotiations of 2005. But more than that, the effort to specify the 
sequencing, parameters and safeguarding of R2P illuminated just how much contention 
multilateral agreement would have to overcome. This included debate about whether 
primary state responsibility has been exhausted; whether measures short of more coercive 
                                                          
30
 The issue of norm exogenization is addressed below and more specifically in Ch1 
31
 This is evident not only in relation to crises since 2005, but in relation to institutional developments 
described above, and by debates within the SC especially 
32
 It is worth pointing out that there was no alternative to tying R2P so closely to the SC. It was entirely 
reasonable, and the only realistically achievable political solution 
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action have been appropriately deployed; how one determines whether the threshold for 
international engagement under chapter VII has been met; and ethical issues relating to the 
desirability, appropriateness and consequences of the actions being considered/mooted. 
 
Many of these, along with renewed fears about the potential misuse of R2P, have been 
evident in crises since 2005. Recent events in Libya and Syria have exposed the political 
fragility around R2P, and questioned the true extent of its meaning and purchase. Indeed, 
political decision-making at the international-level is arguably more challenging, less 
predictable and less organized than it ever has been. With global power increasingly diffuse 
and fragmented, the complex global changes taking place today – so impervious to any 
unifying theoretical explanatory framework – are not only adding new challenges into the 
policy mix but altering how they are likely to be addressed in the future. Variable 
differentiation characterizes this new context. How states respond to specific issues and 
crises, how they attempt to pursue their political and economic priorities and the 
relationships and alliances they seek to foster, will be highly and selectively dependent. One 
likely consequence of this unpredictable fluidity is that the processes and fora for decision-
making will advance varied forms of adhockery/adhocracy as the default – and oft-exclusive 
– ‘go to’ approach. By contrast, the post-CW western-dominated narrative of globalized 
opportunities and risks demanding globalized solutions and concomitant normative and 
legal development will seem less appropriate; less relevant; less acceptable.  
 
Such changes are only likely to complicate the picture for R2P, and compound longstanding 
unease about what it means and what it represents. Indeed, with no country immune from 
the complex and uncertain changes, ideas – particularly those relatively new and emerging – 
are no less vulnerable. This is especially true for an idea like R2P which, in attempting to 
deal with an old, longstanding problem, was about trying to capture some sense of 
global/collective responsibility and to further the development of multilateral response 
mechanisms through the UN. The problem, however, is that this new context does not 
necessarily lend itself to advancing the cause of an overarching global/systemic construct. If 
anything, the rising confidence of emerging powers to depart from seemingly routinized 
modalities of international governance and interaction – in order to advance political and 
economic interests – will lead to a system of international relations imbued with greater 
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lacunae, amorphous characteristics and a more pronounced emphasis on norms of 
sovereign equality and non-interference than international responsibility and accountability. 
Moreover, such political voids are, and will, provide greater scope for normative 
contestation about the meaning of the 2005 agreement and normative regression as its 
appropriateness is actively challenged. 
 
Resultantly these dynamics have practical consequences for the application and impact of 
R2P – consequences most acute in relation to the coercive end of the response spectrum. 
These have been brutally exposed since the Libya crisis of 2011. In this case, aside from 
recognising that it is by no means definitive that R2P was a key driving factor behind the 
NATO response, Libya demonstrated the risks to, and continued questions about, the place 
of R2P and humanitarian intervention in general. Considering the position of the BRIC 
countries, the highly limited invocation of R2P, and subsequent controversy about NATO’s 
implementation of the mandate,33 it is hard to understand how Gareth Evans could arrive at 
the conclusion that the ‘End of the Argument’ had arrived, that 2011 was when R2P ‘really 
came of age’,34 or be so sure that R2P has ‘made a difference’ and was ‘here to stay’.35 
Though aware of what he describes as ‘serious’ ‘issues…about the proper scope and limits of 
implementation strategies’ Evans’ argument conveniently detaches implementation from 
the constitutive principles of R2P. This allows him to repeat the idea that ‘support for the 
general principles of R2P…is effectively complete’36 even if, in the case of Libya, the way it 
                                                          
33
 Based upon the nature of the agreement as explained in Chapter 5, and the specific politics of the Libya 
case, it is highly questionable it was R2P which propelled states to act in Libya. These kinds of debates do, 
however, require a more detailed exploration and accounts which are not possible to achieve here. But 
considering how the SC operates, with its consistent unwillingness to tie itself to doctrines or codification, and 
the fact that the international dimension of R2P was not invoked by states in Resolution 1973, one should be 
very careful to assume R2P made any difference to how states decided to act in this case. This is not to say 
concerns about human rights abuses were not part of the mix, and justification, but that it is more likely other 
more dominant priorities were driving the response. See Security Council ‘Resolution 1973 – The Situation in 
Libya’, S/RES/1973, 17 March 2011 
34
 Gareth Evans (2011) ‘End of the Argument: How we won the debate over stopping genoicde’, Foreign 
Affairs, December 2011 
35
 Evans (2012) ‘R2P After Libya: The State of Play – And Next Steps’. Jennifer Welsh’s position is much more 
carefully crafted: ‘it would be too rash to conclude that the Libyan case ends the debate over RtoP’s status, 
meaning, and strength in contemporary international society’ in (2011) ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting 
Coercion and Controversy back into RtoP’, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 25, Issue 3, p255 
36
 Evans (2012) ‘R2P After Libya: The State of Play – And Next Steps’ (note for Evans the general principles 
means the ‘four crimes and three pillars’). See also: Evans (2011) ‘End of the Argument’ and Ban Ki-Moon who 
has suggested ‘Our debates are about how, not whether, to implement the R2P’ in ‘Effective prevention 
requires early, active, sustained engagement’, SG/SM/13838, 23 September 2011 
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was implemented risked ‘backlash’ and threatened to make future coercive action 
‘impossible’.37 
 
These warnings have become reality considering the response to Syria. In this respect, 
Evans’ arguments have merit. By identifying some of the contentious elements of NATO 
strategy which ran counter to what Resolution 1973 specified it is possible to understand 
very real factors which have fuelled controversy and subsequently filtered-into/hardened 
the positions of states like China and Russia over this issue. But beyond accepting the reality 
of acute variable complexities associated with any effort at implementation, his argument is 
essentially one-dimensional. It is limited by an unwillingness to consider the possibility that 
the real problem with R2P, and why achieving political SC agreement over the issue of Syria 
has proved almost impossible, is that R2P simply does not command the kind of support 
Evans takes as given and nor is it as significant a factor in terms of mobilizing international 
action as he would have us believe. These latter points are crucial. The Summit Outcome 
was defined as it was largely to satisfy not just a cluster of hard-core opponents, but a 
broader middle-ground of states sceptical about assigning a responsibility to protect to the 
international community. There was very good reason why the phrase 
“international/collective R2P” was not included in the outcome: there was no consensus 
that this should be the basis of future international action. Indeed, one principal framing 
strategy was designed to emphasize that R2P was not about capturing anything new, but 
was rather about trying to capture what already existed in terms of Charter processes, 
provisions and in customary international practice. Clearly this is very different from 
advancing any codified notion of a hierarchical international system based upon 
international scrutiny, attention and external intervention. Here the logic of unpacking the 
agreement is especially useful, because an alternative argument will point to the strong 
acceptance of individual state responsibility and the acceptance of a legitimate international 
role first in helping states to protect, and in exceptional cases, a preparedness to act under 
ChVII. But as Ch5 shows, the agreement was crafted within the context of negotiating 
positions defined by a complex web of dividing lines, normative preferences and 
motivations. 
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One of the most prominent of all was concern about the implications for sovereignty bound-
up with fears about selectivity, abuse, rash decision-making based upon questionable 
motives and with insufficient regard for the consequences for international stability. For 
many states, including China and Russia, the acceptance of primary state responsibility was 
one – seemingly paradoxical – way of limiting/curtailing both the implications for state 
sovereignty and the development of sweeping normative claims about the responsibility 
and role of the international community. Hence both consistently argued that the Charter 
already provided a sufficient basis for dealing with crises and for determining questions 
relating to the use of force.  
 
Of course this is not to say the statement of primary responsibility was not potentially 
significant. It has provided a high-level ‘go-to’ political statement which can be used to 
frame the accountability and responsibility of an individual state. But it can also be used to 
avoid international action, and beyond that it illuminates just how distinct the character of 
the individual state and international community dimensions of R2P really are. Indeed, 
central to China and Russia’s acceptance of R2P (and the US, UK and France for that matter) 
was that the agreement did not change the responsibilities of the SC (in fact it strengthened 
the role of the SC), did not cut-across or alter any existing P5 prerogatives, and thus did not 
fundamentally change the decision-making processes at the international-level. Resultantly, 
how the SC reacted to a specific crisis would remain dependent upon political agreement 
between the P5 based upon operational responses rather than acting (as the SC is loath to) 
for the purposes of implementing a normative doctrine like R2P. And thus, with China and 
Russia remaining highly sceptical of the motivation and consequences of R2P, and 
committed to ensuring norms of sovereignty and non-intervention are not eroded by a 
march towards an international system of anathematic character, one should not be 
surprised by the controversy around the Libya and Syria cases. The detailed basis for this 
argument is outlined in Ch4, but is nevertheless highly relevant to the current context 
considering the grand claims particularly made on the back of the Libya action.38 There is a 
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very strong counter argument to these claims and one which is increasingly strengthened by 
the polarized debate over Syria. Here, efforts to reassert sovereignty in order to limit 
international engagement have seemingly gained ground. These have been fuelled not only 
by the above-mentioned inherent qualifications relating to the international scope of R2P, 
but by renewed concerns about the motivation driving the effort to increase pressure on 
the Assad regime. As later chapters show, concerns about regime change and the possible 
expansion of R2P fed directly into its negotiation. But even with considerable emphasis on 
conceptually insulating R2P by delineating its parameters, these concerns have lingered.39 
The NATO action in Libya has fuelled concerns about regime change, and concern that SC 
resolutions may result in military action. Unsurprisingly, this has subsequently impacted 
upon the ability to agree resolutions relating to the situation in Syria.40 
 
Understanding the complex politics of these two cases demand a research project of their 
own, but nevertheless they provide yet another reminder of just how challenging and 
changeable, international political agreement really is. There have, of course, been many 
other examples of crises whereby R2P has been applied or invoked either by states, Civil 
Society or by advocates. But situations like Burma, Georgia, Darfur, Zimbabwe, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Cote d’Ivoire have only added to the sense of confusion and doubt 
about what R2P really means and what kind of impact it is having, and can have.41 All have 
revealed problems and questions of their own, and even if they speak to the above-
described sense of momentum, there is no inherent progress relating to these invocations 
and nor is understanding whether R2P made any real difference to how states responded as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
resort of the world’s will to act to prevent and halt mass atrocities and mitigate the effects of sovereignty as 
organised hypocrisy, as Stephen Krasner famously put it. It is the normative instrument of choice to convert a 
shocked international conscience into timely and decisive collective action. It navigates the treacherous shoals 
between the Scylla of callous indifference to the plight of victims and the Charybdis of self-righteous 
interference in others’ internal affairs’ in ‘Libya: The First Stand or The Last Post for the Responsibility to 
Protect?’, e-IR, 13 March 2011 
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 Since 2005 successive efforts have been made to broaden or reinterpret the scope and application of R2P. 
Prominent examples include thematic/event-driven invocations in relation to Burma, North Korea, Iraq, 
Georgia, the environment/climate change, disease, terrorism, WMD, and preventive war. These debates are 
relevant to Chapter 4’s discussion of the impact of 9/11 and ensuing development of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ 
40
 Even if this may be for some an all too convenient argument, however, see Security Council (2012) ‘Middle 
East situation – Syria’, S/PV.6710, 31 January 2012, BBC News (2012) ‘Russia and China veto resolution on Syria 
at the UN’, 4 February 2012. Note the proposed draft resolution of January 2012 on the situation in Syria did 
not invoke the R2P phrase, see The Guardian (2012) ‘UN draft resolution on Syria’, 31 January 2012 
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 For a more focused, and detailed, account of post-2005 contestation see Alex Bellamy (2010) ‘The 
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easy as oft-implied.42 In R2P’s case a major part of the problem stems from a propensity to 
assume its meaning and status is commonly understood; to dismiss those with alternative 
preferences as either guilty of misunderstanding or merely concerned with self-
interest/protection;43 and to believe that mere invocation must mean R2P is, in some way, 
driving state behaviour (particularly at the international level). This ‘norm exogenization’ is 
highly problematic, but also a key motivator behind the design and thrust of this research. 
There is a general need to develop and apply methodological tools directed at arriving at a 
deeper understanding of normative change and the complex politics of international-level 
decision-making. Indeed, these two points are fundamentally interlinked as best captured 
by the process-driven approach adopted throughout. The process-driven approach 
developed here not only helps us understand the 2005 agreement but sheds new light on 
the politics of subsequent developments and of individual cases. Hence for this reason, the 
only logical starting point for this thesis is to develop a better understanding of R2P’s 
development into the 2005 outcome.  
 
Clearly, in suggesting we need a better understanding of R2P’s development, this research 
takes issue with the positive hype that has associated with the concept since 2005. As Aidan 
Hehir remarks ‘effusive appraisals of R2P abound’.44 Some key examples of this hype have 
already been identified above, but a central problem for the debate has been the powerful 
influence of advocacy voices (including academics straddling an advocacy position) in 
contributing to a distorted picture of the progression and status of R2P. Indeed, this 
distortion relates both to the process up to 2005 and the post-2005 trends, which, rather 
than clarifying or solidifying the concept, have only served to emphasize the weaknesses 
and questions always evident in the processes leading to 2005 and in the consistent 
underlying politics since the end of the Cold War. Foremost among these voices has been 
Gareth Evans. Although an undeniably committed and impressive advocate, it is self-evident 
that this thesis’s critical arguments take profound issue with Evans’s claims, characterization 
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and defence of the concept. The present-day context, allied to the insights yielded by the 
process-tracing in Chapters 3-5, expose his claims about the ‘end of the argument’ and 
suggestions that R2P was/is a ‘brand new international norm of really quite fundamental 
ethical importance and novelty’ and ‘unquestionably a major breakthrough’ as premature, 
ill-conceived and anything but unquestionable45. Such claims – however well-intentioned – 
have contributed to the disproportionate hype which has led R2P to an unhelpful position of 
dominance in the debate about international responses to mass atrocities and intra-state 
crises.  
 
There is, of course, a broad and increasingly critical set of voices engaged with R2P and 
associated debates46. It would be quite wrong to portray the literature unfairly in this 
regard. But the reason for emphasizing the role of advocacy and the positive rendering R2P 
seems to attract, is that such effusive appraisals are more prominent and ubiquitous – 
despite their disconnect from the empirical findings presented throughout – and because 
the sheer weight of emphasis on R2P – despite fundamental questions about its status and 
utility – threatens to overwhelm the central issues of the debate R2P has ultimately failed to 
address. Its mere linguistic existence is not a sufficient reason to believe it has had any 
significant impact upon state behaviour/practice. Nor is it sufficient reason to believe R2P is 
the only possible approach to overcoming the obstacles associated with civilian protection 
and mass atrocity crimes. As later chapters reveal, and pinpoint, a series of (continuing) 
ethical, moral, normative and legal issues ensured the agreement of R2P was not merely 
qualified but was decidedly un-transformational in its constitution. The agreement 
reiterated and reaffirmed existing processes and provisions. It was an expression of the 
prevailing imperfections inherent to the international system albeit bound-up with a long-
standing normative plea about how states should treat citizens in peril. The arc of the 
debate – even with the increasing number of critical voices – is, therefore, problematic. 
Indeed, the problem is now such that the R2P lobby (or ‘industry’ as Hehir describes it) 
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increasingly appears to act for its own protection of a concept which sits so uneasily in an 
international system which yields most painfully to change.47 
 
In this regard, defensive reflexes and all-too-convenient (oft post-hoc) justifications 
designed to insulate the existence, relevance and persistence of the concept from the 
painful realities of global politics, equally abound. As Hehir convincingly argues, those cases 
where R2P ‘demonstrably failed to effect change…are downplayed [by the R2P industry] in 
favour of those cases where R2P ostensibly played a role’.48 But taking this line of argument 
even further, such an insight is even more problematic because a) the likelihood that R2P 
would effect change was always open to question considering the way it was agreed and b) 
because Hehir’s use of the word ‘ostensibly’ rightly speaks to the need to understand in a 
much deeper and more neutral way how, if, and to what effect R2P has played a part in 
shaping or conditioning international responses to specific cases.49 There is a very significant 
difference between the existence, or even invocation, of R2P, and impact. There is also a 
stark contrast between the enormous overhyped expectations surrounding R2P and the 
realities of how and why R2P was agreed in the form it was in 2005. Such claims are out-of-
kilter with what states were willing to accept then or now, and fail to consider the additional 
effects of the structured outcome on propelling R2P into the Summit Outcome. Indeed, 
these effects merely exacerbate the concerns expressed here when considered in relation to 
the detailed explanation of the agreements formulation because they emphasize just how 
normatively shallow, as well as operationally contingent, it was. But considering these 
criticisms and observations – and those evident throughout the thesis – it is necessary to 
situate the research question (of how we can explain the high-level political agreement of 
2005) within the broad scope of R2P literature. Here the simple explanation is that while the 
thesis clearly covers critical and analytical terrain embraced (in different ways) by the likes 
of Aidan Hehir, Jennifer Welsh, David Chandler, Alex Bellamy, James Pattison, David Rieff 
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and others, it is distinct in what it sets out to do.50 Indeed, scholars like Hehir and Welsh 
themselves make explicitly similar arguments to those presented here; most notably Hehir’s 
assessment that the 2005 agreement was effectively an appeal to and affirmation of the 
status quo is clearly concordant with the explanation proffered in Chapter 5.51 Similarly, 
David Chandler’s strident critique around the politicisation of human rights finds some 
sympathy – albeit from a different perspective – in Chapter 452. The distinction is that the 
emphasis here is directed at understanding the processes leading to the 2005 agreement in 
order to provide a stronger basis for making claims about the potential significance, status 
and impact of R2P. In other words, while the empirical chapters incorporate analysis and 
critique evident in the works of the abovementioned scholars, it does so in relation to the 
specific processes leading to the 2005 agreement.  
 
To further situate this approach some additional comparison with key R2P thinking is 
necessary. For instance, while Aidan Hehir’s impressive study considers the evolution of R2P 
his approach is concerned much more by what he calls the ‘theory and practice’ of R2P and, 
in so doing, with outlining some significant institutional reforms consistent with a defence of 
humanitarian intervention and international law (rather than necessarily R2P). Although 
there is much to be admired with this approach, and especially his damning critique of the 
presentation and substance of R2P, this research is much more time specific and more 
tentative in its consideration of alternative proposals. David Chandler’s contributions to the 
debate, meanwhile, are much more overtly driven by critique, from emphasizing, on the one 
hand, the potential relationship between R2P and the negative implications associated with 
human rights politicisation to the equally problematic (and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) issue of the extent to which R2P can enable the avoidance of international 
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action53. Indeed, similar arguments have a prominent place in later empirical chapters, 
speaking as they do to key stages in the negotiation and development of R2P. The very 
formulation was loaded so heavily in favour of primary state responsibility that rather than 
clarifying the problems associated with international action actually served to complicate 
the political processes which would define possible responses. Finally, to take perhaps the 
leading account of the development of R2P, Alex Bellamy’s Responsibility to Protect is 
undeniably well-crafted but is both different and problematic by comparison to the 
approach and findings on display here. The first distinction is that Bellamy’s starting-point 
leads him into an analysis of an R2P agenda and related ways to refine it. This starting-point 
is predicated on the belief that ‘more needs to be done to protect civilians from genocide 
and mass atrocities’. Although clearly unproblematic as a belief, the contrast with the 
approach here is significant because of the way it filters into his subsequent analysis. 
Crucially, Bellamy describes R2P as ‘the single most important recent development’ in the 
effort to ‘prevent and stem the tide of genocide and mass atrocities’.54 Putting aside the 
advocacy tendencies which increasingly define his output on R2P, the significant point is 
that the findings of this thesis call such a statement into question. If anything, the 
significance of the development of R2P is that despite so much bluster and positive rhetoric 
the agreement has changed very little in how the international community responds to 
intrastate conflicts and crises. Thus, by its very nature Bellamy’s book is very different. 
However, more problematically a central feature of the work is Bellamy’s own telling of the 
story of R2P’s emergence. Though sophisticated and influential (for instance the Journal of 
Intervention and Statebuilding described it as ‘the resource for a detailed account of how 
R2P came to be’55) the detailed empirical tracing offered here questions aspects of 
Bellamy’s account and introduces additional insights which provide the basis for the 
significant doubts about R2P expressed in this introduction. The simple point is that the 
detailed processes matter to a much greater extent than evident in any of the leading 
accounts of R2P. Understanding much more fully how and why R2P was agreed in the 
context of its international negotiation is a vital part of ensuring the claims we make about 
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international norms and agreements rest on more solid analytical foundations. The detail 
matters in this case because it guards against the rendering of R2P according to theoretical 
models ill-equipped to explain the central research question and because it directly 
challenges those overly optimistic appraisals of its status and development. Indeed, the 
empirical findings – allied to the recent failures of the international community in 
responding to internal crises – illuminates why the need for an enhanced critical edge to the 
R2P debate has perhaps never been more important. They represent a powerful 
counterpoise to the trajectory and momentum of mainstream R2P discourse. Moreover, 
although they are time-specific in focusing on the path to 2005, the insights they yield are 
powerfully relevant to the present day. They not only provide the basis to engage with the 
panoply of ethnical, moral and political debates associated with the concept, but they allow 
one to fully explain and pinpoint the limitations in the agreement, the lack of normative 
momentum, the on-going persistent political obstacles and resistance, the tensions which 
define the debate around international responses, and ultimately the lack of 
transformational change despite the 2005 agreement.  
 
Thus, the persistent continuity in how the international community attempts (or not) to 
address the issue of intra-state humanitarian crises should not be met with any surprise. But 
to return to the driving focus of this research, the arguments and insights presented in this 
introduction derive from the emphasis on understanding the processes underpinning R2P’s 
development. Central to the thesis in this regard is a process-driven approach which derives 
in significant part from a constructivist view of understanding R2P as a potential norm of 
international behaviour. The underlying research logic is that in order to understand 
compliance with, and to hypothesize about, the potential impact of international norms and 
agreements, we need to understand the detailed processes of social construction by which 
they emerge. Although research in this area is advancing, compliance and constructivist 
norm research has often been preoccupied with demonstrating that norms and agreements 
actually impact upon state behaviour. This often manifests itself in the form of norm 
exogenization whereby behavioural changes are traced back to the norm in order to 
convince us of their behavioural effects. This is a problem inherent to the study of R2P 
considering the tendency of advocates to assume its collective meaning. I go on to show 
that this tendency is reinforced by the way that constructivist norm tracing models macro 
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rather than micro processes. The implications of exogenization are profound, as it requires 
us to assume, among other things, that states understand the meaning and applicability of 
norms in the same way and results in the diminishment of emphasis on the processes by 
which they emerged as a source of valid information for analysis. This is evident in aspects 
of the current debates and efforts increasingly motivated by ‘operationalization’. However, 
resulting insights have tended to advance from the starting point of an assumed 
understanding of the R2P agreement rather than one which adequately incorporates the 
negotiation of R2P as part of understanding potential compliance with it. Such 
understanding is therefore an interpretative one which has the potential to be defined 
excessively according to one’s own personal, political and ideational imperatives. Thus, we 
should heed Edward Luck’s warning that it is important that people do not conflate a 
version of R2P they wish to see with what it actually is.56  
 
As well as drawing upon constructivist thinking the logic and approach adopted here is also 
inspired by Robert Friedheim’s hugely impressive Negotiating the New Ocean Regime and 
by Dyson and Featherstone’s seminal The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union.57 Although both are in key ways very different to what is presented here 
there are some important similarities. Friedheim’s ‘underlying premise...that the meaning of 
UNCLOS III cannot be truly understood without linking process...to substance – that the law 
of the sea negotiations have to be viewed in their totality to understand how the 
international community has addressed and will be likely to deal with ocean law and policy 
problems’58 is clearly concordant with the emphasis on process and compliance here. The 
extent to which R2P can be said to contribute to addressing the problems associated with 
humanitarian intervention and help protect civilians, and its potential impact on future 
behaviour and policy choices, depends in large part on accounting for the processes leading 
to the agreement. Of course, such an approach cannot be detached from an awareness of 
the post-agreement phase and subsequent debates. Indeed, this phase is central to 
legitimating some of the claims regarding the 2005 agreement, and for identifying the more 
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‘solid’ elements of it.59 In the case of Dyson and Featherstone, a key lesson they identify, as 
Amy Verdun explains, is that ‘…agency matters. It matters who the person was holding the 
position: personalities matter, social relationships (connections and networks of individuals) 
are crucial, and the personal experiences of key players are certainly not negligible’.60  
 
This is borne out by the story of R2P. For instance, the importance of Lloyd Axworthy’s 
personality and approach as Canadian Foreign Minister was strongly evident in the 
processes leading to the establishment of the Commission which proposed the R2P idea61. 
Likewise individuals such as Kofi Annan, Tony Blair, Gareth Evans, George Bush, Allan Rock 
and many others repeatedly demonstrate the central importance of individuals in shaping 
and responding to events, defining problems and for realising outcomes – for good or bad. 
Inevitably this thesis has also been influenced, to varying degrees, by the ever-expanding 
volume of R2P-specific academic work, in addition to a vast associated literature.62 This 
thesis makes its contribution to this literature both in its specific argument relating to the 
development of R2P in the World Summit outcome document and in its development of a 
constructivist approach to micro-process tracing. In the next chapter we turn immediately 
to the questions of theory and method that frame my arguments about the meaning and 
significance of R2P. My central claim is that a focus on the social construction of 
international norms requires detailed empirical analysis of the way norms are negotiated 
and agreements structured. This claim is intended to complement rather than challenge 
existing constructivist theory, but nevertheless has significant implications for an 
understanding of R2P. 
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Chapter 1: Theory and Methods 
 
For constructivists, understanding how things are put together and how they occur is 
not mere description. Understanding the constitution of things is essential in 
explaining how they behave and what causes political outcomes…an understanding 
of how sovereignty, human rights, laws of war…are constituted socially allows us to 
hypothesize about their effects in world politics.63 
 
This project’s origins flow from a simple, but pivotal question. How can we explain the high-
level political agreement of R2P in 2005? For such a seemingly obvious starting-point, this 
question has yielded insufficient attention or explanation within the mainstream context of 
R2P debate and literature. In isolation, the empirical findings of this thesis directly challenge 
the optimistic, oft-advocacy infused, portrayal of R2P’s development evident in the more 
widely-cited accounts. Indeed, for those driven by a desire to understand the politics of R2P 
Chapters 3-5 provide ample stand-alone revelation and analysis. But though the empirical 
findings provide the indispensable lifeblood to the story of R2P that is the essential focus of 
this research, the beating heart and catalytic creator of the overall R2P-related arguments 
derives from a constructivist-inspired, process-driven hypothesis crafted to address the 
overarching first-order question. From this perspective, the research design is more than a 
means to an end. Why? Because inherent to the process-driven logic is a set of claims about 
the nature of norm formation, and the causal patterns of policy formation, which go beyond 
the story of R2P alone. The empirical information not only exposes those weaknesses in 
how R2P is characterised and defined, but also challenges how the ontological assumptions 
of constructivism –the dominant theory of normative development – are applied in practice.  
 
An early priority was to develop an appropriate conceptual framework. From the outset, 
this was defined by a distinct appreciation of process and a bold proposition about how we 
should understand potential compliance with international norms/agreements.64 At its 
heart is a process-driven hypothesis constituted by an acceptance of the core ontology of 
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constructivism and complemented by a highly-intensive methodological agenda based upon 
‘process-tracing’, elite-level interviewing and extensive documentary analysis. This 
combination of theory and methods required enormous commitment. Not only did it yield 
reams of usable information – which thus required difficult choices about what could 
realistically be included within the constraints of a PhD – but the more the research 
unfolded more pressing was the need to develop alternative analytical explanations and 
concepts relating to R2P’s development and to consider how the explanatory power of 
these impacted upon the research framework and the future development/application of it. 
Although not without weakness, the empirical findings strengthened the research logic and 
its significance and evolved the potential to extrapolate it to alternative normative and 
multilateral contexts – a point particularly relevant in relation to the criticisms of 
constructivism below.  
 
Indeed, a crucial factor behind these knowledge-based theoretical and methodological 
developments is that the acceptance of constructivism as an approach to the study of IR was 
applied in such a way to allow this natural evolution to take place. The research framework 
was designed to test the hypothesis that a more detailed understanding of process yields 
better information about the likelihood of prospective compliance with R2P, or rather its 
influence upon policy decisions and decision-making. Crucially, this approach was never 
about tracing or portraying the development of R2P through the prism of a preconceived, 
pre-determined model of normative development. Such an approach would have been 
wholly mistaken, and, based upon the empirical findings presented in subsequent chapters, 
would have required considerable effort to mould what are undeniably complex multi-
dimensional dynamics into essentially abstract, artificial frames of the kind which have 
gained considerable traction in the study of international norms. This is not to say, however, 
that the development of theoretical models and frameworks is unnecessary, or that 
constructivist insights are not highly relevant to our understanding of R2P and normative 
developments more broadly. In fact, mechanisms of social construction identified by 
constructivists are prevalent in the story of R2P. But because of weaknesses in pre-existing 
models – most notably the “norm life cycle” (NLC) (see below) – it is essential constructivists 
refine how they conceptually package the mechanisms and insights they have already 
identified.  
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Significantly, while the explanatory power of this thesis derives primarily from what it says 
about the development of R2P – not least in how it challenges the accounts of Bellamy and 
Evans and the tendency to characterise R2P with excessive optimism, it is also underpinned 
by a secondary premise which suggests that the process-driven approach generates 
analytical insights potentially more useful than orthodox forms of constructivist analysis. 
And though these two premises are distinct in terms of the core focus of the research they 
nevertheless both necessitate attention because they are united by, and emerge from, the 
same central hypothesis and were extracted from the empirical tracing evident in Chapters 
3-5. To unpack these interlinked premises more directly, the detailed findings expose 
weaknesses in the theoretical models and insights developed by constructivists. In 
particular, the NLC projects a more positive, progressive, linear, unidirectional trajectory 
onto normative development than is borne out by the empirical testing of the research 
hypothesis in respect of R2P. This recognition led to the development of a more detailed 
(albeit case-specific) process-driven account of normative development than would have 
been possible had it been based up a priori assumptions relating to ‘norm emergence’, 
‘cascade’, ‘internalization’ and ‘institutionalization’.65 These concepts certainly have 
relevance to how we understand the development of international norms, and, in the case 
of the latter, is relevant to the story of R2P. Nevertheless, they oversimplify the complexity 
of international-level normative development and its resulting impact upon state behaviour 
and choices. As later chapters show, the analytical insight offered by these concepts is 
inherently limited.  
 
Thus, in response to the inability of the NLC to render the complex dynamics evident in the 
case of R2P, the latter part of this chapter outlines a considerably less rigid conceptual 
framework designed to facilitate the reader’s understanding of its development. The 
significance of this framework is that it was developed in response to the awareness that 
the original intention of deploying the NLC as the theoretical framework was an 
unsatisfactory way of explaining the development of R2P. Specific criticisms of the NLC are 
weaved throughout this chapter, but suffice to say its continued use would have provided a 
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distorted picture of how R2P was agreed and what the process reveals about its status and 
significance. To borrow a phrase, rendering the complex multi-dimensional and multi-actor 
processes according to such a model would have risked ‘forcing reality into a straitjacket’.66 
That said, it is important to recognise that this does not mean the NLC should be completely 
disregarded. The conceptual framework below draws upon the explanatory power of some 
of the motives, mechanisms and dynamics of social construction clearly evident in the NLC. 
The crucial distinction, however, is that this alternative framework is not defined or 
packaged in any modelled or patterned way. It is more of a guide to help the reader make 
sense of aspects of the empirical narrative that follows. In this respect, the conviction that it 
would be a mistake to attempt to render the development of R2P according to the NLC also 
raises a more difficult set of questions about the extent to which it is possible to provide 
convincing theoretical models of normative change. Theoretical insights and concepts 
designed to aid our understanding of a specific case are one thing, but packaging them in a 
model designed to explain international norm change more generally is quite another. The 
danger is that the pursuit of the latter would privilege parsimony over complexity, generality 
over specificity. Thus, by contrast to the former approach, the bias of this research is 
directed at specificity through its detailed account of the processes leading to the 2005 
agreement. As the introduction made clear, it is contended that a more detailed 
understanding of process has generalizable power as does – albeit in a considerably more 
qualified way – the concept of the structured outcome. But beyond this, the extent to which 
one could, or would want to model such complex processes, is left very much in doubt. 
Indeed, the introduction of the structured outcome was driven by the need to craft an 
alternative less formulaic, less linear and a less inevitably progressive framework to 
understand the development of R2P, and which, in so doing, was able to address the 
overarching research question in a way the NLC could not. The critical element in all of this 
was the question of what underpinned the rapid, unexpected transition from a lack of 
political traction in the period 2001-2004 to high-level political agreement in 2005. With the 
empirical chapters arguing that there was underlying continuity of state positions following 
on from the post-Cold War humanitarian intervention debate, it was clear the answer could 
not rely upon explanations centred on normative momentum, socialization or acculturation. 
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Such mechanisms are necessarily part of the constructivist tool box but are wholly 
insufficient in this case. Likewise, the concept of institutionalization – though clearly evident 
and important – is relevant only insofar as it is embedded in the explanation of how it was 
realised. Singularly it would provide a false picture of the status of R2P. The utility of 
institutionalization derives from understanding what it was that propelled R2P towards this 
wholly unexpected point. This is where the structured outcome concept enters the fray, 
packaging the structural factors which were so crucial to the eventual outcome. 
 
Indeed, the introduction of the structured outcome to account for how R2P rapidly and 
unexpectedly transitioned from an idea with minimal political traction to high-level 
international agreement, strongly suggests that understanding international norm 
development depends upon a detailed understanding of process. An awareness of this is 
necessary to ensure constructivism meets its own goals and thus requires the use of 
appropriate methodological tools. In this regard, the structured outcome was one of a series 
of revelatory insights about the development of R2P which leads to the argument that R2P 
has neither had the effect that many suggest, nor does it appear to have the kind of identity 
or behavioural-changing transformational potential often ascribed to it. The basis for these 
propositions are revealed in later chapters which show inter alia how unchanged political 
responses to R2P were post-ICISS, how the post-9/11 context shaped its prospects, how the 
core planks of R2P were defined in accordance with framing strategies designed to project it 
as ‘nothing new’, and how continued post-2005 contestation around the meaning, 
significance and status of R2P should have been expected considering the nature of the 
agreement and the evident ‘pull’ of alternative and complementary norms of sovereignty 
and non-intervention. All of these insights are significant to our understanding of R2P, and 
were drawn from the process-driven hypothesis and the application of process-tracing. This 
method has the potential to go beyond the singular unique case of R2P. On the one hand it 
provides a lesson about the importance of process for understanding norm development 
and prospective compliance with general applicability, but on the other may offer an 
additional force as a theoretical construct relevant to understanding normative 
developments and agreements at the international level. The force of the structured 
outcome may be unique to this case, but it is also possible that it may represent an 
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identifiable feature of other multilateral and omnilateral67 international negotiations. It may 
offer particular utility for understanding normative development specifically in relation to 
the structuring effect of negotiation contexts. 
 
The structured outcome argument has the potential to capture – and conceptually package 
– the core characteristics of negotiation processes in order to determine their effect on the 
propulsion and form of international agreements, and within that, the effect upon those 
agents negotiating. In the specific case of R2P, the structured outcome captures a vital link 
in the transmission of R2P towards the Summit agreement and demonstrates how the 
factors constituting it shaped how the negotiations unfolded. The implication is that this 
insight may have broader explanatory power as a tool/paradigm for understanding norm 
development at the international level where it is more vulnerable to effects like the 
structured outcome. This power maybe especially strong in the case of controversial norms 
including those with acute moral, ethical and justice implications, and those at an earlier 
point in their development (than would be implied by the NLC for instance). This was 
especially true in the case of R2P where, although a series of mechanisms of social 
construction were evident (thus representing some important conceptual elements of our 
understanding, see below), the dynamics underpinning its development were less 
straightforward than models like the NLC would imply. Specifically, its development was not 
progressive in terms of an entrepreneurial phase, institutionalization and normative cascade 
which might lead to internalisation and implementation processes but rather was 
underpinned by considerably more complex dynamics. Entrepreneurialism and 
institutionalization were evident, but the dynamics which helped propel it towards the 
latter were not about a progressive gathering of momentum as the acceptability of R2P as a 
norm of international behaviour gained traction. Its path into the negotiations was more 
dependent upon a distinct set of structuring factors in order to help overcome a lack of 
political traction and momentum. Resultantly, once the negotiations began the prospects 
for R2P’s inclusion were inevitably influenced by these factors as was its ultimate definition.  
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Ch5, in particular, exposes how the structured outcome manifested itself and why it matters 
for understanding the status and potential impact of R2P. It demonstrates that our 
understanding of normative development and its impact upon international affairs requires 
a detailed understanding of process. As explained previously, in testing the core hypothesis 
that a detailed understanding of the process yields better information about the likelihood 
of compliance, the detailed findings – particularly in relation to the multilateral negotiations 
of 2005 – exposed issues with the characterisation of R2P’s development and status as well 
as weaknesses in constructivist accounts of norm development. These findings provided a 
feedback-loop which led to the formulation of the idea that the approach adopted here 
should influence how constructivists seek to understand norm construction and evolution. 
Prior to outlining my research methods (the process-tracing approach and the associated 
interviewing and documentary methods) it is necessary to first consider some of the 
challenges that are found in existing in R2P research and in constructivism more generally. 
 
The research hypothesis was fundamentally driven by the question which opened this 
chapter. It was a concern for understanding the development of R2P in order to consider its 
status and potential impact in international affairs. But although defined in terms of 
constructivism, the hypothesis and associated methodology was also shaped by an 
awareness of documented criticisms of constructivism and – as the research unfolded – by 
an increasing concern at the portrayal of R2P in mainstream debate. The combination of 
these factors strengthened the commitment to detail and reinforced the importance of 
tracing the micro-processes of R2P’s development. Unsurprisingly, aspects of the criticisms 
reside on the same terrain. In particular, the problems of norm exogenization and of 
linearity in the portrayal of normative development are issues of general concern but have 
more specific relevance to the case of R2P. In other words both have distinct theoretical and 
empirical relevance for understanding the approach adopted here.  
 
Taking these in turn, the concern with norm exogenization stems from the criticism that 
some constructivist research falls into a trap whereby norms are taken as ‘given’ in order to 
demonstrate their effects.68 This places norms outside the social processes that necessarily 
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constitute them; in particular it obscures the on-going relationship between normative 
meaning and agency. This fed directly into the explicit process-oriented approach. Rather 
than framing the research in terms of determining the impact of R2P as the primary outset 
goal, this approach was about the ‘social construction of meanings and significance from the 
ground up’.69 A vital constitutive element of this approach was the contention that the 
construction and negotiation processes which underpin international agreements and 
normative developments can and should be seen as an ‘integral aspect of the compliance 
process’.70 However work intensive, this more positive constructivist approach was 
influenced by the seed of an idea expressed by Beth Simmons in her influential 1998 article 
‘Compliance with International Agreements’. This related to a research agenda based upon 
the incorporation of the ‘discursive elements’ of negotiation into a ‘fuller story of the 
compliance process’: 
 
Governments persuade and become convinced of the value or appropriateness of 
particular standards of behavior over the months, years, and even decades they 
spend in their formulation. This research agenda might even call for an examination 
of the discourse used by participants as such negotiations unfold; attitudes towards 
compliance are shaped by and reflected in this discourse. This strategy uses the 
negotiation process as data on attitudes towards compliance, rather than viewing it 
as a source of bias in decision-making.71 
 
The extensive explanation of R2P’s path through the Summit negotiations in Ch5 
demonstrates the practical influence of this idea upon the overall research hypothesis and 
associated methods. Moreover, although this thesis is delineated by time parameters in 
tracing R2P up to 2005, the findings not only provide a better understanding of the 
underlying normative and political foundations of R2P but also lay the foundation for further 
complementary empirical and theoretical research. Beneficially, by emphasizing process the 
research approach helps mitigate the associated issues with the abovementioned 
exogenization problem. For instance, the approach helps ensure the processes by which 
norms emerge and change are not omitted or defined by diminished prominence in order to 
prioritize impact, guards against the assumption that norms are clearly, commonly 
                                                          
69
 John Ruggie (1998) ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge’, International Organization, Vol. 52, No.4, p885 
70
 Simmons (1998) ‘Compliance with International Agreements’, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol.1, p90 
71
 Simmons (1998) ‘Compliance with International Agreements’, p90-1 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
36 
 
understood by actors,72 and remains cognizant of the possibility that other behavioural 
logics are at play rather than ‘spuriously crediting international norms with 
consequences…that are better explained by other types of factors’73. Indeed, equally 
relevant is the need to explain violations of international norms as well as compliance with 
them. As Vaughn Shannon points out in constructivist research ‘the power of norms can 
seem sweeping’ with scholars, in a desire to demonstrate the importance of international 
structures and institutions, tending to homogenize the effects of international norms thus 
leaving variations unexplained and under-theorized.74  
 
The detailed process tracing approach helps to guard against such issues/pitfalls and 
crucially ensures the meaning and status of R2P is not taken for granted. The problem of 
norm exogenization is, however, more than a theoretical weakness relating to the 
application of constructivism alone. It also has utility as a concept for explaining the 
tendency (generally amongst advocates) to overstate what the 2005 agreement 
represented and the extent to which it altered the underlying politics of the intervention 
debate, and to gloss over the detailed processes underpinning its development – a factor 
which inevitably alters our understanding of its status as an international norm. Here the 
problem is bound-up with a propensity to view normative development in linear terms, with 
an insufficient appreciation of the processes leading to the outcome, and advocacy-infused 
biases which bestow an assumed meaning and teleological progressivity upon R2P. This 
latter point is particularly problematic in this case because of the possible implications of 
coercive forms of international action taken for the purposes of protecting people within 
the borders of an individual State.75 There is no guarantee that seemingly well-intentioned 
norms might precipitate positive outcomes either in terms of a specific crisis-situation or 
more broadly in terms of the development of international society. However, more directly 
                                                          
72
 Vaughan Shannon similarly argues that ‘it is taken as unproblematic that “shared expectations” are literally 
clear, common understandings of what the prescriptions and parameters of norms are’ in (2000) ‘Norms Are 
What States Make of Them: The Political Psychology of Norm Violation’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
44, No. 2, p298 
73
 Jeffrey Legro (1997) ‘Which norms matter? Revisiting the “failure” of Institutionalism’, International 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1, p34, see also Shannon (2000) ‘Norms Are What States Make of Them’,  p297 
74
 Shannon (2000) ‘Norms Are What States Make of Them’, p298, Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) ‘Taking Stock: 
The Constructivist Research Program’, p397 
75
 These apply not purely to the internal situation but to the impact of action on the structures of international 
relations more broadly 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
37 
 
significant is the combination of two biases: a theoretical bias which has tended to couch 
normative development in linear terms,76 and an advocacy bias which not only overstates 
the development and significance of R2P but which leads to the diminution and attempted 
discrediting of continued contestation or opposition. Superficially, this is often characterised 
as a product, for instance, of misunderstanding, misguided invocations, or intransigence and 
hostility by so-called ‘spoilers’.77 The theoretical dimension of linearity is most explicitly 
evident in the brief outline description of the NLC below. But it is also evident, albeit 
implicitly, in overly progressive portrayals of R2P. Three examples of such depictions by 
Gareth Evans, Ramesh Thakur and Thomas Weiss and Anne Marie-Slaughter – all prominent 
scholars of international relations – are especially revealing: 
 
Within just four years of the first articulation of the concept—a mere blink of an eye 
in the history of ideas—consensus seemed to have been reached on how to resolve 
one of the most difficult and divisive international relations issues of our, or any 
other, time.78  
 
[R2P is] Possibly the most dramatic normative development of our time – 
comparable to the Nuremberg trials and the 1948 Convention on Genocide in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II.79 
 
In 2006 the Security Council passed a resolution, which was also endorsed by 
the…General Assembly, accepting that all governments have a responsibility to 
protect their populations…and that if they fail in that responsibility the international 
community has the right to intervene. This was an enormous normative step 
forward, akin to an international Magna Carta, even if it will take decades to 
elaborate and implement.80 
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A simple reading of these three positions reveals telling commonalities. They share a 
proclivity for grand claims about the nature and significance of the R2P agreement. And, in 
the case of the latter two, are unafraid to invoke momentous events/documents 
(Nuremberg and the Magna Carta) as historical comparators. Certainly, as the introduction 
acknowledged, there is a distinct momentum around the R2P phrase which is significant. 
But this is arguably more significant because a central feature of it is that it is despite 
continuing contestation, debate and confusion around the meaning, significance and impact 
of R2P. In such circumstances, and more importantly based on the empirical findings here, 
all three are gross overstatements which belie the multi-layered and multi-dimensional 
complexity of the detailed processes necessary to understand the collective meaning and 
potential behavioural impact of R2P. Framing the argument in this way is important because 
the tendency to portray normative development in linear terms, as the three above do in 
differing ways, bestows upon R2P a superficial gloss uncomfortably detached from the 
detailed processes leading to the agreement exposed in later chapters. Without the 
appreciation of detail so central to the approach adopted here it is far easier to present the 
2005 agreement, and subsequent institutional developments, as evidence of progression 
towards broad member state acceptance. Moreover, because R2P was articulated in the ‘05 
agreement its status as an international norm – essentially because it exists – is too often 
taken for granted. Advocacy preferences, and a general lack of appreciation for the 
negotiating dynamics, have led to numerous assumptions about what that agreement 
meant in terms of the long-standing intervention debate and what it means for the future of 
international relations. Some of these assumptions are evident in the three quotes above, 
from Evans’ claims about ‘consensus’ and resolution, to Slaughter’s obvious 
misunderstanding about the nature of the international role in R2P and the more generally 
implicit assumption that the place of R2P in international society is effectively assured. This 
leads to the abovementioned description of ‘spoilers’ portrayed as blocking the apparently 
inevitable path and implementation of R2P.  
 
However, as later chapters demonstrate these kinds of claims appear considerably less 
viable under the heat of critical analysis. Indeed, by contrast to these and the overly 
simplistic and all too convenient linear accounts of normative development it is the detailed 
understanding of process which reveals just how multi-layered and multi-dimensional the 
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path to 2005 really was. Crucially, the findings demonstrate the sheer unsustainability of 
separating the existence of the norm of R2P from the processes leading to its construction 
or, moreover, to linearize their character. However obvious this point may appear, it is 
arguably one of the most pressing issues facing the presentation of R2P today. As Chapters 
3-5 show, considering the evident contestation leading to the limited negotiated agreement 
of R2P and the impact of the structured outcome on its propulsion, there is insufficient basis 
to assume the place or impact of R2P is assured. The scope for normative regress – 
especially in such a highly controversial area of international politics – remains a very real, 
yet underappreciated dynamic.  
 
Indeed, by unpacking the (proposed post-2001) constitutive elements of R2P, regress is 
certainly evident in relation to its surrounding expectations and normative scope. This was 
shaped by a changing political context, but also by continuities in state reactions to the idea 
of defining an international norm/doctrine to enable action to protect civilians within the 
borders of an individual state. Nowhere was this more apparent than in how the nature of 
international responsibility was eventually defined. A curious paradox of the negotiations 
was that the meaning of R2P was more tightly crafted than one might expect. The relative 
contentiousness of R2P was certainly diminished in context of the broader negotiation 
package but even then a central factor behind its inclusion was that its definition was tightly 
crafted to ensure multitudinous policy-lines brought out during the multilateral negotiations 
were broadly upheld and not crossed. Accordingly, the political statement of R2P was 
delineated to capture essentially what already existed in Charter provisions and processes. 
The agreement was specifically not intended to transform how the international community 
dealt with internal crises and as such was repeatedly framed as representing nothing new. 
Such points may seem pre-emptory but in actuality they demonstrate the importance of 
understanding detailed micro-level processes not least because they highlight the tendency 
to overstate R2P’s development and its potential significance. The combination of the more 
nuanced understanding of R2P’s meaning in Ch5 and the structured outcome argument 
introduced from Ch4 onwards raises questions about the nature, meaning and significance 
of the R2P agreement. More specifically, the detailed process provides vital insight relating 
to attitudes towards R2P, including how and why it was negotiated in the form it was and 
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thus what impact it might have on how the international community attempts to deal with 
gross violations of human rights.  
 
Alternative normative positions, preferences and practical concerns evident in the positions 
of states fed into the R2P’s formulation. These meant it was more likely that future decision-
making would remain subject to the same issues, same politics and same dilemmas that had 
long defined the intervention debate. Indeed, even though the statement of individual state 
responsibility provided a potentially useful go-to political statement for framing domestic 
and international accountability, the way the process impacted upon the path of R2P meant 
subsequent post-agreement contestation (which should always be expected) would likely be 
exacerbated in this case once the structuring factors which helped propel it towards 
agreement were no longer in play.81  
 
Self-evidently these arguments suggest the positive gloss bestowed upon the status of R2P 
fails to capture a considerably more complex picture. But returning more directly to the 
theoretical significance of these arguments what should be clear is that the linear 
tendencies of pre-existing models of normative change have little utility in this case. The 
progression of R2P into 2005 was considerably more staggered and distinct. Indeed, the 
case of R2P required the introduction of a distinct explanatory construct (the structured 
outcome) in order to more satisfactorily answer questions that the NLC could not. This is 
where the process-driven hypothesis meets with methodology. In order to avoid making 
assumed or sweeping statements about R2P, to avoid modelling R2P according to a pre-
determined or pre-conceived notion of what its specific development looked like, and 
ultimately to provide a more advanced account of the processes in this case, a variant of 
‘process-tracing’ was aligned with elite-level interviewing and extensive documentary 
analysis. As stated above, detailed process-tracing helps alleviate the identified weakness in 
constructivist norm research, and in presentation of R2P. It enables us to better understand 
the development of international norms and the associated modalities of political 
negotiation. Here the application of this approach yields empirical findings which reinforces 
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the importance of detail and rigour which flows from the initial research starting point. The 
main issue in this regard is the approach adopted here focuses on the micro-processes of 
social construction rather than a (generally) broader historical approach to normative shifts 
over longer periods of time. The results yielded from this approach clearly contrast with 
aspects of Bellamy’s leading account of the emergence and adoption of R2P. Although his 
starting-point was very different82 later chapters reveal weaknesses with his portrayal that 
in large respect relate to weaknesses in his adopted approach. Certainly this thesis does not 
claim to be the exhaustive account of R2P’s path to 2005 – undoubtedly there are many 
new findings to unearth, and perspectives to consider. That said, because of its commitment 
to detail, and because it is not driven by advocacy or any desire to map out a policy agenda 
to ensure implementation by policy-makers, the account is theoretically, methodologically 
and empirically powerful in what it says about how we should understand the agreement of 
R2P. In essence, this thesis rests on the extent of the detail extracted by the applied 
methodology.  
 
Before briefly outlining some relevant points relating to the combination of deployed 
methods it is worth returning to the issue and place of the NLC in the context of the 
adopted research approach. As already stated, the NLC was the original starting-point to try 
and address the overarching research question. However, as the research process unfolded, 
its limitations as a theoretical model quickly became apparent. The empirical tracing of 
R2P’s development required an altogether different explanation to the causal story of norm 
change implied by the NLC. Its fundamental limitations mean it can be no substitute for the 
form of process-tracing utilised here. Indeed, an important by-product of the thesis findings 
is that the alternative explanation in the case of R2P – particularly in relation to the 
structured outcome – exposes the NLC’s fragilities as a generalizable model. This in turn 
raises questions about how constructivists develop appropriate tools and conceptual 
frameworks which match-up to the core social ontology which unite all. But prior to setting 
out the alternative looser and unmodelled conceptual framework, it is necessary to provide 
a sense of why the NLC has been so influential but why it is so problematic. Arguably the 
two are closely related. Undoubtedly the NLC is a model which has its own significant power 
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– it is the classic account of normative change. The NLC has a usability and utility which 
partly explains its influence on scholars since its introduction by Finnemore and Sikkink in 
1998. It neatly and effectively packages key mechanisms and dynamics identified by 
constructivists in the social construction of international norms and which are admittedly 
also evident in the construction of R2P. It emphasizes, among other things, agency and 
entrepreneurship, discursive practices, framing, agenda-setting, socialization, and 
organizational platforms. Such conceptual elements are, to varying degrees, relevant and 
necessary to how we make sense of the process-oriented analytical narrative that follows in 
later chapters.83 Moreover, as Helen Yanacopulos suggests, the life cycle can be ‘a useful 
tool in explaining how attention to an issue can gain momentum and become important 
to…policy makers, organizations and the general public’.84 However, the NLC’s greatest 
virtue of neatly packaging a multitude of differing processes, logics, dynamics and 
mechanisms identified by constructivists into a patterned model, is ultimately its greatest 
weakness.  
 
 
 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s central argument is that ‘norms evolve in a patterned “life cycle” 
and that different behavioural logics dominate different segments of the life cycle’.85 
Accordingly, norm development can be understood as a three-stage process of 1) norm 
emergence 2) norm cascade and 3) internalization (Figure 1.1) with each of the three stages 
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characterised by distinct actors, motives and dominant mechanisms (Table 1.1). More 
directly they argue: 
 
The pattern is important…because different social processes and logics of action may 
be involved at different stages in a norm’s “life cycle”. Thus, theoretical debates 
about the degree to which norm-based behaviour[sic] is driven by choice or habit, 
specification issues about the costs of non-violation or benefits from norm 
adherence, and related issues often turn out to hinge on the stage of the norms 
evolution one examines.86   
 
 
 
However, while the NLC has real virtues and is based upon serious scholarship which has 
undoubtedly contributed to advancement of knowledge in the study of international norms, 
it suffers from some critical weaknesses. These relate particularly to its patterned model, its 
linearity, and direct inability to explain the obvious disconnect between stages 1 and 2 of 
the NLC if it were applied in the case of R2P. As the empirical work progressed it became 
clear that trying to describe the process in terms of the NLC led to a distortion of that 
process. In particular, it became clear that the institutionalized agreement of R2P – which 
would situate it on the path towards cascade – in fact lacked many of the characteristics 
that would be associated with much earlier stages of the NLC. A concern here was that the 
model itself led to overstating normative progress and it was the linearity of the model that 
was the root cause. Thus, if the NLC was adopted as the research framework it would only 
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serve to constrain the process-driven hypothesis which resides at the heart of the entire 
project.  
 
Put simply, the application of this hypothesis speaks to the aim of taking our understanding 
of R2P’s development much further and deeper than has previously been the case, or which 
the application of such pre-existing models of normative development would currently 
allow. The NLC offers an overly simplistic and a progressive linear characterisation which 
belies the true complexity of normative change. Indeed, the sequencing of R2P’s 
development was out-of-kilter by comparison and anything but linear. The path towards its 
institutionalization was wholly unexpected not merely because the idea provoked such 
longstanding divisions but precisely because its impact upon these divisions was so limited. 
Institutionalization was achieved despite the lack of underlying dynamics which the NLC 
would attribute to propelling R2P towards that point. There was no evident momentum or 
bandwagoning effect, no clearly identifiable tipping point and nor was there any 
significantly impactful domestic pressure pushing upwards into the international context for 
R2P’s political realisation. There were states supportive of the idea and willing to mobilize in 
accordance with that support, but the influence and activism of this small cluster was 
anything but catalytic. Indeed, even with the institutionalization of R2P, the concept of a 
‘tipping point’ lacks utility because it speaks more to the dynamics which precede that point 
but which were so lacking in this case. Even within the negotiating context it would difficult 
to describe the acceptance of R2P’s inclusion in the World Summit Outcome in such terms. 
This inclusion derived from the combination of the structural effects of the negotiating 
process and the way the language was formulated within that context. But the process 
towards the end-point was not about momentum if described, for instance, in terms of the 
momentum of supportive states exerting pressure on the ability and willingness of others to 
avoid following suit. Rather, the complex and curious factor in the story of R2P’s path to 
agreement was that its negotiation was far less problematic, far less contentious than 
anyone might have expected. As later empirical chapters show, the structuring of the 
process to a large degree mitigated the potential blocking or removal of R2P from the 
Summit negotiations (including by so-called 'critical' states). A central reason for this was 
that there were simply bigger issues in play which relegated R2P’s relative place in the list of 
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member state concerns. Greater prominence to R2P within the negotiations would have 
unleashed a considerably more pronounced and problematic backlash.  
 
Additionally, complicating the picture is that the institutionalization of R2P was less 
controversial because its negotiation was decidedly un-transformational in its constitution. 
R2P was framed, and crafted, as a statement of what already existed rather than anything 
new or novel. Indeed, post-05 obstacles, contestation, and divisions, are of no surprise 
considering this point. Institutionalization neither clarified nor answered the multitude of 
problems which provided the initial impetus for R2P’s development partly because states 
were unable or unwilling to do so in that context, partly because the characteristics of the 
central problems are less amenable to normative solution than oft-implied, and partly 
because of how the process arrived at the point of institutionalization. Crucially, the latter of 
these explanations relates directly to the status of the 2005 agreement. According to the 
NLC, because of its institutionalization R2P would be situated in Stage 2 with other dynamics 
kicking into effect towards its continued progression and influence. However, this thesis 
directly challenges the implication that institutionalization was such a pivotally significant 
step. In so doing, it questions the depth of the normative foundations which underpin the 
agreement, suggests the agreement is far less significant than oft-implied, and that post-05 
contestation was actually more likely because of how institutionalization was achieved. It is 
certainly true, and important to note, that not all norms are or have to be institutionalized 
or negotiated. But because R2P was subject to such processes, it is even more necessary to 
ensure our understanding sufficiently addresses the central research question of how and 
why this was achieved.  
 
Thus, with the NLC insufficient to address such questions, to help make sense of the 
complex empirical narrative in Chapters 3-5 an alternative conceptual framework is 
required. What follows is a looser and un-modelled framework designed to complement the 
process-tracing methodological approach described below. Resultantly, it represents a brief 
guide specifically aimed at understanding the processes of R2P’s developments rather than 
packaged for more general application. As such it is more about facilitating the transition 
into the analysis by drawing out the key concepts evident in the empirical, intensely political 
processes. It is also important to note that the framework is not exhaustive, is purposefully 
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selective in its definition and is not temporally defined according to any notion of ‘stages’ in 
the R2P process. There is inevitable cross-over with elements of the NLC but such elements 
reside differently in this context. Accordingly the ‘framework’ is defined by the following 
components: Entrepreneurship/Agency, Framing, Policy Windows and Agenda-Setting, 
Advocacy and ‘Critical States’ and Institutionalization and the concept of the Structured 
Outcome. 
 
Entrepreneurship/Agency: State-driven and individual entrepreneurship and agency was a 
constant factor in the story of R2P’s promotion and development. The identification of such 
entrepreneurship by constructivists across a multitude of cases is thus appropriate and 
important (fn examples). But rather than purely focusing on the efforts of entrepreneurs to 
build awareness and support for normative change around the idea of R2P, the efforts of 
alternative agents in explicitly or implicitly impacting upon the development of R2P in a less 
direct, or less positive sense, also revealed itself as a central factor in the political processes. 
In this regard, beyond the headline efforts of, inter alia, Kofi Annan, Lloyd Axworthy, Gareth 
Evans, Allan Rock, Paul Martin and the Canadian and EU governments in support of the idea, 
the counter-efforts of what can loosely be described as ‘non-supportive’ actors were also 
revealed. How this non-support manifested itself varied according to specific time and 
context-relevant factors. For instance, after the publication of the initial ICISS R2P report 
subsequent processes revealed numerous examples of political resistance, opposition and 
mere indifference to the idea. These elements were then most clearly exposed during the 
2005 negotiation process where – even with the effect of the structural factors on the 
negotiations – R2P’s leading state and individual advocates had to operate in a context 
defined by alternative ideas, preferences and interests much more specifically relevant to 
the potential outcome of R2P87. Indeed, this point also speaks to the efforts of alternative 
entrepreneurs to redefine policy options or acceptable behaviour in seemingly distinct 
policy areas but which invoke similar normative questions or which reside on shared 
underlying foundations. Such problems were inescapable with the pro-R2P entrepreneurial 
efforts complicated by the sheer interconnectedness of the normative web R2P related to. 
In this regard, the subsequent empirical analysis shows how the formulation of the post-
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9/11 Bush Doctrine involved political and normative framing derived from shared 
foundational terrain. The political implications of the policy decisions of the Bush 
administration had the effect of calling into question R2P’s appropriateness and relevance 
as a proposed solution to the issue of mass atrocity crimes. Thus, in order to understand the 
micro-processes of R2P’s development it was clearly necessary to ensure the emphasis on 
entrepreneurialism was not narrowly defined, but more broadly situated.  
 
An additional factor evident in the empirical analysis was the limited impact of the 
persuasive strategies employed by entrepreneurs and pro-R2P advocates more generally. 
Although the framing of R2P was highly significant within the context of the 2005 Summit 
negotiations, the traditional emphasis on persuasion as the principal method by which 
entrepreneurs attempt to achieve their aim of convincing states to ‘embrace new norms’88 
is not entirely helpful. It was certainly the intention of key entrepreneurs – at various stages 
of the process – to successfully persuade states to embrace a specific aspect of the agenda. 
For instance, in establishing ICISS Lloyd Axworthy and his Department engaged in an 
extensive bilateral process designed to bind the initiative to broad-based international 
support. Similarly, the utilization of persuasive tools was at the heart of the Canadian 
Government’s post-ICISS effort to build awareness, and ultimately, support for the idea. 
However, as later chapters show, the effectiveness of these approaches was continually 
outweighed by the level of resistance evident in the international system. Indeed, this was 
most clearly manifest in the inability of advocates (most notably Canada) to elevate R2P 
onto the international agenda prior to the point at which the structured outcome began to 
kick-in. That said, the lack of political traction or momentum leading into the World Summit 
process does not negate the importance of entrepreneurial leadership and individual 
agency. Arguably it actually amplifies it. At each stage, commitment to the idea, to 
leadership, to addressing the set of problems associated with civilian protection, to 
providing resources to support the agenda, and to adapting to difficult circumstances were 
– for better or worse – continually on display. Lloyd Axworthy’s commitment led him to 
establish ICISS despite the overwhelming lack of significant supplementary state support and 
despite momentum draining away from the intervention debate which had dominated the 
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1990s international agenda. Moreover, the support structures he left in place on his 
departure from politics were essential assets in the Canadian Government’s subsequent 
political sponsorship of R2P. There may have been differentiation in the degree of 
Ministerial support, but without Axworthy’s initial entrepreneurial efforts there would have 
been nothing to sponsor. Indeed, the Canadian Government committed resources and 
personnel to a twin-track diplomatic strategy fully aware of the obstacles and complexities 
which lay ahead89. A significant effect of this was to ensure Canada was able to mobilize its 
leadership of the idea once the unexpected opportunity of the World Summit opened-up. 
Canada’s initial strategy was intended, and expected, to be a long-term endeavour, but once 
the chance to accelerate the agenda within the institutional context so previously resistant 
emerged the Canadian government’s association with R2P enhanced both its ability to react 
and its relative influence within the Summit negotiations. The proceeding empirical chapters 
illuminate these elements of the explanation in significant detail. In so doing they reveal a 
range of skills and qualities on display during the process, and within the context of a hugely 
difficult normative environment. Aside from persistence, a willingness to commit resources 
(a factor closely related to institutional or governmental platforms) and to making the most 
of available opportunities, more direct personal skills are also strongly on display. Within the 
context of the World Summit negotiations the deft, instinctive political abilities of Canadian 
Ambassador Allan Rock ensured the platform of his position was most effectively exploited. 
His charisma, energy and skilful framing of R2P was instrumental in alleviating concerns, in 
framing and presenting it to states, and to keeping the idea alive and situated in each and 
every draft outcome document. Thus, even though the structured outcome resides at the 
heart of the explanation of how R2P was agreed in 2005, individual agency and 
entrepreneurship was a constant throughout each and every stage of the empirical 
narrative.  
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Framing90: The construction and use of cognitive frames was a consistent factor in the story 
of R2P’s development. Their explicit use was most closely associated with pro-R2P 
entrepreneurship and advocacy but was also evident in the use of counter-frames by those 
less supportive or opposed to the idea. The most significant use of framing was on display 
during the 2005 negotiations. Even with the powerful effects of the structured outcome, 
realising the agreement depended upon the successful framing of R2P to win acceptance or 
acquiescence of member states. In some respects this framing varied according to the 
actor(s) presenting the specific framing, and the actor(s) the frame was designed to move 
towards acceptance. But such variations were often subtle nuances of emphasis designed to 
motivate key actors. For instance, Allan Rock’s political engagement with African states 
would invoke the importance of their ownership of problems on their continent, which was 
in their interest to address collectively and which R2P was a part of the tool box for doing so 
(see Ch5). But at the heart of the framing of R2P was a set of core claims designed to 
provide a clear sense of what R2P was, and should be, about, and, more importantly what 
R2P was not (meant) to be or about. In simple terms, these frames were designed to 
convince states that R2P represented nothing new, did not expand or alter existing 
provisions or processes, was a ‘pro-sovereignty’ idea, kept the international dimension of 
R2P narrowly curtailed and related only to a narrow set of specific cases/crimes. From this 
perspective, the framing of R2P as ‘nothing new’ also shows how understanding the 
constitution and application of frames can reveal important insights relating to the level of 
resistance and limitations on what states are willing to accept. Aside from the Summit 
negotiations the use of framing was also prevalent in the processes preceding them. Here a 
range of strategies and tactics – documented in Ch4 – were utilised by post-ICISS R2P 
advocates led by the Canadian government. But framing R2P during this pre-Summit period 
was considerably more difficult. An unreceptive political climate and disinterest in the idea 
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meant advocates were unable to achieve any significant momentum or traction despite 
evident evolution in the way they sought to present the idea.  
 
Advocacy and Critical States: Though two distinct concepts, significant cross-over between 
advocacy and ‘critical state’ status was evident in the story of R2P’s development. As 
already stated, the Canadian government was the leading state entrepreneur which 
mobilized behind R2P and which was most responsible for crafting framing strategies 
designed to build support for it. Indeed, in a broader sense the advocacy of R2P – including 
by ICISS Commissioners and Civil Society – flowed from the strategies and resources applied 
by the Canadian government. The various elements of post-ICISS advocacy strategy were 
either resourced, mobilized, or defined, by Canadian government input. The specifics of 
follow-up changed over time and often in response to political feedback. But throughout the 
process advocacy was defined by constant repetition, widespread dissemination, political 
persuasion, ‘ground-up’ regional advocacy, and responding to political obstacles, opposition 
and opportunities. Considering the scope of the advocacy objectives the recognition by 
Canadian officials that ‘collective help’91 was required was pragmatic and necessary. 
Accordingly, Canada engaged Civil Society actors and mobilized key ICISS ‘assets’ to take on 
aspects of the agenda which would have unnecessarily drawn upon its own limited 
resources. Although it by no means neglected any of these activities – as already stated, 
Canada was the key orchestrator behind the advocacy of R2P – it did allow officials to drive 
forward an intergovernmental advocacy track to complement the Civil Society one. As Ch4 
shows, this bilateral and multilateral effort was beset with obstacles and set-backs. Minimal 
progress was made until the unexpected opportunity of the World Summit process opened-
up. But without Canadian leadership the World Summit would have been far less of an 
opportunity than what eventually transpired. Indeed, because of Canada’s centrality to the 
whole pro-R2P effort its status as a ‘critical state’ is undeniable. This concept is prominent in 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s NLC, and evident in specific case studies such as Richard Price’s 
study of the path to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)92. In simple terms, 
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a critical state is a state which, by virtue of its support or non-support, can potentially swing 
the balance either towards the adoption of a new norm or towards its failure. In this case 
continuous Canadian leadership was critical to keeping the idea alive and moving towards 
agreement – particularly within the context of the 2005 negotiations and the structured 
outcome. Additionally, however, the concept also has real utility in relation to a negotiating 
context. Aside from Canada’s vital role during the 2005 negotiations a number of other 
states were also critical to the final inclusion of R2P. A number of EU states – notably the UK 
– and key African states – notably Rwanda and South Africa – were also critical actors in 
mobilizing behind the idea. Indeed, the latter were particularly important for allaying 
concerns and to some extent legitimizing the idea in the key African region. Considering its 
own history Rwanda’s powerful moral weight was particularly significant. However, critical 
states also relate to those who could have made the path to agreement considerably more 
difficult than transpired. In this regard, the effect of the structured outcome and the way 
R2P was formulated helped mitigate the extent and willingness of certain states un-
enamoured by the idea to make the path that much more difficult. While on the one hand 
states like China and Russia (and indeed the US) were convinced that R2P was non-
transformational, the sheer scale and complexity of the agenda also impacted upon their 
negotiating priorities. Once convinced the agreement was sufficiently limited, the need to 
commit more considerable effort to its elimination or further weakening was less of a 
priority. Indeed, as Ch5 clearly shows, the structured outcome impacted across the board on 
the priorities and profile of R2P to the considerable benefit of its propulsion towards 
agreement.  
 
Policy Windows and Agenda-Setting: Elevating R2P onto the international political agenda 
proved to be one of the most difficult aspects of the entire process. Continuity in terms of 
international attitudes towards the issue of humanitarian intervention ensured the ICISS 
process was embedded in what is described as the ‘fading out’ of momentum around the 
effort to achieve political solutions and consensus (see especially Ch2 and Ch3). R2P would 
eventually find its place on the reform agenda leading to the 2005 World Summit, but the 
path towards this point would be complex and unpredictable with important policy 
windows playing major roles in the explanation. While we can accept the definition of 
agenda setting as the ‘process in which state actors, international organizations, and non-
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state actors struggle to decide whether an issue deserves a prominent place on the political 
agenda’93 understanding the practical mechanisms and effect of this process requires close 
attention to detail. As a general point this process is undoubtedly competitive and 
unpredictable. The number of issues which can be actively considered at any one time is 
limited, and highly contingent. Thus, entrepreneurs will have to be prepared to compete 
with other issues, entrepreneurs and interests to gain a place on the international agenda.94  
Moreover, agenda-setting is bound-up with predictable and unpredictable policy windows 
and the preparedness of actors to exploit or react to them. Indeed, as John Kingdon points 
out, policy windows can provide entrepreneurs greater opportunity to ‘push their pet 
solutions, or to push attention to their special problems’ onto the international political 
agenda.95  
 
Elevating R2P onto the international agenda was a primary objective of Canadian official’s 
post-ICISS but proved highly problematic to achieve. The opening of an unexpected policy 
window due to the shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks exacerbated the fading out of interest 
in state willingness to discuss an idea related to humanitarian intervention. It also provided 
an opportunity for the formulation of policies and policy doctrines which challenged R2P’s 
relevance, utility and potential impact. That said, the development of such alternative 
policies – most notably by the US administration – led to the invasion of Iraq and a profound 
crisis of the international system. The significant fractures to multilateral relationships gave 
rise to an additional policy window which Kofi Annan fully exploited. This initial policy 
window was entirely unpredictable, opening as a result of a chain of events and a crisis 
which engulfed the international agenda. The upside in terms of R2P’s path towards 
agreement was that the crisis provided the backdrop and platform from which Annan was 
able to project his call for an assessment of the nature of the threats facing the world, and 
the UN’s place within it96. It was from this that the crucial institutionalized response 
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emerged. Annan’s establishment of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
(HLP) provided the vehicle to propel the R2P agenda stagnating under considerable 
pressure. Additionally, however, the HLP would also become a key ‘linking mechanism’ in 
the process towards the 2005 World Summit. In this respect, Annan’s agenda-setting role 
would be crucial in exploiting a further predictable policy-window in the form of the follow-
up conference to the Millennium Summit (which became known as the 2005 World Summit) 
97. Two initially distinct processes would merge into one process defined by a broad, 
ambitious reform agenda to be negotiated in the six months prior to the September World 
Summit. Annan’s comprehensive report In Larger Freedom – which drew from the work of 
the HLP – would provide the initial agenda for the Summit negotiations thus ensuring that 
the initial planned agenda for the Summit was dramatically expanded. Most importantly, 
Annan’s report included a clear endorsement of R2P and called upon states to do likewise. 
This endorsement helped lock R2P into the subsequent negotiating agenda. The processes 
around these developments are important factors in the structured outcome logic outlined 
below. But they also emphasize the crucial role of individual agency in altering the dynamics 
around elevating R2P onto the international agenda in a radically accelerated timeframe. 
Finally, within the context of the negotiations the scale and complexity of the reform 
agenda provided an additional boost to R2P’s prospects. Though a central task had been 
accomplished in elevating R2P onto the negotiating agenda it was to R2P’s benefit that the 
agenda was so vast. Its vastness helped to relegate R2P’s relative importance vis-à-vis other 
priorities and proposals. These beneficial pressures – which stemmed from the exploitation 
of policy windows and successful agenda-setting – are essential explanatory factors for 
addressing the central research question of how R2P was agreed in 2005. 
 
Institutionalization and the Structured Outcome: The Canadian government’s aim of 
elevating R2P onto the international agenda post-ICISS was directed specifically at the 
United Nations. Aside from seeking to achieve a place for discussion of R2P on the formal 
General Assembly (GA) agenda, the long-term objective was to realize institutionalization in 
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the form of a GA resolution complemented by a more operationally focused SC resolution. 
Considering the lack of political progress made in the period 2001-2004, the 
institutionalization of R2P by September 2005 was an undeniably surprising development. 
As the previous facets of this conceptual framework have explained, exploiting the 
opportunity of the World Summit certainly depended upon the skilful mobilization of 
individual agency. But explaining how R2P transitioned from a lack of political traction to 
institutionalization in such a rapid period of time is arguably more significant considering the 
lack of normative momentum underpinning this development. The ability of agency to 
exploit the opportunity was possible because the dynamics leading to that point were so 
distinct. In this respect, the utility of institutionalization – described as the process ‘whereby 
new norms, values and structures become incorporated within the framework of existing 
patterns of norms, values, and structures’98 – is limited on its own terms. Our explanation 
needs to embed this concept within the context of the detailed processes leading to that 
point. It needs to acknowledge the causally significant effects of the structural 
characteristics of the process and the way they interacted with agency most notably during 
the intense multilateral negotiations. Indeed, this combination is necessary not only to show 
how and why R2P was agreed but because from a more general perspective not all norms 
are negotiated and not all norms are institutionalized. Hence, the concept of the structured 
outcome provides a powerful tool for addressing the surprising, rapid, unexpected and not 
necessarily positive development of R2P from political stagnation to political agreement. 
More specifically, its analytical power derives from two key elements. First, the structured 
outcome explains what changed R2P’s political prospects. It shows how and why the 
agreement was possible despite the lack of traction and preceding momentum, doing so by 
packaging the mechanisms and dynamics which explain the propulsion of R2P in the way 
that frameworks like the NLC cannot. This is crucial because there was no preceding 
evidence of any “bandwagon effect” nor was there any catalytic ‘coalition-building’ which 
might lead to such a dynamic. 99 As revealed in the section on framing, this manifested itself 
in a complete lack of desire for any significant or meaningful departure from existing 
processes and provisions in relation to the role of the international community vis-à-vis 
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mass atrocities. Second, because the structured outcome emphasizes the effects of the 
structural factors on realising the outcome it inevitably has consequences for how we 
understand the significance and status of R2P. The empirical findings raise questions about 
the speed of R2P’s development, and suggest that once the structural factors which 
propelled it towards agreement were removed a reopening of contestation and debate 
would be even more likely. More significantly, even with these factors facilitating the path 
to agreement, the sheer limited nature of it suggested very little was likely to change in how 
the international community seeks to address mass atrocity crimes.  
 
Explaining the factors which constitute the structured outcome logic and showing how they 
interact and interrelate is a complex affair. The concept is first introduced in Ch4 and is then 
traced more specifically – along with the multilateral negotiations – in Ch5. The crucial point 
about the structured outcome is that it shows how R2P was propelled from late 2003 by a 
series of structuring factors rather than by normative momentum or acculturative dynamics. 
With an advocacy process stalling in the face of multilateral resistance the High-level Panel 
was the change which most dramatically altered R2P’s political prospects. Once it had 
endorsed R2P in its report, subsequent factors locked R2P into the Summit process in a way 
which dramatically reduced the possibility that it might be removed from the 2005 
negotiating package. Viewing it in this way also helps ensure that there is no artificial 
separation between structure and agency. Indeed, in explaining how and why R2P was 
agreed structure helps us understand how the agreement was possible, while the micro-
processes of R2P’s emergence and negotiation enable us to better understand its 2005 
formulation. The emphasis the High-level Panel is particularly significant, however, because 
its establishment was the first stage in R2P’s structured outcome. It is also significant 
because it was born out of the Iraq war – an event oft-attributed as a negative in R2P’s 
development but which actually represented the principle exogenous shock which 
enhanced R2P’s political prospects. Iraq provided the impetus for an assessment – through 
the High-Level Panel – of how existing international structures dealt with threats to 
international peace and security, and how they might be changed to address a raft of long-
standing and emergent policy issues. In terms of the overall process, this institutional 
innovation was arguably the high point of Annan’s ability to indirectly shape R2P’s political 
prospects.  
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Defining the HLP as Stage 1 of R2P’s structured outcome also speaks directly to 
understanding how and why R2P was agreed. This is what the structured outcome is about. 
It identifies and packages the structural factors within/of the process which enabled the 
agreement of R2P. In this respect, it identifies a wide range of endogenous factors including 
the HLP (for its agenda-setting vehicular role and endorsement of R2P); Annan’s subsequent 
report In Larger Freedom (for reiterating and amending the HLP’s endorsement of R2P, thus 
locking R2P into the World Summit process); and, the design and structure of the member 
state negotiations (including the ‘piggy-backing’ of the HLP/ILF agenda onto previously 
agreed Millennium Review Conference processes, the adoption of a ‘package’-driven 
approach to reform, the introduction of a smaller ‘core group’ of states, and resource 
constraints relating to time and scale). Uniting these is the idea that the structural 
characteristics of the negotiation process were causally significant for realising the outcome. 
The extent to which the outcome was possible depended upon the possibilities the 
structure provided: the way it locked R2P into the GA negotiations; the way it narrowed the 
odds for its inclusion and limited the resources of states and their capacity to maintain pre-
existing policy lines/positions in the context of the processes characteristics. 
 
Having defined the approach in theoretical terms the final element relates to the 
methodological combination of a process-tracing variant and the use of elite-level 
interviewing and extensive documentary analysis backed-up by equally extensive knowledge 
of existing primary and secondary literature. Such qualitative methodological tools were 
selected for what they offer in terms of ensuring the micro-processes of R2P’s development 
were explored and explained in a sufficiently detailed way. It is important to recognise that 
process-tracing is a method, a tool researchers (and increasingly constructivists) use for the 
conduct of research. As Bennett and George explain, it has numerous variants and its use 
can be for the purposes of theory testing or theory development.100 In this case the use of 
process-tracing is designed to test the hypothesis that a more detailed understanding of 
process yields better information about the likelihood of prospective compliance with R2P. 
Thus, an analytical variant of process-tracing based upon the ‘use of hypotheses and 
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generalizations’ is adopted here as the approach best placed to overcome the weaknesses 
of the NLC and extract a more detailed analytical narrative of the development of R2P.101 It 
is certainly a demanding, time-consuming, resource-intensive and highly complex approach. 
But the benefits are more than worthwhile as demonstrated by the empirical chapters 
which challenge many of the dominant perspectives found in the current literature. 
 
Nowhere is this combination of enormous complexity but rewarding pay-off more evident 
than in the vast chapter which reconstructs the negotiation of R2P into the 2005 Summit 
Outcome.102 It captures the essence of the methodological approach which defines Chapters 
3-5. The benefits reveal themselves later on, but relevant here is that the process of 
developing the empirical account was dependent upon process-tracing using the 
complementary tools of interviewing and documentary research. Indeed, developing the 
narrative was the final stage of the process. Previous stages involved the complete 
deconstruction of the process in order to reconstruct it into an appropriate explanatory 
format for addressing how/why R2P was agreed, and in what form. Indeed, this process 
defined each of the empirical chapters.103 To achieve this, elite-level, semi-structured 
interviews were utilised as a primary research method. The selection of interview 
participants was inevitably targeted due to the costs involved, but nevertheless an 
impressive range of individuals were involved successfully in the research process. The 
modalities of such interviewing was generally either face-to-face or via telephone, and – if 
ethical permissions were forthcoming – also digitally recorded. That said, because of the 
scale of the project and the need to deepen understanding of existing or new avenues of 
research (e.g. to uncover new information, address contestation/inconsistencies or to 
enhance detailed precision) the use of email was a constant invaluable mechanism for 
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discovery. Such emails were pursued with individuals not formally interviewed or with those 
who were interviewed and who were happy to remain involved in the process.104  
 
Aside from developing the empirical base of the research, the continual effort to engage 
elites in the research process helped build and reinforce relationships and contributed to an 
evident ‘snowball’ in the interviewee sample. From the outset, a range of key elites were 
targeted for contact – the majority of which were successful – but as the process unfolded a 
bandwagon dynamic positively impacted upon the availability and willingness of additional 
individual participation.105 This was especially important when trying to get to the heart of 
governmental processes like the development of the ICISS proposal documented in Chapter 
3. Indeed, a primary advantage of interviewing is that is allows one to delve into the more 
‘inner workings’ of political process in a way that other methods do not.106 But this requires 
considerable organization, patience and preparation. For instance, semi-structured 
interviews combine pre-planned questions designed to focus discussion but with in-built 
flexibility. It enables the interviewer to ‘think on their feet’ in order to adapt the schedule 
based upon its real-time progress. But this is ultimately dependent upon detailed planning 
and sufficient confidence as an interviewer.107 This was evident during the first interview 
conducted in November 2008 with former Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy. 
Preparation for such an elite interview involved enormous secondary reading, extensive 
formulation of interview questions in addition to technical, logistical and ethical 
arrangements. The subsequent outcome was a free-flowing interview of significant 
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empirical benefit but which then required additional processes relating to transcription and 
analysis.108 The whole method is unquestionably resource-intensive.109  
 
Piecing together the empirical analytical narrative which follows thus depended upon 
structured planning, exhaustive effort and a willingness to embrace opportunities as they 
arose. But it also required critical awareness. Interviews of any ilk yield specific problems.110 
For instance, access constraints, resource-limitations and ethical issues are always factors 
which can complicate an interviewing process. But even more significant is how to navigate 
the management, presentation and interpretation of reams of empirical information 
yielded. It was apparent during the early stages that the formulation of the written analysis 
would have to be wary of some important factors. First, because of the complexity, scale 
and time-frame of the R2P development processes documented here it was evident that 
there were inescapable limitations to an individual interviewee’s knowledge of the detailed 
developments occurring elsewhere in the process. They, quite reasonably, spoke to what 
they knew best. This is, of course, advantageous to the extent that it can produce accounts 
of greater specificity and detail, but it can also impose a bias upon one’s understanding if 
this is ignored and other methods are not utilised. Second, related to this was the self-
evident tendency of some to elevate their own involvement and importance. ‘Principled 
trumpeting’ and self-aggrandizement were sometimes particularly overt. Finally, there were 
inevitable constraints upon the extent of information interviewees could recall from events 
which took place years previously. Although not as problematic as it might have been, the 
need to cross-check details and chronology was continually necessary.  
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Indeed, the benefits of interviewing outweigh the negatives if the researcher is sensitized to 
the potential pitfalls. This means ensuring individual accounts are not taken at face-value, 
that the interview sample is sufficiently broad, and most importantly they are used in 
combination with other methods and empirical information. In this case, extensive 
documentary data was used to construct the analytical narrative but also to carefully cross-
check the interview material. This was supplemented with secondary literature and first-
hand accounts by individuals involved in the process. It is important to note, however, that 
the use of secondary literature varies considerably. Because of the underlying process-
driven hypothesis a central point was to yield more detailed information than has previously 
been evident in the study of R2P. In some cases this meant the secondary literature was less 
well-developed and therefore offered less benefit.111 In others, a combination of interview 
material and documentary analysis exposed weaknesses in secondary accounts which 
actually became a necessary part of the empirical narrative. But to show how documents 
were used, the development of the World Summit chapter (Ch5) was based upon seventy-
thousand words of primary documentary extracts and over seventy-thousand words of 
interview extracts.112 Such documentary extracts included the rolling draft negotiating texts, 
policy documents/proposals, press releases, government and diplomatic statements, and 
documents made available under Freedom of Information requests.113 
 
Subsequent chapters provide a much clearer picture of how these methods – designed to 
realise the central hypothesis – worked in practice. They each emphasise just how 
important process is for understanding the development and potential impact of 
international norms. They highlight both the theoretical limitations of the NLC and the 
tendency to overstate the eventual of agreement of R2P in 2005. This thesis does not, 
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however, take up the broader theoretical question of whether the NLC is the appropriate 
way to model normative development; in relation to the development of R2P it 
demonstrates the power of the micro-process approach. However, prior to beginning this 
account it is necessary to embed the detailed processes in broader context. The next 
chapter on the prehistory of R2P deals with this necessity. 
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Chapter 2: From Macro to Micro 
 
The story of “Constructing the Responsibility to Protect” emerges from the empirical tracing 
in Chapters 3-5. Beginning with Axworthy’s establishment of ICISS and culminating with a 
deconstruction of the Summit negotiations, the story is one of enormous complexity 
defined by non-classic, non-linear, normative development. Although the time-span is short 
(1998-2005) particularly revealing was just how surprising and unexpected the eventual 
agreement was. This in itself warrants close examination. No-one could have predicted the 
transformation in political prospects which took place once the structured outcome kicked 
into effect in 2005. Before this, the political momentum around R2P was regressive rather 
than progressive despite the considerable efforts of individual and state-sponsored 
advocacy. In many respects, the reaction R2P provoked post-2001 mirrored the 
humanitarian intervention debates of the 1990s. The dividing-lines were inherently similar, 
albeit conditioned and exacerbated by the post-9/11 context. Ironically, however, it was this 
changed context which provided the catalyst for the unexpected changed prospects. The 
divisions exposed by the invasion of Iraq precipitated a crisis which engulfed the 
international system and mobilized Annan’s Summit-focused response. This helped redefine 
the international agenda, locking R2P into the subsequent negotiations and provided R2P 
with something it had so far failed to muster: political traction.  
 
This triumvirate of chapters carries through these arguments with exhaustive commitment 
to detail and a matched commitment to asking the questions necessary to deepen our 
understanding of R2P’s development. But with the limited time-frame embedding them 
within a brief historical context is necessary. How one defines this context is dependent 
upon the tools one applies. For instance, a macro-analysis of the historical conception of 
sovereignty, or a genealogy of protection, would provide distinct explanations of the 
development of R2P.114 But even with this pre-history more qualified in scope – focusing on 
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the post-Cold War era115 – historical perspective is necessary to make sense of the process-
driven empirical chapters. The research logic and constructivist ontology demands it.  
 
Axworthy’s establishment of ICISS was a seminal catalyst in the development of R2P, but as 
Ch3 shows, his response was motivated by a series of events and changes which dominated 
the post-CW decade. The crux issue was humanitarian intervention with intra-state crises 
dominating international politics in the 1990s. The question of how the international 
community could (or should) be mobilized to respond to gross violations of human rights 
was – at its most fundamental – about the very nature and purpose of the international 
system. This was especially acute with humanitarian intervention essentially focused upon 
the legitimate use of force to provide outside protection for populations within the borders 
of an individual State. The polarized extremes of this debate were captured by contrasting 
responses to two epoch-making events. First, effective inaction during the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide had conscious-shocking implications and personally impacted upon the responses 
of key actors thereafter. The question this event led many to ask was: how could the 
international system not react to uphold basic human rights in such an extreme scenario? 
Second, by contrast the equally influential intervention in Kosovo exposed the 
consequences of action. NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia to prevent ethnic cleaning 
divided the international community. The lack of UN authorization proved especially 
controversial, fracturing the international community as the consequences of the 
illegality116 were played-out in heated debates across numerous fora.117 Concern centred on 
the potential precedential effect of the intervention and the apparent weakening of an 
international system predicated upon sovereignty and non-intervention. China, Russia, India 
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and the NAM were especially inflamed by what transpired in this case – an important point 
considering their positions in relation to the negotiation of R2P in 2005.118 
 
Although the challenge of humanitarian intervention has multiplicious dimensions,119 these 
examples captured a stark dilemma at the heart of the debate and demonstrated just how 
difficult realising a political solution would be.120 This is not to dismiss, however, equally 
problematic events in inter alia Somalia (1993-1995) and Srebrenica (1995). These 
contributed to the sense of challenge and momentum around the issue of protection and 
impacted upon the international community’s willingness to act subsequently.121 Indeed, 
Kosovo may represent the apex-point of the debate which triggered more concerted efforts 
to respond, but it can only be fully understood in relation to the wider context of the 1990s. 
Key features of this context are briefly explored below, but particularly significant was the 
rapid decline in the SC’s capacity to act in the way it had done in the early years of the 
decade. The UN’s response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the 1992 SC Summit were 
undoubted high-points.122 But as the decade progressed P5 enthusiasm to act ‘ebbed 
away’.123 This was especially acute post-Somalia. Certainly the 1990s saw some important 
changes relevant to the development of R2P including an expanded understanding of what 
constituted a threat to international peace and security, a significant reduction in the use of 
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the veto, greater elements of thematic engagement, and an evolution in aspects of its 
working-practices.124 But even so, collective P5 appetite for action, especially in hard-end 
cases, declined dramatically. 
 
A central problem was that the heightened post-CW expectations rapidly ran into trouble. 
After some initial successes, the dramatic increase in the number and scale of external 
‘multidimensional’ UN-mandated interventions began to take their toll upon the 
Organization’s credibility.125 Expectations moved well ahead of the UN’s capacity curve. The 
‘shattering failures’ in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda were symbolic of an 
Organization grossly overstretched, and of a marked decline in the willingness of the P5 to 
act.126 That said, however, an important factor was that the SC continued to authorize 
peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions even after these failures, and that humanitarian 
concerns were an increasingly evident part of the justification mix invoked by the SC (and 
the UN more generally) throughout the 1990s. These matter because they are also relevant 
to understanding the evolution of expectations and the entrepreneurial responses provoked 
by those above-mentioned failures. The first spoke to a continuing willingness to engage the 
UN in highly complex, ambitious and ultimately intrusive interventions to help build peace 
and to support the establishment of State structures for self-governance.127 These actions, 
even with host state consent,128 both reflected, and contributed, to an expansion in what 
forms of international engagement might be acceptable/possible.129 Second, the integration 
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of human rights and associated provisions into UN mandates, and the explicit or implied use 
of humanitarian justifications for the use of force, helped frame the development of policy 
frameworks designed to mobilize better responses to humanitarian crises through the SC 
but also to determine what to do should SC authorization not be forthcoming. Here the 
notion of ‘sovereign responsibility’ would inform the efforts of Annan, Axworthy, Blair and 
ultimately ICISS.  
 
Thus, this broader context is clearly important even if it necessarily complicates the picture 
of R2P’s development. Indeed, these factors may have fed into the subsequent 
development of R2P, but they also exposed some of the central obstacles and risks to 
achieving better, more consistent responses to crises like Rwanda in 1994. Accordingly, one 
should be guarded in how these dynamics are characterized for a number of reasons. First, 
by definition humanitarian intervention is a significantly more coercive enterprise. It is often 
non-consensual, and requires a commitment of resources and political will not easy to 
muster. Resultantly it is regarded as a more direct affront to sovereignty than international 
action permitted by consent or conducted in the effective absence of internal institutions. 
Second, action authorized by the SC during the 1990s was not doctrinally-driven but was 
based upon case-by-case assessments of the specific circumstances. This does not negate 
possible precedental effects, but is nevertheless a vital distinction relevant to any discussion 
of selective inconsistency and the entrepreneurial responses considered herein. Despite 
considerable effort (see below) there was no desire to codify or systematize the SC’s role in 
relation to humanitarian crisis however broadly or narrowly defined.130  
 
This point is equally relevant to concerns relating to the complicating use of humanitarian 
justification and the extent to which attempting to alter the pre-existing normative 
framework might impact upon the decision to intervene. Indeed, there is worthiness in 
Simon Chesterman’s observation that ‘interventions do not take place because states do not 
want them to take place’ and his argument that the ‘suggestion that the present normative 
order is preventing interventions that should take place’ is ‘simply not true’.131 Though 
somewhat overstated, Chesterman’s argument points to the fact the SC has within its 
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authority the ability to act – something which was recognised and reflected in the 2005 
agreement. A more subtle distinction, however, is that the 2005 reaffirmation of existing 
Charter processes/provisions was designed to limit the development and scope of the 
international normative context.132 From a P5 perspective this was certainly about 
protecting existing prerogatives and freedom to manoeuvre, but equally significant were 
concerns about the implications R2P might have on state sovereignty. Many states, 
including China and Russia sought to limit its international dimension precisely because they 
wanted to guard against fundamentally altering the balance between individual sovereignty 
and the international community – hence the lack of agreement on an international R2P. 
This also meant that considerations relating to responses to future crises would continue to 
be partly-shaped by the sensitivity of the sovereignty issue.  
 
But this is more about looking at the debate from a slightly different perspective because 
Chesterman’s position also speaks to a broader set of issues. Foremost among these is the 
issue of what drives state responses, bound-up with that undeniable ‘90s trend favouring 
the deployment of the language of humanitarianism as legitimizing discourse.133 Despite this 
trend, the inconsistency of responses and the potential misappropriation of such language 
to cover or complicate alternative, including less pure, motives revealed an underlying 
continuity: namely that political interest and political power remained predominant.134 
Resultantly, the extent to which one could rely upon humanitarian justification to mobilize 
international responses was/is considerably more qualified, not least because as this 
discourse developed it became more difficult to untangle the complex web of motivations 
driving case-specific responses. Thus, determining what lies behind state positions is more 
challenging, more likely to provoke concerns about the true purpose of proposed 
interventions,135 but ultimately increasingly central to determining both the legitimacy of 
individual cases and the likelihood of developing improved responses to humanitarian 
crises. But speaking more directly to the process leading to apex of the intervention debates 
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around Kosovo, after the Somalia debacle136 the relationship between interest, power and 
humanitarianism was brought into much sharper relief. There was an evident regression in 
the willingness to commit to missions based purely upon State-breakdown or humanitarian 
crisis within the confines of a distant land. The US administration’s response was most 
telling, developing a Presidential Directive that ‘implied sharp curtailment of American 
involvement in future armed humanitarian intervention’.137 This Directive placed ‘American 
interests’ at the heart of a new framework for ‘decision-making on issues of peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement’ in the post-CW context.138 This was the prime example of a 
documented policy response reflecting rapidly changeable attitudes towards issue of 
intervention. But the most practical implementation of this regression was the impact it had 
upon decision-making in response to the situation in Rwanda. Though the UN Secretariat 
had to face its share of the burden of accountability, the lack of direct ‘interest’ in the 
situation was surely a telling factor behind the lack of concerted response to the 
slaughter.139 
 
The cumulative effect of Somalia, and the tragedies in Rwanda and a year later in Srebrenica 
was to have an enormous negative impact upon the organizational credibility and 
reputation of the UN. Even with undoubted internal failings, it was apparent just how 
beholden the UN was to its member states, and how challenging (impossible even) it was to 
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manage perception and expectation. Nevertheless, these failings would provide the basis 
and backdrop for how the debate around Kosovo would be framed by key actors. With the 
need to protect civilians a primary narrative used to justify NATO’s unilateral action, the 
debate reached a critical point. Though united by similar concern for human rights, the 
challenge of Kosovo was markedly different to the challenges posed by Rwanda and 
Srebrenica. Whereas the latter posed questions about how to mobilize international 
responses to mass atrocities, Kosovo was about how its unilateral nature might affect the 
‘imperfect, yet resilient, [post-WW2] security system’.140 This was the ‘challenge of 
humanitarian intervention’.  
 
Inevitably, considering the fractures Kosovo opened-up, the intervention debate drew 
polarized responses and reaction. Particularly significant was the sheer hostility expressed 
by China, Russia, the NAM and G77 to the idea of humanitarian intervention.141 The 
underlying positions of states are of course central to understanding the development of 
R2P in later chapters. But at this stage more significant was that the question of when 
coercive intervention might be justified provoked key entrepreneurial responses designed 
to find a solution to the political impasse. Most significant were the responses of Tony 
Blair,142 Lloyd Axworthy, and Kofi Annan.143 Though very different in their focus and 
temporal development, all were united by important commonalities.  
 
First, all shared a sense of the challenges, but also the opportunities of the post-CW era 
including well-rehearsed arguments about how the forces of globalisation were redefining 
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the interests and security concerns of all nation states.144 New threats required new focus 
and new solutions. In this context, the human rights of civilians should be protected and 
command international action predicated upon global responsibilities and collective values. 
Second, in accordance with this, each articulated conceptions of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’, tapping into a discourse which had been gaining traction since the end of 
CW145. Third, all at some point in their entrepreneurial responses reflected a general 
dynamic in the intervention debate – particularly post-Srebrenica – of seeking to find ways 
of codifying or systematising decision-making in relation the use of force to protect.146 This 
dynamic was a product of the cumulative impact of the above-described policy failures 
which led to a ‘challenge to the idea that ad hoc was the right approach’.147 Thus, there was 
a marked shift in emphasis from ad hocery to codification, and while there were certainly 
differing degrees to which they pursued this approach, all considered forms of 
criteria/policy-frameworks to improve multilateral decision-making processes. Finally, each 
exposed key lessons and obstacles relating to the prospects of political agreement. The UK’s 
efforts tested the limits of multilateralism in exposing the lack of political prospects for any 
doctrine-based P5 agreement. Annan’s public challenge helped provoke the negative 
reactions referenced above148 while his private efforts revealed numerous issues with 
developing – let alone agreeing – use of force criteria; exposed the limited extent to which 
the UN could take the issue forward; and highlighted the need to develop alternative 
language to frame the intervention debate.149 Similarly, Axworthy’s ultimate initiative in 
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establishing ICISS demonstrated a fading out of interest in the issue and a lack of support for 
his proposed response.150  
 
The lessons exposed by these responses are relevant to the overall development of R2P, and 
in the case of Annan and the UK demand greater attention than possible here. But before 
outlining additional points relevant to this prehistory, it is necessary to briefly zone-in on the 
second of the identified commonalities. Though ICISS’s conception of R2P more explicitly 
adopted a ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ framework based upon the work of Francis Deng,151 
Blair, Annan (and indeed Axworthy) also adopted and appropriated arguments which 
tapped into the sense that sovereignty was changing.152 For instance, Annan drew 
inspiration from former French President François Mitterrand153 who had argued the 1991 
agreement of SC Resolution 688 condemning the repression of the Iraqi Kurdish 
population154 was the ‘first time, non-interference has stopped at the point where it was 
becoming failure to assist a people in danger’.155 Mitterrand had emerged as an early 
articulate advocate for the ‘duty of humanitarian assistance’ by arguing ‘international 
conscience will no longer tolerate certain situations which may exist here or there, in the 
name of non-interference in the internal affairs of a State. [W]hen we see flagrant and 
massive violations of human rights, we cannot remain passive. Our duty is to put a stop to 
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these situations’.156 Similarly, Annan was not the first SG to argue that sovereignty was 
being ‘redefined’ with Pérez de Cuellar and Boutros-Ghali both outlining important 
arguments about the nature of sovereignty. De Cuellar in particular picked-up on key 
themes evident in the later formulation of ICISS, including the idea that responsibility was 
inherent to sovereignty and was reinforcing, not weakening, and that international 
responses were not about any ‘right’ but about collective responsibility. 157  
 
The intellectual foundations of the ICISS report were, however, more directly influenced by 
Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen’s formulation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’. Like many 
of the examples cited here, the CW end was instrumental in how this framework was 
conceived. Though taken-on and developed as a response to the emerging problem of 
“Internally Displaced Persons”158 it was initially driven by concern for ‘the effect of the end 
of the cold war on the African continent’.159 Of particular concern were the consequences of 
internal conflicts – ‘within the domestic jurisdiction and…national sovereignty of the country 
concerned’ – on civilian populations.160 The framework Deng helped develop was an 
attempt to overcome the obstacles associated with state sovereignty and would latterly 
become the ‘centerpiece of his mandate as representative of the Secretary-General on 
IDPs’.161 At its heart was a very simple, but potentially transformational idea which Cohen 
best-captured in a 1991 paper, writing that sovereignty carried with it ‘a responsibility on 
the part of governments to protect their citizens’.162 Both the language and the emphasis on 
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primary state responsibility would become central planks of R2P as it subsequently 
developed. Moreover, even though it was not designed to legitimise humanitarian 
intervention as such, it nevertheless embraced a conception of international responsibility 
(and accountability) inherent to ICISS’s R2P.163 Additionally, Deng’s emphasis on 
cooperation, assistance and capacity-building would also be central to the 2005 agreement 
of R2P, as would the implicit idea that these, and defined mechanisms for international 
protection, would help strengthen, not weaken, state sovereignty.164 
 
Of the three main entrepreneurial responses ICISS was the one which explicitly sought to 
alter the language of the intervention debate. But even though it introduced the R2P 
phrase, its proposals would still be subject to the same underlying politics, questions, 
concerns, and obstacles that dominated the debates of the ‘90s and the efforts of Annan 
and the UK. Indeed, though Annan’s efforts reflected his desire to ‘bring the UN closer to 
the people’165 they fuelled a response centred on the less well-packaged concept of 
‘individual sovereignty’.166 However, even though he was unable to develop language of a 
more positive/benign disposition, or a solution to the impasse, Annan did provide the 
stimulus for alternative responses. He encouraged Axworthy to establish an independent 
commission, and encouraged the UK to develop its SC-focused, criteria-based response. 
These efforts, based upon Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech, involved the development of a set of 
‘policy guidelines’ in an ‘attempt to develop the underlying policy for [SC] action.167 But 
after a difficult period of cogitation within the FCO to map-out a relevant strategy, and 
efforts by the UK Mission to informally discuss circulated iterations of a ‘Paper on 
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International Action in Response to Humanitarian Crises’, the period 1999-2000 ultimately 
represented a ‘fading out of the political discussion between member states on the subject 
of trying to create a doctrine’.168 Ultimately, however, the UK’s efforts were not 
overcommitted because officials recognised early on that securing agreement was a 
‘hopeless task’. Thus, despite high-level prominence given to the UK position, the political 
capital deployed within the SC was more qualified.169 Nevertheless, because this was not 
doctrine/normative work ‘from the side-lines’ it exposed the limits of multilateralism 
evident in, and relevant to, the overall story of R2P.170  
 
Similarly, Annan’s consideration of criteria exposed the difficulty of developing proposals 
with realistic prospects of success.171 This was problematic because Annan’s consideration 
of criteria was partly the result of an attempt to reassert the centrality of the SC in decision-
making relating to the use of force. His efforts to ‘complicate’ his reaction to NATO’s 
unilateral intervention in Kosovo via the line ‘there are times when the use of force may be 
legitimate in the pursuit of peace’ had only exacerbated internal tensions within the 
Secretariat between those who regarded the action as an unacceptable violation of the 
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Charter and those who believed the action was justified.172 Certainly post-Kosovo Annan’s 
position would become more ‘wedded to the importance of SC authorisation’.173 But 
nevertheless the tensions demonstrated the risks of becoming too closely associated with a 
western-dominated idea and which ultimately would require member state solution.174  DPA 
head Kieran Prendergast, for instance, was a particularly powerful critic of Annan’s 
approach. Accusing Annan’s speechwriters of ‘zigging and zagging’, Prendergast believed 
Annan’s arguments would lurch ‘depending on the audience’ between ‘robust diplomacy 
backed by force’ (the ‘zigging’) on the one hand and ‘robust internationalism and legality’ 
(the ‘zagging’) on the other. As far as Prendergast was concerned this was unsteady and 
undignified, and wholly unhelpful.175 It was important, therefore, that after the apex of his 
1999 GA challenge Annan changed tack in recognition that he had done all he could 
publically and that it was time to pass on the ‘talking stick’.176 Fortunately for Annan, this 
was taken-on by Lloyd Axworthy who, demonstrating that entrepreneurship rarely gets far 
‘without sponsorship’177, brought with him the political sponsorship of his Government, and 
the hope of an alternative, positive way forward. In this thesis the empirical story of R2P, as 
a distinctive or novel approach for addressing all the issues explored in this brief background 
chapter, begins with the Axworthy response.  
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Chapter 3: Axworthy and ICISS 
 
 Lloyd Axworthy, in my opinion, was one of the great Canadian Foreign Affairs 
 Ministers.178 
 
Lloyd Axworthy was one of the most prominent and controversial Foreign Ministers of the 
1990s. During this period Axworthy personally defined Canada’s foreign policy agenda, 
elevated his country’s influence in the world, and instigated and supported a series of 
initiatives which impacted upon the development of international relations, and will forever 
define his legacy. One of his final acts was to oversee the announcement of the 
‘International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’.179 It was Axworthy’s 
response to the intervention debates, but also a symbolically appropriate culmination of the 
development of a ‘human security’ agenda he had been developing since assuming office in 
1996. Established to find ‘new ways of reconciling seemingly irreconcilable notions of 
intervention and state sovereignty’ Axworthy hoped ICISS would act as a ‘tipping agent’ 
towards the development of new shared understandings and, ultimately, state practice, in 
the name of protecting civilians.180 The Commission’s establishment was catalytic. Its 
Report, published in December 2001, articulated the admittedly ingenious R2P phrase, 
setting in motion advocacy for an idea which would eventually lead into the 2005 Summit 
Outcome.181  
 
Axworthy’s status as a pivotal R2P entrepreneur is widely acknowledged. However, a 
tendency to narrowly characterize his decision to establish ICISS as a direct response to 
Annan’s challenge has limited our understanding of his entrepreneurial response. By 
contrast, this chapter argues Axworthy’s contribution should be understood in a broader 
context which embeds ICISS within his human security (“HS”) agenda, considers the impact 
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of Rwanda and Kosovo on its development, and the importance of Axworthy the person, 
Axworthy the politician. Thinking of it in this way is how we can best understand the 
decision to respond; how we understand the decision to respond is how we can best 
understand the intended contribution. This chapter analyses these factors, in addition to 
critically reviewing the widely cited ICISS proposals. The need for a more detailed and 
holistic account of these processes is in contrast to authoritative accounts of R2P. Bellamy’s 
respective chapter provides an illuminating case in point: 
 
In early 2000, Canadian officials…began advocating an ‘International Commission on 
Humanitarian Intervention’…Lloyd Axworthy recognised that, to be effective, any 
such commission would need ‘serious political sponsorship’. Axworthy persuaded 
Annan  to endorse the commission and to accept its report, but the Secretary-
General maintained that it should sit outside the UN for obvious political reasons. At 
Annan’s encouragement, Axworthy agreed Canada would sponsor the new 
commission.182  
 
Aside from some brief additional information, this quote effectively captures Bellamy’s 
explanation of how ICISS was born. Although factually correct, it omits a wealth of 
interesting, relevant, and new information which can provide us a more solid foundation for 
analysing the Canadian response, and subsequent development of R2P. In particular it fails 
to capture the lack of consensus that characterised the development of the ICISS proposal. 
Unfortunately it is symptomatic of the broader problem identified in Ch1, namely it is an 
account based upon the application of methodological approaches neither designed, nor 
intended, to ask the questions which might yield answers that go beyond surface-level (or 
now received wisdom) explanations. Drawing on interviews with those directly involved in 
the process this chapter has three main parts.183 First, it argues ICISS emerged out of dual-
processes of temporal narrowing and deepening of the HS agenda. Second, taking this 
further, these political developments merge with the more specific processes leading to 
ICISS. This merging identifies Kosovo as the most decisive influencing factor behind 
Axworthy’s decision to respond. Here the focus on micro-processes sheds new light on the 
politics of the decision, contributing to the formation of a more complete, vivid narrative. It 
shows how Kosovo contributed to the above-mentioned narrowing as hard and soft power 
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tools became increasingly aligned, how it focused attention onto moving ‘discussions and 
action on [humanitarian intervention] forward’ and, crucially, how the policy options lining 
the path to ICISS’s establishment were beset with obstacles and complexities.184 As the 
‘norm broker’ ICISS warrants this kind of closer attention.185 Finally, part three focuses on 
the production of its report and critically assesses its content. 
 
Policies and Policy-Development: The Human Security Agenda 
 
In 2005 Axworthy was identified as one of only two Canadian leaders who ‘made a 
difference on the world stage’ in a period generally defined by Canadian ‘decline’.186 Central 
to this was the emergence and development of a policy agenda which yielded some of the 
‘signature initiatives’ of the Liberal government from 1996-2000187 and proved to be a 
‘source of pride’ for Liberals and the public alike.188 The agenda was thematic and initiative-
based, but also ‘niche’ in its approach – with the oft-expressed accusation of ‘foreign policy 
on the cheap’– in the view of one senior Canadian official – at least ‘partly true’.189 
Ideationally driven, it was a way of projecting influence to make a difference internationally. 
Indeed, the fit between policy and platform was logical and mutually constitutive. As, 
former Canadian Prime Minister, and a former Cabinet colleague of Axworthy, Paul Martin 
suggests, the development of a ‘soft power’ approach was about Axworthy charting out 
‘what he felt was the dominant role the Department of Foreign Affairs should play’ in 
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recognition of the changing roles of various government departments expanding their scope 
into areas of international policy.190 DFAIT was thus the vehicle and platform Axworthy’s 
used to drive his distinct policy agenda forward. Axworthy understood that the position of 
foreign minister provided an invaluable platform from which to project his new vision and 
policy ideas. As Axworthy commented ‘if you wanted to make a difference as a Canadian 
there could be no better place to do it’.191 Axworthy regarded the position as ‘a central 
figure’ of ‘strategic’ significance that ‘can make a difference in shifting the weight or balance 
between the two contending pressures’ of Canada becoming a ‘compliant satellite’ or, as he 
clearly preferred a Canada ‘maintaining an independent stance...making a distinctive 
contribution to the global common weal’.192 It was certainly clear that Axworthy was never 
going to be a ‘typical’ foreign minister, as Pearlstein remarked in late-1999 he ’seemed not 
to understand that Canada’s foreign minister is supposed to walk softly and carry a little 
stick’.193  
 
Like many concepts the meaning of HS is contested. Broader developmental conceptions 
(often captured as ‘freedom from want’) compete with narrower articulations focused upon 
greater emphasis on the protection of civilians (under the alternative moniker ‘freedom 
from fear’).194 At the heart of all, however, is a central concern for individuals and human 
rights and their place in international affairs. It was this which influenced Axworthy’s 
packaging of Canadian policy. Indeed, the extent of the agenda was such that by 2000 
Axworthy had established HS as the ‘cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy’.195 By this point 
its definition was purposely ‘narrow’, and intensely focused upon the ‘physical protection of 
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people’.196 Arriving at this conception was a product of four-years of policy-learning, of 
momentum and practical initiatives, and an increasingly strong sense that new approaches 
were needed to address the difficulties around protection evident during the post-CW 
period.197 By definition, HS emerged partly in response to challenges to traditionally 
dominant state-centred conceptions of ‘national security’ deemed an obstacle to civilian 
protection. ICISS emerged out of the temporal development of Axworthy’s conception of HS 
and its practical agenda which increasingly challenged such traditional paradigms. As the 
agenda narrowed and deepened the Kosovo intervention led to the recognition that the 
intervention issue was a ‘glaring gap’ in the protection ‘jigsaw’ and an issue for the 
credibility of an agenda apparently directed at protecting civilians.198  
 
From the outset HS ‘aligned perfectly with Axworthy’s natural instincts’.199 It resonated with 
his Liberal disposition and religious background and provided a prospective framework for 
realising his aspiration to increase public participation in the processes of policy-making.200 
Axworthy’s long-standing interest in international affairs was well-known, but early 
experiences as Foreign Minister were critical to Canada’s appropriation of the idea. First, his 
ministerial mandate letter emphasized his responsibility to protect Canadian citizen’s 
abroad which would be challenged early-on by a sense of vulnerability that this could be 
achieved alone: 
 
I received a mandate letter from the PM on going to Foreign Affairs; on which one of 
my jobs as Foreign Minister was to protect Canadians abroad. Normally that is 
interpreted by making sure they got  passports, if they lost them we would find 
them…all that kind of stuff. But I had this experience in the first couple of months 
where Canadians were kidnapped; a young nurse from Alberta was hacked to death 
in Chechnya, a young couple killed in Paris in a terrorist attack. I think it fit my own 
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attitude that…I cannot protect Canadians by myself, we need international 
agreements, international norms, standards, and enforcement mechanisms.201  
 
Axworthy believed a new paradigm was needed at the international-level to ensure the 
protection of Canadians and which incorporated the protection of people everywhere202. 
The second formative experience – on a flight to Minneapolis – was his introduction to a 
UNDP Report which incorporated the HS concept.203 It captured the essence of what 
Axworthy believed: ‘Why’ he wondered, after reading the report, ‘is protecting people less 
important than (protecting) boundaries?’ HS was, in his own words, a ‘comfortable fit’.204 
This was a seminal moment in the history of Canada’s HS agenda. But equally significant was 
Axworthy’s early recognition of its utility. As one of his senior officials remarked, Axworthy’s 
instinctive ‘ingenious’ ability to recognise a ‘powerful idea’ and to ‘run with it’ was central to 
its appropriation.205 Strategic political awareness combined with personal drive and 
ideational commitment translated an idea into a ‘serious policy agenda at the international 
level’206. Axworthy recognised the strength of its language and core message and therefore 
its potential utility as an ‘instrument of advocacy in international society’.207 Axworthy 
personally gave the agenda a sense of direction, impetus, serious of political weight.208  
 
By contrast to Japan’s developmental conception, Canada’s would arrive at a narrow 
protection-based formulation. The belief was protecting people from ‘threats of violence’ 
was where the ‘concept’ offered the ‘greatest value-added’. Canada’s position was that the 
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broader the concept the less weight and ‘value’ it would carry.209 As Paul Heinbecker – a key 
architect of the agenda – would explain, while ‘more encompassing economic and social 
definitions’ of HS were ‘entirely laudable’ they risked ‘meaning all things to all people and 
end up meaning nothing to anyone, at least nothing new and “actionable” by governments’. 
Canada’s approach was instead designed to establish a ‘norm of behaviour which would 
encourage the protection of people’.210 It was norm-building which sought to prioritize 
specificity over generality.  
 
While by no means the principal intellectual driver Axworthy’s activism and belief in 
Canadian leadership was at the heart of the agenda.211 Arriving at the narrower conception 
of HS however took time. The Ottawa Treaty in this regard was politically symbolic.212 Post-
1998, the agenda was accelerated and redefined, becoming more obviously focused upon 
protecting people from conflict and forms of violence.213 Pre-1998 the emphasis vaguely 
talked about the need for a ‘broader definition’ of security’.214 Human security was 
fleetingly evident in early 1996, but the language was notably generic and fluctuated 
between rather diffuse priorities.215 Individualism and human rights was evident 
throughout, but there was little indication as to just how fundamental and all-encompassing 
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HS would eventually become216. Indeed, early conceptions were couched in the language of 
‘sustainable development’ or ‘sustainable human security’ – an articulation of one of the 
‘most expansive definition[s] of human security’.217 Thus, while the idea had early resonance 
its practical application was not yet understood, nor its scope and parameters coherently 
defined.218 
 
Over time the agenda would markedly shift towards a concept focused on protection 
thematically-linked by violence and conflict. This narrowing of Canada’s agenda – while also 
explained by specific domestic factors – was consistent with increasing challenges to 
developmental understandings of HS precipitated by ‘the discussion of physical protection 
during the 1990s’.219 It was evident in Axworthy’s speeches, in policy-documents, in the 
initiatives pursued, and by a notable deepening of the agenda demonstrated by Canada’s 
efforts to advance and embed its protection of civilians’ initiative during its 1999-2000 
membership of the UNSC. These factors contributed to a momentum which was 
subsequently shaped by, and merged with, the more specific momentum created by the 
intervention debates. In this process, ICISS was a development which flowed logically and 
‘naturally’ out of the Canadian agenda.220 
 
Indeed, the initiative-based thematic approach DFAIT adopted was central to the 
intellectual definition of the agenda. As DFAIT’s concept-paper ‘Human Security: Safety for 
People in Changing World’ explained: ‘practice’ led the ‘theory’.221 The initiative approach 
was driven by a number of factors. First, the approach was driven by Axworthy’s personality. 
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He would, as one of his former senior officials remarked ‘get up in the morning thinking 
about what to do next’.222 Although Axworthy’s approach would provoke the accusation he 
was like a ‘flint that produced dazzling sparks’ but ‘too often died and failed to ignite’ it 
nevertheless was the very approach which underpinned the establishment of ICISS.223 
Second, despite recognition that the multitude of different interpretations and visions of HS 
meant the concept was particularly difficult to define officials sought to drive the agenda in 
order to ‘mainstream’ it into the ‘language of international diplomacy’.224 This meant 
pursuing progress on a ‘global human security agenda’ in the various ‘councils of the 
world’.225 A strategy defined by numerous differentiated organisational platforms, including 
bilateral and multilateral relationships and networks. Third, the collective effect of the 
initiatives pursued facilitated the formulation of the ‘freedom from fear’ conception 
because each specific initiative meant focusing on the ‘identification of a problem to identify 
a potential solution-set’.226 If Canada could achieve – through results-oriented diplomatic 
processes – practical results to real-world problems, and demonstrate positive impact on 
civilian protection so they could demonstrate HS’s utility as a way of shaping and redefining 
the landscape of international relations where the needs of civilians were not secondary to 
the interests and security of states.227  
 
Prima facie the initiatives pursued appear ad hoc, but were in actuality logically united by 
shared concern for protecting individuals from forms of violence and conflict. The Ottawa 
Treaty was again a key catalyst. Unique decision-making processes combined with the 
superimposition of a HS framework ‘over what had traditionally been treated as an arms 
control and disarmament issue’ yielded a significant political success which subsequently 
shaped future Canadian approaches to international protection issues.228 Axworthy became 
explicit about its utility for addressing other human protection problems.229 Significantly, 
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that the process incorporated a follow-up track designed to realise its practical 
implementation impacted upon the constitution of future initiatives including the 
conceptual development of ICISS. Additionally, Canada’s involvement in the successful 
negotiation of the 1998 Rome Statue was also informative. After supporting it with high-
level political championship and active Canadian diplomatic engagement Axworthy believed 
it captured the ‘ultimate essence of a human security philosophy’230 and was a fundamental 
step towards qualifying sovereignty in a way consistent with HS: 
 
 It began to wear away the national sovereignty argument, once again as we did in 
 the land-mines we were challenging national sovereignty, saying that it’s not 
 inviolable, it’s not something that is given from heaven. The classic statement of the 
 ICC which is if the national court and judicial system takes care of the crime 
 wonderful, but if they won’t do it then the international court steps in. That to me 
 was a way of finally putting the brakes on the late twentieth century extreme abuses 
 of national sovereignty we saw in Rwanda and in the Balkans.231  
 
The ICC Statute was thus part of an accumulation of developments which for many were 
eroding and qualifying sovereign barriers to civilian protection. HS depended upon effective 
accountability and individual and collective responsibility. The logic was one of deterrence, 
but also about seeking to shift the parameters of acceptable international behaviour away 
from the ‘indifference and inaction’ that had often defined responses to mass atrocities and 
international humanitarian law.232  
 
Associated with this was the agenda’s focus on improving the prospects for good 
governance, lasting peace, and reconciliation in conflict-torn countries. Indeed, if anything 
captured the complex multitude of factors affecting the prospects for HS in the post-CW 
period it was the idea of ‘peacebuilding’ defined by the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative as 
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‘the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace and decrease the likelihood of 
violent conflict’.233 Established in 1996 this initiative was personally-driven by Axworthy in 
response to the Report of the multi-donor Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda.234 Its principal recommendation that ‘humanitarian action cannot be a substitute 
for political action’ spurred the development of policy proposals within DFAIT around the 
question of ‘what Western governments might do to arrest the repeated cycles of violence 
which were generating the need for humanitarian assistance’ and led to the establishment 
of the Initiative and a dedicated DFAIT Peacebuilding Program from late 1997 onwards.235 
The emphasis on peacebuilding is interesting for many reasons. It incorporated core 
principles of Axworthy’s preferred policy-making approach including NGO consultations and 
strong direct Ministerial involvement and resonated with the objectives of HS.236  Moreover, 
the evolution of the Program highlighted the development and increasing importance of HS 
in Canadian foreign policy. From 1999, the Peacebuilding Program would become the 
Peacebuilding and Human Security Program as part of a renewed effort to ensure Canada 
remained at the ‘forefront of international policy development and advocacy on 
peacebuilding and human security’.237 Embedding it into the broader agenda was logical as 
DFAIT officials sought to build on the ‘momentum’ of practical policy successes in order to 
increase its ‘prominence’, to clarify its meaning and organize the agenda in to an 
encapsulating ‘policy framework’.238 This internal restructuring confirmed the narrower 
conception of HS, with the associated intellectual arguments becoming increasingly explicit 
as a result. These would be best captured in the appropriately-titled Safety for People in a 
Changing World which offered the most coherent explanation of the concept, its historical 
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roots and the post-CW conditions which had seen a ‘decline’ in security for ‘many of the 
world’s people’ because of ‘transnational threats’ and the proliferation of intra-state 
conflict. Significantly it sought to allay fears HS was intended to ‘supplant’ national security 
by suggesting it was complementary and articulated a clearer integration of hard power 
tools for HS purposes: 
 
…when conditions warrant, vigorous action in defence of HS objectives will be 
necessary [and] can involve the use of coercive measures, including sanctions and 
military force.239  
 
This process of developing the meaning of HS and of establishing relevant programs and 
structures to advance it would also lead to the creation of a dedicated HS Program (HSP) 
instigated in December 2000. Although post-Axworthy’s, its mandated emphasis on 
‘freedom from fear’ emerged from the above-described process of ‘definitional narrowing’. 
From the outset, the Program’s focus was directed at violence and conflict, or rather ‘to 
contribute to the creation of a sustainable environment for human security, by supporting 
initiatives and activities that promote human security in societies in conflict, potential 
conflict and post-conflict’.240 The program was significant for its annual funding ($10m per 
year, 2000-2005) and its contribution to ICISS follow-up efforts – both in terms of 
committed financial resources and its core objectives and priority issues expressed in the 
policy management framework (tables 3.1 and 3.2).  
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This framework’s development was driven by a combination of events, initiatives, and 
policy-learning. It began in preparation for the HSP and Canada’s two-year SC term (January 
1999-December 2000) dominated during its Presidential terms (February 1999; April 2000) 
by Canada’s thematic pursuit of the Protection of Civilians (PoC) Issue Area. Here the aim 
was to ‘demonstrate [its] practical relevance’241 in the context of a forum which despite 
expanding its remit, responsibilities, and engagement in humanitarian situations/issues 
continued to display apathy and tensions between international humanitarian action and 
sovereignty and non-interference. This contributed to selectivity, inconsistency, and a lack 
of political commitment in its decision-making, with protecting the security of civilians not 
yet an established priority for international action.242 Canada’s efforts aimed to redress the 
balance by recasting the way SC members viewed the plight of civilians in conflict. In this 
regard, NATO’s Kosovo campaign provided impetus to these efforts and was a pivotal event 
in the above-described definitional narrowing. Kosovo demonstrated a pressing and current 
real-world dilemma which challenged the SC and Canada’s commitment to HS. Its 
importance to understanding Canada’s response is largely self-evident. However, interviews 
with officials involved at the time – including the principal political officer for the 
                                                          
241
 Elissa Golberg and Don Hubert ‘Case Study: The Security Council and the Protection of Civilians’ in McRae 
and Hubert (2001) Human Security and the New Diplomacy, p223  
242
 Golberg and Hubert ‘Case Study: The Security Council and the Protection of Civilians’, p223-4  
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
89 
 
establishment of ICISS – consistently referred to the development of the PoC within the SC 
as a key contextual factor leading to its creation.243 The dedicated ICISS track emerged from 
– and merged into – the combination of parallel processes: the deepening of the PoC agenda 
on the one hand, the Kosovo crisis on the other. It emerged out of these interwoven, 
overlapping and simultaneous processes which thus warrant closer attention. 
 
The SC and the Protection of Civilians 
 
A key strategy for advancing HS involved seeking to maximise opportunities for its bilateral 
and multilateral promotion. Tailored strategies were developed to increase the prospects 
for policy advancement within specific fora in recognition that some issues ‘would have 
[greater] resonance than others’.244 No fora was more important, however, than the UN, 
and specifically the SC. Though aware of its weaknesses, Axworthy considered the UN a 
‘vital instrument for developing and implementing human security policies’.245 
Unsurprisingly, Axworthy would seek to grasp the political opportunities potentially 
afforded by non-permanent SC membership, including the guarantee of two monthly-terms 
as SC President – a position with an invaluable ‘procedural authority’.246 The path to 
achieving SC membership was typically unique. Despite some internal unease Canada’s bid 
was pursued with a policy agenda akin to a domestic election campaign.247 Canada’s agenda 
was defined by three interconnected themes: to enhance the Council’s ‘credibility and 
effectiveness’; to open-up its working methods; and to apply ‘concrete elements of human 
security in Council debates and decisions’.248 This was a calculated risk but perfectly 
concordant with Axworthy’s ideational and policy-making preferences. Axworthy believed a 
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successful result would provide a weight of expectation, credibility and ‘legitimacy’ to 
Canada’s efforts once on the Council.249 
 
Canada immediately began to advance its agenda as President in February 1999 during 
which some crucial PoC seeds would be sewn. The objective from the outset was to ‘provide 
a holistic framework for protection related efforts’.250 It was also, however, about seeking to 
instigate and embed changes to the very culture of the SC and broadening its ‘definition of 
security to [include] new [HS] challenges’.251 This involved trying to ‘consolidate’ and build 
on current or past SC work in order to establish concordance between them and the PoC-
theme.252 But this would require ‘an important departure from past Council practice’ not 
least because it was likely to provoke pre-existing normative tensions and challenge the SC’s 
capacity to agree appropriate mandates and commit to protect civilians in situations of 
armed conflict.253 Although distinct from humanitarian intervention, the PoC was similarly 
influenced by the trends and events of the post-CW era. Conflicts in Rwanda, the Balkans, 
Somalia, and DRC had focused minds on policy responses. In this respect, Canada’s efforts 
yielded early success. Thematic open debates moved the effort to consolidate ‘the council’s 
commitment on a range of protection issues’ forward.254 The resulting Presidential 
Statement expressed the Council’s ‘willingness to respond, in accordance with the 
Charter...to situations in which civilians, as such, have been targeted or humanitarian 
assistance to civilians has been deliberately obstructed’. This breakthrough statement was 
doubly significant. It requested a SG report recommending ways the Council could ‘improve 
the…physical and legal protection of civilians’ and articulated a broad understanding of how 
this work might be defined.255 This was followed, in September 1999, by the adoption of the 
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‘watershed’ Resolution 1265 which formally embedded the language of the initial 
Presidential Statement.256 The SC then reinforced this in April 2000, with Resolution 1296 
affirming its ‘intention to ensure, where appropriate and feasible, that peacekeeping 
missions are given suitable mandates and adequate resources to protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical danger’.257  
 
Axworthy regarded the embedding of the PoC into the SC’s ‘protocol’ as a ‘huge turning 
point’, and an important step in the development towards R2P.258 Indeed, it was 
normatively and practically significant. Nevertheless, the processes behind these 
developments exposed continuing controversy and resistance. The principal area of 
contention was the potential use of coercive action where alternative protection measures 
proved inadequate – the ‘hard end’ of the protection spectrum. Even without this element 
both resolutions required months of negotiation, with China and Russia apparently 
particularly infuriated.259 But Annan’s recommendation the SC consider intervention ‘as a 
last resort’ only exacerbated controversy – as did debates on humanitarian assistance in 
March 2000.260 States concerns centred around norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and non-interference, as revealed by the emphasis on state consent, and of upholding the 
SC’s primary role for maintaining peace and security.261 Additionally, the depth of state 
commitment to protection would be challenged in practice. For instance, Canada’s efforts to 
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hold debates on Chechnya and Sudan proved unsuccessful due to opposition within the 
SC.262 
 
Despite this, Axworthy’s desire to operationally mandate protection was revealed during 
the case of Sierra Leone and negotiations leading to Resolution 1270 establishing UNAMSIL 
in October 1999.263 In this case, Axworthy reportedly pushed ‘hard to place UNAMSIL under 
Chapter VII and to mandate it to protect civilians, saying that he would not allow another 
Rwanda “on his watch”.264 This was an important test-case and revealing insight of 
Axworthy’s mind-set. However, though notable for its inclusion of civilian protection, 
UNAMSIL was not an example of forcible intervention but a Mission deployed with host 
government consent.265 Although humanitarian intervention was a ‘priority issue’ of civilian 
protection (Table 3.2) with the deepening of its SC work Canadian officials identified a 
fundamental gap in the protection jigsaw which it was neither designed, nor able, to 
address.266 The most critical factor behind this – which ultimately spurred the development 
of ICISS – was NATOs 1999 intervention in Kosovo. This event marked the apex of the 1990s 
humanitarian intervention debates, provoking questions around the so-called ‘right to 
intervene’. More significantly, this intervention, and Canada’s participation in it, had a 
profound impact on Axworthy’s policy agenda, testing his commitment to HS but also 
stimulating an entrepreneurial desire to respond.267 
 
The Road to the Commission 
 
The ‘big test case’268 
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The Kosovo crisis precipitated the opening of a policy window which led to a sustained 
period of public and private debate. This was certainly no different in the case of Canada. 
From the months prior to Operation Allied Force, until long after the end of major combat 
operations, Axworthy and his officials would be exercised by all aspects of the decision to 
intervene269. It was the event, which Axworthy describes as the ‘genesis of the Commission’ 
and ‘where the R2P really got born’.270 That ICISS was not launched until some fifteen 
months later, however, was demonstrative of a long and difficult process. 
 
Axworthy’s involvement in the decision to actively and operationally support military action 
against Milosevic was – in his words – ‘the toughest decision I ever made’.271 One official 
described him as ‘tormented’ by the decision but once committed convinced it was correct 
and justified.272 Although not a pacifist, Axworthy’s discomfort with military force was well-
known and led to a period of personal introspection conditioned by his religious beliefs 
which led him to focus upon the meaning and applicability of ‘just war’ in this context.273 
Unease with the option to use force apparently extended to Cabinet, with Axworthy 
describing it as neither an ‘easy sell’ nor a ‘clean process’.274 Nevertheless, the subsequent 
government line was couched in the language of HS with Axworthy’s voice the strongest in 
arguing NATO’s action was a ‘response’ to Milosevic’s ethnic cleaning, and designed to 
‘restore human security to the Kosovars’.275 It was, he argued, this ‘humanitarian 
imperative’ which had ‘galvanized the Alliance to act’ and thus a ‘landmark’ for HS because 
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had NATO ‘backed down’ after all the ‘negotiation and diplomatic efforts’, and in the face of 
‘an affront’ to its ‘values’, it would have been undermined as a ‘force for global action’.276  
 
Indeed, seeing Kosovo in terms of HS drove Axworthy’s decision to the support the 
intervention. It was based on the recognition that the rhetoric he had espoused in the years 
previous would mean little without action to back it up.277 Axworthy, however, went 
further. Aside from packaging the intervention in this way he also explicitly incorporated the 
action into the development of his policy agenda.278 This was a significant shift in thinking. 
Kosovo represented the point when Axworthy began to integrate hard power tools, into his 
previously soft power dominated toolbox.279 It had the dual effect of further 
defining/narrowing his conception of HS whilst simultaneously broadening its range of 
application. Furthermore, it was out of this transition that ICISS and more explicit R2P-
related language would emerge. Axworthy, and his officials, turned their attention to 
questions of how HS could be ‘translated’ into hard power.280 As this was best captured in a 
major speech at Princeton University: 
 
 Sometimes...hard power – in this case military force – is needed to achieve human 
 security goals. NATO’s air campaign should serve to dispel the misconception that 
 military force and the human security agenda are mutually exclusive. Clearly, they 
 are not. Pursuing human security involves using a variety of tools.281 
 
Although the potential use of force was fleetingly evident in earlier speeches,282 this 
evolution (including to the point where NATO would be described as a ‘vehicle’ for HS) was 
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neither straightforward nor without weakness.283 Criticisms of Axworthy’s agenda would 
often focus upon a noticeable disconnect between hard and soft power, and the agendas of 
the DFAIT and the Department of National Defence (DND).284 This was partly the product of 
Axworthy’s military aversion, but was also accentuated by the significant budgetary cuts 
which affected all government departments.285 Nevertheless, it is hard to escape the 
substantive criticism that the previously described conceptual narrowing of the HS agenda 
was not sufficiently matched by a concomitant narrowing in the ‘commitment-capability’ 
gap long identified in Canadian defence policy.286 Indeed, this problem was only 
exacerbated by the foreign policy context. Post-Kosovo, the idea that robust applications of 
military force may be required to protect civilians was increasingly prevalent in Axworthy’s 
public speeches.287 Resultantly, a ‘rhetoric-resources’ gap was source of constant criticism 
across the HS policy spectrum and, in the military’s case, would lead to the accusation that 
Canada’s ‘foreign policy was writing cheques our defence policy can’t cash’.288 This gap was 
particularly problematic for Axworthy as questions were asked about the credibility of such 
an agenda when its most identifiable state sponsor was itself unable, or unwilling to 
materially back it up. As David Malone argued in mid-2000:   
 
 Foreign and defence policy cannot be conducted on the cheap indefinitely. Canada’s 
 international credibility rests not only on imaginative policy initiatives...but also on 
 our ability to help implement them and to share financially the burdens of 
 international action.289 
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One could also describe this as a ‘rhetoric-reality’ gap. While Canada’s contribution to 
Operational Allied Force should not be dismissed, Canada’s willingness and capacity to 
contribute peacekeepers and other military tools declined significantly during the 1990s, 
with the trend continuing thereafter.290 Moreover, aside from NATO’s operational reliance 
upon the US, Kosovo was – for other reasons – arguably less significant in terms of future 
Canadian (and NATO) participation in future military deployments than Axworthy might 
have believed or hoped. Putting aside the usual complexities associated with the potential 
use of force, a more fundamental issue was that the extent of state support for Axworthy’s 
vision for HS – including the significance of the Kosovo intervention and the idea of 
international responsibility he would increasingly articulate – would prove to be highly 
contested. In other words, its normative significance was open to question.291 Indeed, this 
related to Canada as much as it did to other states. Axworthy’s own commitment to HS was 
unquestioned, but how this manifested itself in broader governmental terms was less 
assured – something which thus accentuated questions relating to the capacity and 
willingness to commit military resources. While not immune from the numerous 
complexities relating to any decision to intervene, one might have expected the 
Government which so prominently and boldly espoused HS as a ‘rationale for concerted 
action’ to have more credibly supported it with concomitant levels of resources and 
commitment. Yet in the two post-Kosovo cases of Sierra Leone and East Timor bold words 
were hardly matched with operational commitment. In the former, during a January 2000 
SC debate Axworthy would refer specifically to Council considerations on whether UNAMSIL 
should be expanded with an argument that it was ‘now up to the Council members to 
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demonstrate their willingness to match our professed concern with resources’. This call 
however, for whatever reason, seemingly did not apply to Canada in this context.292  
 
Similarly, Canada’s (lack of) involvement in the 1999 crisis in East Timor provoked sharp 
questions regarding governmental commitment to HS in action. Such questions extend 
beyond issues of capacity into the terrain of political will, asking to what extent HS was 
widely shared, or internalised outside Axworthy’s office. While some attributed (what they 
saw) as an inadequate Canadian response to economic ties to Indonesia, Hataley and Nossal 
argue East Timor exposed a ‘gap between Axworthy’s human security rhetoric and the 
policy behaviour of the Canadian government’ because the latter had not ‘bought into’ the 
HS agenda.293 Resultantly, they argue the limited military contribution and the lack of 
available capacity was symptomatic of Chretien’s ‘aversion to the use of force’ which ‘may 
explain why the rhetoric of [Axworthy] was never connected in a serious way to the 
capabilities of the Canadian Forces’.294 Such cases offer specific insights into the 
development of Axworthy’s agenda during the period officials began considering responses 
to the intervention issue. Aside from accusations of moral selectivism and inconsistency, a 
more stinging critique suggests Canada was more comfortable with ‘doctrine work from the 
touchline’ rather than ‘getting dirty in the mud of the field’.295 Thus, one has to consider the 
credibility of the expansion of the HS agenda into the intervention issue when its most 
critical state sponsor was seen in such a critical light.296  
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That said, the changes Axworthy’s policy agenda and public rhetoric underwent as a result 
of Kosovo were most significant for the entrepreneurial response it led to. Indeed, Kosovo 
was catalytic for the very reason that it, in combination with the UN-commissioned Rwanda 
and Srebrenica reports, brought to a head the intervention debates.297 As Axworthy 
remarked, the latter two ‘raised the question...Kosovo sparked the debate’.298 But in so 
doing, Kosovo would test the nature of international support for the idea of sovereignty as 
responsibility, the extent to which this applied collectively – not just individually – and how 
it could be operationalized in practice. In this regard, it was a key event which exposed an 
apparent disconnect between individual state responsibility and international responsibility, 
or more specifically when, and in what form, the latter ‘kicks-in’.299 
 
How to respond? 
 
The lack of SC authorisation – or state consent – for the NATO action, and questions relating 
to the timing and form of military means used, were the two most prominent areas of 
contention and debate. Both would shape Canadian thinking about how to respond, and 
would frame the associated justifying arguments. Post-Kosovo DFAIT officials were left with 
no doubt that Axworthy wanted the issue of intervention ‘explored further’ and specifically 
focused upon humanitarian military intervention.300 Subsequent consideration was framed 
around an exploration of the ‘rules of the road’ with much internal debate relating to the 
potential utility of criteria or policy framework to facilitate/guide decision-making 
processes.301 ICISS emerged out of this period of reflection, and particularly two key 
intellectual thoughts: 1) that states had to reconcile intervention (in pursuit of HS) and state 
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sovereignty; and 2) that ad hocery had proved to be an unsatisfactory approach to ensuring 
the protection of people in cases of extreme violations of human rights. 
 
The first of these was consistent with the above-described narrowing of HS.302 The 
distinction, however, was that post-Kosovo Axworthy’s discourse would be increasingly 
shaped by attempts to more explicitly qualify sovereignty in the context of humanitarian 
intervention. Accordingly, Axworthy would argue HS: 
 
…is going to have to be reconciled with the principle of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of states. Kosovo illustrates this particular contradiction well...non-
interference remains basic to international peace and security...Kosovo must not be 
held up as a precedent to justify intervention anywhere, any time for any reason. 
However, in cases of extreme abuse, the concept of national sovereignty cannot be 
absolute... The [UNSC] cannot stand aside in the face of outrages we have seen in 
the variety of violent disputes.303   
 
Axworthy would purposely reiterate his argument that HS did not weaken sovereignty, but 
strengthened it ‘by reinforcing democratic, tolerant, open institutions and behaviour’ – the 
state was anything but ‘obsolete’ but remained ‘the most powerful instrument for collective 
action’.304 As Bellamy points out, this represented an endorsement of Deng’s positive 
approach to sovereignty.305 It was a strategy designed with pragmatism in recognition that 
post-Kosovo attempts to reinterpret sovereignty would prove particularly controversial. As 
such, it was also directed at trying to alleviate fears of abuse and – as far as possible – to 
guard against any precedent-setting involving action without SC authority. Nevertheless, 
Axworthy maintained that (despite the controversy) NATO’s action ‘bolster[ed] the 
contention that legitimacy derives from the sanction of the governed and sovereignty 
comes with certain irrefutable responsibilities’ and would resultantly avoid ruling out 
completely the possibility of future action in extreme cases where the Council was 
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‘paralysed’ arguing that ‘in the face of deliberate, systematic, large-scale perpetration of 
atrocities against innocent people’ there remained an ‘obligation to act’.306 
 
The legacy of the Rwandan genocide was one of the most important events which 
influenced this position. Although one official believes Rwanda was increasingly seen as an 
aberration which would not be repeated, and therefore not particularly helpful for moving 
the debates forward, it nevertheless shaped Axworthy’s thinking and motivation – both in 
terms of the specific decision to support the Kosovo intervention, and how subsequent 
policies and arguments were framed.307 The Carlsson Report into the Rwandan genocide, 
with Annan’s Srebrenica Report, reawakened memories of two humanitarian crises which, 
whilst mirroring the lack of consensus evident over Kosovo, starkly differed in terms of the 
action mobilised by states in response. The contrast between unilateral action on the one 
hand, and inaction on the other, united by controversy and dissatisfaction, captured the 
central dilemma. It was certainly true the unilateral Kosovo intervention more directly 
instigated the period of debate and processes leading to ICISS. But as Don Hubert has 
revealed, part of the logic behind the initiative was the thought that ‘if you wanted to 
articulate a doctrine of human security you had to have an answer to what to do in the case 
of Rwanda.308 It was a disaster of such scale it was inevitably going to be part of any 
discussions around humanitarian intervention. 
 
Accordingly, Canada would pursue a strategy designed to advance debate and to ‘further 
redefine the concept of humanitarian intervention’ across numerous platforms.309 In 
addition to his public speeches/statements, Axworthy would Chair a SC open debate on the 
findings of the Carlsson report;310 Canada and Norway would combine to ‘promote 
increased capacity for rapid reaction for UN peacekeeping missions’;311 within the G8 
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Canada would present a paper outlining its position on humanitarian intervention and 
proposed criteria for further discussion;312 and DFAIT would also provide the funding for 
Annan’s March 2000 IPA working group.313 The latter two were consistent with the efforts 
of numerous actors to consider the potential value and viability of formulating criteria or 
guidelines to aid the decision-making processes for the use of force.314 This dynamic – of 
shifting from ad hocery to forms of codification – was clear evidence of policy reflection and 
learning provoked by the ‘very unsatisfactory’ Kosovo process315: 
 
 The UN was not involved...we were kind of making it up was we went along. Isn’t it 
 time for some rules? Isn’t it time for some standards? Isn’t it time for some way of 
 putting a framework in place to determine when, if, and how?316 
 
This shift reflected an increasing understanding that there would be occasions where the 
international community had no choice but to act, that such action should be embedded 
within a ‘cascading scale of mobilization up to and including military intervention if other 
interventions were not working’, but that determining the point at which this may be 
required, remained highly contested.317 Thus, based on the identification of three key areas 
which demanded a response by the international community (strengthening norms relating 
to the PoC; mobilizing the political will to act, and; developing military and civilian capacity 
to succeed), Canada would propose a set of eight considerations developed to help ensure 
that where the use of force was concerned people were ‘asking the right questions’.318 
Additionally, Axworthy would articulate a high-test threshold – with intervention an option 
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reserved for the most ‘severe cases’ of ‘genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
massive and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law’.319 Overall, this 
framework was developed to be ‘demanding’ (to help guard against potential abuse) and to 
help foster the requisite political will (particularly within the SC whose ‘credibility’ was 
increasing endangered320) by seeking to define the conditions under which force may be 
used even if it was pragmatically accepted that any decision-making/responsibility to deploy 
one’s own forces to protect civilians elsewhere would ultimately remain in the hands of 
political leaders.321  
 
These efforts were also directed at two particularly contentious difficulties exposed by 
Kosovo, namely whether the use of force represented the last resort option, and what form 
of military means was most appropriate for realising humanitarian objectives. Both were 
sources of considerable tension within NATO, and subject to major external criticism. 
Axworthy’s unease with military action was evident throughout. While arguing NATO had 
‘no option’ but to take the action it did, there were clear limitations on how far Axworthy 
was willing to go, both in terms of demonstrating unease with the use of bombing – and 
specifically what constituted a legitimate military target – but also in terms of how much risk 
to Canadian forces was he was willing to accept in pursuit of humanitarian objectives.322 
These are inevitable and understandable democratic constraints. However, they aptly 
demonstrate that even where a decision is made, consensus can be fluid, limited and shaky, 
and that the appropriateness of means can be qualified by the need to maintain political 
unity and support. Indeed, Axworthy’s call to find ‘ways to overcome the reluctance of some 
to take risks on behalf of victims of war in far-flung places’ applied just as much to Canada, 
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as it did to anyone else.323 Thus, Kosovo illuminated the complexities of reconciling 
humanitarian principles with practical action, and considering Axworthy’s difficulties with 
the decision and conduct of the campaign in the context of his efforts to develop a 
framework in response, provided evidence of just how difficult decisions to intervene would 
continue to be, even if states were able to agree in principle on the utility of codification.  
 
‘An education in political reality...’324  
 
As it was, codification proved to be a highly optimistic objective. The G8 paper received 
almost no direct discussion, and certainly did not lead to any kind of resulting commitment 
or agreed way forward.325 Similarly, the IPA consultation reinforced a sense of political 
gridlock. The enabling context out of which the Commission idea emerged was thus defined 
by no consensus between states on the issue of humanitarian intervention and an 
international political environment one can only describe as hostile. During this period, 
however, alternative entrepreneurial efforts – in terms of what they sought to do, and the 
evident lack of progress they yielded – inspired Canadian thinking. First, Tony Blair’s Chicago 
speech was viewed as a ‘watershed moment’ and a ‘call to action’ for those who believed in 
the cause of humanitarian intervention.326 That a high-profile leader of a P5 country 
positioned on the same side of the debate was attempting to grapple with the problem gave 
Canadian officials an early kick-start, and continued impetus, to their own efforts. While 
Canadian officials were ultimately unclear how much political capital the UK government 
expended in its subsequent efforts through 1999 and 2000, the inability to achieve political 
consensus within the SC impacted upon Canadian thinking in important ways. In particular, 
the directness of the UK’s strategy and the baggage associated with P5 membership, helped 
instil the view that the political context demanded an alternative approach.327 Officials 
increasingly believed that advocating for a new approach in such a sensitive area might be 
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better suited to a country like Canada with less responsibilities and a more neutral 
posture.328  
 
The second more decisive push was provided by Annan. After the deepening of PoC work 
and the Kosovo intervention Annan’s challenge was the third critical factor leading to the 
establishment of ICISS. As a senior Canadian official stated in 2004, ICISS was a ‘direct 
response to [Annan’s] challenge’.329 Indeed, Annan’s famous We the Peoples question that 
‘Surely no legal principle – not even sovereignty – can ever shield crimes against humanity’ 
would be directly-referenced in a letter from Axworthy to Robin Cook requesting UK 
support for a commission and described as offering the ‘first elements of an answer’.330 The 
relationship between Annan and Axworthy was known to be a good one, with shared 
political and ideational preferences.331 While very different personalities, mutual respect 
was an important lubricating factor in motivating and facilitating the Canadian response. 
Specifically, the nature and substance of Annan’s challenge, including the highly negative 
reactions it provoked, provided the key push. Rather than following the lead laid down by 
Annan’s ‘vision’ state responses had instead remained ‘driven by rigid notions of 
sovereignty and narrow conceptions of national interest’.332 That said, Axworthy’s criticism 
was not exclusively reserved for states, accusing the UN Secretariat of ‘timidity’ in failing to 
‘push the envelope’.333  
 
While Axworthy’s identification of a ‘loss of momentum’ in the debate underpinned 
Canada’s subsequent advocacy of an international commission, the processes to establish 
such an initiative would come up against on-going state opposition, general 
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apathy/disinterest, and issues of political ownership which resulted in minimal state 
reciprocation to Canada’s proposals. Axworthy’s vision for the development of HS, along 
with his conviction that states needed to determine a way forward would – much like 
Annan’s – come crashing into a realpolitik roadblock. Moreover, Axworthy’s acceptance of 
the SG’s private counsel that a UN-mandated Commission would prove to be too politically 
fraught, makes his criticism of the UN Secretariat seem rather unfair and misdirected. From 
this perspective, seeking to understand in greater detail the political realities behind the 
emergence of ICISS enables us to identify key elements or analysis lacking in current 
accounts of the R2P. Most notably, the HS vision which so clearly inspired, motivated and 
framed Axworthy’s entrepreneurial response, would ultimately have limited resonance or 
state support – in this specific issue-area – beyond acceptance of the basic principles of 
sovereignty as responsibility.334 It did not define, in any serious way, the development of the 
R2P from 2001 onwards which conceptually was progressively narrowed, and negotiated 
down. Even Canadian governmental support for HS would be considerably more qualified 
post-2000. However, although the political dynamics of this are most prominently evident in 
the post-entrepreneurial phase which reveals how R2P filtered into and fared in the 
international policy stream, a number of key obstacles which help explain the limited 
agreement of 2005 were already identifiable during this entrepreneurial phase. Thus, 
pinpointing them here establishes key contrast points for later chapters and shows that 
what survived this latter phase bared little resemblance to ICISS’s elaboration of R2P, and 
why this should come as little surprise.335 
 
Axworthy formally launched ICISS at the UN on the 14 September 2000 – a week after Jean 
Chrétien had revealed Canada’s intention to do so in his speech to the Millennium 
Summit336. Announcing it at the UN was no coincidence. It was designed to give profile to 
the initiative and to embed the Commission report within the UN system by revealing 
Canada’s intention to present the findings to the 56th GA Session in 2001.337 This was in 
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recognition that the UN would remain the most important venue for realising any future 
progress in this area. However, the association was only indirect. ICISS received no formal 
UN-authority or backing beyond the personal support of Annan. Indeed, by design, 
emphasis was placed on ICISS’s ‘independence’ in contributing ‘to building a broader 
understanding of the issue, and to foster a global political consensus on how to move 
forward’.338 Nevertheless, though promoting ‘debate’ was a primary objective, ICISS’s 
mandating – including its structures and links to Axworthy – contributed to a perception of 
an implied direction for the Commission’s work from the outset, and one which officials and 
Commissioners would work hard to counter.339 The foreword to the ICISS report would 
explain its work was about ‘the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take 
coercive – and in particular military – action against another state for the purpose of 
protecting people at risk in that other state’.340 But at its press conference launch, Axworthy 
explained ICISS was established to ‘ensure that…indifference and inaction’ by the 
international community when faced by the likes of Rwanda and Srebrenica were ‘no longer 
an option’.341 Accordingly, ‘where states are unable, or unwilling to protect their citizens, 
the UN – and in particular the SC – has a special responsibility to act.342 Clearly this language 
was striking for its normative character.343 There was little doubt in Axworthy’s mind that 
humanitarian intervention was a legitimate tool and that this had to be the basis for any 
subsequent normative advance. As Axworthy wrote to Cook, he wanted a Commission with 
a ‘strong political mandate and orientation’ which would ‘prepare [a] political-legal 
framework for international action’.344  
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It was clear that inspiration for the Commission, and indeed aspiration for its work, was 
provided by the 1987 Brundtland World Commission on Environment and Development.345 
Brundtland provided the intellectual blueprints for ICISS based upon its immensely 
successful concept of ‘sustainable development’ which fused concern for increasing 
environmental pressures with the need for continued human economic development.346 
This reconciliation – which Axworthy described as having ‘changed the way we think and do 
business’ – demonstrated the importance of language and evidence of what might be 
possible in this case.347 Indeed, the narrowing of Axworthy’s HS agenda had indicated pre-
ICISS this kind of thinking.348 
 
 
 
ICISS consisted of twelve Commissioners, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohammed 
Sahnoun, an Advisory Board chaired by Axworthy, a Research Directorate based at the CUNY 
Graduate Center and a Secretariat based in DFAIT led by Jill Sinclair and Heidi Hulan.349 The 
Commission’s structural form remained largely consistent throughout a conceptual and 
establishment phase which lasted upwards of nine months, with the last few months 
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particularly intense.350 However, while there was little derogation in terms of what a 
Commission should look like, Canadian ambitions were progressively eroded by political 
obstacles. According to Christopher Cushing, that it was a Canadian-sponsored initiative was 
effectively the least desirable option.351 International was meant to imply state support and 
buy-in beyond Canada and the regional representation of its individual participants.  
 
Canada’s advocacy of an ‘International Commission on Humanitarian Intervention’ was 
revealed publically in June 2000.352 This initial idea was proposed in early 2000 by DFAIT 
officials Don Hubert and Jill Sinclair based on the logic that the more ‘abstract’ issue of 
humanitarian intervention posed a problem which needed ‘intellectual work’.353 According 
to Hubert, ‘there was a problem of how the issue was framed, how it was talked about, 
what our language was’.354 The potential benefits of a Commission included external and 
independent consideration of an international issue; enabling specificity of mandate; the 
opportunity to carefully select its composition; and the ability to put in place a set timetable 
defining a future outcome.355 With Axworthy’s support and direction, Canadian officials 
(particularly Sinclair, Hulan and Cushing) would begin the process of trying to put in place 
the strongest option, or ‘angle’ they could. During this phase officials would show admirable 
persistence and flexibility, adapting as ‘events unfolded and preferred options fell to the 
wayside’.356 From the outset, it was agreed that its potential effectiveness would depend 
upon political leadership and ‘serious political sponsorship’.357 However, the key tenets of 
the policy-making approach which had served Axworthy so well on other initiatives would 
prove to be considerably less amenable to the contentiousness of humanitarian 
intervention.  
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Although ICISS represented a continuation of the HS agenda from the Canadian perspective, 
it did not command widespread State support, or reflect any shared imperative to respond. 
State responses to the Canadian proposal admittedly varied, but there was an almost 
universal lack of political support. This was evidenced by the difficulties officials faced in 
trying to realise their preferred options, of which there were broadly three. Option 1 was for 
a major International Commission which would carry the support or endorsement of a 
broad coalition of governments’.358 Option 2 was for a UN Commission established under 
the initiative of the SG. Option 3 was for a Canadian-sponsored Commission. The 
establishment process was not, however, a simple case of moving from one option to the 
other as obstacles got in the way. It was much more fluid. Officials identified a series of 
options early-on followed by constant diplomacy/dialoguing as they worked towards 
achieving the most politically viable formulation they could. As such, consistent with this 
effort to realise a genuinely ‘international’ initiative, a number of hybrid options were also 
considered. One such example included a core group of sponsoring governments joining 
together akin to a ‘like-minded’ coalition.359 
 
The process was defined by extensive bilateral consultations, the feedback from which ruled 
out either of the first two options, or any other associated hybrid options. Cushing’s 
recollection of this bilateral process, which involved a very large number of states, reveals a 
highly unreceptive political context: reactions ranged from outright opposition, general 
scepticism and disinterest in the taking on such a difficult issue, to politically vain responses 
relating to political ownership of the idea.360 Annan’s rejection of a full UN Commission was 
entirely understandable. Nevertheless, the interweaving of two of the most important R2P 
entrepreneurs at a meeting in Atlanta at the 20th anniversary celebrations of CNN would 
prove particularly important. Although in one sense providing a knock to Axworthy’s efforts, 
Annan’s willingness to support a Canadian-sponsored Commission provided an additional 
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impetus to act.361 Annan’s advice reflected his deep understanding of the UN system, and, 
as it turned out, would prove to be fully justified having already exposed the limitations 
inherent within his own system.362 Indeed, his subsequent public and private support for 
R2P was essential to its development, and while based predominantly on the essence of an 
idea which resonated strongly, this early prior commitment to follow-up was 
unquestionably important.363 
 
Despite such political difficulties Axworthy remained committed to respond, demonstrating 
his willingness to take an alternative path regardless of the obstacles. Canada continually 
sought additional political sponsorship and support, but from mid-summer onwards the 
Canadian-sponsored option became the reality.364 It is certainly likely that Canada’s 
proposal was a more difficult sell because of its association with Axworthy’s uniquely strong 
normative agenda. However, this would paradoxically be less important when it became 
clear Canada would have to effectively assume complete ownership of all aspects of it. 
Officials would seek to emphasise independence and balance, but the most pressing focus 
shifted from attempting to win additional state support to trying to put in place the best 
Commission they could. Moreover, whilst considerable emphasis has been placed here on 
seeking to embed our understanding of ICISS within the political context of the time, 
particularly in terms of how this context conditioned the possibilities for a collective 
response, successful entrepreneurship more often than not depends upon the 
demonstration of qualities which go beyond such constraints. As Cushing points out, you 
rarely get your preferred option; diplomacy ‘is about getting what you can from the real 
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world’.365 The relationship between the ‘real world’ and this entrepreneurial phase is 
undoubtedly crucial to our understanding of the political development of the R2P. But 
equally important is recognising that in face of opposition and indifference Axworthy’s 
commitment to act did not waiver. It is for this reason that his leadership, underpinned by 
the persistence and professionalism of his department, deserves considerable credit. His 
initiative set the R2P ball rolling and established the key institutional structures – notably 
the ICISS Secretariat within DFAIT – which helped lock-in future Canadian advocacy and 
sponsorship. 
 
Axworthy would assume personal responsibility for acquiring funding for the initiative, 
realising a $1m commitment from Cabinet, and additional significant contributions from a 
number of US-based private foundations.366 Additional state contributions arrived from 
Switzerland and the UK, with the latter providing just £10k towards the London roundtable 
– a commitment agreed after the launch of ICISS.367 Indeed, finalising the arrangements 
went on very late in the day. The most important aspect of this was determining its 
composition. Selecting the two co-chair positions to give North-South balance was 
particularly crucial. Although described by one official as ‘never a serious option’ Axworthy 
expressed a desire to Chair ICISS but was persuaded against doing so by ‘two or three’ of his 
staff.368 Accusations of a pre-cooked agenda would only have been further fuelled had 
Axworthy effectively appointed himself to such a position. However, an attempt to keep 
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Axworthy involved did lead to his appointment as Chair of the Advisory Board, which 
although genuinely designed to further build-in political follow-up, had limited impact on 
the report, and was subsequently described as a ‘mistake’ by one official close to the 
process.369 As it was, former Australian Foreign Minister Evans was formally appointed with 
Sahnoun in August 2000.370 Algerian Sahnoun was selected not only because he was from 
the global south, but because of his UN experience.371 He was not, however, the first choice. 
In fact, fellow countryman Lakhdar Brahimi was initially approached by DFAIT and Evans – 
an invitation which Brahimi ‘firmly refused’.372 A highly esteemed UN figure, Brahimi 
rejected the offer for two principal reasons. First, he was in the process of completing the 
Report on UN Peace Operations which militated against taking on another major 
commitment, and second, because of unease with the subject matter:  
 
The marvellous phrase "Responsibility to Protect" was not coined yet. The issue was 
"intervention", generally qualified as "humanitarian", and on that I shared the 
common view of countries from the South.373 
 
Brahimi’s viewpoint was widely shared. Indeed, after Evans’ appointment, recognition the 
term ‘humanitarian intervention’ was too ‘politically loaded’ led officials to change the 
name to “ICISS” in what was a strategically necessary development.374 The name change did 
not alter the fact that, at its heart, the Commission was about this, but did seek to package 
it in a more palatable way to avoid creating ‘panic’ amongst key constituencies which would 
ultimately need to be brought onside.375  
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Both co-chairs were regarded as successful appointments, with a comparatively good 
balance between them.376 Sahnoun’s ‘revered’ reputation in Africa was deemed an 
important asset, as was his ‘strategically smarter’ personality which complemented the 
undoubtedly brilliant but more ‘exposed’ Evans.377 The appointment of the remaining ten 
Commissioners – completed in a ‘chaotic’ short space of time – was based upon a 
combination of factors to balance an identified skill-set, but was also constrained by 
individual availability.378 This skill-set included: regional representation (to bring to the table 
different perspectives and backgrounds)379; a balance of experience and expertise (political, 
NGO/CS, military expertise, international law and academic background); and individuals 
with a capacity to write well. Personal reputation and connections were also important, as 
was their ability and credibility in dealing with a complex set of issues/debates.380  
 
ICISS’s credibility was part-dependent upon getting these selections right. Nevertheless, 
while achieving fair balance was always going to be difficult, ICISS was left vulnerable to 
accusations of Western-dominance with five Commissioners from this region, including two 
Canadians.381 The combined P5 representation of Russia and the US was seen as important; 
officials believed that if these could agree then this would show that common ground 
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existed to move forward.382 On the other hand, Asian representation was moderate and 
indeed questionable, considering it included none of the region’s most important powers. 
Equally, questions of balance extended to the lack of female participation.383 Despite 
approaching Louise Arbour and Sadako Ogata both were unable to commit, leaving this valid 
criticism a source of regret for Canadian officials.384 Before outlining the R2P proposals, it is 
important to note that all Commissioners were asked prior to appointment whether they 
bought into the central premise that the current international state of play was 
unacceptable – in other words whether they agreed that a problem existed. This was 
entirely consistent with the ICISS mandate but an important condition nevertheless. 
 
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
 
ICISS met on five occasions, once with the Advisory Board, and was supported in its work by 
eleven regional roundtables and national consultations.385 Its report The Responsibility to 
Protect was published in December 2001.386 It reflected the consensus of all the 
Commissioners, and was drafted – in a ‘genuinely cooperative approach’ – by Evans, 
Ignatieff and Thakur.387 Consistent with the politically-oriented mandate, the report was 
short and accessible.388 The ICISS working process has been covered in detail elsewhere, and 
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will be referenced here where necessary to illuminate the proposals.389 However, some 
points are worth mentioning. First, the roundtable consultations helped shape the positions 
of Commissioners on some issues, provided a cross-regional testing ground for ideas and 
proposals, and identified areas where progress might be possible or where compromise 
would prove more difficult to achieve.390 Second, the DFAIT-based Secretariat purposely 
adopted a ‘light touch’ posture towards the Commission’s intellectual work, mainly to avoid 
being seen as influencing rather than facilitating the outcome but also to incorporate some 
flexibility if the outcome proved undesirable.391 This was perhaps unlikely, however. The 
ICISS report was generally a comfortable fit for those who had been involved in shaping and 
defining Axworthy’s agenda. As Welsh et al point out ‘a great deal of the Commission’s 
language and concepts’ reflect the HS agenda that was so prominent a part of Canadian 
foreign policy in the 1990s’.392  
 
Intellectually underpinned by sovereignty as responsibility and the logic of the Brundtland 
formulation, ICISS would articulate in three words a simple, but beautifully packaged idea. 
Consistent with Axworthy’s argument that intervention and sovereignty had to be 
reconciled, ICISS argued the solution rested in sovereignty itself, and in language which 
moved away from a ‘right to intervene’ towards a ‘responsibility to protect’: 
 
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the 
protection of its people lies with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war 
insurgency, repression or state failure and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the 
international responsibility to protect.393 
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This formulation proposed a new and distinctive solution to the impasse which had defined 
the intervention debates. Rather than talking of rights, or dual concepts of sovereignty – 
which often illuminated polarisation rather than a path for reconciliation – R2P sought to 
reframe how sovereignty was perceived and understood. Emphasising primary responsibility 
was designed to positively reinforce state sovereignty. The mantra was responsibility the 
objective protection. There was more to ICISS’s proposals than the development of new 
language. Nevertheless, its linguistic contribution was immensely important to its 
development – albeit with positive and negative implications. Construction of the phrase 
was driven by the indelible contribution of Evans who aimed to develop a ‘conceptual 
toehold’ which people could ‘get hold of’, hopefully changing the way they think.394 That 
Evans presented the idea to his fellow Commissioners early in the process was certainly, as 
he acknowledges, somewhat ‘presumptuous’.395 Despite describing them as initially 
‘profoundly resistant’ ICISS’s proposals would ultimately centre on this powerful phrase.396 
 
It did so for a number of reasons. R2P directed the focus of attention onto people, capturing 
the essence of a ‘moral imperative’ to act in certain ‘exceptional’ cases which in so doing 
implied direct accountability for those with primary responsibility. Thus, at its core R2P 
articulated a notion of protection extremely difficult to oppose in principle.397 Additionally 
R2P responded to oft-expressed concerns regarding the association between ‘humanitarian’ 
and ‘intervention’. This concern was expressed during the ICISS roundtables, and 
particularly strongly by ICISS Commissioner and former President of the ICRC Cornelio 
Sommaruga.398 Finally, R2P offered some originality, particularly in its conceptual 
application, but at the same time appeared both ‘self-evident’ and ‘obvious’.399 It did not 
fundamentally depart from the development of international discourse but rather 
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represented a comfortable normative fit which flowed ‘naturally out of the discourse that 
[had] been around’.400  
 
Of course, ICISS recognised the humanitarian intervention debates were more complex and 
deep-rooted than to be addressed simply by language – however clever. ICISS would thus 
outline a broad series of proposals designed to address the most pressing and difficult 
issues. First among these was to embed R2P within a continuum of responsibilities 
composed of a responsibility to prevent, a responsibility to react, and a responsibility to 
rebuild.401 Accordingly, R2P was not exclusively about military intervention, but about a 
range of tools, strategies and responses – from diplomacy to coercion. This continuum logic 
was entirely understandable. It built-on existing international thinking, and was borne out 
by emphasis on prevention and rebuilding during the regional consultations. It was also 
consistent with the focus on primary responsibility, designed to help guard against fears R2P 
would provide the basis for greater uses of military intervention, rather than it being seen as 
a last resort option. As Evans explains, the crucial need ‘was to come up with a total 
approach to this that did not just frighten the horses. That motivated governments to 
respond appropriately to create an environment in which the immediate reflex response 
would not be “that’s none of our business”...but to create an environment in which the 
reflex response was “we should do something, yes this is our responsibility”’.402  
 
Inevitably, different situations warrant different kind of responses, and the essential focus 
of protecting people from mass atrocities would benefit from preventing them in the first 
place.403 Nevertheless, the continuum argument would contribute to a series of issues 
which, over time, would threaten to undermine and erode the utility, novelty, and narrow 
focus of R2P (albeit in a form very different to the one presented by ICISS). Generally these 
issues would be united by difficulties and disagreement of definition and timing. Indeed, in a 
stinging critique of the R2-Prevent, Thomas Weiss would take umbrage at the statements 
that (1) prevention was the ‘single most important dimension’ of R2P, and (2) ‘less intrusive 
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and coercive measures [be] considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are 
applied’404 arguing these were ‘highly situational’ priorities.405 Furthermore, Weiss would 
describe priority (1) as ‘preposterous’ because much of the ‘superficially attractive’ language 
on prevention was a ‘highly unrealistic way to try and pretend that we can finesse the hard 
issues of what essentially amounts to humanitarian intervention’.406 A similar view was 
expressed by one Canadian official, who described prevention as necessary for the purposes 
of agreement, but something which added very little of substance.407 Weiss’ argument that 
R2-Prevent ‘obscured’ the most pressing aspect of the R2P, namely to react better, has 
some merit. The problem lay in that the need to enhance palatability concomitantly had the 
potential to erode the definitional focus of R2P – the parameters of which were ultimately 
designed to limit the focus onto mass atrocity crimes. But this meant there was a risk R2P 
would be too broadly applied, with the characterisation of real world situations as R2P, 
including in the preventive stage, particularly lacking in clarity. Aside from damaging its own 
credibility, this could also threaten to undermine well-embedded more benign strands of 
prevention and protection. Indeed, defining what constituted a live R2P-crisis would emerge 
as a major obstacle. Not least because R2P would remain associated with 
military/humanitarian intervention, which, combined with misguided invocations, would 
invoke – for many states – negative connotations of a Western-dominated agenda.408 ICISS 
certainly attempted to condition the debates with the intellectual agenda they proposed. 
But unavoidably its report was ‘very heavily’ focused on the military dimension, reflecting 
the ‘currency’ of the time and the simple fact that ICISS was formed in response to the 
challenge of humanitarian intervention.409 As such, its proposals were always going to be 
strongly associated with, and arguably judged, by its contribution in this area. 
Unsurprisingly, the responsibility to react and the issue of right authority (dealt with in a 
separate chapter), would expose the most difficult areas of discussion leading to 
compromises inevitably evident in its final report.410    
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ICISS endorsed the position that military force was a legitimate policy option in ‘extreme 
and exceptional cases’.411 Recognising this lacked definition, ICISS outlined an elaborate 
framework consisting of a just cause threshold and a set of just war ‘precautionary’ 
principles.412 The latter consisting of right intention, last resort, proportional means, and 
reasonable prospects were apparently agreed with little difficulty.413 While consistent with 
the various other attempts to develop decision-making criteria, the substance of the 
proposals, combined with the equally consistent lack of political support for them, meant 
the prospects for success were extremely limited from the outset. This is not to completely 
disregard their utility as a useful guide. But it is to say that codification can never displace 
hard-edged, political realities. To suggest otherwise would be based on the pursuit of 
analytical distinction which is, in actuality, fallacious. More directly, ICISS’s argument that 
each ‘condition’ had ‘to be met at the outset’ was particularly problematic, overestimating 
the clarity of their proposals.414 Rather than the ‘clear guidelines’ ICISS suggested they were, 
such criteria would always be open to interpretation, and carry their own ‘inherent’ 
difficulties.415 
 
They each raise questions and points of debate. The argument for right intention, that the 
‘primary purpose of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering’ is highly 
questionable, and in practice would arguably represent regression rather than 
progression.416 Although acknowledging so-called ‘mixed motives’, it is debatable whether 
one could pinpoint an intervention where humanitarian objectives were evidently the 
principal motivation.417 Moreover, as Kosovo demonstrated, democratic political constraints 
are very real. Interventions often require evidence of national interest in order to justify, or 
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make more palatable, the inherent risks and costs associated with such a course of action. In 
such circumstances, the legitimating discourse of politicians will almost inevitably – out of 
pragmatic necessity – emphasise this dimension.418 Thus, determining whether altruism is 
actually the primary motive would prove to be extremely difficult. Besides which, ICISS’s 
argument that ‘good international citizenship is a matter of national self-interest’ as a way 
to answer the potential for non-altruistic reactions or ‘demands’ by domestic audiences, 
underplays, as Welsh et al. argue, the ‘serious political barriers…decision-makers face’ 
including whether in fact leaders should put their own citizens in harm’s way in order to 
protect the lives of those elsewhere.419 More fundamentally, ICISS arguably overstated the 
extent to which the majority of States defined their interests in a way which would lead to 
more concerted action to protect people, and, that while R2P attempted to change the 
‘referent object for analysis’ to those who need protection, identifying motive in such a 
principal way served to reinforce the view – even with the progressive emphasis on 
responsibility – that the level of focus would remain directed onto those who can do 
something, rather than those who cannot.420 
 
Additional practical difficulties are also relevant. For instance, last resort and reasonable 
prospects are challenged by issues of timing and temporality which in part define their 
purpose. What actually represents a ‘reasonable prospect for success’ is open to 
interpretation and dependent upon how one defines ‘success’ and according to what 
timescale.421  Similarly, determining when military force becomes a last resort is open to a 
raft of interpretations. The points at which diplomatic efforts become exhausted or where 
sanctions fail to achieve their objective are ultimately political judgement calls which cannot 
be specified or formulated with any tangible exactitude in advance. It may be the case, as 
Weiss argues, that coercive action ‘may make sense sooner rather than later’.422 Indeed, 
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these problems are relevant to the implicit theme throughout: that aside from issues of 
political will and interest, determining when and in what form the multilateral system kicks-
in is at any stage subject to political difficulties which R2P was unable to address. 
Furthermore, even without criteria the eventual formulation of R2P would provide states 
additional opportunity to argue over the various transition points between primary state 
responsibility and international engagement – with ample room for delay and avoidance on 
both sides. Meanwhile, R2P would provide a linguistic basis for broader applications and 
political appropriations which ICISS had attempted to guard against with this framework.423 
ICISS’s intention was to narrow R2P’s focus to limit the broad and abusive use of 
humanitarian justifications. However, while a just cause threshold was a central plank for 
achieving this; its definition would be troubled by differences of opinion between its 
Commissioners. Consequently, ICISS argued that for military intervention ‘to be warranted, 
there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings or imminently likely 
to occur, of the following kind: 
 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, 
which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability 
to act, or a failed state situation; or 
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by 
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape’.424 
 
In principle, the logic of defining limited conditions is sensible.425 In practice, however, 
arriving at agreement on when it is ‘right to fight’ is one of the most challenging aspects of 
jus ad bellum. That there is no ‘[generally accepted] comprehensive and exact definition’ of 
just cause was reflected in ICISS’s deliberations, its proposals, and particularly in the real 
world debates post-9/11.426 Although right to avoid quantifying ‘large scale’ the inclusion of 
the threshold served to highlight just how politically difficult arriving at common consensus 
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on such matters is likely to be.427 As Adam Roberts argues, the preventive dimension of 
intervention means its resulting ‘rationale...must depend crucially, not on actual crimes or 
hard numbers, but on speculative judgements about the likely future course of events in a 
given country’.428 
 
This problem was exacerbated by the emphasis on primary responsibility, which, although 
necessary to reinforce the norm of non-intervention (i.e. intervention permitted only in 
exceptional cases), highlighted the problem from a different perspective. It added into the 
mix the question of whether individual state responsibility was in fact exhausted. A long-
standing problem with just cause is that there will be claims to ‘justice’ on both sides.429 It is 
true this does not imply reflexive ‘moral equivalency’, and that the nature and history of the 
regime and situation in question will condition the credibility of such claims, nevertheless it 
builds in the possibility for delay, and contestation about where the means and 
responsibility to address a situation actually resides. Individual states will be positioned to 
argue they are working towards realising their responsibility/demands of the international 
community, perhaps even directly invoking the language of R2P. Although accepting that 
your own words can hurt you, they can also provide an instrumental basis for avoidance and 
delay. This is especially possible where there is disunity at the international-level – either 
because of a genuine lack of agreement, or because it may suit those with little interest/will 
to act, or those who remain essentially opposed to any determinations potentially leading 
to international intervention for humanitarian reasons.  
 
Additionally, a fundamental problem with any such threshold relates to what crimes or 
situations would justifiably warrant the use of military action. This problem is particularly 
acute in the area ICISS sought to address. A comparison with self-defence (with its explicit 
basis under Article 51 of the UN Charter) exposes the political dilemma ICISS faced: of 
attempting to define a threshold high enough to guard against fears of exploitation – 
keeping in mind the embedded status of non-intervention under Article 2(7) – but at the 
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same time does not set the bar so high it arbitrarily precludes a series of crimes, human 
rights abuses or other threats to civilians which may justify international action. ICISS 
wrestled with this issue, with alternative viewpoints on how ambitious, or limited, it should 
be.430 
 
Resulting compromise was a set of proposals which lacked specificity and includes the 
optimistic assumption that ‘large scale’ would not, in most cases, ‘generate major 
disagreement’.431 Furthermore, ICISS was arguably regressive, excessively narrowing its 
threshold by omitting precedents already set by the SC – most notably external action to 
restore an elected government as was the case in Haiti in 1994, and Sierra Leone in 1997.432 
Indeed, during the development of the PoC the SC did not caveat its preparedness to 
respond to deliberate targeting of civilians with such a genocidal or ‘large-scale’ 
threshold.433 Meanwhile, the language of ‘actual or apprehended’ while potentially 
incorporating necessary flexibility, returns us back to the dilemma of how its threshold 
conditions are to be determined, and crucially at what point? The issue of timing means the 
distinction between various types of threats to civilians, including those below the ICISS 
threshold, will be marginal and open to interpretation. Likewise the evidence base one uses 
is dependent upon how it is actually assessed.434 Here ICISS struggled, arguing that ‘ideally’ a 
‘universally respected and impartial non-government source’ would provide reports on a 
particular crisis situation.435 In reality, however, member states would not be willing to cede 
control of the decision-making process in such a way, and besides which – as Welsh cautions 
– even where facts are ‘reasonably clear’ states will continue to take into account ‘order, 
stability, and self-interest’ in this sense representing only ‘necessary, and not sufficient, 
conditions for a decision to intervene’.436  
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The lack of SC authorisation for Kosovo provided the backdrop to the Commission’s work. 
Unsurprisingly, the question of right authority represented the single most challenging issue 
on which ICISS would struggle to reach agreement.437 How to address a lack of SC authority 
was, according to one official involved, a ‘red-flag’ issue raised by Sahnoun in particular.438 
As it was, agreement arrived late in the process, with Lee Hamilton the last to join the 
consensus ‘in the last hour of our last meeting’.439 Hamilton’s position not only reflected a 
traditional US desire to avoid being exclusively tied to the SC, but was also based on the not 
unreasonable question of what states should do in the event of a SC veto, or threat of, in a 
similar, or even more obvious, humanitarian crisis?440 It is reasonable because 
fundamentally legality and legitimacy are not of the same character. Just as a legally 
authorised intervention can lack legitimacy, or see its legitimacy eroded by how it is 
conducted, so an intervention could take place without initial explicit legal authority, but 
has a strong prima facie case for legitimacy, which may also lead to subsequent SC 
endorsement.441 It is certainly true there are numerous potential formulations, and 
associated complexities with arguments relating to legitimacy vis-à-vis legality, but the point 
is nevertheless evident. On the other side of the argument, some Commissioners were 
equally adamant ICISS was not going to offer any comfort or explicit support for action 
outside the SC context.442 Resultantly, ICISS outlined a formulation which – at its core – was 
SC approval.443 It was the ‘prerequisite for legality’.444 Not wishing to consider alternatives 
to the primacy of the SC would prove to be pragmatic. As subsequent chapters show, 
political necessity would bind R2P to the SC in such a way that supporters of humanitarian 
intervention would deem it excessively narrow, and in some respects regressive. The 
problem for ICISS lay with the general formula they adopted which was overly optimistic 
and perhaps more elaborate than necessary. Mirroring previously arguments by Annan, 
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ICISS sought to tie the credibility of the SC, and indeed the UN, to its capacity and willingness 
to realise its R2P.445  
 
Accordingly, the challenge was to make the SC ‘work much better than it has’.446 To achieve 
this ICISS proposed a P5 ‘code of conduct’ whereby a P5 member would agree not to deploy 
the veto to block an otherwise majority resolution ‘in matters where its vital national 
interests were not claimed to be involved’.447 Even if, in theory, such a proposal appeared 
achievable, the practical obstacles would remain immensely difficult. Aside from a lack of 
willingness of P5 members to limit their prerogatives in such a way, achieving consensus 
regarding what national interest actually meant would be particularly problematic – with 
systemic and domestic pressures at play.448 For example, China’s 1999 veto of a resolution 
to extend a peacekeeping mandate in Macedonia was based upon anger and sensitivity at 
Macedonia’s establishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan a few weeks earlier.449 Although 
highly critical of this veto, which he describes as ‘so far removed from their immediate 
national interest as recognisable by anybody else that it was an offence against the 
multilateral system’, Jeremy Greenstock nevertheless rightly cautions that attempts to 
realise such a proposal would lead to a ‘clause’ which, in its attempt to define national 
interest, would be ‘very convoluted’.450 
 
Not only that, but such a code would still require the inevitable caveat that each case should 
be determined on its own merits; according to its own circumstances. This would inevitably 
condition any assessment of how reasonable or unreasonable a (potential) veto would then 
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be – particularly in recognition that there are numerous potential points of difference in any 
decision to intervene even if some are admittedly more genuine than others. As Kosovo 
showed, objections from Russia – and within the UN Secretariat – related to whether 
diplomacy had in fact been exhausted, and whether or not the use of military force was an 
appropriate course of action. In this regard, what may be more necessary, but no easier to 
achieve is a more credible ‘set of relationships’ between the P5 members, defined by 
increased levels of trust and understanding which could lead to greater consensus and less 
pronounced objections to ideas of intervention to protect people.451 Moreover, it is also 
worth considering that the inability to overcome a veto/veto-threat may be a result of a 
failure by those who table a resolution, to deploy, with sufficient force and astuteness, the 
kind of political arguments and diplomatic strategies necessary to enhance P5 engagement, 
and ultimately involvement with any subsequent decision. As Greenstock remarks, in some 
cases ‘those who are putting down a resolution that might be vetoed are as responsible for 
the breakdown as the vetoer’.452 These debates aside, the potential that the SC would ever 
agree to adopting such a code was one of the least likely ICISS proposals. 
 
There were additional problems with ICISS’s proposals. First, arguing the SC needed to work 
better resulted in an implicit association with the longstanding toxic issue of SC reform. 
Although ICISS explicitly attempted to sidestep this issue it did at least acknowledge that 
reform – widely seem in terms of enlargement and enhanced representation – would not 
necessarily improve SC decision-making.453 Furthermore, ICISS’s understandable insistence 
that SC approval should be sought first ‘in all cases’ raised its own issues, particularly if the 
SC is unable or unwilling to authorise an intervention.454 In the run-up to NATO’s action in 
Kosovo a concern for German policy-makers, for instance, was that a formal rejection of a 
resolution would carry a legal weight which would be hard to overcome.455 In effect, the 
ability to plead necessity in mitigation would be hindered by such a clear statement of the 
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SC. Whether or not a credible position, it provides an example of some of the fine political 
and legal balances at play.  
 
This is not intended, however, to imply any issue with the SC’s legal centrality, or in seeking 
to engage the SC as early as possible in an unfolding humanitarian situation. In fact, the 
often drawn-out processes of SC decision-making make this more important. But it does 
demonstrate that a formal authorisation request, if rejected, could pose significant 
problems for those who regard action as necessary and for the very basis of international 
law. Alternatively of course, action which neither seeks nor has SC approval similarly has the 
potential to undermine the authority of the SC and the UN. ICISS’s response was, 
pragmatically, to avoid ruling out the possibility of action in certain cases where the SC is 
unable or unwilling to do so itself.456 Indeed, with the R2P crafted as much a moral calling as 
it is anything else, should the SC not react accordingly it does not merely dissipate in 
response. As Roberts argues, while SC approval is of ‘inestimable value’ it is ‘not possible to 
conclude that in every case such formal approval is essential to international acceptance of 
a particular operation’.457  
 
That said, ICISS ultimately and wisely placed R2P in the domain of the SC. Despite its many 
political failings and inadequacies, the harsh truth is that the solution ultimately rests in its 
hands, with alternative institutional proposals such a so-called ‘league of democracies’ or 
other formulations of ‘coalitions of the willing’ loaded with all kinds of difficult and 
dangerous consequences.458 Of course this meant the issue of political will, which ICISS 
hoped to address with the combination of its proposals pressuring the SC to act for the sake 
of its own credibility, including under the pressure of world opinion, would remain most 
challenging. However, ICISS’s alternatives if it failed to act, of turning, for instance, to the GA 
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through the Uniting for Peace procedure, more reflected a lack of agreement between 
commissioners than a realistic or desirable policy option.459 There is little reason to believe 
this route offers an approach for enforcing R2P. The GA is arguably more politically difficult 
than the SC, with its processes slow and unwieldy, and composed of a majority of states 
who remain strongly committed to non-intervention.460 Moreover, as with the proposed 
criteria and code of conduct, the likelihood the SC would cede control in such a way was, 
and remains, minimal to say the least. 
 
There was more credibility to the option of action pursued by regional organisations.461 
However, this has its own complexities, particularly in cases where state consent is lacking, 
but also because the willingness of regional organisations to act in such a way has not been 
generally evident.462 Indeed, increased regional action may represent a dangerous 
precedent, both in terms of not wishing to erode the SC’s centrality but also by building-in 
tensions regarding an apparent universal responsibility. While accepting that it would not be 
possible to ‘find consensus around any set of proposals for military intervention which 
acknowledge the validity of any intervention not authorized by the SC or GA’ the problem 
for ICISS was that the Kosovo intervention which inspired its establishment did not lead to a 
formulation politically capable of adequately addressing the relationship between R2P and 
action outside of the UN context.463 That Ramesh Thakur can subsequently state that ‘even 
now if you brought the twelve commissioners together you would get a difference of 
opinion on whether or not that was justified or not’ and the statement ‘Kosovo did not meet 
the tests we put out in that it was not UN authorised’ shows just how difficult this issue was 
always going to be.464 It is apt therefore that one Canadian official would describe ICISS’s 
efforts in this area as somewhat ‘tortured’.465  
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A better option might have been to argue that the concept of domestic law necessity be 
applied to the international context as justification for violating the law in extreme cases. 
This approach avoids attempts to define or codify action outside the SC and gives scope for 
some form of subsequent endorsement. It would also have been generally consistent with 
key aspects of ICISS’s position. Indeed, an opening for this line of approach was evident in its 
mention of ex post facto authorisation – as was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone –and 
which ‘might conceivably have been obtained in the Kosovo and Rwanda cases, and may 
offer a way out of the dilemma should any case occur again in the future’.466 ICISS could 
have pursed this as an argument for a necessity clause/defence. As Evans has ‘subsequently 
discovered’ pleading ‘mitigation’ was a ‘better way’ than the more ‘complex argument’ that 
the SC would be ‘shooting itself politically in the foot if it makes the wrong decision’.467 The 
key point to bear in mind is that mitigation – as Hans Corell makes clear – is not defined in a 
formulaic or codified way.468 There are inevitable issues with this approach, and it would 
certainly demand high-levels of rigour to avoid political abuses. However, on balance 
necessity represents a better approach than considerably more contentious attempts to 
arrive at alternative institutional or legal formulations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Much of the focus on ICISS’s proposals has been purposefully directed at the reactive stage 
of the responsibility continuum. While ICISS attempted to argue R2P was not simply about 
military action – and there is undoubtedly merit to this argument – considering its genesis 
and the context of the debates of the 1990s, one has to recognise that R2P was always 
going to be associated with the coercive dimension of protection. ICISS would not have put 
so much effort into trying to define the conditions under which force may be used were this 
not the case. ICISS hoped its proposals would address the many longstanding concerns the 
humanitarian intervention debates had provoked. Action without SC authorisation – as in 
Kosovo – but also the cases of inaction – most notably in Rwanda – where the obstacles to 
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action were generally regarded as a lack of will rather than concerns for Rwandan 
sovereignty, captured the complexity of the issues ICISS was attempting to deal with.  
 
To summarise, ICISS’s formulation of R2P – mirroring Axworthy’s thinking – was based on 
the contention that human rights and sovereignty, and intervention and sovereignty were 
not at incompatible concepts but reconcilable. Accordingly, they argued, there was an 
emerging consensus that sovereignty implied responsibility and that this should provide the 
conceptual framework rather than ‘humanitarian intervention’ or a ‘right to intervene’. 
Indeed, for Alex Bellamy, debates over the legality and legitimacy of force in Kosovo had 
actually ‘masked a deeper consensus about sovereignty as responsibility’, and, despite 
having negative short-term implications, in the ‘longer term’ created an ‘impetus...for 
resolving apparent tensions between sovereignty and human rights most clearly manifested 
in ICISS and the activism of Kofi Annan’ which ‘helped progress and clarify the appropriate 
licensing authority for the use of force’. In his view, given this ‘broad consensus’ evident in 
Kosovo ‘it is not surprising that agreement was reached on the adoption of…R2P in 2005’.469  
 
However, this reading of the development of sovereignty as responsibility and R2P is highly 
questionable. Kosovo was undoubtedly a key catalyst as evident throughout, but to suggest 
that it contributed to resolving the relationship between human rights and sovereignty 
particularly lacks credibility. Indeed, the specific mechanics of the subsequent development 
of R2P, notably during the WS process, shows that the formulation states adopted was 
heavily state centric in order to convince sceptical states it did not represent any movement 
beyond what the UN Charter already provided for. Moreover, that agreement was achieved 
in 2005 was surprising and related more to a series of structural and other political factors 
than any broad willingness to embrace an idea implying an explicit international R2P which 
could lead to international action – including external intervention (Ch5). Furthermore, 
R2P’s potential use as a powerful device for avoiding responsibility by actually reinforcing 
state control over a specific situation cannot be overlooked as a genuine concern. Indeed, 
although this thesis suggests that by applying the logic of ‘unpacking’ to the R2P one can 
identify solid elements of agreement; this does not mean that when constituted as a whole, 
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the distinction is entirely sustainable in the way Bellamy’s approach would suggest. As the 
previous points implied, R2P was intended to address those issues relating to the action and 
inaction of the international community in the face of mass atrocity crimes. Thus, the form 
of R2P, with its emphasis on individual state responsibility, cannot be detached from the 
international dimension, especially the institutional procedural modalities for intervention. 
The latter are absolutely central to it. R2P was never simply about qualifying sovereignty but 
about doing so in a way which could lead to associated behavioural changes. As such 
although one can observe a willingness to support the strong emphasis on individual state 
responsibility, the motivations of states for doing so varies considerably, which in turn 
impacts upon how credible the R2P is in terms of its likelihood for motivating action at the 
international-level. Reversely, the numerous obstacles and complexities provoked by the 
international dimension of R2P – many of which were discussed in some form above – 
similarly impacts upon the credibility of the individual state dimension.  
 
The justification for addressing such points here is that for all ICISS’s effort its best-case 
scenario (of SC and GA endorsement of its proposals), had immensely unlikely political 
prospects.470 For instance, the UK’s SC-focused efforts from 1999-2001 exposed how 
difficult it would be to agree a framework for intervention amongst the P5. Even with 
greater inbuilt flexibility, the UK proposals provided a hard lesson regarding the limits of 
what might be achievable. This is relevant not simply to illuminate the negative political 
possibilities in this area, but because post-2001 some ICISS commissioners would 
increasingly argue the potential constraining power of criteria. The problem with this 
argument is that it only has merit insofar as there is evidence that the States who need to 
be signed-up to such criteria display any willingness to do so. Trying to sell to sceptical or 
fearful GA States the benefits of criteria is naive when the P5 are united by an unwillingness 
to constrain their scope of action in such a way. 
 
Of course, it would be unfair not to recognise David Malone’s insightful point that 
Commissions need to ‘look beyond what is achievable in the short term’. Nevertheless, the 
suggestion that ICISS based its proposals on ‘international politics as [they] think it should 
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be rather than as it is’ is more telling.471 ICISS wanted to have ‘real world’ impact.472 But 
instead, the Commission’s proposals often lacked a sense of political realism by ignoring the 
actual state of play regarding the multilateral capacity of UN member states to arrive at 
consensus on common values and principles for the implementation of an idea as 
potentially transformative as R2P. It is similarly for this reason that the reference to state 
motivation is a more central consideration than some may wish to acknowledge. The 
assertion that the 2005 agreement was surprising is based upon an analysis of R2P’s 
development, particularly how the agreement was possible considering the difficult political 
circumstances post-9/11. This of course derives from the process-driven hypothesis and the 
contentions expressed in Ch1 regarding the theoretical and methodological tools required 
to understand normative development. But it was also reinforced through the interviewing 
phase which repeatedly generated responses which suggested that far from commanding 
unanimous support a considerable majority of member states remain committed to more 
traditional notions of sovereignty vis-à-vis the role of the international community. As one 
ambassador intimately involved in the negotiations suggested, a significant majority of the 
states who signed-up to R2P maintained positions predominantly defined by continuing 
fundamental objections to an evolution towards a hierarchical international system based 
upon responsibility, oversight and external intervention.473 As another put it there is a 
persistent belief that sovereignty continues to trump human rights.474 Suggestions that 
these arguments were made exclusively by those who oppose R2P (or the idea of) would be 
wrong. In fact, the expression of scepticism and the identification of obstacles were 
articulated by those most directly involved in its development and negotiation. Neither 
should one assume such criticism was exclusively directed at the G77 or NAM, it was also 
directed at key Western countries whose agendas have most closely been associated to the 
cause and development of human rights, and R2P. These criticisms matter because as the 
introduction emphasized, the post-2005 focus of R2P advocates has shifted towards its 
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operationalization. However, considering these questions about the extent of member state 
commitment to R2P, one has to question the solidity of the foundations on which 
operationalization can be based? And how closely matched is the understanding and 
explanation of the R2P presented in the remaining two chapters to the academic literature 
and R2Ps most committed supporters? Certainly the oft-expressed reliance on the apparent 
‘unanimity’ of the agreement is not in itself sufficient to explain its collective meaning or 
how agreement was realised.  
 
Thus, the shift from the entrepreneurial/norm brokerage phase captured here, to the hard 
politics of trying to win support for the R2P idea which consumes resulting chapters, is 
immensely important. It reveals just how difficult the political context proved to be, and just 
how qualified one’s perception of the R2P’s impact should be. Indeed, rather than any 
reconciliation between sovereignty and human rights, subsequent events captured a clear 
fading out of the humanitarian intervention debates as terrorism and Iraq became the 
preoccupation of states to the detriment of genuine concern for human rights or 
humanitarian issues. Moreover, that R2P would be applied post hoc to Iraq not only 
damaged the international environment (and R2P more directly) but also demonstrated that 
once ICISS published its report its content would no longer fall under its exclusive 
ownership. On the contrary, its ideas – particularly the language of R2P – would be subject 
to political appropriation, and (attempts at) reinterpretation, inevitably leading to significant 
changes to what ICISS proposed here. There was no reason to expect or believe political 
leaders would not attempt to graft their own thinking and policies onto the potential 
application and utility of R2P. Indeed, that there were differences within ICISS in relation to 
the issue of thresholds and authority means it should come as little surprise that such 
differences would be correspondingly evident once R2P emerged out into the ‘real world’ – 
as testified, for instance, by the support of Michael Ignatieff and others, for an invasion of 
Iraq based on humanitarian justifications. In essence, one should always keep in mind the 
inevitable centrality of normative contestation in the development of international norms.  
 
Thus remaining chapters are directed at showing how R2P faired in the international policy 
stream. Considerable emphasis in this regard is directed at the negotiation of R2P which is 
such an important part of any analysis of normative developments (Ch5). This, combined 
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with an account of R2P advocacy post-ICISS in Ch4, is also about ensuring one does not 
attempt to retro-fit an understanding of R2P which does not correspond with the 
procedures and substance of the 2005 agreement.475 In this sense, they provide a more 
realistic and accurate appraisal of the status of R2P by tracing the underlying developmental 
political processes. However, it is also important to qualify the arguments regarding ICISS 
and its proposals by acknowledging that the core idea of R2P did have a lasting power. The 
2005 agreement was, after all, in the name of R2P. This thesis is not naive to this fact. 
Indeed, while it certainly offers a critical perspective of what R2P ultimately represents, this 
is not incompatible with a recognition that its language, not just the novelty and catchiness 
of its phrasing, but the emphasis on responsibility and the implied moral conviction that 
mass atrocity crimes ought to demand the attention and action of the international 
community, has had some impact. 
 
Moreover, that the impact of ICISS’s proposals was highly qualified does not diminish the 
emphasis on them or the entrepreneurship of Lloyd Axworthy. Realising normative change 
and addressing difficult political issues – particularly at the international-level – depends 
upon the commitment of individuals in the face of entrenched opposition and existing 
embedded ideas and behaviour. As this chapter has shown, Axworthy’s determination in the 
face of considerable opposition and indifference resulted in the establishment of the 
commission which not only developed R2P, but which then subsequently benefited from 
built-in structural advocacy by the Canadian government and by individuals he had engaged 
in the process (most notably Evans and Annan). Axworthy deserves considerable credit for 
his contribution. Perhaps more importantly, however, this entrepreneurial phase provides a 
necessary comparison point for the detailed tracing and analysis of R2P that follows, which, 
ultimately – even if likely to provoke the sensitivities of some of R2P’s most vocal supporters 
and advocates – should be the (methodological) basis upon which our understanding of the 
R2P, including potential compliance with it, is founded. 
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Chapter 4: International Advocacy in an Unreceptive Policy Environment 
 
 We have entered the third millennium through a gate of fire.476 
 
Published in December 2001, the R2P Report emerged into one of the least receptive 
political contexts one could have imagined. While its pre-Christmas release – designed to 
ensure ICISS completed its work in accordance with its original mandate – did little to 
facilitate its political prospects, the issue of timing was ultimately beyond control.477 The 
September 11 terror attacks provided a macro shock to the international system with broad 
psychological, geo-political, institutional, and thematic repercussions.478 By contrast to the 
systemic consequences of the end of the CW, the ‘post-9/11 era’ was defined by a 
pronounced shift in the international political context – albeit with consequences arguably 
no less significant. This new context would pose numerous challenges and obstacles to the 
development of R2P, challenging its appropriateness and relevance, and hindering attempts 
to engage member states with the idea let alone gather momentum towards common 
agreement. Indeed, the rapid reorganization of the international political agenda 
precipitated by 9/11 reduced R2P’s traction as an emerging idea whilst simultaneously 
impacting – directly and indirectly, implicitly and explicitly – upon its shape, meaning and 
character.  
 
Appropriately, this chapter adopts a distinct dual-structure to explore the micro-
development of R2P within the macro-context which shaped, conditioned, constrained and 
enabled post-ICISS advocacy and R2P’s eventual negotiating prospects. The combination of 
Part 1’s ‘changing political contexts’ and the post-ICISS micro-development in Part 2 ensures 
sufficient analytical weight is directed at the relationship between the broader macro-
context and the more specific micro-processes. Though inevitably balanced towards the 
latter, the complex interrelationship between the two contexts demands this approach. On 
the one hand the macro-context conditioned the development of the micro-processes, but 
on the other understanding how R2P faired in that macro-context depends upon the 
detailed tracing of the micro-processes.  
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Structurally this chapter is temporally delineated. It broadly focuses on the period late 2001 
until the end of 2004.479 Part 1 considers the powerful effects of 9/11, and the Iraq war on 
the international political context and the status, perception and prospects of R2P. It 
demonstrates how the normative terrain became significantly less conducive than even the 
1990s had proved to be, as alternative interventionist doctrines and ideas emerged in 
response to the terrorist threat. This was most notably captured by the preventive war Bush 
Doctrine which moved front and centre-stage.480 Additionally it demonstrates the persistent 
power of individual agency. Changed conditions provided alternative entrepreneurs 
significant opportunity to introduce new or reawaken previously dormant ideas. Within the 
US administration, individuals with long-standing neo-conservative views saw their influence 
rise exponentially after an internal battle to gain the President’s ear.481 As a result, they 
would unlock the extraordinary resource capacity of the US, including its unrivalled military 
capabilities. 
 
The important factor in all of this, however, is that there were acute political consequences 
for R2P’s micro-development which help explain the eventual agreement in 2005. In 
particular, Part 1 captures five core themes relevant to this point. They relate to: changes in 
the international political agenda; the formulation of the Bush doctrine and its relationship 
to R2P; humanitarian justifications for the Iraq war, especially Tony Blair’s post-hoc 
deployment of R2P; a detrimental regression in the normative status and implementation of 
human rights; and how the substance and nature of the humanitarian intervention debates 
played out in this new context. Indeed, while these themes are broadly consistent with the 
existing (associated) literature, collectively they provide the basis for a dynamic temporal 
layering of processes which unite the chapter’s two principle parts. Additionally, it should 
also be said that theme five addresses a necessary and significant qualification relating to 
the overall argument. Namely, that the above reference to post-CW and post-9/11 systemic 
continuity guards against any artificial separation between the humanitarian intervention 
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debates of the 1990s and our understanding of R2Ps development in the post-9/11 
context.482 In other words the debates remained fundamentally relevant even if the context 
altered their perception, and the way they were dealt with by states. 
 
Indeed, it is entirely reasonable to consider the counterfactual ‘what if?’ in terms of how the 
transition between the entrepreneurial phase (Ch3) and the post-ICISS advocacy phase (Ch4 
and Ch5) might have fared had 9/11 and Iraq not happened? As Ch3 demonstrated, there 
were already considerable obstacles facing R2P, and though exacerbated during the post-
9/11 context, it is likely they would have remained prominent and strongly resistant to 
multilateral state resolution whatever the scenario. Thus, the change in political context was 
defined by continuity as well as change. The international politics around R2P were certainly 
more difficult and more confused. Political priorities and perceptions were undoubtedly 
affected by the events that transpired. But it would be wholly misguided to exclusively 
attribute the difficulties the R2P advocacy coalition faced in trying to build support for R2P, 
to these events alone. Indeed, in relation to the international agenda, Part 1 argues there 
was already a discernible fading of political momentum to the humanitarian intervention 
debates prior to 9/11.  
 
Complicating the picture, however, is the seemingly paradoxical and potentially 
counterintuitive argument that despite its negative impact on the normative substance of 
R2P, Iraq was the central impetus for the ‘game-changing’ institutional response which 
facilitated R2P’s path to 2005.483 Iraq was a factor in limiting the meaning and parameters of 
R2P, but it also provided the contextual basis for Kofi Annan’s establishment of the High-
level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change (“HLP”) in late 2003. Born out of Annan’s 
attempt to re-focus the international agenda, the HLP provided the vehicle to propel an 
agenda stagnating under considerable pressure. And although the processes around the HLP 
are dealt with in relation to the political structuring and negotiations of the Summit process 
in Ch5, its it necessary to recognise from the outset that Ch4 and Ch5 are very much part of 
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the same explanation. Recalling Ch1, the NLC suggests norms develop in a three-stage 
process. Entrepreneurs seek to achieve the backing of a ‘critical mass’ of states, and often 
institutionalisation, in order to move the norm towards a ‘tipping point’ eventually leading 
to a ‘norm cascade’. However, as the process-driven hypothesis reveals, the processes of 
norm construction are highly complex and hugely political, with existing concepts of 
normative change limited in relation to the specific characteristics of how R2P achieved 
institutionalisation in 2005. It is for this reason that Part 2 of this chapter introduces the 
‘structured outcome’ construct (prior to its detailed exposition in Ch5). It packages the 
structuring of the processes which propelled R2P from the HLP towards the 2005 agreement 
and reveals how the sequencing of R2P’s construction undermines the three-stage NLC, with 
the processes defined as much by normative regress as progress.484 
 
Indeed, the point of introducing these arguments upfront is that they demonstrate the 
necessity of the micro/macro framework and the structured outcome logic that emerges 
from it. If tracked according to the NLC one could say that by 2005 R2P’s institutionalized 
status signified successful arrival at the ‘tipping point’ and momentum towards ‘cascade’. 
But this would inadequately explain the true status of R2P and would imply layers of 
agreement which either do not exist, or which are far more qualified than often portrayed. 
In other words, the utility of these concepts is inherently limited. By contrast, the power of 
the structured outcome derives from its understanding of the micro-processes of R2P’s 
development into the 2005 outcome and the impact the macro-context had on shaping 
them. More specifically, its explanatory power stems from its greater nuance. It shows how 
R2P was propelled from late 2003 by a series of structuring factors rather than by normative 
momentum or acculturative dynamics. With an advocacy process stalling in the face of 
multilateral resistance the HLP was the change which most dramatically altered R2P’s 
political prospects. Once it had endorsed R2P in its report, subsequent factors locked R2P 
into the Summit process in a way which dramatically reduced the possibility that it might be 
removed from the 2005 negotiating package. Ch5 tackles the detailed negotiation of this 
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phase, particularly because a core element of the explanation is that the limited scope of 
the agreement was also crucial to ensuring it remained in the Outcome document. But a 
fundamental point about the impact of the structured outcome is that once these factors 
were no longer active, post-agreement contestation and doubt about R2P’s significance and 
potential impact was even more likely as states began to consider the practical and 
normative implications of what they had signed-up to.  
 
Thus, the period this chapter covers represents a vital part of R2P’s development. It 
addresses the impact of headline macro events within the context of a micro-focused desire 
to understand how R2P was agreed in such a short space of time, and in the face of 
seemingly consistent multilateral resistance. Indeed, Part 2 is very much directed at the 
micro-processes of an emerging advocacy coalition, tracing their efforts to engage and 
persuade states to support R2P but also to simply keep it alive within the ‘unreceptive policy 
environment’. Here R2P’s principal sponsor and lead advocate was the Canadian 
government. Its multi-level strategy was broadly defined by a twin-track approach of Civil 
Society engagement and inter-governmental diplomacy and supported by the persistent 
efforts of Gareth Evans and Annan’s enthusiastic, relieved support.485 But despite real 
commitment, political pressures on R2P were evident almost immediately with a 
continuation of opposition and scepticism from the 1990s debates exacerbated by the 9/11 
instigated change in the political agenda and the Iraq War. And for all the efforts of 
individual entrepreneurs and advocates, there was greater detachment between them and 
the member states ultimately responsible for defining R2P than is oft-described. This was 
not particularly surprising. The lack of matched support for the human security vision which 
defined Axworthy’s Commission response to the intervention challenge essentially mirrors 
this point. Inevitable limitations on the persuasive abilities of entrepreneurs and advocates 
partly relates to issues of political ownership and how ideas are appropriated and shaped 
through state interaction, and negotiation.486  
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Indeed, particularly notable throughout the process was the complete lack of 
dedicated/exclusive multilateral discussion of R2P within the UNGA.487 As becomes clear, 
Canada’s thwarted GA efforts during 2002 provide an early sense of the importance of this 
point, especially in view of the HLP Report’s description of the ‘collective responsibility to 
protect’ as an ‘emerging norm’.488 This statement was questionable considering the 
normative foundations which should underpin it were highly contested. That said, a key 
point to note is that some of the changes made to R2P by states during 2005 mirrored some 
of the responsive changes evident in the advocacy strategies pursued by Canada and Evans. 
Although there was varied success in the framing and persuasive tactics deployed, there was 
a clear willingness to narrow R2P’s scope in recognition of its continued negative (but 
unavoidable) association with humanitarian intervention. This was especially explicit post-
Iraq. Additionally, one should not underplay the importance of the Axworthy legacy post-
2001. The ICISS support structures he put in place were central to the coordination of 
advocacy efforts with key individuals personally close to him enhancing Canadian leadership 
throughout the period. In summary, this chapter tracks the political development of R2P 
identifying the ways advocates sought to keep it alive in the midst of an uncertain and 
unreceptive environment. In so doing, it pays considerable attention to the impact of key 
events, and to laying the foundations essential to our understanding of how R2P was agreed 
in 2005. 
 
Part 1: Changing Political Contexts – 9/11 and Iraq 
9/11 and the International Political Agenda 
 
Gareth Evans’ description of 9/11 as ‘almost suffocat[ing] at birth’ the R2P report is certainly 
apt.489 The immediate, but long-lasting sense of shock the coordinated terrorist attacks on 
the US provoked reverberated worldwide. Previous self-assured perceptions of insulated 
security on the part of US citizens would quickly diminish – replaced by a climate of fear and 
expressions of anger and revenge born out of a vulnerability not previously associated with 
the world superpower. The consequences of almost 3000 deaths – the majority in the heart 
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of the New York financial district – were immense and publically and privately evident 
almost immediately.490 The most obvious effect was the rapid elevation of terrorism to the 
top of the international agenda, with the US leaving states very little space for demur. As 
President Bush starkly stated on the 20 September, every nation had: 
 
 ...a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.491  
 
This ultimatum would symbolise the subsequent nature of the US policy spectrum towards 
terrorism, and international affairs more broadly. There would be little space for shades of 
grey, little evidence of ‘subtlety and nuance’.492 The approach was one of with us or against 
us, good versus evil, right versus wrong, freedom versus fear, freedom versus repression, 
justice versus cruelty.493 The US was now engaged in a ‘war on terrorism’ which demanded a 
response that was ‘sweeping, sustained, and effective’.494 In its own way, sweeping and 
sustained it certainly was, effectiveness, however, is a considerably more debatable and 
harder characteristic to assess, particularly when considered in relation to the first two. That 
said, these broad tenets of US strategy provide a useful categorisation to bear in mind for 
understanding of how the political context altered and impacted upon R2P. The sweeping 
response saw the Bush administration shift from apparent disinterest in terrorism and Al-
Qaeda prior to 9/11, to preoccupation with the issue and a commitment to responding in 
whatever way they deemed necessary.495 This latter point was particularly significant. 
Controversially, in addition to military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the war on 
terror led to the formulation of a National Security Strategy with a preventive war doctrine 
at its heart.496 This was consistent with the post-9/11 rhetoric and preferences of a clique of 
individuals around the President. Framed by the ‘with us or against us’ mentality, 
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established ideas of containment/deterrence, and previously accepted understandings of 
self-defence as defined under international law, were fundamentally challenged.  
 
Significantly, the war on terror was neither selectively targeted nor narrowly defined, but 
was breathtakingly expansionist in its outlook. As Finlan remarks, words that had ‘regulated 
international diplomacy since the end of World War II such as containment, sovereignty and 
status quo [were] discarded in favour of a new vocabulary of power politics that ranges 
from the ‘axis of evil’ to regime change’.497 As becomes clear, the implications for R2P were 
widely negative. Indeed, despite some logic to the linkages made by the US in terms of the 
relationship between terrorist organisations, state sponsors thereof, and the need to secure 
WMD and their proliferation, the extent to which the US would prove willing to act with 
minimal regard for the UN (i.e. unilaterally, or selective multilateralism) undermined 
confidence in the motivations of Western countries in particular. Moreover, that the 
invasion of Iraq became the ultimate expression of the Bush doctrine – despite a non-
existent relationship with Al-Qaeda – only added to the mistrust.498 Iraq’s elevation as the 
primary state focus from 2002 onwards would not only provide space for R2P-appropriation 
and reenergize the contested question of just cause, but represented the hard edge reality 
of a preventive doctrine which effectively sought to qualify the sovereignty of states in 
accordance with the determined preferences – or demands – of the US government.499 It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that States – particularly outside the West – would question 
whether R2P represented a logical concordant normative advance or a dangerous threat to 
international order500, and would subsequently seek to strongly reemphasise the existing 
building-blocks of IR in accordance with a stricter reading of the UN Charter. 
 
One approach to understanding the impact of an event like 9/11 is to consider it in terms of 
its defining characteristics, its relationship to individual agency, and how it compares to 
other significant historical events. By any measure, the 9/11 attacks were of major 
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consequence, representing a ‘historical focusing event’ which precipitated the opening of a 
sustained policy window, and altered the composition of domestic and international 
agendas.501 Of course, as Birkland points out policy windows do not guarantee subsequent 
policy change.502 In this case, however, policy change was evident in numerous ways. 
President Bush’s 9/11 diary description that ‘the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place 
today’ provides a revealing insight into the thinking upon which subsequent US policy would 
be based.503 Such arguments for change were widely articulated, including most 
prominently by staunch US ally Tony Blair who described the events of 9/11 as ‘a turning 
point in history’.504 US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice mirrored this thinking, 
describing how an ‘earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of 
international politics’.505 This was twined with a powerful sense of opportunity.506 Indeed, 
the very recognition of opportunity is often a crucial factor on the path to realising policy 
change. While terrorism was already a firmly established issue of concern for many states – 
including the US – it did not necessarily command domestic or international urgency.507 The 
9/11 attacks altered the posture of the US, and its willingness to act. The opening of a policy 
window afforded space for individual contestation regarding the form and direction of US 
policy. Rice’s posing question to senior National Security Council staff asking ‘how do you 
capitalise on these opportunities’ to – as Nicholas Lemann explains – ‘fundamentally change 
American doctrine, and the shape of the world, in the wake of September 11th’ 
demonstrated the administration’s active reassessment of its position and policy.508 This 
resultantly provided a more conducive environment for the advancement of long-held 
policy preferences and thinking.509 Neoconservatives brought to the table well-prepared, 
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well-versed views which emerged as key tenets of the Bush Doctrine’s formulation.510 These 
views also ranged from highly indifferent to highly critical of the UN and, by association, 
ideas of global responsibilities which might undermine the US’s freedom to pursue its own 
defined interests and objectives. In this backdrop, the already challenged ability of actors 
like Kofi Annan and States like Canada to shape the agenda, or even to remain relevant in 
the aftermath of 9/11, would be eclipsed.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the environment for R2P was immensely more difficult. America’s 
commitment to the development of a doctrinally-defined normative agenda based upon 
humanitarian principles was already limited pre-9/11. But this would only decline further as 
it focused on a preventive doctrine regarded as more appropriate and more flexible for the 
pursuit of US security. This did not exclude the subsequent use of humanitarian 
justifications, or indeed mean there were not foundational similarities underpinning the 
concepts. But it did mean R2P’s appropriateness, relevance, scope, and parameters would 
be directly and indirectly challenged by an approach predicated upon a broader conception 
of qualified sovereignty than intended by R2P and by states already sceptical of what they 
perceived as moves to undermine the protection and stability afforded by sovereignty 
norms. Problematically, such scepticism would be further strengthened post-Iraq as 
countries – like Germany and Chile – began questioning the dangers of R2P in view of the 
unilateral impulse 9/11 had seemingly ‘accelerated’.511 
 
One can summarise this as alternative entrepreneurs shaping, intentionally or otherwise, 
the scope, parameters and political prospects of R2P. Indeed, in one respect, R2P’s major 
selling point of emphasizing state responsibility proved to be its Achilles heel, providing a 
readymade framework to map onto a spectrum of concerns from mass atrocities, to failed 
and failing states, WMD non-proliferation, terrorism, and rogue states. It is for this reason 
that acknowledging the foundational links between R2P and aspects of US thinking is so 
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important. R2P would inevitably be conditioned by the ‘new context for intervention’ and 
should thus be considered accordingly.512 It illuminates the damage done to the 
international context, the difficulties faced by advocates to build support for R2P, and why it 
underwent significant conceptual narrowing in order to reverse an increasingly diluted focus 
on mass atrocity crimes. Although quite obviously the issue of humanitarian crises did not 
go away, with Darfur in particular providing a bold reminder of the many political and moral 
dilemmas, this additional layer of complexity made the battle to maintain interest in the R2P 
that much more difficult.513  
 
Thus, emphasising the changed context shows how an opportunity for some had a reverse 
negative impact on R2P. That said, this assertion requires more careful unpacking 
considering the contention that even prior to 9/11 there was an observable fading of 
momentum in the humanitarian intervention debates – the ‘what if’ question mentioned 
above. Of course the discussion of 9/11 to this point would seem strange were one to 
overlook the validity of statements made by those involved in the R2P process that 9/11 
contributed to ‘dissipating’ the momentum, frustration, impatience and guilt which had 
previously built-up514, that the attacks ‘distracted’ attention away from the R2P agenda515, 
and that one of its major effects was to highlight that the ‘moment for talking’ about 
intervention had now ‘passed’ with the priority of states directed at terrorism, and not 
‘civilian conflicts in Africa or anywhere else’.516 Equally, perspective also matters. Within the 
UN Secretariat commitment to righting the wrongs of past humanitarian failures remained 
strong despite 9/11 – even if the urgency Annan tried to instil was ‘eclipsed’ by it, and 
conditioned the content of his subsequent speeches.517 Nevertheless, the prospects for 
political agreement were already waning. Annan had taken his challenge as far as he 
reasonably could; exposing a multitude of obstacles in the process. Within the SC, the UK 
government’s proposals (which continued into 2001) hit a proverbial brick wall, exposing 
little P5 appetite for a doctrinal or codified solution. More broadly, Kosovo had left a 
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lingering bitter legacy for many NAM states.518 Similarly, the specific ICISS establishment 
processes demonstrated the limits of state interest in the issue and Axworthy’s proposed 
institutional response, including the HS thinking which had defined his approach. Indeed, 
within the Canadian system there was a subtle drop-off in Canadian ministerial support for 
HS initiatives. Axworthy’s successor John Manley sought to emphasise a more ‘pragmatic’ 
foreign policy approach and, according to officials, was far less willing to pursue his 
predecessors work.519 Thus, although the impact of 9/11 was very real, the picture is 
significantly more multifaceted and multidimensional, with its impact in many respects 
accentuating pre-existing political dynamics.    
 
This point was similarly evident in the area of human rights. The post-9/11 period certainly 
revealed empirical damage to their cause. However, prior to 9/11 the extent to which they 
were constitutive or embedded in the calculations of States – particularly within the West – 
was already under challenge. 9/11 merely fuelled this challenge. For instance, Michael 
Ignatieff’s argument that human rights were under ‘attack’ sophisticatedly captured, albeit 
in a more philosophical sense, challenges which ‘raised important questions about whether 
their claims to universality are justified, or whether they are just another cunning exercise in 
Western moral imperialism’.520 His identification of the West as a key source of challenge 
was especially significant, for instance showing how domestic resistance to human rights 
norms by the US was evident despite ‘linking rights to popular sovereignty’. One should not 
be surprised therefore when/if the paradoxical US opposition of ‘international human rights 
oversight’ predicated as being an ‘infringement on its democracy’521 is perceived as arrogant 
and exactly the kind of behaviour likely to undermine the development of an international 
society constituted by human rights. In this respect, Annan’s We the Peoples new 
millennium clarion call to put people at the ‘centre of everything we do’ was exactly that, a 
call; an urging which – to be enacted – depended upon the attention and responses of 
member states, largely in recognition of the essential idealism which defined it.522  
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Indeed, returning to the intervention debates, despite assertions 9/11 fundamentally 
changed the ‘strategic landscape’523, the extent to which humanitarian concerns were 
driving international policy decisions in the 1990s was always open to question. The 
suggestion that ‘international security again became the primary framework for the use of 
international force, not humanitarianism’ is not just ‘debatable’524 but a considerable 
overstatement.525 As Adam Roberts’s writes, the ‘historically unprecedented role’ of 
humanitarian issues in the 1990s did not signify a ‘fundamental departure from the system 
of sovereign states and power politics’.526 International action has always been defined by 
an often indistinguishable (and fluid) mix of motivations, ‘politico-strategic’ interests and 
power calculations.527 9/11 and subsequent events made ‘more acute’ and brought into 
‘sharper relief’ the ‘often uneasy coexistence of altruistic motives with the interest-based 
and power-political considerations of intervening powers and coalitions’ which ‘has always 
been there’.528 Thus, how we define the shift from the pre-9/11 era to the post-9/11 era 
should be more subtly qualified in recognition of the observable continuity between them.  
 
Nevertheless, 9/11 affected the status of human rights in two principally regressive ways. 
Their normative standing was damaged, not least because of the implementation of 
government policies not just inconsistent with them, but detrimental to their cause. A key 
plank of the Bush Doctrine entailed the promotion of US values of freedom, liberty, and 
democracy.529 However, concern for civil liberties and the rule of law suffered as a result of 
action often conducted in the name of such values. With widespread replication, numerous 
Western governments acted institutionally, operationally and legislatively in ways which 
contributed to the strengthening of the power of the state vis-à-vis their own citizens. 
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Prominent examples included the controversial 2001 US ‘Patriot Act’, the UK Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001, and the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act 2001 all of which 
expanded the scope and range of powers available to their respective governments.530  
 
Moreover, adherence – rather a lack of – to international humanitarian law and human 
rights provisions would be a particularly troubling issue. Western and non-western countries 
alike would exploit terrorism as an enabling justification contra pre-existing obligations. For 
instance, throughout the war on terror the US would face heavy criticism for its use of 
rendition and extraordinary rendition, the increasing use of military and special courts, and 
for its detention practices within and without its borders.531 Involvement with such 
behaviour would not, however, be confined to the US. Numerous countries would be 
allegedly complicit in some form of the organization, operation and facilitation of such acts. 
As a report of the International Commission of Jurists explained, the practice of rendition 
‘involved a “spider’s web” of cooperative endeavours’ with countries such as Bosnia, 
Canada, Indonesia, Italy, Macedonia, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Spain and the UK, alleged 
facilitators of extraordinary renditions.532 
 
Such conduct was largely predicated upon the so-called ‘war paradigm’.533 States invoked 
the ‘exceptional’ nature of the terrorist threat to justify derogations from existing domestic 
or international law.534 In one respect, this was very much a US-led agenda.535 However, the 
extent to which this was more generally appropriated caused considerable damage to R2P 
and the protection of human rights. Of course, it would be wrong to ignore the ethical 
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dilemmas which exist in determining what measures are appropriate, particularly in terms 
of balancing security concerns with an on-going commitment to liberty and individual 
rights.536 Nevertheless, examples like the constructed categorisation of ‘unlawful enemy 
combatants’ designed to strip individuals of their right to protection under the Geneva 
Conventions537 and the UK’s efforts to derogate from Article 5(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“Right to liberty”) to allow the detention, potentially 
indefinitely, of non-British suspected terrorists, show how security concerns undermined 
rights protection.538 Moreover, pointing to Western examples – especially those states who 
openly espouse the language of human rights – is purposeful. Aside from the ‘threat of a 
bad example’ as Amnesty International put it,539 approaches to the war on terror by such 
prominent countries enabled others with already questionable records to internally clamp 
down on dissidents and justify other repressive actions in the name of terrorism.540 It 
ensures we keep this in mind when we describe Western countries as some of the more 
vociferous supporters of R2P.  
 
Clearly it would be misguided to assume that normative developments, however well 
intentioned, cannot lead to negative ethical and unintended consequences, particularly 
considering the problems of political ownership and appropriation. Indeed, the 
abovementioned points are prescient from the perspective of flagging-up issues which 
would eventually affect R2P. The gap between rhetoric and action is an obvious criticism. 
This is not simply because of the kind of inevitable non-compliance with international 
norms. It is because of behaviour purposefully pursued in contradiction to established 
international standards – behaviour often justified in the name of the very norms being 
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violated. It is unsurprising, therefore, that for some, the behaviour of states in response to 
terrorism was described as threatening ‘the very core of the international human rights 
framework’ just as it should not come as any surprise to see states adopting similarly 
incompatible behaviour when it comes to R2P.541 More specifically, R2P would suffer from 
an association with negative connotations a number of which with roots in the period 
covered here. These would fuel concerns R2P represented yet another example of well-
intentioned but ultimately hollow rhetoric.  
 
The purpose of this section has been to highlight 9/11’s impact on the international political 
agenda with a broader macro overview of how this affected R2Ps political prospects. As 
implied, altered perceptions of threat and changed international priorities had direct and 
indirect implications for R2P. But within this two interrelated issues require greater 
attention because of their centrality to the above arguments, and to understanding how 
R2P was agreed in 2005. They are: the Bush Doctrine, and the 2003 unilateral invasion of 
Iraq. 
 
The Bush Doctrine and Iraq 
 
There is already an extensive literature which deals with the Bush Doctrine and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq – one of the most controversial and divisive conflicts in recent history. This 
section, however, has a specific purpose. It is concerned with understanding their impact on 
R2P’s development. Is the Bush Doctrine relevant, and how did Iraq alter, if at all, its 
political prospects? The answers are complex, interrelated and necessarily qualified. But for 
simplicity, the argument focuses on three principal areas: 1) the concept of preventive war 
and its structural/foundational relationship with R2P; 2) the Bush Doctrine’s inherent 
unilateralism revealed by Iraq; and 3) the invocation of humanitarian and R2P-esque 
justifications. 
 
1. ‘The limits of sovereignty’542  
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Despite contestation and even rejection of the idea of the Bush Doctrine there is sufficient 
reason to define it this way.543 The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), and a series of 
post-9/11 Presidential speeches, articulated its defining strands premised on the view that 
the changed political context meant ‘new threats’ required ‘new thinking’.544 At its heart 
was a preventive war doctrine which formally stated the US ‘will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such 
terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country’.545 
Although pre-emptive and preventive are used interchangeably, the pre-emptive label used 
by the US was, however, a misleading representation of its intentions. As Dale Copeland 
argues, pre-emptive and preventive motives are distinct.546 The distinction is that while the 
former is action pursed in anticipation of an actual/existing or imminent threat, preventive 
action is defined by a considerably lower threshold. Preventive action is anticipatory, but 
neither imminent nor ‘presently occurring’.547 In this case, there are three notably worrying 
consequences. First, the burden of proof is massively reduced.548 It enables the initiator of 
military action the power to subjectively determine the extent of their ability to act, and de 
facto the legitimacy of the use of force contrary to existing standards of international law. 
Second, preventive action accelerates the use of force forward in the response spectrum, 
and away from what would normally be understood as last resort.549 Quite clearly this 
thinking was counter to ICISS’s attempts to placate widespread concerns that force will be 
used abusively or too quickly. Third, the scope of threats covered by the US doctrine was 
purposively (and logically) expansive. It covered a swathe of apparently interrelated issues, 
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including WMD, ‘rogue states’, and dealing with threats posed by the ‘evil designs of 
tyrants’.550 Problematically, the scope was not just broad, but ‘set no standards’ for 
preventive action, failing to ‘distinguish between disarmament and regime change, or 
between rogue states and stateless actors’.551 When allied to the more contentious 
implication that the legal basis of preventive self-defence is long-standing, and thus neither 
ground-breaking nor unprecedented, there is ample reason to assert there is a prima facie 
case pointing to considerable associated impact to R2P.552   
 
This assertion is particularly strong in relation to the Bush Doctrine’s unilateralism and the 
issue of humanitarian justifications discussed below. Both exposed R2P in highly 
problematic ways. More fundamental, however, is the implicit idea that a foundational 
relationship exists between R2P and the Bush Doctrine.553 This argument vividly packages 
the importance of exploring the relationship between the macro-context and the micro-
processes. It captures the shared terrain underlying two apparently distinct concepts which 
helps explain how the legacy of this period contributed to a mistrust of R2P. How this 
mistrust manifested itself in relation to R2P advocacy is addressed more specifically in Part 
2. But powerful remnants of this period, particularly vis-à-vis Iraq, remain relevant today 
because they are stem from the idea that the concepts share commonalities and underlying 
foundations of a more significant character than often portrayed. In particular, the use of 
humanitarian justification and the sovereign responsibility framework which fed into the 
formulation of both reinforced fears of a slippery slope in how R2P might apply in practice.  
 
Before that, however, additional observations demand attention. In particular, the 
development of the Bush Doctrine exacerbated the tension between altruistic and security 
interests. It signified a shift away from the primary issue of civilian protection at the heart of 
the humanitarian intervention debate and thus in one sense rendered the ICISS framework 
less relevant to the post-9/11 international agenda. Additionally, the Bush Doctrine’s scope 
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fuelled the long-standing debate around mixed motives whereby action can yield positive 
humanitarian outcomes without being pursued primarily for humanitarian reasons, or 
where strategic and humanitarian justifications coexist. Nicholas Wheeler describes this as 
the ‘alternative moral possibility’. Indeed, although one can describe the post-9/11 period 
as accentuating the ‘political constraints’ on humanitarian intervention it raised the 
possibility that the required strategic rationale could be provided by the war on terror.554 
Resultantly, ICISS’s emphasis on ‘right intention’ appeared unrealistically narrow and pure in 
the new context, as well as unrealistic considering the lack of primary humanitarian impulse 
driving international action during the 1990s. Inevitably, this would shift emphasis away 
from ICISS’s focused emphasis on mass atrocity crimes. But this kind of debate is arguably 
more problematic for the claim that debates associated with R2P and the Bush Doctrine 
derive from the same foundational terrain. Indeed, this argument helps explain efforts, 
most notably by Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, to develop corollary frameworks 
directed at enabling action to address other policy priorities.555 It is neither intellectually 
surprising nor illogical that international risks relating to WMD proliferation, terrorism and 
unstable or repressive States could be defined by a framework akin to R2P in order to 
mobilize political action.556 
 
Indeed, a key plank of the Bush Doctrine was about ‘compelling states to accept their 
sovereign responsibilities’.557 As Richard Haass effectively explained the ‘emerging global 
consensus that sovereignty...is contingent on each state fulfilling certain fundamental 
obligations’ applied to terrorism and WMD as well as mass atrocities. Accordingly, States 
‘have the right to take action to protect their citizens against those states that abet, support 
or harbor[sic] international terrorists, or are incapable of controlling terrorists operating 
from their territory’, and that where ‘regimes with a history of aggression and support for 
terrorism’ seek WMD thus ‘endangering the international community, they jeopardize their 
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immunity from intervention, including anticipatory action’.558 Such thinking exposed 
numerous risks relating to the relationship between the domestic and international 
dimensions of R2P. Implicit in this formulation is the idea an individual States responsibility 
to protect its citizens can be inverted in such a way in order to justify external action to 
uphold it. But this goes considerably further than ICISS’s emphasis on international 
responsibility to address individual failures to uphold domestic responsibilities. So, in the 
subsequent case of Iraq, the Bush administration’s pursuit of regime change became active 
because the changed post-9/11 context had a pivotal impact on President Bush’s sense of 
‘responsibility’ to protect the security of the American people.559 Indeed, speaking with 
Tony Blair on 17 July 2003, Bush explained the action they took in explicit terms:  
 
 The prime minister and I have no greater responsibility than to protect the lives and 
 security of the people we serve...[his] regime...was a grave and growing threat.560 
 
Notably, this ran in addition to humanitarian justifications relating to abuses committed 
against the Iraqi people (see below).  
 
2. Unilateralism 
 
Post-2001 R2P would undergo considerable conceptual narrowing. A central element of this 
was its exclusive binding to the authority of the SC. As already shown, the Kosovo 
intervention sparked intense debate and hostility. There was minimal desire to weaken non-
intervention or other restrictions on the use of force. ICISS’s uneasy solution to the 
authority question focused on the role and responsibilities of the SC, even if this meant 
many of the most difficult issues remained unanswered. In some respects, the P5’s key 
policy-lines were unaffected by the post-9/11 context. If anything it reaffirmed what we 
already knew. Most obviously, the US had always reserved its willingness to act without SC 
authorisation if it deemed necessary to do.561 Nevertheless, the development of the Bush 
                                                          
558
 At the time Richard Haass was Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department, in ‘When 
nations forfeit their sovereign privileges; Armed intervention’, International Herald Tribune, 7 February 2003 
559
 President Bush quoted in Bob Woodward (2004) Plan of Attack, p27 
560
 Number 10 (2003) ‘Press conference with President Bush at the White House’, 17 July 2003 
561
 For instance, prominent Clinton administration figures had always been very clear to avoid any 
misunderstandings that this was anything but the case. Madeleine Albright famously told her UK counterpart 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
155 
 
Doctrine exacerbated concerns relating to the potential increased use of unilateralism by 
embracing it as a key constitutive tenet.562 The consequences of this for R2P were thus 
considerable, but paradoxically not entirely negative.  
 
The problem with the Bush Doctrine centred around its’ explicitly expansionist outlook, 
which was combined with a selective multilateralism consistent with long-standing neo-
conservative thinking.563 Crucially, its preventive outlook involved ‘no mention…of the 
necessity to refer such judgements to the SC’.564 Thus, when it came to Iraq, the full nature 
of the US approach to legality, and the degree to which it should be subject to international 
constraints, was most starkly revealed. Donald Rumsfeld’s statement that ‘the 
mission…determines the coalition’ captured the Administration’s attitude to the idea of 
collective multilateralism.565  
 
Consequently, this approach posed a multitude of problems for R2P. In particular, the very 
essence of the Bush Doctrine challenged the existing law-based international system. As 
Murswiek warned, if generalized it would lead to a transformation in State relations, with 
the annulment of the general prohibition on the use of force replaced with a ‘general 
entitlement to preemptive use of force’.566 Indeed, only limited attempts were made to 
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define limitations on the Bush Doctrine’s application567 which would ultimately depend upon 
unilateralism because of the opposition and divisions it was always going to provoke. It 
effectively gifted the US its own ability to determine – with considerably less sense of 
accountability, restraint or definition – the threshold at which action can be taken. 
Inevitably, debate over the potential precedent-setting of such an approach subsequently 
emerged. Did the US intend it to apply exclusively to itself, or was there a preparedness to 
accept its potential use by others in a similarly unregulated way? Even if there is strong 
reason to view the Bush Doctrine as restricted by its strong belief in US exceptionalism568, 
and indeed on the maintenance and continued pursuit of US primacy569, there was a real 
possibility other states in a position to act may seek to invoke similar justifications in 
defence of their own actions.570 Either way, much of this undermined the collective system 
R2P depended upon, or alternatively merely exposed it for what it really was. Moreover, 
aside from inflicting ‘massive damage to the UN’,571 the impact of Iraq on P5 relations and 
SC authority, was especially considerable. As Allan Rock observed, a principle post-Iraq 
preoccupation focused on attempts to manage the ‘frosty’ P5 relationships and the general 
reaction to the invasion.572 But for ICISS, the decision to intervene and the resulting 
breakdown in relations undermined its proposed threshold and precautionary framework.  
Although US opposition to criteria pre-dated Iraq, its fallout further diminished the political 
prospects and perhaps even desirability of P5 agreement in this area. Moreover, this applied 
equally to the always unlikely proposal requesting P5 restraint where the veto was 
concerned.  
 
That said, as becomes apparent, there is the seemingly paradoxical argument that it was the 
very unilateral invasion of Iraq which unintentionally instigated the required dynamics for 
realising the R2P agreement. Post-Kosovo, fears about the possible structural and 
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precedential effects of unilateralism dominated international debate.573 In the context of 
Iraq, such fears assumed even greater political significance and spurred Kofi Annan to argue 
the ‘fundamental challenge’ posed by preventive self-defence required an urgent, proactive 
assessment of the ‘rules of the road’ for dealing collectively with the multitude of challenges 
facing the UN and its member states.574 This led to the above-mentioned establishment of 
the High-level Panel – defined here as the first stage in R2P’s structured outcome. 
Additionally, the fractures exposed by Iraq impacted on the eventual formulation of the R2P 
agreement. Although any agreement was always going to be narrowly and tightly defined 
(particularly compared to ICISS), Iraq further reinforced and imposed certain expectations, 
preconditions and political necessities upon the Summit negotiations.  
 
These would lead to an R2P package defined by a narrow high-bar threshold, explicit binding 
to the SC, and a strengthened emphasis on individual responsibility to reaffirm the centrality 
of the state. Underlying motivations for this package mirrored long-standing opposition and 
scepticism evident during the humanitarian intervention debates. But in 2005 the 
imperative to resist further potential interventionist moves was an acute factor in light of a 
strong sense that the diplomatic and political options prior to the Iraq invasion had not been 
fully exhausted.575 Inevitably, tensions were built into the eventual agreement which spoke 
to political pragmatism but which reaffirmed a continuation in the underlying politics of the 
debate.576  
 
3. Humanitarian and R2P Justifications 
 
R2P’s eventual formulation was also about seeking to guard against its potential use as a 
pretext for future Iraq’s.577 There was little doubt amongst interviewees that Iraq inflicted 
significant direct/indirect damage. Observations highlighted its ‘poisoning’ of the 
international atmosphere for R2P, the ‘terrible damage’ it inflicted on the idea, how it gave 
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R2P a ‘very bad name’, provided opponents with a ‘recent and dramatic example of how 
Western powers cannot be trusted’, and generally ‘soured’ the name of intervention.578 
Certainly, the immense complexity of the Iraq affair throws up numerous avenues for 
considering its relevance to R2P.579 However, the most identified issue was the use of 
humanitarian language, particularly as a cover/justification for geo-strategic objectives, and 
the efforts of Michael Ignatieff and Tony Blair to justify Iraqi regime change in accordance 
with R2P principles.580 These factors complicated the effort to build support for R2P, 
contributed to its conceptual narrowing, and which, for many, undermined the prospects 
for future action driven by humanitarian values.  
 
Afghanistan and Iraq highlighted the long-standing debate about the role of utilising state 
motivation as a means for assessing the legitimacy of interventions.581 The issue was not 
whether humanitarian concerns were the principle justification, but whether the outcomes 
could warrant justifiable humanitarian claims – thus undermining the claim that right 
intention should be central to R2P – and whether the ICISS’S just cause threshold was too 
high and too strict considering the nature of the two regimes. Such factors are embedded in 
a complex web of considerations, with equally complex and contested explanations. Putting 
aside humanitarian questions, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were principally and 
initially driven by strategic objectives. Indeed, in the post-9/11 context the prospects for 
action pursued purely or predominantly to prevent humanitarian crises was undoubtedly 
diminished.582 This question of whether the requirement for right intention was compatible 
during the 1990s was even more acute in the post-9/11 context. Here the relationship 
between interests and humanitarianism became murkier and security concerns overrode 
                                                          
578
 Interviews with Jeremy Greenstock (Chipping Norton, 8 June 2009) Gareth Evans (London, 25 May 2010), 
Lloyd Axworthy (Winnipeg, 27 November 2008), Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), and private interview with 
UK official (22 October 2010) 
579
 These actually get more complex as time passes, particularly since the UK role is, at the time of writing, 
subject to an extensive independent inquiry, on the debate about Iraq’s impact see Nicholas Wheeler (2004) 
‘The emerging norm of collective responsibility to protect after R2P and HLP’, paper presented at the BISA 
Conference, University of Warwick, 20-22 December 2004 
580
 Almost all of the interviews considered at some point the impact of Ignatieff and Blair. Lloyd Axworthy 
(Winnipeg, 27 November 2008) and Gareth Evans (London, 25 May 2010) were particularly critical 
581
 See especially Nicholas Wheeler (2000) Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
582
 And by definition even less likely than it was during the 1990s, see Simon Chesterman (2006) ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention and Afghanistan’ in Jennifer Welsh (Ed.) (2006) Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Relations, p172 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
159 
 
humanitarian considerations to an even greater extent. Although ‘Operation Enduring 
Freedom’ in Afghanistan was initially justified as self-defence and directed at targeting Al-
Qaeda and Taliban ‘military installations’, the observable ‘shift’ in the US government’s war 
aims towards nation-building raised some important questions.583 Without the overriding 
9/11 strategic rationale for the intervention, it is unlikely serious violations of human rights 
would not have breached the ICISS threshold, nor have been met with any comparable 
concern by the international community.584 This is despite, for instance, reports of the 
targeted massacres of civilians in May 2000 and January 2001.585 Thus, Welsh rightly asks 
what ‘could and should’ the international community have done prior to 9/11 ‘to prevent 
massive human rights violations inside that country?’586 With this in mind, it is unsurprising 
some would wish to emphasize the potentially positive humanitarian outcomes of such an 
intervention, and identify a relationship between the R2P framework and the war on terror. 
As Chesterman elucidates, the shift towards R2P applies ‘to civilian protection in another 
state’ and ‘action in response to terrorist attacks against one’s own’. For instance, had more 
been done to ‘induce or compel the Taliban regime to protect the Afghan population, 
Afghanistan might have proved a less inviting haven for Al-Qaeda’ and once the US removed 
the Taliban from power ‘it imposed a special responsibility...to leave Afghanistan a better 
place than they found it’.587 The cross-over application of R2P is clear to see and is 
consistent with the suggestion R2P has significant political utility because of more 
fundamental structural relationships rather than simple misguided appropriations. 
Additionally, this strengthens Dannreuther’s identification of a shift towards intervention 
debates ‘increasingly contextualized with the longer-term demands of ‘peace-building’.588 If 
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so, this would at least imply a more positive emphasis on a key aspect of the R2P-
continuum.589   
 
The potential for positive humanitarian outcomes was also evident in the Iraq debates, with 
Ignatieff and Blair prominent adopters of this position.590 For both, however, their 
justifications were more closely bound-up with alternative preferences regarding the moral 
permissibility of removing a tyrannical regime such as Saddam Hussein’s. As an ICISS 
Commissioner, and one of the Report’s principal authors, Ignatieff’s support for the Iraq war 
was particularly revealing.591 His position was not determined by an assessment of US 
intentions – which led to the assumption by ‘anti-interventionists’ that ‘all the bad 
consequences of an intervention derive from ignoble American intentions’ – but rather was 
swayed by a greater emphasis on the potential consequences of the military intervention.592 
His view was that it was perfectly possible, and reasonable, to apply one’s own priorities 
onto the actions of another, even if they did not correspond. Alternative justifications could 
lead to desirable consequences: ‘if the consequence of intervention is a rights-respecting 
Iraq in a decade or so, who cares whether the intentions that led to it were mixed at 
best?’593 Accordingly, the ‘fundamental case for war’ was about taking the opportunity to 
deal with an ‘especially odious regime’ with the potential for the creation of a ‘decent’ Iraqi 
society.594 Of course, Ignatieff would later recant his support.595 But his uneasiness with the 
indifference of some towards Saddam Hussein remaining in power reflected on-going 
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contestation regarding the conditions which could justify military action for humanitarian 
reasons.596  
 
As becomes apparent, the association between Iraq and R2P-esque justifications would 
shape the future ambitions and framing strategies of its key advocates. In the eyes of ICISS 
colleagues Evans and Thakur, Ignatieff’s position failed to ‘satisfy’ the criteria/framework 
they had outlined.597 Unfortunately, the harsh political reality was that the criteria they had 
defined were neither formally accepted, nor insulated from continuing debate. As Fernando 
Tesón wrote in defending his support for the intervention on humanitarian grounds, the 
‘question of threshold has long been a matter of debate’.598 Whereas ICISS argued for actual 
or apprehended large-scale loss of life, alternative viewpoints posited that the sustained 
level of repression warranted action. Ignatieff would even ask – in response to comments 
that [Hussein] ‘was a genocidal killer, but that was yesterday’ – ‘since when do crimes 
against humanity have a statute of limitations?’599 Such thinking was self-evidently removed 
from the ICISS framework and all its qualifications.600  
 
However, more problematic was Tony Blair’s efforts – couched in the language of R2P – to 
articulate a lower threshold justifying action against a regime like Saddam’s. According to 
one Canadian official, Blair’s appropriation of R2P proved highly damaging, with doubt as to 
whether he did so because ‘the language sounded good’ or for another reason.601 Blair’s use 
would be most evident in a 2004 speech which questioned the existing state of international 
law602:   
 
It may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can 
systematically brutalise and oppress its people and  there is nothing anyone can do, 
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when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the 
definition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass 
graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a 
catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be?  
 
If we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept in a community 
that others have a right to oppress and brutalise their people...we surely have a 
responsibility to act when a nation’s people are subjected to a regime such as 
Saddam’s. Otherwise, we are powerless to fight the aggression and injustice which 
over time puts at risk our security and way of life.603 
 
The Iraq war was certainly not pursued primarily for humanitarian motives.604 However, the 
suggestion Blair’s position cynically abused or was a selective ‘rationalisation’605 of R2P to 
shore up a controversial case, arguably underestimates the extent to which it was genuine 
dynamic driving Blair’s motivation to act and which ‘built on the frame’ of his 1999 Chicago 
speech.606 Although aware regime change lacked a legal basis,607 it was nevertheless always 
part of the justificatory mix, and the UK’s underlying policy objectives.608 In terms of 
motivation, there is evidence Blair believed the repressive nature of the regime was one 
important reason for acting, and that this reflected a continuity of position from Kosovo, 
through Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq. In this respect, the rationalisation argument is 
overly simplistic. Arguably, Blair’s post hoc justifications were arguably more damaging 
because they actually legitimized concerns Iraq represented a genuine example of what R2P 
was about and how it might be used.609 For Blair, that consensus coalesced to a greater 
degree over dealing with Milosevic, did not mean the basis upon which the policy in Iraq 
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action to defeat Saddam Hussein’s tyranny – so-called humanitarian intervention to protect the Iraqi people 
from a tyrant’  
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Committee, HC 334-ii, 8 July 2003 
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was pursued was necessarily distinct, and that when opportunities arise to remove such 
regimes they should not be taken.610 Indeed, a memo to his Chief of Staff dated 17 March 
2002 (a year prior to the invasion) shows Blair wanting to ‘re-order our story and message’ 
to one ‘increasingly...about the nature of the regime. We do intervene – as per the Chicago 
speech. We have no inhibitions – where we reasonably can – about nation-building i.e. we 
must come to our conclusion on Saddam from our own position, not the US position. From a 
‘centre-left perspective’, Blair wrote, ‘the case should be obvious’: 
 
Saddam’s regime is a brutal, oppressive military dictatorship. He kills his opponents, 
has wrecked his country’s economy and is a source of instability and danger in the 
region. I can understand a right-wing Tory opposed to nation-building, being 
opposed to it on grounds it hasn’t any direct bearing on our national interest. But in 
fact a political  philosophy that does care about other nations – e.g. Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Sierra Leone – and is prepared to change regimes on the merits, should 
be gung-ho on Saddam.611 
 
Considering this, it is not surprising Blair would seek to shape how things ought to be. It is 
the very essence of normative contestation. His arguments certainly made R2P advocacy 
more difficult. But we should not fall into the trap of thinking R2P’s path to achieving wide 
acceptance was merely disrupted by an anomalous distortion of its purpose.612 Indeed, R2P 
would undergo a series of changes throughout this period, as advocates sought to fight back 
against the association with humanitarian intervention, the generally difficult political 
context and Iraq. This resulted in advocates limiting the ‘scope of what they would ask the 
world to sign up to’613 – a reflection of these political difficulties and the reality that R2P was 
very much an emerging idea with no agreed or collective understanding of its meaning or 
application.  
 
It is important to note, however, that these observations are not about defending Blair’s 
approach, but rather provide an explanation of key political dynamics. How these impacted 
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 Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p69 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
164 
 
on the micro-processes of R2P’s development are picked-up in Part 2, but beforehand it is 
necessary to consider some of the broader counter arguments and critiques relevant to 
understanding how the R2P was eventually shaped, but which also frame some of its 
potential weaknesses. First, while the use of humanitarian justifications were always part of 
the justifying discourse – including by the US – the feeling that Iraq was one step towards a 
slippery slope of interventions to remove unacceptable regimes did little to engage the 
support of those states already ‘allergic’ to the idea of R2P.614 Considering the lower 
threshold evident in the positions of Blair, Ignatieff and Tesón it was entirely reasonable to 
ask where the argument for intervention ends? Dealing with repressive regimes without 
narrow constraints could leave any number open to potential intervention.615 Moreover, 
although any justification relating to the nature of a regime is likely to involve reference to 
past actions, any attempt to allow retrospective action would undermine the existing basis 
of international law, and prove even less amenable to rational decision-making.616  
 
Second, although there was a general reaction against the humanitarian arguments, they 
fuelled fears R2P could be used and abused as a ‘politically attractive’ pretext to justify 
military actions pursued for instrumental and strategic reasons.617 This problem is entwined 
with a broader trend of humanitarianism seeping into the justifications used to legitimate 
military force, thus exacerbating the difficulty of convincing already sceptical states that 
they represent something more than cover for Western manipulation or convenience.618 
This was evident in Iraq where the US was accused of reverting to a ‘liberal rationale’ in 
defence of action floundering on the principle justification of ridding a dangerous and 
repressive regime of its WMD.619 This led to suggestions Iraq had ‘wrecked’ the ‘liberal 
intervention consensus’ and warnings by Kenneth Roth that it risked breeding ‘cynicism 
about the use of military force for humanitarian purposes’ which ‘could be devastating for 
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people in need of future rescue’.620 Interestingly, however such arguments were couched 
predominantly in terms of humanitarian intervention and not R2P.  The former continued to 
be the principle framework for considering such debates, fuelling the idea that for many it 
and R2P were much the same. This association, further exacerbated by Iraq and the Bush 
doctrine, would intensify efforts to frame and define R2P contrary to such negative 
connotations. 
 
The third major issue is the question of to what extent state motive should be a factor in 
assessing humanitarian action/inaction and opposition to a normative development like 
R2P.621 This longstanding debate was particularly significant in the case of Iraq. Fears R2P 
could provide a vehicle/slippery slope for further interventions, and the argument Iraq 
damaged the cause of humanitarian intervention, are united by motivational concerns – 
even if they emanate from different perspectives. For instance, cynicism about the Bush 
administration’s emphasis on the nature of the regime was understandable considering the 
US’s historical attitude towards human rights abuses in Iraq. Additionally, limited initial 
concern for humanitarianism had consequences for how military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq were conducted, further damaging the name of intervention and R2P.622 It is 
certainly true, therefore, that such events impacted upon R2P’s subsequent formulation. 
During 2005 supporters would work hard to narrow R2P’s scope, and to guard-against 
genuine concerns it represented a shift away from pre-existing UN Charter provisions. 
However, motive is not simply a Western problem. The negative associations identified 
provided ammunition to those States who would wish to avoid further intrusive measures 
which could shine a light upon their own questionable human rights records. This was 
practically evident in Darfur. Opposition to Western intervention was seemingly 
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emboldened,623 with the Sudanese government seeking to draw links between Iraq and R2P 
to portray US activism in Iraq and Darfur as ‘oil-oriented and anti-Islamic’.624 This was 
exacerbated post-2005. With R2P loaded heavily in favour of primary state responsibility it 
enabled Sudan to emphasise its own role in addressing the problem, and enable states 
unwilling to assume responsibility for events in Darfur.625 
 
Indeed, despite considerable debate about what international response would have been 
appropriate, there is also a sense among some that the response of the international 
community was too late, and that besides which the motivations of states where not driven 
by a genuine willingness to commit to an armed intervention if necessary, even when the US 
described events in Darfur as ‘genocide’.626 Although one should be extremely careful in 
how R2P is applied to a crisis which flared well before its formal adoption, it nevertheless 
raises important questions of political dynamics relevant to our future understanding of 
it.627 However, that the severity of the crisis in Darfur emerged from early 2003 also meant 
it ran parallel with vast military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if there had been 
clear consensus and support for a military response to Darfur, in such circumstances the 
ability to provide the kind of military resources required was greatly reduced.628 Indeed, this 
point is about more than military capacity. It more generally reiterates how the changed 
political context altered the perception of threat and strategic priorities of key powers 
which were sufficient to mobilized an immense show of power with qualified concern for its 
impact on the international system and an agenda focused on responding to mass atrocities 
crimes. And although there is evidence throughout this period of what Macfarlane and 
Weiss describe as ‘a quieter movement over the longer run towards institutionalising the 
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protection of civilians in international society’,629 this progress was complicated by a 
complex mix of post-9/11 Iraq-driven regression which exacerbated pre-existing political 
objections and challenges to R2P. The ability to generate political support for R2P was thus 
hindered by Iraq, but paradoxically it provided sufficient shock to the international system 
to initiate the pivotal institutional response in the process leading to the 2005 agreement.  
 
Part 2: International Advocacy in an Unreceptive Policy Environment 
 
Considering the development of the humanitarian intervention debates, the obstacles 
evident in the processes leading to ICISS, and the changed political context post-9/11, R2P’s 
rapid progression into the 2005 agreement was immensely surprising. Explaining how and 
why this happened leads to a complex set of dynamics which do not lend themselves to 
existing accounts of norm emergence, including the classic NLC.630 In R2P’s case, its 
institutionalization in 2005 did not necessarily reflect widespread acceptance of its meaning 
or, crucially, its significance.631 Nor was the agreement necessarily underpinned by sufficient 
normative foundation for moving towards its ‘operationalization’. The agreement of 2005 
was purposefully designed to be non-transformational in terms of how the international 
community sought to deal with mass atrocities and commanded broad rather than deep 
foundational support. Indeed, it merely opened up a new stage of legitimate political 
normative contestation.632 Considering Ch5’s explanation of R2P’s development as a heavily 
state-centric formulation which purposefully qualified and limited the international scope of 
R2P633, of all the problems currently facing R2P one of the most significant arguably stems 
from lack of careful attention to these how and the why questions.  Indeed, this has been 
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accentuated by repeated overestimations of its significance, and symptomatic, for instance, 
of a general lack of understanding, individual normative preferences of advocates, and what 
Welsh describes as ‘limitations in international relations theory with respect to the study of 
normative change’.634  
 
For all R2P offered as an idea, not least its pithy phrasal qualities, there was a discernible 
lack of a catalytic core group of states working actively (post-ICISS) to prioritize its normative 
development – particularly not around a norm which sought to expand on or assign 
international responsibilities. Despite increasing evidence of its use in the diplomatic 
lexicon, and some momentum in efforts to build support, the eventual agreement was not 
ultimately driven by these factors. Indeed, considering Canada ‘was almost alone in its 
efforts to ‘operationalize’ the Report’ post-2001635 – a position confirmed below – the need 
to understand those factors which facilitated its agreement becomes even more significant. 
What emerges is a complex explanation of macro and micro change, with exogenous and 
endogenous factors interacting with structure and agency, continuity and change. It is these 
which provide the basis for the ‘structured outcome’ logic.  
 
Keeping in mind Part 1, the principle exogenous shock affecting R2P’s prospects was Iraq. It 
provided the impetus for an assessment – through the High-Level Panel – of how existing 
international structures dealt with threats to international peace and security, and how they 
might be changed to address a raft of long-standing and emergent policy issues. In terms of 
the overall process, this institutional innovation was arguably the high point of Annan’s 
ability to shape, albeit indirectly, R2P’s political prospects. It was also the first stage in R2P’s 
structured outcome.636 Returning more directly to the how and why, the emphasis on the 
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HLP as Stage 1 of R2P’s structured outcome essentially relates to an attempt to specify the 
structural factors within/of the process which enabled its agreement – a strategy which 
demands the application of micro-level analysis. Ch5 traces the specifics of this logic, along 
with the multilateral negotiations in 2005. But for the purposes of early signposting, 
examples of key endogenous factors included the HLP (for its agenda-setting vehicular role 
and endorsement of R2P); Annan’s subsequent report In Larger Freedom (for reiterating and 
amending the HLP’s endorsement of R2P, thus locking R2P into the World Summit process); 
and, the design and structure of the member state negotiations (including the ‘piggy-
backing’ of the HLP/ILF agenda onto previously agreed Millennium Review Conference 
processes, the adoption of a ‘package’-driven approach to reform, the introduction of a 
smaller ‘core group’ of states, and resource constraints relating to time and scale). 
 
Uniting these is the idea that the structural characteristics of the negotiation process were 
causally significant for realising the outcome.637 The extent to which the outcome was 
possible depended upon the possibilities the structure provided: the way it locked R2P into 
the GA negotiations; the way it narrowed the odds for its inclusion and limited the resources 
of states and their capacity to maintain pre-existing policy lines/positions in the context of 
the processes characteristics. In this respect, the argument here is consistent with the idea 
that ‘agency must itself be contextualized within its structural setting, but must be seen as 
structuring and not just structured’.638 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
processes leading to the R2P agreement, particularly those relating to its negotiation. How they did so was 
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Hence structure helps us understand how the agreement was possible, while the micro-
processes of R2P’s emergence and negotiation enable us to better understand its 2005 
formulation. However, an important question at this point is why this argument has been 
outlined in such detail in a section designed to focus on post-ICISS advocacy? The answer is 
Chapter’s 4-5 overlap in significant ways, with both necessary for completeness, and 
substantiation. The structuring (argument) is significant because without it the political 
prospects for R2P – within the GA especially – were unquestionably mixed and murky. R2P 
did not emerge into the 2005 process under the propulsion of a significant coalition of 
states. There was no widespread consensus of its meaning, or potential use, beyond the 
emphasis on individual state responsibility which would become a fundamental framing 
strategy during the negotiations to limit concerns regarding R2P’s scope. Indeed, Canadian 
advocacy was projected to be a long-term endeavour of building-upon and consolidating 
emerging norms relating to state responsibility and international responsibilities.639 That 
Canada (et al.) would seek to make the most of the Summit opportunity is unsurprising. But 
it did mean the agreement would reflect many of the weaknesses evident prior to, and 
during, the advocacy stage. Although controversial, one should ask whether R2P would have 
achieved multilateral agreement without the structuring elements of the process – if it were 
negotiated more exclusively, or in a less overwhelming package?640 This does not mean R2P 
cannot have an impact, or is illegitimate or insignificant, but does mean our understanding 
of the 2005 agreement should be more nuanced tan focusing on the simple fact of 
agreement.  
 
This section thus traces ICISS follow-up efforts – essentially driven by Canada, but aided to 
varying degrees by Annan, Civil Society and ICISS remnants. In so doing, it illuminates the 
obstacles they faced, but also why persistence and state sponsorship are vital elements for 
achieving normative change. Without these the Summit opportunity would not have been 
an opportunity at all. 
 
Figure 4.1: R2P Advocacy Post-ICISS Report 
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Post-ICISS Advocacy: A Brief Synopsis 
 
The ICISS process was conducted more under the radar than originally envisaged. An initial 
idea for an intergovernmental ‘Group of Interested States’ (GIS) proved particularly 
unworkable, not least because until the Report was completed such a Group would have 
very little to go on, let alone rally around.641 This, as it transpired was not especially 
problematic. Besides, as Ch3 documented, ICISS establishment processes were Canadian 
dominated with limited additional state sponsorship or support. Subsequent follow-up 
efforts would largely mirror this, with Canada often singularly leading where 
intergovernmental efforts were concerned.642 Central to Canadian advocacy were the 
officials and structures within DFAIT responsible for defining, coordinating, and resourcing 
what would prove to be a multidimensional and ‘multifaceted’ strategy.643 In this respect, 
ICISS’s design proved to be particularly crucial. Although initial follow-up ideas like the 
Advisory Board functioned extremely poorly, the embedding of the initial ICISS Secretariat 
within DFAIT installed a small but vital support structure for advancing R2P. Post-ICISS this 
structure would remain in place, renamed “The R2P Unit”.  
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Figure (4.1) captures the transition from ICISS to advocacy, and the (intended) building 
blocks of it. The contribution of each element is unpacked below with the focus on micro-
process yielding insights and detail insufficiently evident in the existing R2P literature. From 
the outset, supplementing Canadian leadership was the committed support of Annan – who 
fulfilled and built-on his commitment to publically receive the report – and continuing 
support of some ICISS Commissioners; most prominently Gareth Evans The initial 
presentation of the Report to Annan in December 2001 captured this composition with 
representatives from each of the active elements of follow-up in attendance.644 But it was 
also symbolic for its limited profile. Publishing and launching in December under any 
circumstances would be difficult. But with 9/11 (which delayed publication to accommodate 
an additional ICISS meeting to consider its consequences645) it is not surprising Edward 
Mortimer would describe the Report as ‘sinking like a proverbial stone’.646 Thus, the de facto 
– albeit second – launch, took place at the IPA on 15 February 2002. This was one of a series 
of significant R2P-related events which took place throughout the period 2002-2004.647  
 
Consistent with the characteristics of the follow-up campaign, few of these events were 
especially high-profile. This was symptomatic of the restrictive political context but also of 
on-going scepticism and hostility which rendered such a strategy unwise. Indeed, for this 
reason Canada would focus on ‘bottom-up’ advocacy designed to raise awareness and build 
support – be it regionally or bilaterally – and continued support for ‘operationally’ focused 
efforts consistent with the work undertaken within DFAIT’s Human Security Program. That 
said, many of these events – which are explored throughout this section – illuminate many 
of the central problems which would plague R2P throughout its development.648 These 
included a notable inability to engage the P5 with an idea that might undermine their 
decision-making freedom; a lack of observable consensus showing the GA was willing to 
adopt a norm accepting (let alone assign) international responsibility as proposed by ICISS; 
fears R2P would be used as a cover for military action, or expand into other areas which 
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could infringe sovereignty; a continued association with humanitarian intervention; and on-
going contestation over the point at which military action might be necessary and how it 
should be authorized. That many of these would also plague R2P post-2005 was largely 
because the agreement reflected such competing and contradictory pressures, rather than 
actually dealing with them. However, the roots of the 2005 formulation also reflected a 
narrowing in the R2P being sold by advocates post-ICISS in response to the political 
obstacles. Advocacy would be increasingly directed at emphasizing R2P’s potential to 
constrain the ability of states to ‘justify the use of force for humanitarian purposes’.649 
Central to this approach included strengthening emphasis on its primary state dimension, 
tying R2P exclusively to the SC, and advocating for agreement on use of force criteria. 
Inevitably, however, the success of these elements varied in terms of their political realism 
and in terms of the political consequences they would later have.  
 
The ICISS Commissioners and Advisory Board 
 
Beginning with ICISS is a logical starting point for tracking R2P advocacy. Like the 
explanation of the processes leading to its formation, the emphasis on micro-process 
generates new and interesting insights not widely evident in the R2P literature. Structurally 
the most important development was the transition of the ICISS Secretariat into the R2P 
Unit. This was central to Canadian follow-up strategy, and within that, for the facilitation, 
deployment and continued coordination of ICISS assets.650 Incorporating follow-up was 
always a key objective for Canadian officials. ICISS’s structural characteristics demonstrated 
this, albeit consistent with the desire to maintain the integrity of the Commission’s 
independence. The previously-mentioned ‘light touch’ approach of the ICISS Secretariat, 
whilst not oblivious to the possibility that occasional interventions might have been needed 
to bring discussions back on track (so not so independent Canada would be unable to move 
forward with follow-up),651 was about avoiding accusations of a pre-cooked agenda and 
about giving Canada flexibility and space to determine for itself how it would take 
                                                          
649
 Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p73-4 
650
 Private interviews with Canadian officials (19 May 2009, 31 March 2010); interviews with: Christopher 
Cushing (Bradford, 9 June 2010) and Ramesh Thakur (Waterloo, 22 June 2009). The Unit is dealt with in more 
detail in the section on Canadian follow-up efforts below. Here it relates mainly to how ICISS assets where 
incorporated into Canadian efforts (the overarching strategy for which is also detailed below) 
651
 Interview with Christopher Cushing (Bradford, 9 June 2010) 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
174 
 
subsequent ownership of follow-up.652 Thus, with this significant caveat in mind ICISS 
‘assets’ essentially related to three categories: the ICISS Report; the ICISS Commissioners; 
and the regional consultations it undertook from 2000-2001. Each of these would directly 
influence key planks of Canadian strategy such as dissemination, stimulating debate, and 
‘bottom-up’ regional advocacy.653 The framework provided by the report would be deployed 
in each of these areas as a key introduction to R2P, and to instigate debate. However, as 
important as the transition from ICISS Secretariat support to Canadian advocacy through the 
dedicated R2P Unit is, it was not a simple progression without qualification. As an internal 
document reveals, Canada’s ‘leadership on R2P follow-up’ did not ‘imply…comprehensive 
endorsement of all its findings’: 
 
 Rather we view the report as a helpful contribution to a complex legal and political 
 debate and as a vehicle for promoting international discussion...654 
 
This is an important qualification which, with the point about flexibility and space, would 
feed directly into how DFAIT framed the report’s utility across its follow-up strategy. ICISS 
no longer maintained control of its report, but was now a tool for an intergovernmental 
effort which would inevitably shape its substance and political prospects. Nevertheless, it 
was an important tool and starting point. Similarly, the engagement of ICISS Commissioners 
would continue – admittedly in a less significant way – but with continued coordination 
through the R2P Unit.655 Generally, this would relate to inviting them to attend events 
relevant to Canadian efforts.656 Finally, the process dimension of ICISS may seem an odd 
‘asset’ but was significant for its impact upon advocacy, particularly as Canadian follow-up 
continued in a not too dissimilar path thereafter.657 Meanwhile, a key strand of Canadian 
advocacy would continue to embrace key tenets of the policy-making model which 
underpinned many initiatives of the Axworthy era – including the establishment of ICISS. 
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The emphasis on regional engagement and engagement with a multitude of state and non-
state actors would continue as a feature of Canadian policy.658  
 
Thus, effective follow-up support structures, additional to the strict timeframe and demand 
for a politically-driven report, were central to how ICISS was constituted.659 Officials wanted 
to avoid replicating previous Commissions which lacked political follow-up or enabling 
mechanisms, leading to their reports falling by the wayside.660 Ultimately, ICISS’s 
distinguishing feature was Canada’s unique state sponsorship. This gave R2P the platform, 
access, resources and persistence necessary to be in a position to eventually influence the 
2005 outcome. Indeed, follow-up processes were always going to be intensely political. 
Without such sponsorship even the most effective and committed post-ICISS efforts would 
have struggled to merely keep the idea alive. However, Canada’s sponsorship was not just 
essential because of political intensity, but because key ICISS structures did not function as 
intended, or were less pronounced than might have been expected.661 Most obviously the 
Advisory Board proved unworkable for a host of personnel-related reasons. The initial idea 
was that its members would act as the Report’s ‘key advocates to ensure…the political 
momentum required to follow-up on its recommendations is maintained.662 It would play a 
‘key role’ in follow-up by integrating a cross-regional coalition of sitting politicians or 
individuals linked or committed to the agenda.663 Although partly established to keep 
Axworthy involved, the intention for each of the ICISS components was that they should be 
‘real’, and function accordingly.664 However, aside from one joint ICISS-Advisory Board 
meeting in June 2001, it did not operate effectively. The central problem was that its 
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membership was constructed around individuals Axworthy had been personally or politically 
allied to whilst Foreign Minister.665 This may seem unremarkable. However, the danger was 
that by composing it around Axworthy the perception would be ICISS was just another 
personally-driven HS initiative, and thus a vehicle for furthering his well-known policies 
regarding intervention.666 This would have merely compounded the difficulties evident 
during the initial efforts to gain state support for the initiative in 2000. However, 
paradoxically whereas a number of the Board Members had been allies on other policy files 
this did not translate to reflexive support in this issue area. Amre Moussa, for instance, 
while personally close to Axworthy, was deemed unsupportive of the R2P agenda by 
Canadian officials. But ultimately any resulting public damage was limited by its lack of 
profile, and because of its ultimately inactive role.667  
 
An additional issue was that a number of its members left office, or moved positions during 
the lifecycle of ICISS. Many who were Foreign Ministers when ICISS began were no longer so 
after its report was finished.668 The prime example of this was demotion of UK Foreign 
Secretary Robin Cook to Leader of the House of Commons in early June 2001. Cook was a 
close friend of Axworthy, who, despite only sanctioning highly qualified UK support for ICISS, 
pushed for Board representation rather than simply participation in the GIS. His reasoning 
was interesting: 
 
[Cook] is not, however, persuaded that we should stand aside from the Advisory 
Board.  He is concerned that, if we are not on the Advisory Board, we will have 
responsibility for the report without real power to influence it.669 
 
As it was, Cook attended the London meeting in a ‘personal capacity’ without FCO 
objection.670 However, the concern with not being able to influence a report which the UK 
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may subsequently be associated with is an interesting dynamic considering ‘ownership’ and 
‘credit’ were reasons which militated against greater UK sponsorship from the outset.671 
Nevertheless, this raises the question of just how much influence the Board could have 
yielded in any case. Aside from those real issues around the Board’s composition, Axworthy 
himself expresses a sense of marginalisation from the work of the initiative he, in the final 
analysis, had been most responsible for establishing: 
 
I found a very cold shoulder from those who were now running the operation, they 
didn’t want to talk to me, didn’t want much to do with me; were basically saying 
“you’re history”.672 
 
Of course, clashes of political ego are always part of the explanation, especially in cases 
where political ‘big beasts’ are concerned. That said, a series of factors within ICISS seemed 
to work against a more activist Board however constituted. First, whereas Axworthy 
believed the Board’s political profile was well-equipped to help sell the report, Thakur did 
not believe ICISS ‘lacked people from the real world’.673 Second, the immensely dominant 
personality and approach of Evans meant the extent to which the former Australia Foreign 
Minister would be willing to take political advice from such a Board was always 
questionable.674 Moreover, as ICISS’s main intellectual force, that Evans would wish to take 
ownership of the idea, and exert his personality (however forceful) in whatever came 
afterwards, was entirely unsurprising. Indeed, whereas the Advisory Board proved to be 
‘unworkable’675 Evans would become one of R2P’s foremost advocates.676 His contribution 
would be exhaustive, and fundamental to the HLP’s 2004 endorsement of R2P.677  
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Evans’ commitment was significant by any measure. His constant willingness to make the 
case for R2P combined with the ability to influence the HLP stood him apart from his fellow 
Commissioners. His output was remarkable.678 The initial expectation was that ICISS 
Commissioners would be ‘used wherever possible within their region’.679 As it unfolded, 
however, their contribution to follow-up was less that might have been expected. This was 
not necessarily a criticism, but more a pragmatic recognition commitment to the ICISS 
process was itself a significant investment of time.680 Indeed, it was hugely beneficial that 
Evans’ advocacy of R2P aligned with the work undertaken by the widely-respected 
International Crisis Group (ICG). As he acknowledges, a ‘good deal’ of his advocacy was as its 
President, a position which undoubtedly enhanced his claim to a hearing.681 After Evans, 
Thakur was the next most public advocate, publishing extensively as well as attending 
numerous R2P-related seminars and events.682 Meanwhile, Co-chair Sahnoun was not a 
prolific writer or as prominent as Evans, but was nevertheless appreciated as bringing 
respect and credibility to the Report, particularly in Africa.683  
 
Although other Commissioners attended events and made some effort to bring attention to 
the report, arguably the biggest issue was not variation in ICISS follow-up, but Michael 
Ignatieff’s support for Iraq. The new context exposed internal differences regarding 
thresholds for potential military action and thus effectively exposed the consensus on which 
ICISS was apparently built.684 The trouble was when faced with a situation like Iraq Ignatieff 
clearly felt the debates were far wider than the framework ICISS had proposed to shape 
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international debate.685 And while Ignatieff was by no means a prominent articulator of R2P, 
and was subsequently no longer deployed as an advocate in the way he might have been686, 
his position exacerbated the difficulty of winning support for an idea in which interest had 
already been ‘killed stone dead’ by 9/11.687  
 
Like Canadian advocacy, Evans’ and Thakur’s efforts were driven by persistence. Neither 
wanted the report they had spent a year working on to be left on a shelf to get dusty.688 This 
is an important motivation in itself. However Evans’ efforts were so committed and driven 
his experiences as a student in Cambodia, and then watching ‘impotently’ as events in Africa 
and the Balkans destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives, are very much part of the 
explanation.689 By 2004, Evans’ efforts to embed R2P ‘in the consciousness of policy-makers 
and those who influence them’ was his ‘primary public policy objective’. The aim was for 
R2P to become a ‘commonplace’ not ‘controversial’ idea – something he believed was 
beginning to succeed due to ‘an endless repetition of the principles and constant 
articulation of what follows from them.690 This advocacy, though, was about more than 
energy and persistence. Both focused on the substance of what R2P was about, and how it 
could remain relevant in an international context focused on terrorism, and subsequently 
divided by Iraq. Both would put considerable effort into responding to the ensuing post-Iraq 
backlash, firstly by emphasizing the responsibility continuum in an attempt to quell fears 
R2P was merely about armed intervention, and secondly by arguing R2P only applied in a 
narrow set of circumstances (i.e. mass atrocity crimes).  
 
Accordingly, Thakur and Evans ardently espoused the just cause and precautionary criteria 
ICISS outlined. Evans essentially argued the threshold for intervention needed to be ‘set 
very high and tight’, because without ‘excluding less than catastrophic forms of human 
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rights abuse, prima facie cases for the use of military force could be made across half the 
world’.691 As it transpired, keeping R2P narrowly-defined would prove essential in 2005, a 
development Evans accepted as necessary because he realised ‘very early on that our 
formulation was too wide, and that you had to find ways of narrowing it.692 Moreover, in 
contrast to Ignatieff, both would reiterate the threshold’s imminence which meant they 
were not retroactively applicable.693 However, although such arguments were eminently 
sensible, the political traction they garnered was extremely limited. Putting aside debates 
relating to the desirability of such politically subjective criteria, Thakur’s argument they 
could potentially constrain abuse or unilateralism and provide some ‘safeguards’ for 
sceptical or hostile states, might have played well in those regions where R2P 
scepticism/opposition was greatest, but was never going to win P5 support.694 The P5 would 
ultimately accept a high/narrow threshold, but at no point demonstrated a willingness to 
actively consider – let alone agree – precautionary principles, or any other prerogative 
impacting limitation. Moreover, post-Iraq political necessity meant Canada would further 
narrow R2P, arguing that action could only be authorized by the SC – a position further 
removed from ICISS’s more open position.695 Although designed to sooth unilateralist fears 
and assure states R2P did not go beyond the UN Charter, the P5 were ultimately content to 
accept this formulation because it did not obligate them in any new way, nor limit their 
freedom to manoeuvre. Thus, R2P’s hard-end reactive weaknesses would remain the most 
problematic issue throughout reflecting the fact that R2P was an intensely political idea 
which would continue to reflect the nuances and differences between those States 
ultimately responsible for (directly/indirectly) shaping it.  
 
Kofi Annan and R2P: ‘I wish I had thought of this myself...’ 
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Annan’s headline-challenge was vital for sparking into motion the processes leading to ICISS. 
However, his contribution continued well beyond his passing of the ‘talking stick’. His two 
most important contributions: the HLP, and subsequent endorsement of R2P in his ILF 
Report, are addressed more exclusively in Ch5 in recognition of their importance to the 
structuring of the Summit process. But understanding the roots of both depends upon an 
understanding of Annan’s own advocacy for R2P, which began from the moment ICISS 
published its report. Although different in its profile and approach, Annan’s advocacy 
represented continuity in terms of the motivations and commitment which underpinned his 
efforts to mobilize states prior to ICISS. Such continuity mattered because Annan’s support 
for R2P was not entirely matched by those around him, with some cautioning against his 
association with a controversial idea which could negatively impact upon his profile if it 
failed to gain the support of states. The internal politics of Kosovo remained relevant post-
ICISS indicative that for some R2P was substantively similar to humanitarian intervention 
and did not alter the underlying politics. Despite this, Annan’s support was unambiguous 
and prominent. He was, as Canadian officials put it, a ‘crucial’ and ‘committed’ ally whose 
support was ‘sincere and strong’.696  
 
During the ICISS establishment phase, Annan’s rejection of a UN Commission, and private 
urging for an alternative route, were important factors in the process. Just as important, 
however, was Annan’s ‘gutsy’ commitment to receive the report on its release, give it 
‘prominence’ and to put it into the UN system.697 That this commitment came prior to the 
ICISS process had begun was indeed gutsy. But as it transpired, any risk the report would not 
align with Annan’s instincts was almost immediately dispelled. Annan’s ‘relief’ at the 
‘rhetorical reformulation’698 – which he believed was the report’s ‘central accomplishment’ 
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– was clear to see. Wishing he had thought of it himself, Annan’s overwhelming 
endorsement confirmed him as a ‘true believer’ from the outset.699  
 
Annan’s role was generally based on public advocacy but was also complemented by efforts 
to strengthen institutional mechanisms associated with the agenda.700 Annan sought to 
bring attention to R2P wherever he could, doing so at high-profile events, press 
conferences, interviews, and most interestingly in relation to live conflicts. Such activities 
helped build R2P’s profile,701 provided early indications of how it might apply diplomatically, 
and contributed to attempts to detach R2P from the unilateralism debate which drove its 
emergence. Annan’s position also gave him a privileged agenda-setting role within the UN. A 
key event in this regard was the SC Retreat held under the Presidency of Singapore in May 
2000.702 This retreat represented the only time R2P was discussed by the SC throughout the 
period until 2006.703 Indeed, it was the only real example of exclusive UN-based discussion 
of R2P prior to the Summit process and GA debates in 2009.704 The relevance of this retreat 
for understanding R2P’s development is twofold. First, that it was discussed as an agenda-
item under Annan’s initiative was an example of his privileged ability to provide access 
points for introducing R2P into fora which mattered most for its future prospects.705 Second, 
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the ensuing political discussions illuminated the scale of the challenges facing the agenda 
and thus require detailed explanation.706  
 
The report was introduced by both ICISS co-chairs.707 Attendance involved P5 
representation, including Jeremy Greenstock, Jean-David Levitte, John Negroponte, and 
staff from within the UN Secretariat. Ultimately, the response of SC members varied.708 P5 
positions generally mirrored contributions made during the February IPA launch event, 
where subtle nuances and shared commonalities emphasized some of the obstacles which 
R2P would have to navigate.709 Here the P5 were generally united by a shared ‘reluctance to 
accept any kind of constraint of the discretion of the UNSC’,710 as Malone explains: 
 
[w]hat was striking was that those most resistant to being tied down by the R2P 
concept were SC ambassadors rather than the membership at large or the G-77. 
Both Greenstock and Levitte favoured the concept in principle, particularly Levitte, 
but they made clear that the Council would continue to act on a case-by-case basis 
rather  than driven primarily by abstract principles. Frankly, this surprised nobody 
from the UN community in attendance, although, as I recall, Evans took on the 
Council’s approach quite heatedly as too convenient by half.711 
 
This certainly fits with Greenstock’s account, who recalls asserting that he could not see the 
SC agreeing ‘in principle...to have a doctrine as opposed to ad hoc judgement on each 
specific case’, adding Evans ‘was quite cross with me in saying that so firmly’.712 Within the 
Retreat this issue was exposed to an even greater extent. Chinese and Russian 
representatives both emphasised the SC’s central role for legally authorising action – a 
longstanding position which would become even more entrenched post-Iraq. Moreover, 
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Mortimer specifically recalls Russia focusing on the proposed ‘code of conduct’ by arguing 
that the veto right was not about national interests but was ‘part of their global 
responsibility’.713 Both shared an absolute unwillingness to undermine the SC’s centrality, 
the privileges which flow from permanent membership, and to constrain their freedom to 
manoeuvre within the Council’s decision-making processes. In a not dissimilar vein, the US 
was the arguably the least engaged of the P5.714 Attempts to potentially obligate US action 
in areas outside its national interest, and to then constrain its ability to decide on what 
cases American force might be used were always unlikely.715 As Greenstock remarks, the US 
‘never likes to be constrained by general principles of multilateral action’ and if ‘you scratch 
beneath the skins of a Russian and American’ you will find them ‘equally resistant to being 
constrained or vulnerable to global governance or multilateral action’.716 Indeed, Somalia 
had demonstrated to the US the pitfalls of humanitarian intervention, leading to subsequent 
efforts to limit US involvement in peace operations and more explicitly tie any such 
involvement more closely to advancing US interests and ‘national security objectives’.717 But 
more directly problematic was that the ICISS proposals coincided with the US 
administrations preoccupation with Iraq, and moves toward the expansionist and legally 
indifferent Bush Doctrine.  
 
Although France and the UK were more open to the idea, their positions came with 
significant caveats. Notably, they apparently shared the P5 view that they would lack 
political will to act with hard power if ‘new situations emerged’718 – a position which for 
some was confirmed by the SC’s response to Darfur – and questioned the extent to which 
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criteria would actually facilitate consensus.719 Moreover, both also accepted SC action 
would remain case-by-case, a politically pragmatic caveat but from Greenstock’s perspective 
shaped by his experience of trying to sell the UK’s less formulaic criteria through 1999-2001. 
Indeed, ICISS proposals entered into a forum where political discussion of such codification 
was actually ‘fading out’.720 Furthermore, neither could rule out action taken outside the SC, 
a position consistent with their involvement in the Kosovo intervention and a caveat 
relevant to keep in mind despite R2P’s binding to SC authority in 2005.  
 
Though there are obvious tensions between the P5 positions, the Retreat discussions 
encapsulated the 2005 formulation of R2P which emerged without veto restraint, without 
criteria, and without international obligation/responsibility. The weight of Council opinion in 
2001 which favoured ‘the principle of authorization for specific action only, and not for any 
general doctrine’721 would remain consistent throughout the period leading to 2005. 
Indeed, the ‘05 agreement was permissible because it did not undermine/override the 
policy positions outlined but essentially suited the above preferences. The US would accept 
R2P’s tying to the SC because it did not obligate them to act, alter the decision-making 
process of the SC, or impact upon its ability to act unilaterally.  Likewise, China and Russia 
were satisfied by the SC’s confirmed centrality, the narrow four-crime formulation, and 
acknowledgement of a case-by-case approach. Although China had apparently suggested 
during the Retreat that were an extreme case like Rwanda to happen again there would be 
consensus on the need for action,722 this would not be about behaviour driven by principle, 
but about decision-making driven by the merits of the individual case. Of course, future 
action seemingly consistent with, or even part-motivated by R2P, can have precedent-
setting consequences. But the unwillingness to embrace R2P as conceived by ICISS, or in a 
way which implied acting according to principle is a subtle distinction many would do well to 
bear in mind when R2P is attributed as a principal driver/motivator of policy in certain 
cases.723 Moreover, that the SC-centric formulation would emerge as the only politically 
feasible option also meant fundamental questions relating to the nature and residence of 
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international responsibility, the point at which multilateral system engagement moves 
beyond individual responsibility into more coercive territory, and then what the appropriate 
policy options might be, would remain areas of contention.  
 
The exclusive tying of R2P to the SC was one of the clearest symptoms of the Iraq war. Its 
impact on the political context antagonised states already exercised by the unilateral 
Kosovo intervention, and in so doing impacted upon how advocates sought define R2P. In 
key respects advocates had little choice but to respond in this way. As state sensitivity 
widened, so the willingness of states to agree narrowed. After his ambiguous flirtation with 
‘legitimacy’ in relation to the 1999 Kosovo intervention, Annan’s position thereon was no 
different. Indeed, Annan’s contribution to the structuring of the Summit process and his 
advocacy of R2P substantially flows from his response to the Bush Doctrine and the march 
to Iraq which stemmed from it. 
 
As Mousavizadeh observes, Annan’s post-Kosovo position was ‘even more wedded to the 
importance of SC authorisation’ – a position which would be conditioned and amplified to 
an even greater extent post-2001.724 The changed context certainly affected the content of 
Annan’s public output, with Mortimer’s work increasingly focused on terrorism, preventive 
force, and themes such as the ‘dialogue of civilizations’.725 But the rule of law and 
emphasising his ‘continuing belief in multilateralism and collective security’ were central 
themes throughout the period Iraq dominated.726 Annan’s advocacy of R2P was thus 
embedded within this approach, making clear, for instance, that the ‘instrument’ for action 
‘must be the UN, and specifically the SC’.727 However, Annan’s advocacy was about more 
than ensuring it stayed within the legal parameters of the Charter. Rather, R2P represented 
part of the solution for addressing an international system ‘in crisis’.728 Crucially, though Iraq 
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was the principle motivator for his institutional HLP response, an accumulation of factors – 
including ‘hesitant and tardy’ responses to crises in Liberia and the DRC – led Annan to the 
conclusion that there needed to be ‘a hard look at fundamental policy issues and at the 
structural changes that may be needed in order to strengthen them’.729 Unsurprisingly, 
Annan expressed hope the HLP would consider R2P in its work – not that they would have 
needed any reminder of Annan’s clear, public support for the idea.730  
 
One of the most interesting elements of Annan’s public advocacy was his willingness to 
apply the language of R2P to a live crisis such as Darfur; despite divisions within the UN 
regarding what the political approach should be.731 Annan would invoke R2P on numerous 
occasions from mid-2004 onwards,732 as he sought to exert pressure on the Sudanese 
regime and the international community to respond to alleged ‘ethnic cleansing’ taking 
place in Darfur.733 The use of R2P language did not observably alter the political dynamics of 
the crisis, especially in terms of mobilizing an engaged, or more importantly unified, 
international response. But it was a demonstration of Annan’s desire to embed R2P in the 
vocabulary of international diplomacy. Nevertheless, despite pleas for a ‘robust 
international response’ Darfur raised more questions than answers, and exposed the SG’s 
ultimate reliance upon member states.734 While Annan raised the possibility of military 
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intervention even the strongest advocates of sovereignty as responsibility ‘failed to 
seriously contemplate military intervention’.735  
 
Indeed, the complex politics of Darfur exposed key potential weaknesses in any eventual 
formulation of R2P. The emphasis on primary responsibility – particularly if there is limited 
appetite for serious international action – can give space to a government to argue that it is 
working towards realising protection, and enable an individual leader to successfully exploit 
the disunity of the SC. In this case, Sudanese President al-Bashir proved able to ‘skilfully 
present himself as part of the solution’736, without following through on any commitments 
he might have made.737 Moreover, the perennial problem of achieving SC consensus was 
evident even in terms of whether to impose sanctions on the Sudanese regime.738 
Furthermore, Williams and Bellamy identified further obstacles directly relevant to the 
change in political context discussed in Part 1, including accusations of Western hypocrisy, 
abuse of humanitarian justifications, and the prioritization of the war on terror which 
altered the strategic priorities of states.739 In any case, the complexity of the crisis did not 
lend itself to straightforward or obvious policy responses. Indeed, that Annan even raised 
the possibility of military action hardly seemed sensible considering the likelihood of such 
action.740 Such words may have contributed to a sense of urgency, but had just as much 
potential to further inflame the situation. Annan could neither see his public declarations 
through, nor safely say that the consequences of such action would be acceptable 
considering the region’s history, the evident internal fragmentation, the dire conditions on 
the ground and the need to consider how military action might impact upon the broader 
Sudanese political context. Moreover, even though Annan was not specifically calling for 
intervention, raising it as a possibility riled the DPA. As Prendergast explains, it ‘doesn’t help 
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to start floating options which are totally unrealistic’ because it actually contributes to 
making internal opposition ‘more obdurate’ if they are led to believe external intervention 
might be an option. As far as Prendergast was concerned, western military intervention was 
a clear non-starter, and thus any approach should have been based on assessing not the 
‘ideal options but the available options’.741 
 
These points may seem a departure in the narrative of post-ICISS advocacy but in actuality 
the Darfur case demonstrated the challenges the agenda faced. Annan’s use of R2P was a 
clear attempt to solidify R2P’s development in the language of international diplomacy 
despite lacking widespread support or understanding. But in so doing, Annan effectively 
exposed the limitations associated with any invocation of R2P. Despite boldly stating that 
‘when crimes on such a scale are being committed, and a sovereign state appears unable or 
unwilling to protect its own citizens, a grave responsibility falls on the international 
community, and specifically [the] Council’742 any specificity of what this practically meant 
beyond broad principle was self-evidently lacking.743 With or without R2P, there was no 
straightforward panacea to the complex set of factors at work in this case. More 
fundamentally, however, the conviction which drove Annan’s advocacy was not matched by 
broad or deep acceptance by UN member states. Within the AU the language of non-
interference was apparent,744 and though the SC had the central role in authorising any 
international response, it did not follow that key SC members accepted Annan’s vision of an 
international responsibility or obligation to act. Ultimately, even by 2004 R2P’s political 
traction was more limited than any advocate might have hoped with the obstacles to 
achieving even state discussion of R2P starkly exposed by Canada’s intergovernmental 
advocacy. The tracing of these efforts dominates herein, before returning in Ch5 to Annan’s 
more pivotal role in introducing the HLP game-changer which transformed R2P’s political 
prospects. 
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Canada’s ‘critical state’ sponsorship 
 
It clearly matters a great deal whether a project has sufficient funding, staff, and 
time built in for follow-up work aimed at reaching policy influentials, the media, 
educators, and the public.745  
 
The importance of political sponsorship was evident throughout the processes leading to 
ICISS. Axworthy’s entrepreneurialism was matched by the backing of his Government, with 
DFAIT responsible for providing and funding many of the support structures necessary for its 
work. However, Canadian support for R2P would not just continue post-ICISS but would be 
critical for realising its agreement within the opportunity-framework provided by the World 
Summit process. It is entirely reasonable to suggest that without Canada’s sponsorship R2P 
would have died as a credible idea. If DFAIT was the ‘engine’ which drove follow-up, The R2P 
Unit within it provided the spark and direction to a multidimensional advocacy strategy 
broadly defined by an ‘interrelated’ twin-track approach of civil society engagement and 
intergovernmental (bilateral/multilateral) diplomacy.746  
 
The Unit was vital for many reasons. First, it provided a natural home for follow-up. It built-
in vital departmental knowledge of the ICISS process and Report, partly because the original 
Secretariat structure meant senior DFAIT officials were regularly briefed about progress, but 
also because key officials involved in the original process subsequently led the post-ICISS 
R2P Unit.747 Second, this dissemination of knowledge resultantly mattered because the ICISS 
structures – with the Secretariat physically located within DFAIT, combined with the 
external support of private foundations – effectively ‘locked-in’ future advocacy. As officials 
observed, the structuring of ICISS helped to develop a ‘sense of [follow-up] obligation’.748 
Although it was possible Canada would decide against supporting the proposals the 
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expectation was that this (as it would indeed transpire) would not be necessary.749 As Ch3 
showed, there was considerable concordance between Canada’s HS agenda and the ICISS 
proposals. Besides which, partly because Canadian support did not represent wholesale 
endorsement of the proposals, and partly to infuse their advocacy with a degree of 
beneficial political distance, officials would deploy a reverse framing strategy designed to 
portray the report as representative of a ‘reasonable middle ground’ which Canada was able 
to support despite objections.750 Indeed, the ‘prevention’ and ‘rebuild’ aspects of the report 
provoked less enthusiastic responses, with a sense they were too strongly emphasized 
whereas Canada would have placed greater emphasis on the reactive dimension and forms 
of intervention within that. Resultantly, officials would present the report as a basis for 
discussion with the caveat that this was ‘not our product’ but one ‘we are willing to accept, 
even if our own version would have looked and sounded very different’. 751 This approach 
was about challenging others to compromise, even though it would be widely recognised 
that even with these qualifications the essence of R2P was almost instinctively Canadian. 
But illuminating such framing tactics is relevant here because the existence of a small 
embedded Unit, working exclusively on R2P, meant Canada was well-equipped to develop 
appropriate and adaptive strategies in a difficult context. Resultantly Canada would prove to 
be the actor most responsible for building political awareness and arguably most 
responsible for (re)defining R2P’s scope and parameters as the WS processes approached.  
 
Furthermore, the third major point is that the very structure of an embedded Unit was itself 
an innovation which helped to insulate and continue the agenda as pressures on it became 
more acute post-9/11.752 The pressures identified in Part 1 not only affected the form and 
prospects of R2P, but also impacted upon Canadian foreign policy priorities and associated 
staffing within the Department. 
 
Although questions would be raised regarding the funding and structural arrangements for 
R2P follow-up – and the extent of on-going Canadian governmental support for HS projects 
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– the Unit benefited significantly from the legacy of the Axworthy era.753 Reporting directly 
to the Director-General of Global Affairs, R2P follow-up coordinated by the Unit was funded 
through the five-year HSP and specifically under the Sub-Priority Issue ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention’ within the PoC Issue Area.754 At the time, the $10m annual HSP funding was, in 
the words of one official, ‘quite an exceptional’ amount of dedicated money.755 Drawing on 
this guaranteed revenue stream, R2P follow-up would be funded from the outset at circa 
$750k per year.756 For instance, from 2000-2002 seven projects ‘to support’ R2P were 
funded at a combined expenditure of $1.6m (6% of total Program expenditures) with 
humanitarian intervention representing almost 20% of all the PoC sub-priority projects.757 
Additionally a further $750k was announced in 2003 to fund specific R2P follow-up 
activities.758 By 2004 a total of twenty-seven humanitarian intervention-related projects 
were funded at a cost of $1.8m, and, though there was a clear decline in the amount of 
funding directed at the PoC, a 2004 Evaluation noted that the Program’s priorities had 
‘shifted’ towards R2P and small arms.759 
 
Embedding follow-up within the HSP represented a logical fit, obviously for thematic 
reasons but also because the latter was designed ‘to support diplomatic leadership’ and 
‘chiefly’ regarded by DFAIT as an ‘advocacy tool’ which aimed to ‘enhance people’s safety 
from the danger of violence...predominately via changing attitudes of specific governments 
or of the international community’. The overriding strategy for follow-up sought to 
‘promote the widest distribution’ of R2P and ‘advocate internationally for greater global 
consensus on its recommendations’ and was defined by two principle aims760:  
 
to strengthen and consolidate emerging norms regarding the responsibilities of 
nation-states and the international community to protect’;  
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to promote more consistent responses on the part of the UN, and the wider 
community, in cases where states are unable or unwilling to protect people from 
massive harm.761 
 
The means for achieving these varied but were consistent with the multi-actor, multi-level 
approach of the HSP as captured by a 2004 evaluation framework of its four Mandated 
Activity Areas (Table 4.1).762  
 
 
 
R2P follow-up activities were focused on ‘Diplomatic Leadership and Advocacy’ as 
illuminated by the twin-tracks outlined below. Indeed, these tracks constituted the overall 
approach, with each revealing specific micro-political insights into the development of R2P. 
That they did, however, was because they were embedded within a strategically-driven tool 
of foreign policy which generated activity outputs well-aligned with the objective of building 
support for R2P. Indeed, in explaining the 2003 funding, Bill Graham succinctly articulated 
this point:  
 
Efforts will focus on engaging governments, international organizations, NGOs, 
parliamentarians, non-governmental policy experts and academics to advance the 
report’s recommendations...Activities will include conferences, round-tables and 
other structured dialogues in national, regional and international settings aimed at 
promoting greater clarity and consensus on the human protection responsibilities of 
sovereign states and the international community.763  
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The process reveals just how politically difficult this proved to be. However, the purpose of 
explaining follow-up in relation to the structures and approach of Canadian advocacy is 
because R2P’s prospects depended upon the platform, staffing, resources and access that 
only a State could provide. Specifically R2P depended upon the dedicated ‘sincere’ 
commitment of DFAIT officials.764 As one senior official remarked, that Canada was able to 
overcome a series of difficult challenges and exploit eventual opportunities was ‘a fantastic 
example of what you can accomplish when you have a good idea, and you have the means 
to promote it, and you do it with persistence and determination’.765 Although high-level 
diplomacy would become increasingly important – especially in the context of the WS 
process – the groundwork for all international interaction and agreement depends on 
officials. This may seem a prosaic point, but in the story of R2P was more significant 
considering the contextual pressures on the R2P/HS agendas which contributed to, and 
exacerbated, post-Axworthy shifts in Canadian foreign policy. While Canada was R2P’s ‘state 
champion from start to finish’, helped – as Thakur and Weiss point out – by continuity of 
government, one should not equate continuity with consistency. There may have been no 
direct ‘breaks’766 in continuity, but Canadian follow-up was nevertheless affected by 
numerous interrelated external and internal factors. This was evidenced by a 2003 
Evaluation of the HSP which revealed that ‘although the follow-up campaign has just begun 
in earnest, the unmistakable impression of people interviewed in New York regarding ICISS 
is that the Canadian government seems to have lost interest in the issue. Compare the great 
care taken to ensure success in phase 1 – the political backing, the level of funding, the 
staffing, the orchestration – to that phase 2, they said’.767 Quiet clearly it would be wrong to 
overlook or wash-over evident variations within the efforts of even the strongest supporter 
of R2P. In terms of explanation the evaluation suggested the perception may have derived 
from the fact R2P follow-up was funded via a Program that ‘we know will sunset’ (the HSP), 
and was thus reliant upon temporary rather than core program funding.768 Certainly this 
may have been one important reason for the perception. However, a deeper understanding 
of what lay behind the perception points to a series of factors which interviewees 
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acknowledge impacted upon follow-up, and which, conversely, may actually have amplified 
the necessity of the HSP during the post-ICISS phase. These factors broadly relate to: the 
changed post-9/11 geo-political context and differential ministerial support post-Axworthy, 
(post-9/11).  
 
In a more specific micro-sense, 9/11’s impact on Canadian follow-up was not just thematic 
but was also institutional – within DFAIT and across government. The increased emphasis on 
terrorism and counter-terrorism created a widely-replicated dynamic whereby staffing and 
resources were diverted to these new priority areas.769 This resultantly impacted upon the 
availability of resources for policy-files of a more humanitarian ilk, with one official 
describing this as creating a problem of ‘brain-share’.770 Unsurprisingly, this was also 
exacerbated by the changed circumstances which seemingly undermined the 
appropriateness and relevance of HS and R2P.771 Civilian crises seemed like a bygone 
problem of the 1990s, while HS seemed to suffer from a lack of ‘toughness’ in the new 
context.772 Indeed, linked to this – but also independent of it – is that post-Axworthy there 
would be inevitable changes in ministerial approaches and support for HS projects.773 As far 
as Axworthy was concerned, post-9/11 Canadian foreign policy turned to the ‘dark side’, 
and far from demonstrating continuity only renewed its ‘stewardship’ of R2P after a 
‘hiatus’.774 Although it is true Axworthy would particularly have had major problems with 
the direction of travel – believing he would likely have ‘suffered’ had he remained in office – 
the issue of varied ministerial support was always possible considering the sheer energy he 
committed to an agenda defined as his own.775 In key respects, the HS agenda was 
‘personality-driven’.776 And though Axworthy left a considerable residual legacy, the degree 
of visibility and profile would suffer as new ministers sought to – quite reasonably – apply 
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their own personality and political preferences.777 Thus, Paul Heinbecker’s statement that 
‘although the Canadian Government never actually abandoned...human security, it never 
pursued it again with the same sense of purpose’ rings most true.778  
 
This is not to say, however, that R2P follow-up was not recognised as an important initiative. 
For instance, Bill Graham publically supported R2P and was regarded as strongly supportive 
while all ministers signed-off funding requests without objection, and with the continued 
support of PM Chrétien.779 But nevertheless there was less visibility to follow-up, and a less 
obvious high-profile ‘political champion’, at least until Paul Martin became Prime Minister in 
December 2003.780 In this regard, it is important to recognise that while longstanding 
characteristics of a country’s foreign policy can exist in some continuous form, priorities are 
essentially transitory, not permanent. They can be affected by a changing context, by 
changes of government and of personnel. A revealing example of this was Axworthy’s 
immediate successor as Foreign Minister. According to interviewees, John Manley was 
entirely different in his approach to policy and process.781 His political preferences favoured 
a more ‘pragmatic’ rather than thematic foreign policy approach, based upon a desire to 
return to ‘first principles’ which meant greater emphasis on bilateral relationships with 
longstanding and emerging/potential partners and opportunities within emerging 
markets.782 As Cushing recalls, the language of HS resultantly diminished, partly because it 
represented the ‘previous minister’s work’ but also (according to another official) because 
Manley quite reasonably saw HS in the context of a broader foreign policy, rather than the 
principle driver of it.783 Indeed, 9/11 was seen as actually reaffirming this kind of approach, 
not just under Manley but thereafter as Canada faced the ‘challenge’ of demonstrating it 
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was a credible and secure partner of the US.784 Thus, HS and R2P would be squeezed by the 
impact of 9/11 and would be subject to further pressures relating to ministerial variations of 
greater importance than generally projected in dominant accounts of R2P’s development.785 
They illuminate a simple but undeniable point that one cannot guarantee political support 
for a specific idea or project will be maintained, reciprocated and remain unchallenged by 
alternative policy options. This is particularly important for ideas dependent upon significant 
resources of political will. In this context, though R2P advocacy was affected in the ways 
outlined, that the core priorities of the HSP remained ‘intact’ with R2P follow-up continued 
throughout, is testament to significant ‘leg-work’ undertaken over previous years which 
enabled officials to further the agenda in subsequent years.786  
 
Canada’s Twin-track Strategy 
 
Canada’s R2P follow-up model was by no means new. The combination of an inter-
governmental diplomatic track directed at ‘promoting broad acceptance of core R2P 
principles’, with a Civil Society (“CS”) track intended to ‘stimulate discussion’787 and 
potentially lead to an NGO-driven advocacy network, in key respects, built on the core 
characteristics of previously successful HS campaigns. However, in contrast to the ICBL – the 
most successful example of this hybrid approach – R2P advocacy would be considerably 
more difficult and fail to achieve a similar kind of bandwagon effect propelling R2P towards 
agreement. Of course, though related in their focus on ensuring the protection of civilians 
from violence, land-mines and R2P are substantially different. R2P is of a more fundamental 
character, more directly bound-up in the contestation over the future development of 
international society as evidenced by the political reaction it provoked. Though Canada 
sought to demonstrate R2P’s concordance with developing international consensus and its 
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inclusion of a number of ‘underlying concepts’ that were not ‘fundamentally new’788, its 
efforts exposed significant limitations in the capacity and preparedness of states to engage 
particularly in a ‘norm-building’ process within the GA789. This difficulty reaffirmed the need 
for a varied approach to follow-up. 
 
As such, intergovernmental efforts were defined by an operational dimension focused 
primarily on the SC, and a normative one focused primarily on the GA.790 Indeed, though 
Canadian follow-up was a multi-dimensional, a multi-level and multi-actor approach, the 
strategy was always UN-‘centred’.791 This was inevitable. Unlike the ICBL, any agreement on 
R2P could only be achieved through the UN. There were no alternatives.792 However, the 
initial plan of taking the report straight into the UN system and pursuing a process within it 
would provide an early indication of just how difficult building support for R2P would be, 
and help explain why in 2004 Hulan would describe reaction to Canadian follow-up efforts 
as ‘mixed’.793 Whereas officials believed many governments were more ‘receptive’ to the 
report’s ideas than expected, with the concept of R2P garnering ‘broad appeal across 
multiple constituencies’794, the depth of this appeal was highly questionable and did not 
necessarily translate to a preference or support for codification (in whatever form).795 
Indeed, a ‘considerable number’ of states ‘very hostile’ to the idea would exist throughout 
motivated for instance by a belief R2P entailed ‘a right of intervention in their domestic 
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affairs’. This hostility would only be exacerbated by Iraq after which ‘many countries backed 
away further’.796 Moreover, Iraq fuelled scepticism even in the eyes of those more 
instinctively supportive of R2P.  
 
Highlighting such problems in relation to the twin-track approach strengthens the 
structured outcome argument and highlights a tension at the heart of the intervention 
problem, and by definition at the heart of Canada’s intergovernmental approach. 
Throughout the process Canada never attempted to present R2P as anything other than a 
potential solution to the question of intervention to protect people. There were inevitable 
variations and subtleties within Canadian advocacy, but unsurprisingly many states focused 
on hard-end questions relating to military action. But this revealed just how difficult 
achieving political support for an international norm which sought to qualify sovereign 
responsibilities in relation to possible international action would be. Resultantly, this raised 
the dilemma of whether pursuing an overtly normative route was in the interests of the 
protection agenda, or whether focusing on the operational dimension (encouraging the SC 
to refer to aspects of R2P/pushing for its ‘practical application’ in ‘specific country 
situations’ would be a better option). In the latter action would be ‘presented as an 
exception rather than a norm’.797 Akin to the UK’s unsuccessful efforts to agree a SC-focused 
doctrine, this dilemma would similarly exercise Canadian officials.798 For instance, Paul 
Heinbecker, Canada’s Ambassador to the UN, would be acutely aware of this dilemma: 
 
…should we instead focus on developing operational norms rather than the 
overarching normative framework? Do we risk reversing progress by seeking to turn 
accumulated practice into explicit norms?799 
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Heinbecker’s question was drawn from his own difficult experience during 2002-2004 of 
trying to even get the R2P report discussed within the GA, let alone realise some form of 
agreement/declaration. In this respect some important details are worth highlighting. In July 
2002 Canada circulated the ICISS report via a Letter to the SG.800 This was central to an early 
prioritisation of ensuring wide dissemination of the report, and gave the report a formal UN 
number under GA Agenda Item 44. However, even these ‘modest’ efforts encountered ‘stiff 
resistance’.801 Unsurprisingly, subsequent political process would run into numerous 
roadblocks. After this first step, efforts to agree even a procedural resolution designed to 
allow formal deliberation of the report were blocked, despite Canada watering down its 
initial proposals to the point of merely requesting Annan to ‘facilitate dialogue’.802 As 
Heinbecker bluntly stated: 
 
We could not get agreement among members even to permit official discussion of 
the report. We could not even get agreement to permit discussion of the report in 
the UN just by interested countries at their own expense.803 
 
The lack of progress within the GA and the continuing political obstacles which beset R2P 
throughout this period demonstrated its lack of development as an international norm. 
Indeed, the repeatedly mentioned structured outcome logic explains how R2P transitioned 
from the state described by Heinbecker to one rapidly accelerated towards agreement in 
2005. The process-driven hypothesis and associated methods exposed just how limited 
R2P’s development within the GA was and why it is so necessary to considering the path to 
2005 in terms of the how and the why of that agreement and in terms of the micro-
processes which defined it. In terms of the politics of these obstacles resistance within the 
GA was strongly evident from within the NAM, with core opposition from India, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Sudan, Cuba, among others804. There was limited desire to lock the GA into a process 
which could lead to substantive discussion of R2P.805 The difficulty of developing a 
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normative framework in this context was thus clear to see. Moreover, the obstacles facing 
R2P were not simply about a group of ‘usual suspects’. Although one official believed 
Canada could potentially have forced a vote to discuss the report, it was clear that to have 
set R2P off on such a negative footing would have been counterproductive, and besides 
which, there simply was ‘not enough’ cross-membership support to have justified such an 
approach at this stage.806 Despite identifying positive movement within key regions, officials 
were well aware of a ‘high degree of scepticism’ across the spectrum regarding the use of 
‘robust action to protect civilians’.807 Though Africa was regarded as more receptive to the 
idea, particularly with developments like the agreement of Article 4(h) of the AU 
Constitutive Act, and a similar clause under Article 11 of SADC’s Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Cooperation,808 Heinbecker regarded African countries as resistant, 
reticent and ‘circumspect’ in their reactions to his efforts to promote R2P at the UN. Their 
scepticism was broadly defined by those who feared too much intervention, and those who 
believed there would be too little, in addition to strong widespread resistance to the notion 
of ‘non-African’ intervention.809 Certainly African support for R2P was undoubtedly a crucial 
factor for ensuring its inclusion in 2005.810 Nevertheless, this resistance to outside 
interference could be seen as undermining potential for genuine international 
responsibilities and involvement in African problems, with AU regional ownership about 
more than a desire to deal with one’s own problems. Such a division of responsibility poses 
significant normative, operational and legal questions which strengthen a number of the 
arguments made previously.811  
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Until 2005 there were few fleeting mentions of R2P within the UNGA.812 For all its 
negativity, India’s statement that R2P continued to lack support and that discussion would 
be ‘infructuous’ and ‘divert attention from issues...of real concern to most Member States’ 
seemed to capture the mood.813 The effect of this on Canadian advocacy was significant, 
necessitating a shift from an overt/provocative normative push to a ‘ground-up’ campaign 
designed to increase support within regions, and negate some of the negative connotations, 
or scepticism hindering progress. As one official commented, post-ICISS follow-up needed to 
reflect the fact that the various regions of the world would not necessarily look at R2P ‘with 
the same eyes’.814 Equally significant was the open admission that GA agreement may take 
years and only after a more exhaustive intergovernmental process had taken place.815 This 
meant focusing on multilateral/bilateral opportunities, engaging with parliamentarians, 
academia, and continuing to make the most of high-level events within the UN context 
when they arose.816 In effect, officials acknowledged successful advocacy would depend 
upon commitment, constant reiteration and repetition of R2P’s principles in order to more 
clearly define what it was (and was not) about.  
 
Consistent with this, was the interrelated “CS-track” designed to facilitate awareness of 
R2P, and to more ambitiously build an NGO-led advocacy coalition akin to those which 
existed for other HS initiatives.817 CS engagement was by no means straightforward. It 
required considerable patience, not least because consensus was less developed than in 
other areas with the issue of military intervention particularly problematic for many 
NGOs.818 Nevertheless, there were real advantages to engaging CS. Between November 
2002 and April 2003 the World Federalist Movement led cross-regional consultations, with 
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key principle meetings held in New York, Washington, Geneva, and Ottawa.819 These proved 
invaluable. The lead role of the WFM re-activated an important relationship. Its Executive 
Director Bill Pace was widely-respected and experienced in coalition-building.820 He was 
extensively networked, and well known to DFAIT having approached Axworthy in 1998 
requesting help to re-energize the ICC negotiations.821 That DFAIT sought a return on the 
favour helped protect R2P from what one official described as NGO ‘friendly fire’. The 
consultations certainly provided important feedback on the substance and how Canada’s 
should pursue follow-up. Indeed, feedback was a key priority of the process. However, 
because this was provided within the context of a dedicated process, it helped to negate the 
possibility for hostile public criticisms.822 
 
Crucially, the consultations considered CS’s potential involvement in R2P advocacy. 
Suggested emphasis for normative promotion focused on R2P’s language, its responsibility 
continuum, alongside efforts to fashion the political will to act, and to strengthen the 
capacity of IOs to respond to emerging crises.823 Throughout the process the WFM was the 
lead CS actor. Aside from organizing the consultations, from 2003 its ‘R2P-Civil Society’ 
project would become one of two major projects it could support at the time, 
complementing a Canadian effort increasingly defined by intergovernmental diplomacy.824 
For instance, its focus on raising awareness and building CS capacity was evident at the 2003 
World Social Forum held in Brazil. This major five-day event enabled the WFM to develop 
contacts with NGOs from all major regions (especially Latin America), convene and attend 
seminars and workshops to raise R2P, meet with media representatives, and distribute 
numerous resource materials.825  
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The significant effort required to achieve broader and deeper state support for R2P was 
born out by the “intergovernmental-track” primarily designed to realise it. In addition to 
the complex African position, the most difficult regions to bring onside were Asia and Latin 
America.826 This should not imply, however, that Canada was able to immediately activate 
the support of ‘like-minded’ states. Canada would have allies. But even this support 
required real work. This was apparent early on as Canada began consulting within the EU 
and the HSN – the latter of which officials used as a cross-regional ‘sounding board’ to 
promote R2P, and to adapt strategy accordingly. Despite general interest, initial reactions 
were characterized by real scepticism that the idea was ever ‘going to fly’.827 Over time, 
Canada would make significant headway in aligning both behind an active push for R2P. 
Before that, however, the credibility of state scepticism was enhanced by what one internal 
DFAIT document tantalisingly described as a substantial deterioration in the ‘diplomatic 
terrain’ since the report’s publication.828 Interviewees were very clear that Iraq and 
specifically the implicit association with humanitarian justifications exacerbated an already 
‘uphill battle’ to convince states of the need for R2P. Iraq compounded long-standing 
opposition and opened up new fault-lines which officials would have to counter. As one 
official remarked, Iraq was ‘seized’ upon by those already opposed, and set-back those who 
were hesitant for fear R2P would give ‘carte blanch’ for other interventions.829 
 
Resultantly, officials would have to ‘constantly...explain and re-explain’ R2P was intended to 
address mass atrocities not situations like Iraq.830 For instance, as the Iraq war approached, 
core framing tactics included arguments R2P could ‘limit’ interventions by creating ‘more, 
not fewer rules’; was a ‘hedge’ against unilateralism/non-SC authorization; and was a ‘pro-
sovereignty’ doctrine.831 The need for such arguments would be more acute after invasion 
had taken place, with the July 2003 Progressive Governance Summit capturing the hostility 
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and divisions Iraq provoked. Though its communiqué agreed ICISS’s report was a ‘valuable 
contribution’ to the debate, and encouraged ‘urgent consideration’ of it by the GA, the final 
text was more significant for the political realities it exposed – both in what it said and what 
it did not.832 Discussion of the report by the broadly ‘centre-left’ world leaders in attendance 
was introduced by Jean Chrétien and strongly supported by Tony Blair. Despite attempts to 
paper over disagreement, there was no endorsement of R2P. Indeed, such language was 
explicitly omitted:   
 
Where a population is suffering serious harm as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling to halt or avert it, 
the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect.833 
 
According to newspaper coverage, this passage – lifted directly from ICISS – was removed as 
a result of strong objections by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Germany.834 With Iraq in mind, 
references to ‘repression’ and ‘state failure’ took on an altogether more challenging 
meaning, provoking fears the formulation ‘could have provided justification for the war’.835 
Moreover, equally important was the general desire for clarity regarding the centrality of SC 
authorization, with Brazil especially insistent there should be no doubt in this regard.836 The 
Summit thus endorsed the position that the UNSC ‘remains the sole body to authorise global 
action in dealing with humanitarian crises’.837 Of course, there is substance to Welsh et al 
suggestion that such fears were ‘exaggerated’ when one considers ICISS’s emphasis on UN 
authorisation and its threshold conditions. However, while they rightly point out such fears 
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were ‘symptomatic’ of the divisions created by the Iraq war,838 this statement was more 
fundamental because its clarity symbolised a subtle shift away from the caveated nuances 
which ICISS deemed necessary to address the issue of what should be done when the SC is 
unable to agree.839 Indeed, SC exclusivity would be prerequisite to any political agreement 
on R2P, and increasingly central to Canadian advocacy despite Chrétien’s best efforts to 
caveat the statement by describing it as ‘perhaps...not that clear’ referring to situations ‘like 
Kosovo where it’s possible to move without the UN’.840 Like the UK, Chrétien did not wish to 
define R2P in a way which implied Kosovo was unacceptable, or accept the SC was now 
more likely to agree than it had been during Kosovo. This was especially important 
considering how difficult engaging the P5 in active consideration of the idea proved to be. 
Despite awareness building events in P5 capitals, responses were unsurprisingly mixed.841 Of 
the P5, France and the UK were deemed supportive, with China and Russia the most 
‘difficult’ to convince, for well-known reasons.842 The US, meanwhile, was arguably the least 
engaged of all. Not only were its priorities elsewhere, but its relationship with Canada was 
strained by the latter’s refusal to support or participate in Iraq. Canada had to ‘fight 
publically’ with allies.843 As such, there was limited interaction on this specific issue, with the 
US public statements or comment conspicuous by their absence. Chrétien aptly captured 
the US position, describing it as ‘unlikely to approve’ of the approach Canada was 
pursuing.844  
 
Nevertheless, the Summit did have positive consequences. Despite Canada’s various follow-
up efforts, the international agenda had found little place for R2P. But the controversy 
provoked by Iraq had a perverse upside, helping to breathe new life into the ember R2P had 
become: 
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...the summit...served to revive a process that had been moribund for some time. 
This was dead and overtaken by September 11...The summit has made it an issue 
and put it back on the agenda.845  
 
Chrétien would reinforce this by expressing support for R2P during one of his last major 
speeches on foreign policy, at the UNGA in September 2003.846 But if the Summit sparked 
interest, it would be Chrétien’s Prime Ministerial successor – and long-time rival – who 
would drive the process forward from 2004 onwards.847 
 
Paul Martin’s advocacy of R2P would shift the balance from a DFAIT-dominated follow-up 
campaign to one driven more from within his own office. According to Martin, although he 
recognised there had been a centralization of policy-making towards the Privy Council under 
successive PM’s – and was not one to shy away from getting heavily involved in Canadian 
foreign policy – his intention was to ‘build-up the overall foreign policy capacity’ of the 
Canadian Government.848 This also meant reinvesting in Canada’s military and strengthening 
the Department of Defence, in recognition that R2P depended upon a stronger defence 
capacity to enforce it when necessary.849 R2P would thus form a central plank of Martin’s 
‘responsibilities agenda’ first articulated at the UNGA in September 2004.850 His contribution 
to follow-up was, however, evident almost immediately, and was significant for a number of 
reasons.  
 
First, Martin immediately contributed to creating ‘new profile’ for R2P.851 Key speeches over 
a four month period at the World Economic Forum; to the Canadian Parliament; and to the 
Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington included important references to R2P, 
complementing a typically supportive speech by Annan to a Joint Session of the Canadian 
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Parliament in March 2004.852 Second, this coincided with a renewed sense of opportunity 
derived from the establishment of the HLP, and the realisation that should it endorse R2P 
the World Summit (process) could be the endgame for an ‘enhanced diplomatic strategy in 
support of R2P’.853 In this regard Martin’s appointment of Allan Rock as Ambassador to the 
UN would be especially important for R2P negotiation prospects, as would his own personal 
diplomacy at key points during the process.854 Third, the substance of Martin’s advocacy 
clearly captured the conceptual narrowing of R2P deemed necessary to ensure it remained 
a politically viable idea. This meant locking R2P into SC-authorization and calling for 
‘thresholds’ to aid the international community in determining when and what action might 
be necessary to protect civilian from ‘extreme threats’.855This position was apparent 
throughout 2004. For instance, an internal document reveals Canada’s support for R2P was 
based upon ‘the report’s finding that the use of force to protect civilians should be UN-
sanctioned and multilateral in nature’.856 ICISS was less directly clear-cut, hence it’s 
numerous, unconvincing efforts, in terms of ‘what if’ the SC is slow to react, or unable to 
agree. Nevertheless, the impetus for Canada was about showing that a ‘properly 
constructed’ R2P would complement existing international law, was about dealing with 
mass atrocities, and would thus make it more difficult to justify intervention for 
humanitarian reasons.857  
 
But as Bellamy points out, these conceptual moves ‘bypassed’ the issue of unauthorised 
intervention – as would the World Summit Outcome.858 Martin’s role in this has certainly 
provoked criticism, not least from Michael Byers who believed by refraining from suggesting 
interventions could occur without the SC’s ‘expressed authorization’ Martin (and thus 
Canada) ‘conceded the point that had motivated the development of [R2P] in the first place: 
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that some mechanism should exist for interventions to prevent mass suffering where the 
UN is unable or unwilling to act’. This, he suggested, ‘stripped’ R2P of its ‘meaningful 
content’.859 On one level the post-ICISS development of R2P revealed evidence of its 
hollowing out as a norm designed to address the question Byers rightly identifies as 
inspiring its initial development860. This resultantly raised questions about how one 
understands the political agreement in 2005. As the politics of the Summit negotiations 
reveal, the transition from ICISS was fundamental in all sorts of ways. The 2005 context was 
very different from the one which led to Axworthy’s establishment of ICISS. Many elements 
of the 2005 agreement were designed to ensure R2P reaffirmed existing processes and 
provisions rather than transform them. Inevitably there were political consequences in 
terms of what this meant for addressing future mass atrocities.861 But Canadian advocacy 
was shaped by a series of factors which were arguably more significant than the debate 
around defining a mechanism for action outside the SC. A combination of the political 
context – which exacerbated longstanding opposition to unilateralism – and the unexpected 
opportunity of the World Summit meant the advocacy process was concomitantly 
accelerated and narrowed. The politics of intervention, and thus R2P, ensured any possible 
nuance regarding unilateralism was unrealistic and counterproductive. SC authorisation was 
an absolute imperative, and from a tactical perspective had to be the primary starting point 
for any multilateral discussion if – as Canada determined it should be – the Summit was to 
be the target venue for agreement. However, an assessment as to whether or not the 
approach Canada adopted was wise depends on one’s perspective. From Byers perspective, 
Canadian strategy under Martin took the easy option by advancing a ‘watered-down, 
parsimonious version’ of R2P believing Canada should have embarked on a longer-term 
effort to ‘shift international opinion towards a right to unauthorized humanitarian 
intervention’.862 But such an approach was, and remains, entirely unrealistic. In reality a 
unilateral doctrine of R2P was off-the-table well before the World Summit. Canadian 
advocacy was ultimately about making the most of available opportunities. Had there been 
a desire to pursue the Byers approach it is likely that there would still be no R2P agreement 
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to this day. But the important point is that the shift towards unambiguous SC-authorisation 
was a necessary factor for achieving any potential outcome during 2005.  
 
However, this debate does raise the issue of timing highlighted in the introduction. 
Considering the formulation of R2P in Ch5, the question is, was the Summit opportunity in 
the best interests of R2P, or did it come too soon for an idea which was not propelled into 
the process by a universal clamour to embrace it? In this sense, there is no reason to regard 
Canada’s advocacy approach from 2004 onwards as necessarily in conflict with this idea. The 
problem is of timing is more fundamental, it relates to efforts to understand the dynamics 
of normative evolution in order to better understand the factors which drive international 
behaviour and the potential importance of R2P. Canada certainly had success in building 
awareness and achieving the support of states (including those it otherwise would not have 
had). For instance, it successfully activated the HSN to express support for R2P in a 
submission to the HLP;863 and achieved Martin-led high-level discussion of R2P at the 
Progressive Governance Summit in Hungary (14-15 October), the APEC summit in Santiago 
(20-21 November), and the Francophone summit in Burkina Faso (26-27 November).864 
Canada also had bilateral successes. Most notably, after considerable consultations, Mexico 
would move from ‘reticent’ about the idea to an active supporter, with officials taken aback 
at how seriously Mexico engaged in discussions prior to announcing its support in the GA in 
2004.865 Similarly, the EU would become much more actively engaged as 2005 approached, 
Chile would be become more supportive, as would Japan, whose conception of HS found 
difficulty with R2P which meant officials had ‘a lot of explaining to do’.866 With such cases, it 
was not unreasonable that Canada would regard itself as making progress. However, an 
equally important part of the story was the recognition that ultimately Canada needed a 
‘game-changing moment’ to get R2P on the UN agenda – particularly after the ‘failures’ of 
2002.867  
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The HLP was this game-changer. It altered the approach and focus of Canadian efforts as the 
potentiality of the World Summit emerged. As Heinbecker commented in 2004, the hope for 
R2P lay ‘primarily...in the SG’s reform efforts, and the work of the reform panel’ because 
efforts to build support for R2P had got ‘almost nowhere’ at the UN.868 Thus, while repeated 
references to the HLP may appear out of place (considering its establishment processes are 
outlined in Ch5), it is evident because it represents a vital element of the abovementioned 
structured outcome argument which can only be understood in the context of the advocacy 
efforts this chapter has sought to explain. What should be clear is that without this 
structuring, there would have been no R2P in 2005. This does not necessarily invalidate the 
agreement, as one official rightly remarked, multilateral Summits can provide significant 
opportunities to ‘blow-through’ entrenched opposition or resistance, and bring into play 
ideas which would otherwise struggle to gain a foothold.869 But even so the lack of 
normative momentum behind R2P should qualify the significance of the 2005 agreement. 
This is especially true considering the detailed negotiations the next chapter traces. R2P 
emerged into the WS process with major questions about the extent to which states were 
willing to embrace the idea of an international responsibility, and how R2P might translate 
into the actual protection of people in need particularly as the only institution which 
seemed to gain from the processes outlined was the SC.870 Advocates certainly deserve 
credit for fighting to keep the idea alive in an often unreceptive political context. But their 
successes were more than matched by significant concessions, and continually checked by 
questions and contestation about what R2P would normatively and practically mean. R2P 
was always a controversial idea, and contrary to what the NLC might suggest, this 
controversy would be inflamed with each new step, each new proposal, and each new crisis. 
But this controversy is just as much because the speed of R2P’s emergence was not 
underpinned by the kind of normative development the NLC might imply.871 Ch5 picks-up 
                                                          
868
 Paul Heinbecker (2004) ‘The UN and Never Again: the Responsibility to Protect’, 13 March 2004 
869
 Private interview with Canadian official (31 March 2010) 
870
 As one official remarked in late 2004: ‘Although there is a high degree of consensus regarding humanitarian 
principles, there remain serious differences among UN member states regarding how these principles should 
be enforced’, ‘Evidence of Mr. Ferry de Kerckhove and Mrs. Marie Gervais-Vidricaire to the Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 17 November 2004, p9 
871
 As Canadian official Ferry de Kerckhove remarked in late 2004: ‘It’s a Canadian initiative. Seen from Ottawa, 
The R2P seems to be a very nice concept. Everyone agrees...But if you think that the countries we’re facing 
take it the same way, I have to tell you that’s not the case’ in ‘Evidence of Mr. Ferry de Kerckhove and Mrs. 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
212 
 
the remainder of the story, showing why the emphasis on micro-process matters so much, 
and why the ‘structured outcome’ explanation offers a more realistic and convincing 
account of how a form of R2P became part of a UNGA Resolution in 2005. In so doing it 
reveals how the multilateral process exposed the fundamental dividing-lines and alternative 
normative preferences which led to an agreement highly qualified, and of distinct character 
to what advocates originally envisaged. 
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Chapter 5: A ‘structured outcome’: R2P and the 2005 World Summit 
 
R2P snuck by, and the history of R2P is that it ran into much greater difficulties after 
the summit than before.872  
 
I think there’s a very legitimate question to raise whether we would have succeeded 
in getting those two paragraphs in had they been the only subject on the agenda.873 
 
 I think it more or less slipped through in the shadow of the bigger issues.874 
 
--------------------------- 
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2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity 
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United 
Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and 
international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping 
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out. 
 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide. 
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As the Introduction outlined, paragraphs 138-140 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
provoked considerable praise, attention and hope. However, as it also alluded to, the idea 
that the ‘unanimous’ endorsement of R2P suddenly signified consensus in such a 
contentious area, would be quickly dispelled. Subsequent evidence of on-going 
disagreement and contestation over its use; appropriateness; and the extent to which R2P 
genuinely reflected a willingness to mobilize resources for collective action to protect 
civilians, have all served to expose the agreement’s many weaknesses.875 Perhaps the most 
revealing problem underpinning this observation is that such difficulties were not 
anticipated even though they were entirely inevitable; entirely unsurprising. The earlier 
statement that ‘unanimity of agreement does not necessarily equate to unanimity in terms 
of meaning, significance or application’, was not generically made – even if it does have 
broad relevance to many forms of international agreement. Nor is the argument presented 
throughout a product of convenient hindsight. On the contrary, it is based upon an analysis 
of the micro-processes of R2P’s emergence driven by the application of methods designed 
to provide a more sophisticated account of the complex interplay of factors which define 
the explanation.  
 
It is from this that the structured outcome thesis emerges, based ultimately on the 
previously identified key questions of how and why R2P was agreed in 2005, and in what 
form. Each of these feed directly into the resulting explanation, as demonstrated by the 
structure of this chapter, which essentially proceeds in two principal – but intensely 
interconnected – stages. The first focuses on the factors which gave structure to the overall 
process, with particular emphasis on the High-level Panel (HLP), Annan’s In Larger Freedom 
(“ILF”) report and the way these fed into the negotiation stage, most obviously by shaping 
the agenda for a Summit initially intended as a follow-up to review commitments made at 
the Millennium Summit.876 These factors should be seen as both enabling and constraining 
influences, helping to explain both the how/why and the what. The second stage continues 
to account for such ‘structuring factors’ but does so more directly within the context of the 
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multilateral negotiations. Here documenting the form of R2P, including the framing 
strategies deployed within the negotiations, and the various necessary political 
compromises, all contribute to an analysis of the final text which opened this chapter. 
Clearly it is crucial that our analysis of the R2P paragraphs is based upon the way they were 
negotiated and how states viewed them; relying purely on a reading of the text would fail to 
accommodate member state variations regarding what the agreement meant and the 
significance they placed on it.877 However, aside from breaking-down how R2P was defined 
and redefined, key structuring factors relating to the way the member state negotiations 
unfolded were just as vital. For instance, changes to the format and the institutional venues 
used for negotiation changed the political dynamics at key points during the process, which 
in turn impacted upon the issues at stake, and the role and resources of the many actors 
involved. Many of these are the subject of extensive analysis in Part 1, and followed up 
where relevant in Part 2. 
 
Though the argument is presented according to the two interconnected dimensions, the 
sheer complexity of the process inevitably means clarity is not easily forthcoming. It would 
be unrealistic and undesirable to attempt a detailed blow-by-blow narrative-driven 
explanation of the Summit process, particularly as existing accounts capture this sufficiently 
well already.878 Such an approach would unduly sacrifice analytical focus. Moreover, the 
specific argument adopted in this thesis ultimately matters because academics and 
policymakers interested in R2P, and constructivists in general, should aim to base their 
understanding of normative development on the processes which underpin them. No 
amount of advocacy commitment can substitute the knowledge this politically-focused 
approach can yield. This is particularly true when one considers the basis for the structured 
outcome argument, and the micro-process driven nature of the empirical research 
presented from Ch3 onwards. As shown previously, the dynamics of R2P’s emergence into 
the 2005 negotiations was neither based upon any bandwagoning effect, nor a product of 
emulation. There was limited reason to believe agreement in 2005 was a realistic possibility. 
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Indeed though the post-9/11 political context may have contributed to shaping the 
parameters of R2P, this was not a product of direct engagement by states in an R2P-focused 
process. Nor was there a sudden Damascene-like conversion by the large number of states 
referred to repeatedly in interviews as essentially opposed to the idea of an R2P.879 Thus, in 
many respects, subsequent disagreements over the meaning, application, and scope of R2P, 
reflect the state of agreement as it was laid down in 2005, in addition to a misreading – for 
whatever motive – of what the agreement really meant. It is for these reasons that the 
argument presented here offers a more convincing explanation of the factors which led to 
2005. Because there lacked a progressive building-up of momentum, the dynamics were 
very different and therefore require a different kind of explanation. In fairness to Alex 
Bellamy, his account of R2P does at least acknowledge the importance of some vital factors, 
notably the adoption of R2P by the HLP and ILF, which he describes as ‘undoubtedly critical’ 
for elevating it onto the WS agenda: 
 
Without this adoption, it is unlikely that the Canadian government and high profile 
ICISS commissioners would have succeeded in persuading governments to discuss 
the R2P, let alone include it in the final text.880 
 
This point is entirely consistent with aspects of the structured outcome argument. However, 
the difference is that this line, rather than explored further, is limited within an 
understandable focus on the form of R2P which emerged. Despite Bellamy’s sophisticated 
account of the textual negotiations881, it surely matters just as much that R2P depended 
upon these (ultimately non-state driven) factors, in addition to a process which unfolded in 
such a way that two key ambassadors – facilitators of the process no less – could describe 
R2P as having ‘snuck’ and ‘slipped by’.882 Of course, it would be wrong not to make clear 
that once part of the negotiations, realising its inclusion in the outcome required immense 
hard work, and considerable negotiated narrowing and political effort. Likewise it does no 
harm to reiterate the point made by a Canadian official that Summits can provide excellent 
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venues to blow-through seemingly intractable opposition883, and that nor should we 
necessarily assume the agreement resultantly lacks legitimacy because of the dimensions 
identified here. As one centrally placed UK official suggested, a GA resolution endorsing the 
idea of sovereignty as responsibility was an important development, providing states with 
language they can at least ‘point to’ in the case of emerging R2P-related crises.884 But 
beyond this the outcome left many issues unaddressed, and considerable doubt about the 
degree of support even the limited agreement commanded.  
 
That said, congruous with the point about legitimacy, some may question whether it 
matters how R2P was agreed when the important bottom-line is that UN member states 
‘agreed’ to its inclusion in 2005. There is some truth in this position: those states that 
opposed the idea, or were reluctant to see such a development occur, took the 
compromises in other areas of the negotiations which came from acquiescing to/accepting 
its inclusion; actively participated in defining the norm in response to their concerns; and 
thus have to live with the consequences of the strategic foothold institutionalisation can 
now bring to advocates of the idea. However, considering what R2P was meant to achieve, 
this alone would represent a one-dimensional take on the nature of the agreement. As 
becomes apparent, the agreement was the product of ‘serious compromises’. As such, its 
meaning and its ‘practical consequences’ essentially reflect this.885 Resultantly, there is 
nothing in the agreement which should lead to the assumption that its meaning is set, that 
states cannot alter their positions, or that alternative normative ideas will not (re)emerge 
which do not suit the agenda as currently framed by R2P. Indeed, many alternative 
normative ideas were active during the 2005 negotiations and actively impacted upon the 
formulation of R2P. Certainly, emphasis on the textual negotiations alone would identify 
these points. But more fundamentally, it is in this respect that the structured outcome 
serves to expand our understanding of R2P’s development from a one-dimensional one to a 
multi-faceted, multi-dimensional one. If the question is: Does it matter how the R2P was 
agreed, that it was included not just because of the negotiations to define it, but also 
because of a series of factors relating to the characteristics of the process? Then the answer 
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has to be an overwhelming yes. Furthermore, though forms of contestation should always 
be anticipated post-agreement, the dynamics of the process in this case actually enhanced 
the likelihood, even inevitability, that this would happen to R2P.  
 
For instance, a product of the scale and content of the negotiations, a running sore 
throughout the negotiations was a feeling – among G77 and NAM countries – that their 
voices were either being ignored, or failing to shape the negotiations in the way they might 
have expected. Moreover, a developing-developed divide (to define it rather crudely) 
emerged cutting across the negotiations, but which became increasingly complex and 
difficult to manage with the arrival of John Bolton as US Ambassador in August 2005.886 At 
this point, the full degree of NAM and G77 fury at the direction the negotiations were taking 
became evident. The hundreds of amendments unleashed by the US in late August, sent the 
existing process – which had been generally based on a facilitator-led ‘perceived consensus’ 
approach – into crisis. A host of issues were reopened, with a curious resulting alliance of 
interest/convenience between the US and the members within NAM and the G77, including 
some of the GA’s most notoriously difficult (and vocal) members.887 As shown below, John 
Bolton’s impact on the Summit process is complex, and in the direct case of the R2P 
negotiations not particularly negative.888 However, his impact on the process was 
significant, and a central factor in helping to provoke a shift from facilitation to an 
alternative ‘core group’ (CG) driven-process with greater elements of line-by-line 
discussion.889 There is no doubt Bolton’s intervention was highly ‘provocative’890, but 
contrary to the idea that Bolton was simply the ‘evil agent’891 who ‘declared open season for 
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other spoilers to reopen contentious issues’892, his intervention altered the dynamic of the 
negotiations because his ‘ideological’ opposition to the facilitator process struck a chord – 
not just with so-called ‘spoilers’ but across the membership.893 Considerable ‘distrust’ of the 
process had already built-up, with a general perception that the process served the interests 
of the ‘well-connected’ Western, and especially European ‘progressive’ states.894 On the 
other hand, the political dynamics of the developing-developed divide, which was 
undoubtedly a prevalent factor in terms of the overall negotiation package, was not simply 
one-way criticism directed at the rich. Western countries were just as exercised by what 
they regarded as a lack of engagement by the G77 and NAM in their own priorities, of which 
R2P was generally one.895 Unsurprisingly, interviewees consistently remarked that the 
apparent reopening896 of issues, and the effective end to facilitation, was inevitable 
anyway.897  
 
It may appear somewhat premature to flag-up such points early on. But this brief insight 
into some of the key dynamics of 2005 demonstrates just how important understanding 
R2P’s development in the context of the overall process really is.898 This is because, with the 
scale of the negotiation package enormous in its ambition, the process through the 
facilitator stage, the core group (CG) stage, and finally culminating in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
stage during the last 24 hours, all served – in various ways – to aid the path of R2P. It was 
certainly an issue of contention, increasingly so as the negotiations moved towards 
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conclusion, but in the overall context, there were simply bigger issues occupying the 
priorities of states. Aside from anger towards the process itself, the vexed longstanding 
issue of SC reform, the relative place of development issues, the Human Rights Council 
(HRC), and hard security issues relating to terrorism, and disarmament and non-
proliferation, all helped to mitigate the reaction R2P might otherwise have received. As 
testified by the opening quotes of van den Berg and Dauth, and reiterated in interviews with 
officials, Allan Rock and many others, in the overall package of issues R2P was difficult, but 
was by no means important enough for member states to draw significantly upon their 
already limited capacity.899 Thus, through each of the three stages of the process the scale 
of the agenda was hugely significant, helping to ensure R2P was consistently part of the 
rolling draft outcome document. For this reason, Van den Berg is surely right to suggest that 
had this not been the case, R2P would ‘never have passed’.900  
 
However, although the way the scale of the negotiations affected the priorities of state is 
clearly a vitally important explanatory factor, it alone does not reveal why R2P maintained a 
place in each and every draft outcome document. Other factors were just as important. For 
instance, a reverse benefit of the scale and structure of the negotiations was that it gave 
those states most committed to R2P the space and opportunity to prioritize it, in some cases 
above almost all other issues. Throughout the negotiations, R2P commanded the concerted 
support of Canada, the EU and a significant number of African states (notably Rwanda). 
Without this coalition, driven by Canadian ambassador Allan Rock, none of the structural 
factors mentioned would have mattered; R2P would have been lost effectively from the 
outset. That said, an additionally significant factor related to how the documents were 
drafted at various stages, and more specifically who was responsible for ‘holding the pen’.901 
With the strongest supporters of R2P continually pushing its inclusion, and other issues 
exercising many member states, R2P was facilitated by the fact that senior individuals within 
the Secretariat, working with the Office of the GA President Jean Ping, were predominantly 
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responsible for drafting and updating the documents. Though these were undoubtedly 
based on the input of the facilitators and member states, the ability to influence the text on 
R2P was easier because of this approach – providing those supporters with a central focal-
point for submitting language and proposed revisions to the text. This was particularly 
significant because a number of the individuals responsible were regarded as ‘allies’ of the 
R2P agenda.902 Furthermore, undermining the idea the facilitator process actually reflected 
consensus, a 5/10 August draft document introduced language – at the request of one 
member state903 – recommending restraints on the SC veto, despite the prospects of the P5 
agreeing to such a proposal was little more than zero.904 Although this specifically did not 
become a sticking-point or obstacle to future discussions on R2P905, it does reiterate the 
point that at various points during the process direct engagement with R2P was 
considerably less intensive than one might expect, and did not always reflect where states 
positioned themselves. Once the negotiations became more intensively-focused, the 
political prospects of R2P were further enhanced by the fact it was dealt with predominately 
at working-level rather than at the level of Permanent Representatives.906 It was at this level 
that the parameters of R2P were defined and redefined. With PR’s more exercised by other 
issues, R2P received limited ‘airtime’ within the Ambassadorial CG meetings which 
resultantly diminished the potential for R2P to be railroaded by high-level opposition. 
Additionally, however, one of the reasons why R2P was not generally a major issue was 
because of the skilful way it was packaged and kept narrowly focused by advocates. Even 
though the R2P formulation was defined by an extremely high threshold; was tightly tied to 
the SC; and crucially was heavily loaded towards primary state responsibility, as far as one 
UK official is concerned a central reason why R2P was achievable during the 2005 
negotiations was because it was ‘packaged in different ways to different audiences’.907 
Ultimately many states took away their own understanding of the agreement based on their 
own preferences, and on their understanding of how it had been presented or sold. Finally, 
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when R2P did become a major sticking point towards the end of the process, the 
introduction of an alternative draft version of the outcome which the Secretariat – under 
Annan’s initiative908 – had been working on in anticipation of a breakdown in the process, 
dared Ambassadors to “take-it-or-leave-it”.909 With the ‘death-knock’ getting ever nearer, 
and many world leaders attending the Summit already in flight, the sense of urgency – 
complemented by crucial high-level engagement by Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin 
with the most intransigent opponents – helped to dissipate the potential failure of the 
Summit outcome, and R2P’s place in it.910 
 
Each of the various elements of the argument presented to this point will be subject to 
greater scrutiny, and elucidation, as the chapter proceeds. Despite the complexity of the 
argument, with the various factors at work, it is not an unfair observation to suggest that 
the path of R2P unfolded far more ‘smoothly’ than anyone might have expected.911 That this 
was the case emphasises just how critical it is that R2P’s development is understood in its 
proper context. What should be clear is that tracing R2P according to the changes it 
underwent would inadequately relegate a series of causally significant factors relating to the 
structural characteristics of a process which began with the HLP and culminated with the 
Summit. Key factors of this process propelled R2P forward and towards agreement. 
Therefore, without embedding one within the other, neither aspect could singularly yield a 
satisfactory explanation regarding how R2P was agreed – considering its limited political 
traction in Ch4 – and in what form.912  
 
Because the agreement depended upon the factors outlined, many of which relate to the 
nature of the process, it is unsurprising many states would wish to revisit the apparent 
‘consensus’ after the summit, or would display alternative understandings of what R2P 
meant. Even with the foothold of institutionalization, it is surely significant that states were 
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essentially ‘forced’913 to take a position on R2P because of the way Annan was skilfully able 
to lock R2P into the Summit negotiations. This thesis suggests that this, and the overall 
argument, is indeed, significant; not just because of what it tells us about potential future 
compliance with R2P but because the various elements of the argument presented here and 
previously, were identified, and reaffirmed, through the use of high-level interviews allied to 
an extensive analysis of reams documentary material. This is especially relevant considering 
the likelihood that the structured outcome argument will be regarded by some as a 
contentious, and overly negative, contribution to the R2P debate. But with existing 
frameworks of normative development, and specifically the NLC, limited in their ability to 
explain the complex micro-dynamics underpinning the construction of R2P, it is vital that 
alternative explanations are sought and considered. The empirical work presented 
throughout this thesis, and which culminates here, is an important step in this direction.   
 
Part 1: Explaining the How and the Why: Setting the International Agenda and the 
Structuring of the Outcome 
 
We have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 
1945 itself...we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the rules agreed 
then, or whether radical changes are needed.914 
 
In the history of R2P, Annan’s ‘fork-in-the-road’ speech of September 2003 was critical to its 
development. The failure/breakdown of the collective security system in the case of Iraq, 
sent numerous international relationships into crisis, and for many, challenged the 
relevance and efficacy of the UN.915 This was certainly how Annan saw it. His own inability to 
prevent the unilateralist march to war instigated a period of introspective strategic thinking 
about the nature of the threats facing the world, and the UN’s place within it.916 The fork-in-
the-road speech built on Annan’s ‘I’m a multilateralist’ speech to the GA a year earlier917 
which – according to those involved – was about ‘drawing a line in the sand’ in front of 
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President Bush918, with Annan reasserting his ‘continuing belief in multilateralism and 
collective security’.919 Whereas in 2002 the effort was directed at trying to make the 
argument for international legality and multilateralism, the 2003 speech shifted in 
emphasis. It was about recognising the fractures Iraq had opened-up and asking states ‘now 
where do we go?’920 The linkages are clear, thus, as Kieran Prendergast suggests, the 2002 
and 2003 GA speeches should be read as intellectual ‘companion pieces’.921 Once military 
operations began in March 2003, attention shifted towards the development of initiatives in 
response to the analysis of the situation Annan and his staff were developing. It was out of 
these processes that the idea of a High-Level Panel (HLP) was born and subsequently 
announced within his 2003 GA address.  
 
According to Kieran Prendergast the initial idea for a HLP was Annan’s.922 There is little 
doubt however, that the DPA, and Prendergast personally, were strongly supportive and 
heavily involved, in its establishment.923 The core impetus underpinning the initiative was 
ultimately provided by the fallout from the Iraq war, ‘stemming directly’ from very public 
and undignified fallout within the SC as the UK and US attempted to agree a follow-up 
resolution to 1441, and the subsequent use of force despite the failure to achieve this.924 
There was a dual-effect to this outcome. On the one hand, it led Annan to regard the 
marginalization of the Organization925 and the divisions between member states Iraq 
exposed, as evidence that the international system was indeed in ‘crisis’ and that, as a 
result, ‘radical changes’ might be required.926 On the other, the assessment that ‘all the 
china [had] broke’ meant his focus turned towards publically articulating the problems – as 
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he saw them – and challenging member states to decide which direction they wished to 
take post-Iraq.927 The attention directed at the UN, however negative, could be 
opportunistically exploited to ‘make something of it’.928 Annan’s rhetoric and proposals, in 
addition to those of the HLP, would certainly provoke some cutting, and justifiable criticisms 
from the likes of Ed Luck, Mats Berdal, and Michael Glennon929, but in terms of R2P’s 
development, this dimension of the decision to respond is a vital explanatory factor 
underpinning the structured outcome argument, and specifically the HLP’s place in it. 
Regardless of the criticism, the HLP, and the way it subsequently fed into the WS process – 
not by design it should be noted – was the vital opportunity R2P needed. It was also a clear 
example of Annan seeking to exploit an unexpected window of opportunity to address a 
whole range of peace and security issues facing the UN. 
 
An additional but related event, which personalised the processes surrounding the HLP 
endeavour, and which fuelled the sense of crisis, was the targeted bombing of the UN 
Mission in Baghdad in August 2003. The death of the UN Special Representative Sergio 
Vieira de Mello and 22 others not only had a great impact on the personnel of the 
Organization930, but brought into sharper relief difficult questions – which were already 
being raised prior to the attack –regarding the UN’s role in the world; its relationship with 
the US; and the judgement of Annan in determining that the political context required the 
UN to engage in the way it did, as early as it did.931 Indeed, according to Prendergast – who 
was himself opposed to the UN rushing into Iraq – there was majority support for a UN role 
in post-war Iraq, with individuals like Jan Egeland and Mark Malloch-Brown (whose 
influence would grow rapidly from 2004 onwards) apparently viewing it as an opportunity to 
show that the UN was ‘relevant’ despite the potential pitfalls of deploying to the country 
without any clear authority to match the responsibilities which would inevitably come with 
UN presence.932 Thus, though the processes for establishing the HLP were already in motion 
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prior to the bombing, the issue of relevance was a key theme throughout 2003, and in this 
backdrop the HLP would become the focal point for the UN’s response. 
 
Development of the Panel’s terms of reference, and the selection of personnel to 
implement/apply them, was conducted during the summer of 2003. Its full title: the High 
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, may have been ‘rambling and obscure’ for 
some933, but rather aptly summed up, in simple terms, what it was meant to do. It was 
tasked with identifying, and analysing, existing and future threats and challenges to 
international peace and security, before suggesting the kind of changes which may be 
necessary to ‘ensure effective collective action’.934 Two of the key reasons why the HLP 
would become such an important vehicle for the aspirations of R2P related directly to this 
mandate and to its final composition. The first of these was particularly significant, because 
despite an expansion of the mandate to include economic and social issues/institutions935, 
such issues were only to be covered ‘to the extent that they have a direct bearing on future 
threats to peace and security’.936  
 
This was certainly a compromise on the even narrower security focus Annan and 
Prendergast had initially envisaged.937 Nevertheless, key planks of the narrative were 
consistent throughout. Most notably, the ‘fork in the road’ speech – drafted to contextualize 
the initiative – was very clear in setting-out the kind of thematic issues Annan wanted the 
HLP to address.938 For instance, an early initiative by the DPA led to the presentation of a 
Prendergast-commissioned paper to the May 2003 SC Retreat which was addressing the 
theme ‘Meeting the new challenges to international peace and security: current 
experiences’.939 This paper captured one of the central issues Annan would address in his 
‘03 speech: namely that the challenge posed by the unilateral Bush Doctrine to the UN 
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Charter, and how the ‘unique vulnerability’ which had led the US to develop such an explicit 
policy could be addressed within the multilateral system, most obviously through the SC.940 
Prendergast’s idea was to outline the basis for a ‘grand bargain’ between the US and other 
UN states specifically on the issue of intervention, specifically in relation to preventive 
action. This idea essentially focused on the role of the SC: it meant on the one hand the US 
would agree to refer to it any issue it regarded as (potentially) threatening either its own 
interests, or international peace and security more generally. This would thus give the SC in 
effect ‘first refusal’ at agreeing forms of engagement. Of course, this is arguably how the 
system should work in any case. However, the other side of the bargain was that if the US 
proved willing to accept such an arrangement the rest of the SC would have to be more 
prepared to intervene (not just militarily, but in various forms) at a ‘much earlier stage than 
they were used to’.941 Perhaps unsurprisingly the idea achieved ‘no traction whatsoever’942, 
partly because of its questionable political realism; partly because the atmosphere post-Iraq 
was so ‘poisonous’943 that engagement on such a contentious issue was highly unlikely from 
both perspectives; and partly because as the Summit approached, divisions between 
member states, and within the Secretariat, over where the thematic focus should lie, would 
dilute the potential for a much narrower examination of hard security issues.944  
 
That said, though the HLP would in effect address issues relating to poverty, the 
environment, and offer recommendations for change – including, for instance, to ECOSOC – 
this subtle expansion ultimately did not matter to R2P. The reality was that its terms of 
reference, embedded in the contextual explanation provided by Annan’s GA speech, helped 
ensure that its eventual report would have to address – in some way – the issue of 
intervention for humanitarian reasons, and the use of force more generally. The Panel 
members certainly would not (or should not) have needed any reminding of just how 
associated Annan had become with the issue of humanitarian intervention, and thereafter 
R2P. His support was widely understood. Even if he did not explicitly direct the Panel’s 
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discussions of specific issues towards specific outcomes945, he did express his hope that the 
HLP would look at R2P and specifically ‘the issue of when this intervention is legitimate, who 
decides under what rules, under what circumstances’.946 Furthermore, whilst introducing 
the Panel, in addition to specifically referring to hard security threats like terrorism, WMD, 
and pre-emptive unilateralism, Annan made clear that the SC ‘still’ needed to ‘engage in 
serious discussion of the best way to respond to threats of genocide or other comparable 
massive violations of human rights’.947 In this respect, despite obvious tension regarding the 
relative place for development issues throughout the process leading to the WS, it did not 
necessarily negatively impact upon the place for R2P. Indeed, as mentioned above, the 
divisions which became so apparent over the agenda for the WS were advantageous: the 
considerable number of other issues exercising and raising the hackles of many member 
states aided the path of R2P. 
 
As far as Canadian officials were concerned the HLP was the ‘game-changer’ R2P needed. 
With their inability to get R2P discussed within the UN, an initiative of this kind was 
gratefully received.948 In terms of Canada’s follow-up strategy, the HLP would ‘assist’ the 
already significant on-going efforts949, but would also become a key focal point for, and a 
contributing factor leading to, an accelerated R2P-focused diplomatic strategy. This was 
particularly true as the potential ‘opportunity’ of the Summit became increasingly 
apparent.950 Evidence of just how important the HLP initiative was to Canadian efforts was 
apparent in the ‘extensive contact’ made during the Panel’s working process.951 Embedded 
within the broader advocacy campaign previously detailed, officials and ministerial figures 
would engage in more direct lobbying of the Panel’s staff and members.952 Unsurprisingly 
R2P would be a central element of this lobbying. Aside from the efforts of Allan Rock and his 
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staff based in New York, and direct contact between DFAIT officials and the HLP’s staff, 
Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, and Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew would 
also be involved in this process of direct engagement.953 Indeed, in the case of Martin, his 
meeting with the HLP at Rock’s New York apartment reflected the strength of his 
commitment to the agenda which began from the moment he became Prime Minister.954 
The way Martin – as Rock describes it – ‘put his shoulder to the wheel’ on R2P, by urging the 
HLP to endorse R2P, and then subsequently by becoming personally involved in the 
diplomatic negotiations late into the 2005 process, was described by one central official as 
‘hugely important’ to the development of R2P.955 Furthermore, Canada would submit a 
specific R2P thematic non-paper to the Panel; in addition to mobilizing a HSN submission 
which included the language of R2P (see below).956 
 
The HLP’s establishment was thus vitally important to Canadian efforts to build support for 
R2P. Why this was the case related to two aforementioned factors. Its mandate, and the 
way Annan presented the initiative, meant it represented an invaluable opportunity to try 
and ‘haul [R2P] back onto the agenda’.957 Despite differences over the relative place for 
development issues – a problem which would become much more pronounced in relation to 
the Summit agenda – the HLP put in place a more dedicated process for considering and 
proposing solutions to address threats to international peace and security, a point which, 
because of its significance, shall be returned to below. Explaining why the HLP was a game-
changer, and why it represents the first key stage in the structuring leading to the Summit 
outcome, however, requires closer analysis. With the lack of traction R2P had garnered 
post-ICISS, it certainly seemed to represent – at first sight – an excellent opportunity to 
reinvigorate a stalling process in the midst of a toxic, rapidly changing international context. 
However, the impetus this political context provided is, on its own, an insufficient 
explanation considering that, within this context, the political dynamics of the R2P’s 
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development offered minimal reason to see any medium-term change in the prospects of its 
discussion within the UN, let alone its agreement. Additionally, as previous reform efforts 
and Panel/Commission initiatives have shown, there are no guarantees that they can or will 
be successful – even when they command the strong support of the SG.958 Moreover, 
criticisms of the way the HLP was presented; the selection of panellists; the content of its 
final report; and the way expectations were raised and (mis)managed throughout the 
process leading to 2005 only serves to complicate the picture further. What made the 
difference for R2P was that the HLP emerged as a credible vehicle for propelling R2P 
forward even with these varied criticisms. In addition to the mandate, what really made the 
difference were two additional factors. The first relates to how the HLP was composed, 
which crucially included Gareth Evans, the second to the unintentional way the HLP became 
the principal ‘linking mechanism’959 for embedding R2P within the proposed package of 
reforms outlined in Annan’s 2005 In Larger Freedom Report.  
 
The Panel consisted of sixteen ‘eminent’ members – five selected from each of the P5 
states, with the remaining eleven regionally representative.960 Collectively, the high average 
age of the participants, and their relative outsider status, was a source of some unease.961 
Interestingly on the latter point, a group of UN Secretariat staff would establish, in June 
2004, what they called the ‘Low-level Panel’.962 Based on a network of seventy 
professionals, most from across the UN system, their emphasis was not directed at broad 
thematic issues but was focused on making the UN ‘function better’, or, as the final report 
put it, many UN staff wanted ‘management reform [which meant] a comprehensive 
overhaul of the inner workings of the Secretariat to make it a more effective and efficient 
organisation’.963 Though clearly a very different idea, the fact that one senior UN official 
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would describe this – even if somewhat loosely – as a ‘rival’ to the HLP was indicative of 
differences of emphasis regarding the relative weaknesses of the Organization, how they 
should be addressed, and ultimately how well equipped the HLP was to address questions 
regarding the internal operational processes and culture of the UN.964 But from the 
perspective of the HLP’s broader thematic focus, and for R2P’s development more 
specifically, the actual ‘real world’ membership of the HLP was at least seen as credible.965 
The actual work of the Panel is addressed in better detail elsewhere, but what is clear from 
those with close knowledge of the process, is that the intellectual power, persuasiveness 
and constant energy of Gareth Evans – strongly assisted by David Hannay966 – was 
fundamental to its endorsement of R2P. In this regard, Evans’ characterization of his role is 
not simply an expression of the kind of vainglory one might expect of a politician, but a fair 
and accurate statement of his contribution: 
 
I fought tooth and nail to keep the…thing alive. I’m not big-noting myself but if I  had 
not been on that panel you would not have heard any more about R2P.967 
 
There is little reason to believe had Evans not been on the Panel he would have been 
proved incorrect in making this statement. Indeed, interviewees repeatedly emphasised 
Evans’ influence at this stage of R2P’s development. For instance, one Canadian official’s 
deconstruction of this process placed Evans firmly as a central figure in the linkages 
between the pre-HLP efforts, the HLP itself, and the subsequent Summit process. This 
explanation went as follows: the HLP changed the dynamics for R2P follow-up, in key part 
because of the crucial appointment of Evans; without his appointment, R2P would not have 
been endorsed in the Panel’s report; without this endorsement, R2P would not (in all 
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probability) have found a place in Annan’s In Larger Freedom report and therefore would 
not have been part of the Summit negotiations.968 Clearly this mirrors aspects of the 
analysis, and the structured outcome logic expressed here, which includes the observation 
that Evans’ appointment was a vital factor within this explanatory framework. The 
difference, however, is that this thesis takes this line of argument even further. The 
emphasis on micro-process, and on the structuring logic which derives from this approach, 
not only equips us to better understand the form of R2P agreed in 2005, but represents a 
wholly distinct explanatory framework to existing constructivist explanations of normative 
development and potential compliance.  
 
Evans’ role in the linkages between the stages was thus crucial, even with the post-HLP shift 
towards a state-driven process which would inevitably, and massively, diminish his role and 
influence. But focusing on the HLP, Canadian officials regarded Evans’ appointment as their 
‘best bet’ for realising a foothold for R2P.969 Indeed this would prove to be the case, and was 
demonstrative of just why the structured outcome logic helps to better explain the changed 
dynamics of possibility. Achieving consensus within the Panel on the issue of R2P was 
certainly not easy. It drew significant resistance and scepticism, and there was certainly no 
desire among other members to have the idea foisted upon them.970 Nevertheless, Evans’ 
influence throughout the Panel’s work was extensive, even to the point where he and 
Hannay would be closely involved in the final drafting/editing of the Report ahead of the 
December publication.971 His ability to overcome resistance, and his powerful influence on 
R2P, essentially reflected the force of his personality. According to Hannay, the discussion 
and agreement of R2P was ‘entirely driven’ by Evans, so much so that he: 
 
...never for one second allowed us to forget that it was over his dead body that this 
was not going to get into our report...[T]hat particular issue was his baby and he ran 
forward with it clasped in his arms and carried it over the finishing line; and great 
credit to him.972 
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Such sentiment was mirrored by others.973 For instance, Allan Rock would describe Evans’ 
contribution as ‘absolutely outstanding’ but unsurprising considering his ‘brilliance’ and 
‘supreme ability’.974 Similarly, Australian Ambassador John Dauth attributed his 
effectiveness to, among other things, ‘sheer energy’ and an ‘ordered mind’.975 The 
importance of Evans at this point of the process is, however, about more than the 
endorsement of R2P. Rather, his appointment; the chance to persuade his fellow panel 
members to back his conviction; the opportunity and platform which the HLP provided, all 
speak directly to Annan’s role in structuring the first stage leading to the unexpected 
outcome of R2P. It is certainly the case that Evans, as a former Australian Foreign Minister 
and at the time an activist President/CEO of the respected International Crisis Group, had a 
profile and reputation beyond R2P. But the fact that he was so closely and prominently 
associated with R2P had to be a key factor in the eventual decision to appoint him. If the 
issue of intervention mattered so much – as it clearly did to Annan – there was arguably no 
one better equipped to speak on it, and no one better equipped to speak to a proposed 
solution which Annan was on record as strongly supporting. Even without clear evidence of 
a direct strategy to appoint Evans, it is undeniable that Annan not only established a vehicle 
with an appropriate mandate for addressing R2P, but loaded it with the individual most 
associated with it.  
 
In setting the stage for the structured outcome argument in Ch4 the HLP was described as 
having an ‘agenda-setting vehicular role’. Describing it as such served a dual-purpose in 
accounting for the role it played. On the one hand, the HLP represented the vehicle for 
Annan’s broader effort to ‘start a debate’ in order to move beyond the divisions of Iraq.976 
Accordingly, the HLP was tasked to focus on possible proposals for change with the 
intention to set the basis for discussion within the GA the following September.977 Quite 
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clearly this was always intended as an agenda-setting initiative. On the other hand, the 
description was also a purposeful statement designed to emphasize the HLP’s – albeit 
unintentional – function as the key mechanism linking it to an existing process which was to 
culminate with the 2005 Summit. When the decision was made to go ahead with the 
initiative in mid-2003 there was apparently little clarity about end-goals. As the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs revealed in their project on the reform process, the ‘process 
[itself] was more important’; setting the agenda ‘most important’.978 In a change which 
would greatly benefit R2P, and suit the thematic priorities of Annan more generally, the 
publication of the HLP report was pushed back to December 2004. The already tight time-
frame for publication was certainly one reason for this shift. But ultimately Brent 
Scowcroft’s acute observation that publishing in the middle of an American election-
campaign would have been politically misguided was the key factor which initiated the 
change.979 Though apparently small, the amended later publication date proved to be a 
fundamental connect in the overall process, and why the HLP was such a vital linking-
mechanism in the structured outcome of R2P. It meant the publication of the HLP report fed 
into pre-existing processes which had emerged out of the Millennium Summit 
Declaration.980 In fact, the HLP report did not just feed into these pre-existing processes, but 
actively altered and shaped them. 
 
To understand why this was the case, it is necessary to be aware of the initial expectations 
for the “World Summit”, and of the preparatory processes surrounding the formal decision 
of May 2004 to convene it.981 The follow-up processes began in December 2000 when the 
GA requested annual reports by the SG directed at tracking progress ‘towards 
implementation of the Millennium Declaration’. Crucially, the GA also requested that these 
reports be supplemented by a more ‘comprehensive’ quinquennial report of the SG, the first 
of which would be published in 2005.982 In July 2002, follow-up mechanisms were further 
strengthened with the establishment of the UN Millennium Project tasked with developing a 
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‘concrete action plan for the world to achieve the MDGs’.983 The final report of this Project 
would be presented to the SG in early 2005 and represent a key document for the 
development of Annan’s comprehensive five-year report. The final piece of the jigsaw – 
namely the Summit itself – was agreed during 2004. Step one was taken in May with the 
decision that the Summit would open the 60th Session of the GA, and would operate at the 
level of Heads of State and Government. Additionally, its thematic scope was also specified 
with agreement that this ‘major event’ would ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the 
progress made in the fulfilment of all the commitments contained in the Millennium 
Declaration, including the internationally agreed development goals and the global 
partnership required for their achievement, and of the progress made [towards] 
implementation...of the outcomes and commitments of the major UN conferences and 
summits in the economic, social and related fields, on the basis of a comprehensive 
report...by the SG’.984 The second step was the December 2004 agreement of the 
‘modalities, format and organization’ of the Summit. This explicitly joined Annan’s 
comprehensive report to the process leading to the Summit by agreeing that it would 
provide the basis for the state negotiations after its publication in March 2005.985 To put it 
simply, the World Summit was primarily crafted as a 2000+5 review of the Millennium 
Declaration. However, with the changed political context, combined with the specific 
processes surrounding the HLP, the timeline leading to the Summit and the nature of the 
endeavour were altered in significant ways.986 
 
There is no doubt the Millennium Declaration was a significant document which – despite 
understandable focus on the MDGs – covered an undoubtedly broad thematic agenda. 
Indeed, as Annan’s 2001 Road map for its implementation testified, the agenda was defined 
by seven key areas, including: ‘Peace, security and disarmament’; ‘Human rights, democracy 
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and good governance’; and ‘Protecting the vulnerable’.987 However, the Millennium 
Declaration was reasonably understood by many as a document primarily focused on 
development, and particularly symbolic for its commitment to the MDGs. As such, it was 
also a reasonable expectation that any ‘review’ of what was after all just a 9-page 
declaration would have focused on tracking implementation based on assessments of 
current progress towards what was agreed. But with the changed HLP publication date the 
unintended consequence was that its report would now feed into the processes 
summarised above – explicitly so once Annan recognised, and moved to exploit the 
opportunity. The dedicated follow-up processes from 2000 would merge into the dedicated 
HLP processes which began in 2003. Thus, two distinct, and initially separate, processes 
would consolidate in a way that very few could have expected. The peace and security-
focused agenda of the HLP would both be propelled by ‘piggybacking’ onto these pre-
existing processes, but would simultaneously alter the form and the objectives leading to 
what was now the same final destination. Practically speaking this meant the HLP report, 
with the report of the Millennium Project, would provide the basis for Annan’s 
comprehensive report in March 2005. Resultantly, this report, titled In Larger Freedom, was 
anything but a straightforward ‘review’ of the Millennium Declaration.988 On the contrary it 
would embrace almost all of the HLP’s proposals, including most importantly an 
endorsement of R2P. Thus, the agenda for the Summit was comprehensively expanded, the 
timelines redefined.  
 
Despite provoking concern amongst the membership Annan’s willingness to exploit the 
unplanned changes to the design and structure of the process leading to the now World 
Summit, was a central element in the structured outcome of R2P. Justifying his 
incorporation of the HLP into his comprehensive follow-up report, Annan was clear that, in 
his view, a ‘point-by-point report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration 
would...miss the larger point, namely, that new circumstances demand that we revitalize 
consensus on key challenges and priorities and convert that consensus into collective 
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action’.989 Annan had a point. As Ch4 demonstrated, with 9/11 and Iraq the international 
political context had changed dramatically. In such circumstances, it was almost inevitable 
that a review of the Millennium Declaration would be affected and shaped by this new 
context. It could not be conducted apolitically, particularly if Annan was right to suggest that 
these major events had ‘upset the consensus behind the...Declaration’.990 That said, 
consistent with the above-referenced criticisms of Luck, Berdal et al, it is worth noting that 
the approach and rhetoric Annan and other senior staff adopted in relation to the Summit, 
would be hugely problematic – not just for member states who wished to focus more 
narrowly on development issues, but also from the perspective of historical and political 
context. Throughout the multilateral consultations the G77 and NAM would question the 
basis of Annan’s approach, and argue against what they regarded as a dilution of the 
development agenda.991 In a similar vein, as the process moved forward to consultations 
over In Larger Freedom, the NAM also endorsed the importance of development, arguing 
that, although it noted Annan’s justification, it remained committed to the view that 
development issues should ‘remain the centrepiece of the deliberations’.992  
 
Meanwhile, once the process leading to the Summit became more integrated so the 
rhetoric used to frame it became increasingly ambitious. For instance, Annan would 
describe it as a ‘rare’ and ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’993 not least because: 
 
[t]he UN must undergo the most sweeping overhaul of its 60-year history. World 
leaders must recapture the spirit of San Francisco and forge a new world compact to 
advance the cause of larger freedom’.994  
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Such rhetoric, while consistent with the fork-in-the-road speech, was purposefully designed 
to ratchet-up the Summit’s importance. The reference to San Francisco in particular was 
made more than once, and testified to the increasingly powerful influence of Mark Malloch-
Brown who was appointed Annan’s Chef de Cabinet in January 2005.995 As Prendergast 
recalls, Annan’s call for a ‘new San Francisco moment’ was a ‘Malloch-Brown-ism’ which he 
never liked, not least because it was ‘never going to happen’.996 Nevertheless, it was part of 
Malloch-Brown’s overall strategy designed to change the conversation and to ratchet-up 
expectations. At the heart of this strategy were Annan’s ILF report and the Summit itself. 
Indeed, in addition to the San Francisco symbolism the very name ‘World Summit’ was 
introduced by the Secretariat in order to package the ambition and importance of the 
agenda997. There is certainly strong reason to question the extent to which expectations 
were raised, and the way the process was framed. Invoking San Francisco was admirable; it 
was the UN’s 60th anniversary year after all. But ultimately calling for it to be repeated in 
2005 was not only a ‘gross overstatement’998 which oversold the problems facing the UN – 
especially when we consider (and contrast with) the political context of 1945 – but was also 
likely to expose the Organization further by building-in unrealistic expectations from the 
outset.999  
 
However, the point behind identifying the above criticisms is not about adding another 
voice to them six years on. In fact, contrary to an isolated analysis of the process, 
considering the source of these criticisms specifically in relation to the dynamics of the 
emergence of R2P, leads to a surprising alternative perspective. That is, the way the agenda 
for the Summit was defined, and the way Annan sought to ratchet-up expectations, actually 
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represented key enabling factors in the structured outcome explanation. Rather than 
damaging R2P’s prospects, they aided R2P’s path in two principle ways: 1) by contextually 
reaffirming the importance of the HLP and its changed publication date; and 2) by offering 
additional evidence as to how the structuring/structural elements of the process helped 
propel R2P towards agreement. For instance, that the HLP and ILF reports would provoke 
accusations of a Western security-driven bias was demonstrative of just how effective 
Annan was in ensuring that the thematic impetus for the establishment of the HLP became 
an essential part of the Summit negotiations. Even though the timeline change was initially 
unintentional, Annan’s exploitative actions meant it became the principal vehicle for 
transmitting R2P from effective political stagnation to a live and active proposal in one of 
the most ambitious reform agendas the UN had ever embarked upon. Once the HLP 
endorsed R2P, Annan locked it into the Summit negotiations via ILF, doing so in the midst of 
further accusations that this report failed to reflect the input and positions of member 
states as expressed during the HLP consultation stage.1000 As Annan remarked during its 
launch, ILF represented the ‘programme of action’ he had ‘been working towards over the 
past two years’.1001 In other words the Summit was explicitly embedded in a post-2003, 
post-Iraq, timeline. 
 
Thus, the initial objectives for the Summit were not just altered; they were transformed. 
Few could have predicted the integration of processes which took place. Considering the 
lack of member state engagement with R2P prior to 2005, and considering the fact that the 
task of defining the process described – and the agenda thereof – was so heavily the result 
of non-state input, the reasoning behind the structured outcome logic should be clear to 
see. R2P’s political prospects were fundamentally transformed by the structuring of a 
process which in key respects was out of the hands of member states until negotiations 
commenced in April ‘05. Indeed, R2P’s subsequent agreement was ultimately dependent 
upon the factors outlined. Had the Summit – and Annan’s comprehensive report – 
proceeded as a ‘mere review’1002 of the Millennium Declaration, it is not a stretch to argue 
that the political dynamics which had so far defined the development of R2P would not have 
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changed as they did.1003 Moreover, had the ownership of the process been driven by states 
much earlier, it is similarly not a stretch to argue R2P would not have been agreed in 2005.  
 
Additionally, the way Annan framed the Summit was equally significant. It did not greatly 
matter to R2P if Annan’s invocation of San Francisco was misguided or overstated. Because 
such rhetoric was designed in accordance with the reform agenda Annan was putting in 
motion, it had the effect of building-in a sense of scale, significance, and other related 
pressures which filtered into the specific member state negotiations. It is true that once this 
stage began, member states took greater ownership of the process, and that, in any case, 
Annan’s ability to actively engage was severely constrained by a series of scandals.1004 
However, the overall strategy outlined to this point – particularly from 2005 – provided the 
negotiating structure which conditioned, and influenced, the way states interacted and 
negotiated the Summit outcome. The expectations were undeniably high; the scale of the 
ILF proposals unprecedented. Indeed, the Summit process would cover an agenda far more 
than a ‘review’ ever would have, and was further pronounced by Annan’s call that member 
states discuss his reforms as a ‘package’ (see below). It is certainly true, as one official 
commented that stakes as high as they were in 2005 can work for and against you.1005 This 
was true here. With expectations so high there was always going to be a sense of deflation 
at the outcome, not least because of limitations in what states could reasonably achieve in 
such a short period of time. As a result a number of issue areas were widely, and rightly, 
seen as political failures.1006  
 
Alternatively, numerous breakthroughs were made which otherwise would not have been 
had the bar been set much lower. In terms of the outcome of R2P, such pressures worked 
very much in its favour. The pressure to achieve an overall outcome; the limitations on time; 
                                                          
1003
 As captured in Chapter 4 
1004
 This was confirmed in numerous interviews (see footnote 1142), Annan was engaged in the process but to 
a far less extent than might have been expected, the oil-for-food scandal in particular drained the resources of 
the SG and his close team  
1005
 Private interview (3 August 2010) 
1006
 Foremost among these were the areas of terrorism and especially disarmament and non-proliferation:  
although not an issue which can be addressed here there is a more fundamental question about the utility of 
summitry as an approach for realising multilateral agreement, particularly when the agenda is so considerable. 
It is arguably unrealistic, and undesirable, to attempt to achieve political agreement in such important areas in 
this way 
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combined with considerable constraints on the resources states were able to commit to 
each individual proposal, all directly impacted upon the way R2P was negotiated. They, 
therefore, represent important tenets of the structured outcome explanation of how/why 
R2P was agreed. In the overall picture, R2P was simply less important and less significant 
than either other individual proposals or the thematic direction of the package overall. 
Certain states were able to prioritize R2P above other issues, not only because other states 
had their own priorities, but also because the overall developing-development fracture 
exposed by the HLP and ILF continued as a major source of general across-the-board 
antagonism and antipathy. This dynamic, for instance, meant the relative place of 
development (or rather the perceived dilution of its centrality) was a much more 
‘controversial’ issue for the G77 (and NAM) than R2P was singularly.1007  
 
Indeed, R2P needed the development dimension of the negotiation package. Why? Because 
it diffused the focus and resources of states in a way that the space available for state 
advocates to push it towards agreement was greater than it otherwise would have been. As 
one centrally placed P5 official explained, had the balance of the negotiations moved too far 
towards peace and security, or had the process been directed from the outset towards a 
peace and security focused document (i.e. human rights, intervention, WMD, terrorism, 
disarmament), the sheer number of ‘redlines’ would have meant ‘nothing would have come 
of it’.1008 Of course, from a Western (and Annan’s) perspective, it would have been 
politically untenable not to address such issues, particularly post-Iraq. There would have 
been a gaping ‘hole’ in the Summit outcome, symbolic of a collective failure to ‘re-centre’ 
the international community had matters clearly central to the work of the UN, and to the 
priorities of many states, not been addressed.1009 But, even though there was a feeling 
development issues had been comprehensively dealt with during the G8 meeting in 
Gleneagles, there was also recognition that any agreement in the peace and security area 
was dependent upon engaging more fully with the G77.1010 Particularly, as their concerns 
                                                          
1007
 Private interview (3 August 2010) 
1008
 Private interview (3 August 2010) 
1009
 Private interview (3 August 2010): That said, I do not wish to fall into the misguided trap that non-western, 
or developing states are not, or were not interested in security issues. Rather this is about the relative balance 
of the agenda being negotiated, and how development concerns relate to harder security issues 
1010
 See: Group of 8 (G8) (2005) The Gleneagles Communiqué, Gleneagles, 7 July 2005 
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over development were as much about process as they were about policy.1011 So, an agenda 
overly focused on peace and security would have meant a much more intensive and difficult 
negotiation of the relevant issues, in which R2P would have red-lined and negotiated in a 
much more profound way.  
 
However, somewhat paradoxically, within this broad dynamic R2P also benefited from the 
ambitious scope of the peace and security proposals. Building on the HLP, ILF included a 
proposed Human Rights Council (HRC); a new Peacebuilding Commission; SC reform 
(including expansion); proposals relating to disarmament and non-proliferation; agreement 
on principles for the use of force; a call for agreement on a process leading to a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism; as well as R2P.1012 R2P was certainly a contentious 
issue, but by comparison was less problematic, less technical, less ‘controversial’.1013 This 
was partly because of the way it was drafted, and sold to sceptics, but also related to the 
specific nature of the other issues.1014 The never-ending issue of SC reform was an 
important factor. It drained and distracted the ‘attention’ of a many states until it began to 
diminish in importance around mid-August when the possibility of agreement dissipated.1015 
However, as the negotiations moved towards their most critical – and crisis-laden – phase 
from August onwards, the most demanding issues would become subject to more dedicated 
political negotiation.1016 Accordingly, the above-mentioned core group (CG) – introduced by 
GA President Jean Ping in response to a breakdown in the facilitator-driven process in late 
August – focused primary on seven ‘priority’ areas1017: development; UN secretariat reform; 
establishment of a HRC; establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission; disarmament and 
                                                          
1011
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010): instance, the G8 was also regarded 
as an exclusionary not open process which exacerbated the previously mentioned problems relating to how 
development should be dealt with in the negotiations. Indeed, despite hope the G8 text could be ‘cut and 
paste’ into the outcome, this was simply not possible 
1012
 For a summary of the proposals see the Annex ‘For decision by Heads of State and Government’, p77-87 
1013
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
1014
 Part 2 deals with this aspect of the negotiations 
1015
 Interview with Dirk Jan Van den Berg (telephone, 18 October 2010), also based on an FCO E-gram which 
revealed that towards the end of August the issue of SC enlargement was a ‘diminishing distraction’: ‘E-gram 
to FCO London from UKMIS NY: UN Summit: Outcome Document: SITREP’, dated 22 August 2005. Germany in 
particular was singled out as contributing ‘almost nothing’ to the negotiations because of their SC ambitions, 
private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010) 
1016
 The reasons for this breakdown are included in Part 2 
1017
 The effect of the core group on the R2P specific negotiation is documented in Part 2, however, the way the 
process was structured is highly relevant to the overall structuring of the process, and specifically the factors 
relating to scale and thematic focus 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
243 
 
non-proliferation; terrorism; and R2P.1018 It is important that R2P was identified as one of 
the most problematic or ‘sensitive’ issues.1019 But equally important was the fact it was just 
one of five peace and security related items, in addition to the already discussed 
development issue. This is because within this cluster each area did not demand the same 
level of attention, nor the same degree of high-level/ambassadorial engagement. Of the 
five, R2P was well down the scale of importance. For instance, the HRC may have 
commanded the support many states, including the US, but was also a major bone of 
contention for many others. Like the Peacebuilding Commission, even in principle 
agreement was complicated by questions relating to future representation, and the scope of 
their mandates considering continuing aversion to further infringements on national 
sovereignty. As Dirk Jan van den Berg recalls, it was one of the ‘bigger issues’ he believes 
helps to explain how R2P proceeded through the negotiations.1020 It was one of China’s 
‘major concerns’1021, and subject to a concerted effort by a group of states set on ensuring 
its dilution1022. As a comparison of the final outcome document with the previous drafts 
(e.g. on the 6 and 12 September) shows, the volume and extent of changes made during the 
final month are clear to see.1023 Indeed, its inclusion was only finally agreed – along with 
text on terrorism and the Peacebuilding Commission – in the very final chaotic stages of the 
process.1024  
 
Similarly, terrorism – a major priority of key Western countries – drained significant time 
and energy throughout without actually overcoming fundamental differences.1025 Even 
more problematic were the negotiations around non-proliferation and disarmament. John 
Dauth, the Australian ambassador with the misfortune of having to lead the discussions in 
this area, could do nothing to prevent the ‘destruction’ of the entire section on 
                                                          
1018
 UN (2005) ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the SG’, 30 August 2005 
1019
 Private interview (3 August 2010) 
1020
 Interview with Dirk Jan van den Berg (telephone, 18 October 2010); one centrally involved UK official also 
referred to the HRC in this way, email (25 July 2011) and private interview (3 August 2010) 
1021
 Private interview with Canadian official (31 March 2010) 
1022
 This group included Russia, Egypt, Pakistan and others, see Traub (2006) The Best Intentions p386-387 
1023
 Boxes 5.3 to 5.10 provide visual representations of the changes which took place across the entire process 
1024
 By the end of the negotiations, the core group was meeting in the basement of the UN. As one ambassador 
described, text on these issues ‘came out of the bowels of the UN’ very late on (25 June 2010) 
1025
 Private interview (25 June 2010); see Traub (2006) The Best Intentions, p385. Moreover, in an indication of 
just how ‘intensely personal’ the process became, a provocative statement by the UK ambassador led to a 
demand by Egypt that the meeting in question should be adjourned because of his ‘insult’, private interviews 
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disarmament and non-proliferation.1026 There was no willingness by the states most 
involved in the disagreement (US, Egypt, Pakistan, Cuba, Venezuela, Iran) to avoid a head-on 
crash.1027 To give a sense of just how damaging the final month was for this part of the text, 
it is worth illuminating how it changed between mid-August and the 14 September. 
Whereas on 5 August there were two-pages of text, by the 6 September the section was 
heavily revised, and almost entirely bracketed.1028 In the 12 September drafts the section 
was empty save for its title, which was then subsequently removed from the final draft 
document on the 13th. In other words, during the most intensive period of the negotiations 
– during which the CG was specifically introduced to finalise key sections of the outcome 
text – the entire section was completely removed. Dauth’s description that this was 
‘extraordinary’ hardly seems to do justice to what unfolded.1029 But from the perspective of 
R2P, these set of issues help to understand its unexpected progression. R2P was not one of 
the issues which demanded much ‘airtime’1030 even with its identification as one of seven 
priority issues. As Dauth observed: 
 
...the focus was elsewhere. In the end we got R2P through because people were 
more exercised about other issues, like arms control and disarmament, like, in 
particular, issues relating to development assistance.1031 
 
Moreover, although R2P would certainly undergo important changes throughout the 
process – including numerous during the final week – these would by no means be on the 
same level as changes made to other areas/issues. Without wishing to labour the point, with 
the agenda as it was, and the negotiations subsequently as stretched as they were, R2P’s 
relative importance diminished greatly. Indeed, this point was well made by one centrally 
placed P5 official whose observations not only highlighted how the HRC and disarmament 
issues were the two most difficult issues of negotiation which drained the most time and 
                                                          
1026
 Private interview (25 June 2010) and interview with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010) 
1027
 Interview with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010), see also Traub (2006) The Best Intentions, p382: on this 
point Kieran Prendergast would describe the Summit process as like a ‘game of chicken between the radicals 
on both sides in which neither side was very worried about a head on crash’, (2006) ‘Interviews: Sir Kieran 
Prendergast’, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 1, p69 
1028
 Bracketing denoted areas of the text not subject to agreement, or represented text which had been 
included at the request of an individual member/group of member states. For a sense of just how littered the 
documents would become it is worth reading through the draft documents from 5 August onwards 
1029
 Interview with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010) 
1030
 Private interview with UK official (22 October 2010) 
1031
 Interview with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010) 
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energy, but also pointed to the overall effect of these issues, and the ‘wider context’ more 
generally, on how R2P was actually negotiated. Because of the factors outlined, R2P was 
‘certainly not one of the key dossiers which attracted a lot of high level attention’.1032 In 
practice, this meant that despite existing as a priority issue for the CG, its negotiation within 
that forum – when constituted at ambassadorial level – was extremely limited.1033 Rather, 
R2P was dealt with predominantly at working-group/sub-group level, where its membership 
was more mixed; its work driven more by officials (desk officers, legal advisors, section 
Heads/Counsellors). Indeed, throughout the process R2P would be negotiated according to 
groupings of ‘variable geometry’.1034 Allan Rock would almost always be present, as on 
occasions would other ambassadors during the facilitation and CG stages of the process. But 
in large part R2P would be shaped to a far greater degree by individuals below this level. Of 
course, variation in high-level attention should not imply that there was not real 
engagement with R2P, or that Part 2’s focus on showing the form of R2P that emerged, and 
for what reason, is not a hugely important part of understanding its evolution. In fact, Part 2 
shows how this approach really did shape its form; how R2P required considerable changes; 
and thus should provide a clearer picture of how we can better understand its meaning. In 
most cases, those involved in negotiating R2P were committed to arriving at some form of 
consensus, or ensuring it was kept extremely narrow. Indeed, the ‘extensive’ nature of the 
discussions – particularly during the facilitator stage – are illuminated by the ‘serious 
compromises’ and linguistic complexity evident in the final paragraphs.1035 Had there not 
been real engagement, the kind of changes made, and framing strategies deployed, would 
not have been as prevalent as they were.1036  
 
That said, it is almost undeniable that the scale of the agenda and R2P’s diminished place 
within it, the diffuse variations in state priorities outlined, and the general, and high-level, 
preoccupation with other issues, all helped insulate R2P’s path through the negotiations. 
Had R2P been part of a smaller, more focused, agenda, it would likely have been subject to 
                                                          
1032
 Private communication with UK official (25 July 2010) 
1033
 This point will be fleshed out in more detail in Part 2, but is backed up by interviews 
1034
 Private email from Canadian official (1 November 2010) 
1035
 Private interviews with government officials (31 March 2010, 3 August 2010, 13 August 2010) 
1036
 Though as Part 2 picks up, and as mentioned in the opening to this chapter, during the facilitation stage 
proposals on individual items were often included at the request of one or a few member states. So the rolling 
texts are certainly important, but were by no means necessarily based upon consensus  
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much greater high-level scrutiny, and would have found its prospects for agreement much 
more laden with obstacles. In 2005, R2P was less prone to the kind of intense political attack 
which could have affected it in a more fundamental way. Moreover, even with daily 
interactions and discussion over the textual formulation, because states were stretched so 
thinly, their ability to become singularly exercised by R2P was massively reduced. Canada 
was able to make a choice to prioritize it above almost all else, but for those opposed or 
sceptical of an idea such as R2P, they also had to contend with similarly problematic 
proposals like the HRC and the Peacebuilding Commission, and working towards 
maintaining the central place of development in the overall package.1037 Many states were 
forced to make their own choices about how they were going to commit their limited 
resources, and which issues they were going to prioritize in order to make use of any 
political capital they might have been able to call upon. In this respect, the fact there was 
often ‘divisions of labour’ in how many states sought to negotiate issues – not surprising 
considering the number of ‘parallel discussions’ that were continually in play1038 – one 
should not have been surprised that R2P would find itself under greater scrutiny and more 
open to question post-2005. Indeed, this is especially true considering the description by 
two officials, from separate countries, that the almost daily grouping where R2P was 
discussed was primarily constituted of ‘interested’ nations or delegations.1039 Of course, 
being ‘interested’ does not imply interest in a positive sense, it can equally mean interested 
in working against something. However, with the dynamics described throughout this 
section, the level of interest in R2P was reduced – particularly amongst those states which 
had long been sceptical and who might have wished, had the circumstances been different, 
to more actively work against its adoption. Alternatively, key supporters were able to push 
hard on its behalf, with less potential for its complete removal. As one European 
ambassador stated, aside from Canada and key African states, EU members continually 
‘hammered’ R2P in meetings throughout the process.1040 Thus, within the overall context, 
R2P’s prospects were altered largely because the balance of influence tipped in favour of 
those most supportive of it.  
                                                          
1037
 This was a point made by Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) and in private interviews, see Part 2 
1038
 Private email from Canadian official (1 November 2010) 
1039
 Private interviews with Canadian and UK officials: both separately used the phrases ‘interested nations’ 
and ‘interested delegations’ (31 March 2010,  emails 1 November 2010, 25 July 2011) 
1040
 Private interview (25 June 2010) 
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At first reading, it may seem premature/out-of-sync to outline in such detail arguments 
clearly relating to the specific multilateral negotiations which began in April 2005, and which 
provide the essential focus of Part 2. Any sense of prematurity may also be emboldened by 
the fact that they have been introduced without having yet explained the nature and form 
of the HLP’s endorsement of R2P, despite its central place in the overall argument. 
However, in a case like this one, where the processes are as complex as they are, and where 
the explanation of how R2P was agreed within these processes (structured outcome logic) is 
as unique and challenging as it is, the emphasis had to be explicitly directed at the latter. For 
this reason, this section has been – and will continue to be – purposefully focused on the 
various dimensions of the structured outcome logic. The sequencing of the overall process 
certainly matters greatly to our general understanding of R2P’s progression. In a broad 
sense this chapter faithfully adheres to that. The detailed explanation of how the processes 
surrounding the HLP merged into the processes leading to the Summit is essentially about 
the importance of sequencing for understanding the development of R2P. The distinction, 
however, is that the interaction and fusing of the distinct temporal processes described in 
this case was identified because it represented a key constitutive element of the structured 
outcome argument. Had this chapter been presented as a chronologically-driven narrative, 
the ability to account for the key factors behind the 2005 agreement would have been lost 
in a sea of detail, and would have lacked any real logical or explanatory clarity. It would have 
provided information relating to how and why R2P was agreed in 2005, but have left it up to 
the reader to pick-out those elements most relevant to addressing these vital questions. 
This would have been most unsatisfactory, not least because such an approach would have 
undermined the very methodological basis underpinning the micro-process analysis which 
has driven the empirical work throughout. This approach has not been about gathering 
detail for detail sake, but about asking searching questions necessary to best understand 
what happened and why. The detail and answers these questions yield (through interviews 
and documentary analysis) provide the building blocks for the explanation.  
 
Reiterating the importance of micro-process is relevant because, as previously argued, R2P’s 
development is not easily explained by existing accounts of normative emergence/change. 
In particular, there is a lack of fit between R2P’s development and the classic NLC outlined in 
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Ch1. It is certainly possible that an alternative, less detailed approach to tracing R2P, could 
be moulded to fit the life cycle model.1041 However, this would grossly oversimplify how 
scholars of IR should tackle the study of norms. However impressively the NLC packages the 
mechanisms of social construction evident in many normative changes – including in this 
one – R2P did not proceed, in any progressive linear narrative sense, according to the 
dominant mechanisms and motives which underpin the three-stages of norm progress. Its 
development was sui generis by comparison. Thus, describing R2P in such terms would 
paper over the complex dynamics identified in this and the previous chapter – dynamics 
which have been identified explicitly through the use of methods directed at focusing on the 
micro-processes of R2P’s development.  
 
It is from this unique exploration of process that the structured outcome argument derives. 
Designed to better explain how R2P became subject to a form of state agreement in 2005, it 
speaks directly to the central issue of just how/why R2P unexpectedly transitioned from an 
idea seemingly going nowhere fast, to one rapidly institutionalised within the forum not just 
most important to its future prospects, but which had proved most resistant to its 
advancement. Here Ch4 is particularly important. As it showed, the political dynamics 
exposed by post-ICISS follow-up were hardly defined by emerging political traction, or 
associated mechanisms of bandwagoning, emulation or normative cascade. Nor are they 
evident during the processes described in this chapter – hence the need for an alternative 
explanation. The structured outcome argument provides this. R2P was propelled to 
agreement, not under the power of a catalytic core group of states, but by a package of 
factors which artificially accelerated its development in a way which has (or should have) 
fundamental consequences for how we understand the form of R2P agreed; the extent of 
active or committed support for the idea (in other words the depth of its underlying 
normative foundations); and what we might expect in terms of future compliance.  
 
The key factors which fall under the structured outcome label have been explored in detail 
throughout this section, and will remain – implicitly or explicitly – key themes throughout 
this chapter. But to summarise, this package includes: the vehicular role of HLP; the 
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 Like, for instance, a broad chronological narrative along linear lines 
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‘piggybacking’ of the HLP agenda onto pre-existing Millennium Declaration follow-up 
processes; the resultant vast thematic expansion of the Summit agenda, including the 
locking-in of R2P via Annan’s ILF, and the elevation of the Summit’s importance; and 
associated factors relating to the varied prioritisation of key issues, and constraints on 
available time and personnel resources. Additional factors are identified below, however it 
is important to explain why these have been covered here in Part 1 considering the need to 
ensure reader understanding, and the undeniable reality that many of them directly relate 
to the member state negotiations covered in Part 2 (particularly in terms of the effects they 
had).  
 
What should be evident is that there is no easy way of unpacking the complex web of 
factors identified, and then repackaging them into a simple and straightforward argument. 
Because of its unique qualities, conceptualising R2P’s development is a challenging 
endeavour. Nevertheless, in truth, the structured outcome speaks more directly to the how 
and the why of R2P’s development, with the multilateral negotiations more directed at 
understanding in what form R2P was agreed. This approach is somewhat artificial in its 
separation, particularly considering Ch4’s point that the argument should be understood in 
terms of structuring and not just structured. Indeed, the essence of the endorsement of R2P 
by the HLP, by Annan’s ILF, and the substantive nature of the state outcome in 2005, can 
only be understood in terms of this structurally contextual setting. What the distinction 
between Parts 1 and 2 does, is it allows for a more focused analysis of the dynamics which 
underpin the outcome of R2P. Our overall understanding of its form and potential impact is 
certainly dependent upon the combination of both parts, but the separation allows for 
specific questions to be explored. In particular, the structured outcome is vital to the 
question of what form of R2P emerged because, as a framework, it reveals a series of 
factors which as a whole demonstrate how and why there was a complete change in the 
state of play as far as the political prospects of R2P were concerned. They did not guarantee 
the outcome; they did not direct states in how they negotiated the shape and definition of 
the specific text; nor were they singularly determinative of the direction and form of the 
outcome. But they did increase the chances of agreement by narrowing the options 
available to states; enabling and constraining some of the choices they were able to make; 
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diminishing R2P’s relative contentiousness; and by limiting the possibility that either the 
discussion or agreement of R2P could be blocked in entirety.  
 
The most revealing question is, if we hypothetically stripped these factors away, could we 
have expected to see GA agreement of R2P as soon as 2005? Considering the presentation 
of the argument from Ch4 onwards, the answer should be self-evident. This point certainly 
matters because of the way it challenges existing theoretical accounts of norm emergence – 
strengthening the need for an alternative explanatory logic. But more than that, if we accept 
the premise that without these factors R2P would not have been agreed in 2005 – or 
alternatively we accept, in a more limited sense, the position that the structured outcome 
factors were indeed crucial for realising the 05 agreement1042 – then we should be equally 
willing to accept that these factors should have consequences for how we understand the 
nature of the agreement. As the opening quotes imply, these considerations are entirely 
legitimate. Undeniably, our understanding must involve a close analysis of the multilateral 
negotiations. This is the point of Part 2, which shows just how vital a micro-process driven 
account of the textual negotiation of R2P really is. It allows us to fill in the gaps of 
indeterminacy which would otherwise be evident in a purely structural account. It shows 
not only how state actors operated within the negotiations, and within the structure 
outlined, but how – through their actions – they sought to make the structure work for 
them, and their policy objectives. In this regard, a range of evident mechanisms, skills, 
characteristics and roles help make sense of the R2P negotiations. These included: cognitive 
framing; strategic calculation and prioritization;1043 diplomatic drafting skills; persuasion; 
networking, including the ability to mobilize existing support networks and structures;1044 
individual negotiating skills/experience; and, characteristics relating to the credibility, access 
and status of the actors involved (particularly those at the forefront of the discussions i.e. 
the norm proposers/attempted norm blockers). There should be no doubt that in order to 
arrive at a textual formulation most states could let pass – but not necessarily embrace – 
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 I accept that for some the idea that R2P could not have been passed in any form may now seem an 
excessively negative argument, or an irrelevant one considering the fact it was actually agreed as part of the 
Outcome document. This, though, would miss the point entirely, as I point out in the following paragraph 
1043
 Evidence of strategic calculation and prioritization has already been clearly identified in the discussion of 
the agenda, and effects of, above 
1044
 These can include governmental/departmental assets or state groupings/networks such as those within 
the UN 
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these factors were continually active. Nevertheless, this alone would not explain what made 
agreement possible, and moreover would relegate a series of considerations relating to 
what the structured outcome framework tells us about the nature of the agreement. 
Because the political dynamics underpinning R2P’s development were not what one might 
expect, there are inevitable consequences for how we understand it. In particular, these 
relate to: the extent to which R2P’s meaning is collectively shared and understood; the 
degree to which it was actually embraced as a normative idea, thus speaking to the 
normative foundations which underpin it; and the expectations we should resultantly have 
regarding potential compliance. Clearly these are heavily interconnected.  
 
As mentioned above, one effect of the structured outcome was that it led to an artificial 
acceleration in R2P’s development. The contrast between the lack of political momentum – 
symbolised by Canada’s inability to gain any GA foothold – and its agreement in 2005, is 
stark considering subsequent claims made on the back of it. As shown in Ch4, the 
acceleration of this development was evident in the way Canada reacted to the 
establishment of the HLP and its merging into the process leading to September 2005. 
Despite, or rather because of, the lack of state buy-in, Canadian officials recognised the 
potential opportunity of this process. It changed the ‘timeline’ of Canadian advocacy, 
shifting it from a long-term track onto an accelerated fast-track where, by the end of 2004, 
officials would come to regard the HLP as just one stage in a three stage process.1045 Put 
simply, Canada exploited the opportunity the structure provided to propel R2P forward in a 
way that they had previously been unable to do. In this regard, the focus and dynamics of 
their advocacy changed considerably. Diplomatic and government assets remained 
consistent in their focus on R2P, but were redirected and strengthened by realisation of a 
‘perfect’ but unexpected ‘opportunity to get [R2P] adopted in the context of a wider 
discussion on what the UN can do, and how it should reorganize itself to face new 
challenges’.1046 Mirroring a previous point, the argument R2P was artificially accelerated 
does not necessarily delegitimize the outcome. The institutional foothold is potentially 
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 Private interview with Canadian official (19 May 2009) and with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1046
 Private interview with Canadian official (19 May 2009) 
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significant1047.  But it should qualify our assessment of its potential significance, not least 
because it has consequently contributed to a disconnect in the synchronisation between 
expectations and normative foundation. Contrary to the view of Ramesh Thakur, it would be 
quite wrong to suggest that the hypothetical question above is an ‘impossible 
counterfactual’, or that regardless of the factors identified, R2P was ‘a concept and a norm, 
whose time had come,’ and that we were ‘going to have it one way or another’.1048 All the 
evidence suggested otherwise. Even Mortimer, who was fully aware of the agenda-setting 
effects of the HLP and ILF, was ‘very surprised’ R2P survived into the Outcome 
Document.1049 This is a sentiment many will no doubt share. Indeed, it will likely surprise the 
reader that R2P was not as contentious as one, quite reasonably, might have expected it to 
be. Ultimately this point has emerged because of the structured outcome and the 
underlying methodological approach. As a framework for understanding R2P, it has helped 
expose a surprising paradox at the heart of R2P’s development. Namely, an idea which 
(based on its recent history) was expected to be too politically sensitive and controversial to 
win broad UN backing – even on a mid-term basis – was in reality far less contentious than 
could ever have been predicted. The textual formulation, and the way it was sold, certainly 
reveals evidence of desensitization. But this diminution was largely because of the factors 
inherent to the structured outcome. This paradox was well captured by Van den Berg whose 
initial reaction was one of ‘surprise’ that it went through so ‘smoothly’, but which was then 
immediately countered by the recognition that it did so because of the way the ‘bigger 
issues’ facilitated its path.1050  
 
Of course, the fact is, for better or worse, R2P was part of a UN resolution in 2005. But if we 
wish to make claims regarding its political significance, we cannot do so without building the 
factors identified here into our analysis. In this respect, the ‘acceleration’ point is 
particularly important. Because R2P was not primarily propelled by the concerted volition of 
states, but rather agreed in the context of a huge negotiation, there are real questions to be 
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asked about the extent to which many member states genuinely embraced the idea. All 
states were active participants in the process, but a repeated suggestion during interviews 
with those involved, was that in reality a majority of UN states had not fundamentally 
shifted their position – particularly regarding the issue of potential forcible intervention.1051 
As van den Berg argues, though there was considerable ‘shaping and reshaping’ of the text 
to make it more ‘palatable’, this did not mean states actually embraced it: 
 
 The concept as such has never been embraced in the sense of wow this is fantastic 
 and we all should align behind it. No, that is certainly not the case.1052 
 
This point should apply just as much to R2P’s ‘strongest’ supporters considering the 
potential costs of seeing it through. But specifically in relation to the way the negotiations 
were defined and unfolded, one should not have been surprised that post-2005 
considerable discontent would arise, not least in relation to questions about what the 
agreement meant, and what had fundamentally changed. A number of states were 
undeniably committed to pushing R2P into the Outcome, but a larger number agreed or 
acquiesced to its inclusion because of the effects of the structured outcome, and because 
many were convinced that it offered nothing new; did not expand or alter existing 
provisions or processes; and kept the international dimension of R2P narrowly curtailed. 
This (international) dimension, in particular, has since been plagued by a lack of clarity and 
specificity because of painful textual formulation of 2005 and a number of purposeful 
ambiguities or questions it left unanswered.1053 These issues, however, are not purely the 
result of the textual negotiations. Part 2 certainly provides the analysis which allows us to 
pinpoint these issues with greater precision. For instance, the lack of specificity surrounding 
the international role reflected a lack of common consensus on what it should be, and a 
fundamental lack of support for a specific endorsement of international responsibility. But it 
is actually the structured outcome framework – working in combination with this textual 
analysis – which best explains the claims made here. In terms of normative commitment, it 
explains how many states could have adopted an idea they did not really want or believe in, 
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and why, therefore, many would subsequently work either: in a more focused way to clarify 
its meaning according to the limited scope as they understood it; or would attempt to 
further narrow it, or even argue against its desirability altogether. Post-2005, the constraints 
which had defined the process – and enabled the R2P’s agreement – were no longer 
relevant.1054 Indeed, the effects of the structuring, (inter alia the way it locked R2P into the 
agenda; relegated its importance in the overall context; divided the attentions and 
resources of states in how they were able to deal with the issue; and the way it led many 
states to politically calculate that passing a restrictive form of R2P would not fundamentally 
change the status quo but would actually aid their pursuit of agreement in other more 
important areas) raises an important question. Namely, why wouldn’t states, on their own 
terms, wish to guard against any expansion in meaning or expectations, or work towards 
reversing apparent ‘progress’ made in the context of a process where their ability to retain 
control was greatly reduced? Moreover, why wouldn’t there be major questions regarding 
the implementation of an idea which lacks specificity and which commands far more limited 
political support than its institutionalization implies? With any political agreement we 
should anticipate subsequent contestation over meaning, application, significance, and 
desirability. Indeed, whatever formulation states agreed upon, there was always going to be 
renewed contestation and post-hoc ambiguities/issues as real world crises emerged, and as 
some states and individuals sought to build-on, and further embed, the agreement. As 
previous chapters have also sought to emphasize, the very nature of the problem does not 
lend itself to easy solutions – especially so where the possible military intervention is 
concerned. That said, the structured outcome’s dynamics increased the likelihood of this 
contestation happening. R2P was always going to require long-term effort to successfully 
embed it, but with the process having dampened down controversy surrounding R2P, once 
the shackles were removed the controversy was only going to be reawakened.  
 
Part 2: An “emerging norm”? Tracing the form of R2P from the HLP to the WS 
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Setting up the argument in this way is particularly important because it raises some critically 
challenging questions relating to the substance of the HLP and ILF endorsements of R2P. 
Clearly the HLP’s establishment, its endorsement of R2P, followed by Annan’s subsequent 
reiteration in ILF, are central factors in the structured outcome argument. They represent 
vital cogs in the overall process and the how/why explanation this chapter has so far 
focused on. But the arguments presented thus far do not just speak to the how/why 
dimensions they also speak to the nature of the endorsements. So while the remainder of 
this chapter largely shifts in emphasis towards more directly understanding R2P’s 
formulation, the structuring factors already identified remain constantly relevant to our 
understanding. For instance, in helping to explain what changed in terms of the political 
dynamics of R2P’s development, the structured outcome raises questions relating to what 
did not change, or at least did not change as much as institutionalization implies. From this 
perspective, the driving logic of the arguments presented here questions the very basis of 
some of the ‘Panglossian assertions’ made by the HLP.1055 There was a distinct lack of 
empirical fit between substantive claims and proposals made by the Panel and the political 
development of R2P documented throughout this thesis.1056 Indeed, Michael Glennon’s 
observation that ‘because the panel gets the past wrong, it gets the present wrong’ 
appropriately captures the sentiment of this claim.1057 In simple terms the HLP’s 
endorsement of R2P was clear: 
 
We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility 
to protect, exercisable by the SC authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in 
the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have 
proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.1058 
 
The problem is that beneath the surface this seemingly straightforward statement was 
anything but. Rather than framed in terms of aspiration (even if the proposals were quite 
obviously aspirational objectives), the HLP’s five-paragraph discussion of R2P was presented 
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in quasi-factual language.1059 Accordingly, the Panel’s position was based on two principle 
assertions: 1) that there was a ‘growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to 
intervene” of any State, but the [R2P] of every State when it comes to people suffering from 
avoidable catastrophe’ and 2) there was a ‘growing acceptance that while sovereign 
Governments have the primary [R2P] their own citizens...when they are unable or unwilling 
to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community.1060 In 
one respect, they were right to describe R2P as ‘emerging’, but such language should not 
imply R2P was emerging into existence under the steam of state interaction or consent. This 
is a subtle, but vital linguistic qualification. More problematic, however, was the fact that 
the use of this phrase was specifically directed, along with the ‘growing acceptance’ 
statement, at the international dimension of R2P. Just what prompted the HLP to suggest 
there was increasing state acceptance of such responsibility is not entirely clear. As the 
processes documented throughout have demonstrated, this dimension was always the most 
controversial; the area where agreement was least likely. Indeed, as shown below, the 
Summit formulation of R2P was based upon a clear avoidance of the phrase (or anything 
similar) ‘collective international responsibility to protect’.1061 Such a phrase would have 
gone far beyond what many states wished to see, and implied consequences far beyond 
what many states were willing to accept. Moreover, as suggested in Ch4, the extent to 
which many states were willing to accept individual state responsibility can be convincingly 
qualified by recognising that this dimension can be seen as a way of actually curtailing, and 
guarding against, the international one.1062 
 
From this perspective, it is hard not to regard these elements of the HLP’s proposals as 
ahistorical, and excessively optimistic. The HLP seemed to adopt a position based more on 
advocacy, than on analysis. The apparent clarity of language gave the lie to genuine 
differences of opinion, perspective and specificity within the Panel, and to evident negative 
continuities in state positions towards the idea of R2P. Revealingly, as Hannay commented 
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in his account of the Summit process, the ‘proposed international norm of [R2P] was highly 
controversial, as the reaction to various speeches on humanitarian intervention had 
shown’.1063 Because this observation of controversy is so convincing, it is unsurprising that 
the HLP’s framing of its support for R2P would, and should, be open to major criticism. No 
amount of repetition of international responsibility was going to make it a reality. However, 
as already argued, there is nothing inherently wrong with a Panel or Commission making 
proposals which are ahead of the curve – particularly if there is recognition they are likely to 
be diluted through political negotiation.1064 Clearly the idea of R2P was not a ‘blue-sky’ 
proposal without any credible prospects. It commanded the support of a number of key 
advocates who, during its Summit formulation, were able to credibly embed it within 
existing processes and charter provisions in a way which emphasized concordance rather 
than radical change.1065 Furthermore, the HLP matters as much as it does to our 
understanding of R2P’s development because its role as a central linking mechanism in the 
structured outcome helps explain those dynamics which did change to move it towards a 
form of state agreement. But in terms of the underlying political dynamics which did not 
change – i.e. those generally relating to the priorities and preferences of states – the HLP’s 
proposals represented a gross denial of the state of existing political consensus, or rather 
existing political disagreement and disunity. The HLP was not just ahead of the curve in its 
bold assertions relating to international responsibility, but was expressing a normative 
position out-of-kilter with the realities of international politics. Indeed, it is perhaps here 
that the utility of the structured outcome framework becomes most evident. Whereas the 
HLP is one factor in explaining how/why R2P was agreed, its proposed form of R2P was 
predicated on misguided assertions, as the limited 2005 agreement would testify. There is a 
clear contrast between the HLP as one of the factors which propelled R2P forward, and its 
influence on the actual transmitted form. This is an important point. Misunderstandings of 
what R2P is, and what it means for the protection of people from mass atrocities, have 
often been based upon (wilful or tardy) ignorance of process, and an unfortunate reliance 
upon the original ICISS formulation which in key respects the HLP replicated. Inevitably 
there were remnants of ICISS in the Summit outcome. But whereas ICISS was unique for its 
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articulation of a transition from domestic to international responsibility, the Summit 
ensured R2P was not presented in such terms. The paragraph on the role of the 
international community might have covered a broad range of tools, but these were not 
embedded within an overarching responsibility framework akin to ICISS, the HLP, and 
Annan’s ILF. Insofar as responsibility was present, it was of an entirely different 
character.1066  
 
Undeniably, the language the HLP adopted was collectively agreed. It was, after all, issued in 
their name.1067 That said, with Evans such a driving influence, it is perhaps no coincidence 
that R2P was so powerfully articulated. With R2P seen as his ‘baby’ and the strength, or 
rather dominance, of his personality well-known, it is not a stretch to argue that the 
language spoke to the extent of his influence and skills than necessarily to the actual 
positions of states.1068 That Evans and Hannay – R2P’s two biggest supporters within the 
Panel – also spent time working like an ‘editorial committee’ on the final draft, only serves 
to strengthen this point.1069 Winning agreement unsurprisingly, however, required 
considerable effort. There were inevitable differences of opinion, and necessary subtle 
changes from the ICISS formulation. As Hannay remarks, within the Panel there was ‘a body 
of people who strongly agreed, and then there were a lot of people who had to be brought 
round to it’.1070 Resultantly, the discussions were, as he describes, ‘fairly sticky’: 
 
The anti-interventionists, Qian Qichen and Yevgeny Primakov, were pretty dubious 
about it. The developing world resistance to it was not very strong because people 
like Salim Salim were strongly in favour of it. As you might expect from a former 
Secretary-General of the OAU, he saw the case for it. So the developing country 
members of the panel were much less assertively against it than you would have 
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expected. Enrique Iglesias was not interested in that; he was mainly interested in 
economic issues. The  Brazilian [Baena Soares] was not very influential although 
undoubtedly he did not like the idea of intervention. So there was less of what I call 
the developing country push- back than has subsequently come about. But the main 
problem was with the Russians and the Chinese. But it was not by any means one of 
the most contentious issues.1071 
 
It is interesting that Hannay describes R2P as not one of the most contentious issues 
considering how the Summit process unfolded. But this observation in the context of the 
HLP may also be a perception filtered according to how difficult it was for Hannay himself to 
support it.1072 Alternatively, the NUPI account suggests R2P was one of ‘four contentious 
issues’ with variations over ‘what it entailed’, and divisions ‘largely’ a developed-developing 
one.1073 Similarly, Traub describes R2P as a ‘deeply contentious’ issue for the Panel.1074 
Either way, there was always going to be resistance and difficulty arriving at agreement on 
R2P, particularly for those who believed it was inextricably bound-up with the issue of 
humanitarian intervention. It is also interesting that the resistance of Qichen, Primakov, and 
Moussa could be overcome.1075 But with Evans ‘playing the game very hard’; not consenting 
to trading R2P away during the discussions;1076 and working to persuade the sceptics, a 
central thematic factor in appeasing potentially hostile resistance was ensuring R2P was 
explicitly tied to SC authorization. Mirroring the narrowing in Canada’s and Kofi Annan’s 
position, the report made clear that R2P was ‘exercisable’ exclusively by the SC. Lifting 
directly from ICISS, the solution to the issue of authorization for the use of force depended 
upon making the SC ‘work better than it has’ rather than finding ‘alternatives’ to it.1077 The 
subtle distinction, however, is that whereas ICISS qualified this by at least considering 
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alternative mechanisms/options, the HLP ruled them out completely.1078 This was consistent 
with what the political context could bear, both in terms of the reverberating legacy of the 
1990s debates, and the more immediate post-9/11 fall-out with the invasion of Iraq and 
development of the controversial Bush Doctrine.1079 But, at the same time, this product of 
political necessity was also symbolic for reaffirming the shift away from the central policy 
dilemma which had inspired Axworthy’s creation of ICISS. Indeed, although an unsurprising 
reality, the harsh truth was that R2P was not placed so firmly in the hands of the SC because 
there was any expectation it was now better placed to respond, but because it was seen as 
the only possible road to political agreement.1080 This may seem obvious. But the point is, 
however much it was the only, or even the better, option, the underlying motivation was 
designed to appease those who did not support any fundamental change in relation to the 
potential use of force. In this sense it spoke to lack of change in the international system, 
rather than to any significant transformation in either state positions or the SC’s willingness 
or capacity to seriously engage with appropriate solutions. That R2P was sold and 
understood by many states during the Summit process as ‘nothing new’ where the role of 
the international community was concerned, is arguably indicative of this point.  
  
With the secure binding of R2P to the SC, the HLP focused on developing proposals which 
could increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of its decision-making processes. First, the 
Panel articulated a just cause threshold broadly in line with ICISS, but with the addition of 
‘serious violations of humanitarian law’.1081 Although Byers is broadly correct that the 
Charter does not specify such threshold conditions in relation to the SC’s capacity to act, 
such definition reflected the political need to keep R2P tight and narrow.1082 This was 
further evidenced by the subtle, but important tightening of what Bellamy describes as the 
                                                          
1078
 See Michael Byers (2005) ‘New threats, old Answers’, Behind the Headlines, Vol. 62, No. 2, p11-12 in 
relation to non-consideration of ideas such as uniting for peace, or ‘regional compacts’ rather than his 
misguided and ill-explained suggestion that ‘the most effective change to the council’s decision-making ability 
would be to combine the British and French memberships into a single, permanent EU seat’ 
1079
 For the HLP’s response to the issue of preventive force, which it rejected, see HLP (2004) A more secure 
world: Our shared responsibility, p63 and Part 3 (pp.61-74) more generally 
1080
 See for instance Yevgeny Primakov (2004) ‘UN process, not humanitarian intervention, is world’s best 
hope’, New Perspectives Quarterly, 2 September 2004   
1081
 Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p75 
1082
 Furthermore, in any case, the SC would maintain jurisdiction to act in accordance with its peace and 
security mandate, so the limitation is less restrictive than it implies, Byers (2005) ‘New threats, old Answers’, 
p10 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
261 
 
‘preventive component’ of the just cause threshold through the reference to ‘actual or 
imminently apprehended’.1083 ICISS did not refer to imminence. Second, in contrast to its 
bold and contentious articulation of international responsibility, the Panel added itself to 
the ever-expanding list of just war appropriations, albeit packaged under marginally 
different labels.1084 Proposing that states adopt such political (i.e. not legal) criteria was, 
according to Hannay, part of an attempt to ‘systematise the consideration at the UN of the 
use of force’.1085 They were, nevertheless, a contentious area of discussion,1086 not least 
because of the almost non-existent prospects of P5 approval. Indeed, Hannay himself was 
initially ‘dubious’ but came round to the possible benefits of them even if he remained sure 
they were a ‘long shot’.1087 The discussion of criteria in Ch3 remains relevant here. What is 
worth repeating briefly is that political agreement of such criteria was simply not going to 
happen,1088 and even if agreement on criteria was possible, the benefits of them are 
inherently questionable.1089 Third, the Panel may not have endorsed ICISS’s more 
elaborately packaged (and qualified) P5 ‘code-of-conduct’, but did outline proposals 
specifically in relation to voting within the SC. This included a system of ‘indicative voting’ 
which the Panel believed would ‘increase the accountability of the veto system’ because 
states would have to publically declare their voting intentions regarding a particular course 
of action.1090 According to Bellamy this represented a ‘weaker constraint’ on the veto.1091  
However, his reading of the report seemingly overlooked the Panel’s more straightforward 
proposal that the P5 individually ‘pledge…to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of 
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genocide and large-scale human rights abuses’.1092 In such terms this actually appears 
stronger than what ICISS proposed. In any case, both options were equally unlikely to win 
collective backing in 2005, or in the long-term.1093  
 
Finally, at Annan’s insistence, the HLP was given the unenviable task of addressing the issue 
of SC reform.1094 Much to the ‘relief’ of the Panel, Annan’s late request for two reform 
options in part got the Panel ‘off the hook’. From Hannay’s perspective had the Panel been 
forced to arrive at one position on such a hugely contentious issue, it would have been 
‘dead on arrival’ and ‘taken the whole report to the bottom of the sea’.1095 From this there 
are two, rather paradoxical points relevant to our understanding of R2P. The first is because 
R2P was bound so tightly to the SC, it is hard to avoid questioning how reform, or more 
accurately enlargement, would impact upon the effectiveness of its decision-making. It is 
hard to see how an enlarged, albeit more representative, Council of 24 could maintain even 
its current effectiveness.1096 Weiss is surely right in arguing that decision-making would only 
be inhibited.1097 Were such reforms to go ahead, R2P would not only be locked into an 
already imperfect body, but one which would be significantly larger, and likely to see its 
effectiveness decline. On the other hand, consistent with structured outcome, despite 
sensible observations that SC reform would undermine the Summit’s overall prospects for 
success1098 SC reform was one of those issues – particularly between June and July – which 
drained and distracted the attention and resources of states to the benefit of R2P.1099  
 
Unsurprisingly, scrutiny of the HLP report has been presented here predominately in 
relation to those areas of the report relevant to R2P. There is no reason to review, or 
critique all 101 recommendations made by the Panel. What is relevant is that while the 
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Panel was not directed by Annan towards specific proposals, there was intention on the part 
of its members to arrive at a report which Annan would be able to support, and to support 
strongly.1100 Any set of proposals are going to provoke criticism, but overall the Panel’s 
report was seen as credible.1101 This is particularly important because had the report been 
widely discredited, R2P could have been lost in an ensuing backlash. Despite the more vocal 
development-fuelled criticism, the report was broadly welcomed in positive terms and, 
crucially, strongly suited Annan’s preferences.1102 With the publication of the report in 
December 2004, swiftly followed by Annan’s ILF report in March 2005, there was a broad 
shift in the characteristics and ownership of the process towards member states as they set 
about reviewing the proposals and formulating policy-positions in anticipation of their active 
negotiation from April onwards. From this perspective, the series of informal meetings held 
to discuss the HLP and Millennium Project reports, largely represented shadow-boxing 
ahead of the real process beginning in April.1103 Nevertheless, some important feedback and 
early R2P-related policy-lines were expressed during this phase.1104 According to the Office 
of the GA President, the reaction of states (who raised the issue) was broadly defined by 
‘two views’: 
 
One recognized the importance of this concept as part of an emerging norm of 
international law; the other cautioned against the concept in relation to its risks vis-
à-vis the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal 
affairs...1105 
 
More specific recorded statements are hard to come by. However, from documents that are 
available both China and Russia would take the opportunity to lay-down early markers. 
Strangely, Russia would offer support for the use of force criteria but only because they 
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should not be seen as limiting or inducing the SC to use force.1106 In other words they would 
change nothing. China, meanwhile, expressed reasonable scepticism about the theoretical 
and practical possibility of formulating criteria considering ‘differences in the causes of 
crises and their circumstances’.1107 This would prove prophetic, with no movement towards 
agreement in this area. Both countries, meanwhile, expressed strong views vis-à-vis the SC. 
For China, it was up to the SC to ‘carefully’ consider where interference may be necessary, 
and only on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. But Russia was even more vociferous, stating that 
interference could only be sanctioned by the SC. Particularly notable, was that while Russia 
was willing to accept that with authorisation mass atrocities ‘may serve as reason for 
interference by [the] international community’ they made no reference to the language of 
R2P but rather commented that the Charter required neither ‘revision or a new 
interpretation’.1108 This was an entirely consistent position throughout the negotiations.1109  
 
By contrast, China directly invoked the language of R2P, but was arguably more hard-line in 
its position with repeated references to ‘basic principles’ of sovereign equality,1110 non-
interference and international law. Insofar as domestic responsibility was referenced, it was 
about reinforcing individual state sovereignty rather than ceding to, or accepting, a 
statement of international responsibility. Indeed, though China accepted that the UN must 
‘pay attention’ to the problem of internal conflicts and find ‘remedies’ to help, it cautioned 
against ‘hasty judgement[s] that the State concerned is unable or unwilling to protect...and 
rush to intervene’,1111 It is important to flag-up these positions because they were largely 
consistent throughout the process. China would agree to R2P’s inclusion because greater 
policy priorities elsewhere where not affected by the negotiations on R2P. In other words, 
as far as China was concerned R2P stayed within the framework of its own preferences 
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based upon a combination of pragmatism (case-by-case), legality and maintenance of pre-
existing prerogatives (SC authority), and on continuity of Charter norms which China 
understood in narrower, more traditional terms than many advocates of R2P would wish to 
see. Had there been an attempt to shape it in a more fundamental way it is likely China 
would have reacted to the crossing of its key red-lines. But because it did not, it actually 
served China’s interests to facilitate its agreement. This should be kept in mind, because 
contrary to Bellamy’s assertion that China would, during August, signal a ‘change of heart’ 
on R2P by announcing ‘deep reservations’, and contrary to his highlighting of President Hu 
Jintao’s defence of a ‘traditional understanding of the UN Charter’ at the Summit itself as 
evidence of this shift, these facets of China’s policy were always apparent and at no point 
did centrally placed interviewees describe any shift in China’s position.1112 It is also relevant 
because it reiterates previous points about subsequent contestation, helping to explain just 
why China would continually emphasise the narrowness of the final four-crime formulation 
agreed in 2005.  
 
The eventually narrow – but not necessarily commonly understood – formulation adopted 
in 2005 is a central factor (with the structured outcome) in explaining how/why R2P was 
agreed. But having completed the HLP report, expectations for R2P were not particularly 
optimistic.1113 There were no guarantees R2P would transit into the Summit negotiations, let 
alone find its way through them. But as shown in Part 1, what made the difference was the 
way the HLP process merged into pre-existing processes leading to the Summit, thus linking 
the HLP to Annan’s ILF report. As the process shifted towards member states, this transition 
was especially crucial, as Evans identified:  
 
If the HLP report hadn’t dealt with this it would have been dead. If Kofi hadn’t picked 
it up in the next stage of the transmission belt it would have been dead. And then in 
the final stage it was much more the efforts of people like John Dauth and Allan Rock 
and Paul Martin.1114 
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In some respects ILF was arguably more significant for its effect on the structuring of the 
overall process than necessarily for the specific nature and form of its endorsement of R2P. 
Ultimately, though, there could not be one without other. ILF had the principal effect of 
locking R2P into an ambitious, ‘diffuse’ agenda,1115 the effects of which (as already 
described) made its path to agreement less complicated than anyone might have 
expected.1116 Paradoxically, however, despite Annan’s well-known support for R2P, its 
inclusion in ILF was not necessarily straightforward.1117 On the face of it Annan was always 
going to support the endorsement of R2P. But in reality those tasked with coordinating the 
follow-up and drafting processes had other factors to consider. Not least the potential 
political prospects of an idea which they knew to be highly controversial and could have 
negative back-draft consequences for the SG’s position.1118 This was apparent to Canadian 
officials who, throughout each stage of the process, remained committed to lobbying hard 
on R2P’s behalf. As Rock explained, having recognised that the process would proceed in 3 
stages Canada’s strategy for R2P involved asking itself ‘how can we play?’ In other words 
how could they maximise the chances for R2P’s adoption in 2005.1119 The means and 
approaches varied. But in general each stage was significant for revealing the primacy of 
individual agency – an important point in the context of the structured outcome 
argument.1120 For instance, during the HLP stage, Canada freely submitted an R2P-specific 
non-paper, backed up by extensive lobbying efforts on the part of its officials in Ottawa and 
at the UN. Such was the high-level commitment that Paul Martin would even meet with the 
Panel in New York where he was able to ‘urge [them] to give it a prominent place among 
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their recommendations’.1121 This was backed-up during the ILF stage. Canadian officials 
would set about ‘working on’, and working with, key officials within the Secretariat 
responsible for the report and the transition towards negotiation.1122 Most notably these 
included Robert Orr who, as Assistant SG for Policy Coordination and Strategic Planning, was 
responsible for the 2005 process, and acted as the principal member state contact1123 and 
the Stedman-Jones HLP team which Annan kept in place to aid with follow-up, and to draft 
the security-focused aspects of ILF.1124 Indeed, once any initial, albeit minor, difficulties 
surrounding R2P’s inclusion were overcome, the structures put in place within the 
Secretariat were significant enabling factors. In the case of ILF, that Stedman and Jones 
remained in place helped ensure continuity and coherence1125 and meant Canadian officials 
could work to influence people they had already established contacts with during the HLP 
stage.1126 Perhaps more importantly, during the multilateral negotiations, Orr’s influence 
would be a significant factor in terms of how the documents were drafted – especially 
during the very final stages. Canada would constantly feed language into those, like Orr, 
who were ‘holding the pen’ in order to keep the R2P section consistent.1127   
 
Ultimately, ILF offered a reiterated but slightly amended endorsement of R2P. It reaffirmed, 
and symbolized Annan’s long-standing support and his desire to see member states follow 
his lead by embracing it as a ‘basis for collective [international] action’.1128 Acknowledging 
the ‘sensitivities’ around the issue, Annan’s endorsement was strong and bold, but in other 
ways was more narrowly and carefully defined. Like the HLP, there was no reference – in 
any form – to ‘alternatives’ to SC authority. It had to work better, and one way of achieving 
that was for the SC to adopt principles to guide its decision-making.1129 Notably any mention 
of indicative voting, or any proposals relating to veto restraint were dropped – most likely 
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because they would only complicate the already ambitious proposals on SC reform, and 
because they were even less likely to be adopted than the decision-making principles. 
Placing the SC at the heart of R2P was pragmatic and central to its political agreement six 
months later. But to reinforce this Annan would present R2P differently to that of the HLP. 
Partly designed to detach R2P’s association with humanitarian intervention,1130 the use-of-
force was dealt with separately in the chapter Freedom from fear, whereas R2P was 
positioned within a section on the ‘rule of law’ within the chapter Freedom to live in 
dignity.1131 Certainly there was hope that this change would help to limit this association, 
and help make the use-of-force section ‘less offensive to some member states’.1132 But this 
was not the only reason for the change. During the drafting process for ILF the HLP’s 
proposal that the composition of the Commission on Human Rights be expanded to 
universal membership was unanimously regarded as the ‘weakest and least convincing’ of 
all. With the idea of a new HRC being pushed by Louise Arbour and Danilo Türk, Malloch-
Brown decided the report should be based upon a ‘three-pillar structure’ which, in 
institutional terms, would embrace the idea of a ‘three council structure’.1133 Human Rights 
would join Development and Peace and Security as the three-pillars, with a newly 
established HRC based on peer review membership, joining the Economic and Social Council 
and the SC as the three councils.1134 Thus, to ensure balance, R2P was moved into the 
section on human rights whilst also having the beneficial effect of separating R2P and the 
use of force.  
 
This also allowed Annan to keep his articulation of the normative dimension much cleaner. 
Indeed, with SC centrality the only pragmatic option, and the use of force guidelines a 
proposal he had long supported, but with little prospect of success, it was his normative 
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statement of R2P where Annan was boldest. He certainly kept it tightly defined. For 
instance, it was to apply only to cases of ‘genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’ – a simpler, but nevertheless high-threshold formulation, which the Summit 
would subsequently adopt with the addition of ‘war crimes’. Annan would also strongly 
emphasize state responsibility, qualifying that it lay ‘first and foremost’ with individual 
states. Although essentially the same meaning as ‘primary’ responsibility, the implication 
was arguably stronger. But in other ways Annan was particularly direct. In placing R2P so 
firmly in the hands of individual states, he was clear that this responsibility did not simply 
mean within their jurisdiction, within their control, but actually spoke to their ‘duty’ and 
‘primary raison d’être’ as a State. Because of this, if they failed (Annan adopted the classic 
‘unable or unwilling’) the international role had to normatively and practically mean 
something. Hence responsibility would ‘shift’ to the international community.  
 
It is true this formulation would not win the approval of states. The international dimension 
would be heavily qualified, with numerous evident caveats leaving many questions 
unanswered. Nevertheless, Annan’s ILF is arguably the most straightforward and well-
packaged normative expression of R2P.1135 Crucially, it provided the starting point for 
multilateral negotiations by locking R2P into a process where its entire removal would be 
almost impossible to achieve. Clearly, therefore, Annan’s role was significant – as it was 
throughout the development of R2P. However, as mentioned in Part 1, one of the key 
effects of ILF and the framing rhetoric used by the SG and others – namely of elevating the 
scale and expectations for the Summit – emanated largely from an overwhelming sense of 
crisis which began to engulf the UN, and Annan personally, from 2004 onwards. A perfect 
storm involving the sexual abuse of refugees by UN personnel in the Congo; allegations of 
sexual harassment against the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers,1136 a 
deeply damaging investigation into the UN’s Iraqi oil-for-food programme;1137 and a 
mistaken response to a BBC interviewer’s question which resulted in headlines around the 
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world quoting Annan as describing the Iraq war as ‘illegal’,1138 engulfed the Organization and 
its SG. Such events challenged the credibility, transparency and accountability of both; for 
some signified a profound existential crisis; and provided considerable ammunition for long-
standing critics of the UN to go on the attack.1139  
 
The consequences of the overwhelming sense of crisis for understanding the development 
of R2P are, though, more mixed. It certainly left Annan floundering and under intense 
personal and professional pressure.1140 Annan and his staff were forced into crisis 
management mode, having to deal with regular attacks on his leadership; a failing US-UN 
relationship;1141 regular reports of the Volcker Inquiry into the oil-for-food programme and 
deeply personal allegations surrounding his son’s involvement in it. Thus, unsurprisingly, 
Annan’s ability to engage directly in the Summit process was heavily curtailed.1142 The 
accumulated sense of crisis also served to complicate and exacerbate an already difficult 
international environment. The timing of the Volcker Inquiry interim reports and a constant 
whiff of scandal did little to help keep the process, and member states, focused upon the 
reform objectives.1143 So in key respects the scandals limited the prospects for a successful 
outcome, which was already challenged by strained relationships within the UN since the 
invasion of Iraq, and a general sense of apathy towards the reform agenda as packaged by 
Annan.1144  
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Alternatively, the extent of the turmoil is directly relevant for understanding how the 
process as described in Part 1 was framed and defined, and is thus directly relevant to our 
understanding of their effects on the way R2P was negotiated. One important impact of the 
scandals was the way it led to major staffing upheaval within the Secretariat. Most 
important was the ascent of Malloch-Brown who set about applying his communication and 
management experience to try and use the reform process as a way of ‘changing the 
conversation’ away from crisis, towards change.1145 Though Malloch-Brown especially 
wanted to see significant management reform, and would not claim there was a clear 
strategy in place for proceeding towards the Summit, he was instrumental in how the 
process was packaged, and in trying to improve relations with the US administration. His 
hope – influenced by the idea of the ‘burning platform syndrome’1146 – was that ‘oil-for-food 
and the crisis surrounding Kofi’s leadership...was going to provide a moment where [states] 
would desert their blocking positions and narrow self-interest and combine around real 
reform’.1147  
 
As such, ILF was at the ‘centre’1148 of this strategy of trying to change the conversation, and 
to transform the situation from a ‘defensive fight’ focused on ‘protecting’ Annan and the 
Organisation, into a serious process focused on reenergising the UN and moving forward.1149 
For some, the ambition of trying to discuss such a huge number of proposals, defined by 
references to ‘San Francisco’ and the idea of adopting reforms as a ‘package’1150 was a 
mistaken approach. Why? Because genuine compromise would be necessary for success but 
was always unlikely, and because the narrative and scale would likely shape the subsequent 
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perceptions of the outcome in a profoundly negative way whatever the outcome.1151 
Indeed, as it turned out, both of these proved partially correct. A package-approach was not 
embraced by states precisely because many were simply unwilling to compromise or 
negotiate in good faith. As it transpired, for a host of complex reasons, the multilateral 
system in this case lacked the necessary ‘lubrication’1152 to enable states to ‘find the 
consensus for change’.1153 It is certainly questionable that many states ever really bought 
into the imperative for change that Annan believed was so necessary, or even commonly 
understood the fons et origo of the crisis.1154 Add in the already documented divisions over 
the thematic scope of the proposals, and the previously described ‘distrust’ of the 
process1155 and it is easy to see why the reform effort ‘fell short’ of what Annan and 
Malloch-Brown had hoped for.1156 As Dauth suggests, Annan arguably ‘underestimated the 
rapid decline in any appetite for consensus in 2005’.1157 But even so, for all the criticisms 
and disappointments relating to process and outcome, one can at least understand the logic 
which underpinned Malloch-Brown’s approach, and there is no doubt it contributed to 
some important achievements.1158 But more importantly, with the remainder of this chapter 
turning to how R2P was formulated between April-September, what really matters for the 
argument is that for all the criticism and disappointments it was this very strategy which 
proved so vital to aiding/facilitating the outcome of R2P. By setting the bar so high – and 
there should be no doubt that it was – the dynamics described in Part 1 kicked into effect. 
And though the form of R2P was very narrow and heavily qualified (below), and based on 
the structured outcome logic was normatively far weaker than is often assumed, there 
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should be little doubt that its prospects would have been significantly reduced had the 
negotiations been more limited.1159 As the Irish Prime Minister remarked if Annan had not 
‘challenge[d] everybody to move from positions, you probably wouldn’t even have got what 
was agreed yesterday’.1160 There is of course that question of whether or not the 
accelerated development of R2P was, and will prove to be, beneficial to its future impact. In 
a similar vein, Malloch-Brown himself wondered if the ‘weak’ and ‘stripped down’ R2P 
language would do it ‘more harm than good’. But as he also pragmatically remarked, even a 
toehold can allow an idea or proposal to be built-up thereafter.1161 The key point, however, 
is that any assessment of the ‘05 agreement; any assertions about R2P’s meaning and 
significance; any claims in relation to potential compliance; and any effort to build-on the 
‘05 agreement, should be based upon understanding R2P not in isolation to the process, but 
fully embedded within it. Indeed, as Ch1 made clear, norm exogenization is a problem we 
need to avoid, not reinforce. Accordingly, to complete the overall explanation of R2P’s 
development, the final stage of this chapter turns specifically to R2P’s negotiation based 
initially upon ILF’s agenda-setting formulation. 
 
The World Summit Negotiations  
 
As should be apparent by now, the World Summit processes are highly complex. Though the 
analytical distinction between the how, why and what of R2P’s agreement provides an 
effective framework for understanding the political dynamics which underpinned its 
construction, it is clear that this untangling of the processes’ constitutive elements, although 
necessary, is somewhat artificial. These twin-dimensions certainly enable one to identify 
factors within the process relevant for addressing the propulsion, and form, of R2P. But 
before specifically addressing the formulation, it is important to reiterate the mutually 
constitutive relationship between these two dimensions. This relationship can be explained 
in the following way: (1) the propulsion of R2P depended in key respects upon the how/why 
factors identified throughout this chapter, but predominately in part 1. These, in accordance 
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 As argued throughout this chapter, without the structured outcome there is strong reason to believe R2P 
would not have been agreed in 2005  
1160
 This was in response to a question of whether Annan had set the ‘bar too high in terms of expectations’, 
UN (2005) ‘Press Conference by Prime Minister of Ireland’, Department of Public Information, 14 September 
2005 
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 Interview with Mark Malloch-Brown (telephone, 23 June 2010) 
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with the structured outcome logic, help explain how R2P went from an idea unable to gain 
political traction within the GA, to one agreed within a rapid timeframe leading to 
September 2005; (2) the factors relating to the how/why are also directly relevant for 
understanding the form of R2P agreed in 2005. They did not simply help propel R2P towards 
agreement, but actually impacted upon the shape and parameters of the agreement 
because – for instance – of the way they impacted upon and conditioned the interaction, 
priorities and resources of states; and, (3) the formulation of R2P is itself a key element for 
explaining how/why R2P was agreed in 2005. The ways R2P was kept narrowly and tightly 
defined, and the specific ways it was framed and explained, were undeniably vital to 
understanding the unanticipated transformation its political prospects underwent. The 
relationship between these three elements may prima facie appear contradictory, but are in 
actuality entirely consistent. As stated repeatedly, the potential agreement of R2P in 2005 
would have been greatly reduced had the factors captured by the structured outcome not 
been in place or impacted as they did. But equally even with these pressures bearing down 
on, and shaping, the negotiations of 2005, it was not given that R2P would emerge as part of 
the negotiated outcome.  
 
The odds that it would be were certainly reduced, but the exploitation of the Summit 
opportunity depended upon agency. In this respect, this final section focuses on the 
multilateral negotiations which began intensively in early April and only ended the day 
before the Summit began on the 13 September. Even with the analytical separation 
described, this task is not made any easier. The intensive negotiations involved some 191 
states, hundreds of individuals, at least 6 draft iterative outcome documents (4 of which 
were ‘official’ versions),1162 with negotiations taking place across 4 key thematic 
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 GA President Draft Outcome Document, circulated 3 June 2005; also released as Draft outcome document 
of the high-level plenary meeting of the GA of September 2005 submitted by the President of the GA, published 
8 June 2005, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1; Revised draft outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting of the GA 
of September 2005 submitted by the President of the GA, 22 July 2005, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.1; Revised draft 
outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the GA of September 2005 submitted by the President 
of the GA, 5 August 2005, Future Document, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2; Revised draft outcome document of the 
high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005 submitted by the President of the 
General Assembly, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2, 10 August 2005; President’s Draft Negotiating Document for the 
High-Level Plenary Meeting of the GA of September 2005, submitted by the President of the GA, 6 September 
2005; Draft Negotiated Outcome, 12 September 2005, 8am and 12.30pm; Draft outcome document of the 
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‘clusters’1163 covering dozens of specific issues and individual proposals, all of which 
required consensus agreement.1164 The mechanics of the process also exacerbate the 
complexity. Under the overall direction of the Office of the GA President (Jean Ping) the 
process was designed initially to be based upon facilitation. Appropriately this involved the 
appointment of 10 regionally representative ambassadorial facilitators1165 with additional 
support from selected Secretariat officials (or ‘resource persons’), and 5 politically-focused 
‘Envoys’ of the SG tasked with helping to ‘promote’ the reform agenda.1166 The drafting of 
the documents – or as described above, those ‘holding the pen’ – was done in the name of 
the GA President, and obviously depended upon his input, that of his staff, the facilitators, 
and member states in a more direct sense.1167 But here the involvement of the Secretariat 
was particularly crucial. The scale of the reform agenda was always going to pose major 
challenges to the Office of the GA President, whoever occupied it. As such, the input, 
support and skills of key Secretariat staff, most notably Robert Orr, was an essential element 
of bringing the outcome to fruition – increasingly so as the process moved towards its final 
hours and the prospects for agreement became ever more fraught.1168 Indeed, this was 
certainly true after the process shifted from a facilitatory process to a more textually-
focused process based upon the ‘core group’ structure.1169 As described above, this 
significant change to the process occurred after the arrival of John Bolton and his now 
infamous proposed amendments to the rolling draft outcome text on the 17 August.1170 
These amendments totalled approximately 700 individual changes to the most recent rolling 
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 The clusters were: ‘peace and security’, ‘development’, ‘rule of law and protecting the vulnerable’ and 
‘strengthening the UN’, see ‘Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the GA President’, 22 February 2005 
1164
 There was no mechanism available for majority voting on individual proposals, see ‘Modalities, format and 
organization of the high-level plenary meeting’, A/59/545, 1 November 2004 
1165
 On the role and selection of the facilitators see ‘Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the GA President’, 27 
January 2005 and ‘Press Briefing by the Spokesman for the GA President’, 22 February 2005 
1166
 ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General’, 4 April 2005 and interview 
with Mark Malloch-Brown (telephone, 23 June 2010), on their effect see NUPI (2006) ‘A fork in the road or a 
roundabout?’, p52 
1167
 In a direct sense: member states sought to directly feed language to those drafting the documents, Canada 
was one of those countries who did so by submitting language on R2P – as did Rwanda in a publically 
circulated draft (see below), private interviews (31 March 2010, 22 October 2010) 
1168
 NUPI (2006) ‘A fork in the road or a roundabout?’ p55 
1169
 As stated in a previous footnote, the Core Group changed in size and approach as the process moved 
towards conclusion, by the final week it met in a smaller group of 12-15 as well as the original group of 30-32 
ambassadors. Additionally the core group had numerous sub-group meetings on specific areas of the text, 
including R2P 
1170
 United States (2005) Revised draft outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the GA of 
September 2005 submitted by the President of the GA, dated 17 August 2005, 11.06am 
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draft outcome document (dated 10 August), and were reinforced by a series of ‘Dear 
Colleague’ letters further explaining policy positions of the US, including one on R2P 
circulated on the 30 August.1171 The resulting effect was the negotiations of individual areas, 
including R2P as one of the seven priority areas described in Part 1, became much tighter 
and more concerned with formulating language on a line-by-line basis to overcome 
resistance; to foster greater consensus. In this respect, the argument that Bolton’s 
intervention precipitated a necessary and inevitable change to the process is directly 
relevant for how we understand R2P’s specific formulation through each of the draft 
outcome documents and each stage of the process. As becomes clear, until mid-August the 
language of R2P was under-developed and over-optimistic in relation to what a majority of 
member states were willing to accept. Here it is important to recognise that the production 
of the draft documents was an iterative process. They provided the basis for further 
negotiation and could not necessarily be seen as representative of agreement at the time 
they were released. It would be quite wrong to assume these iterations represented 
agreement or that the text on R2P was subject to ‘pre-Bolton’ agreement and fell victim to 
‘post-Bolton’ disagreement. Particularly during the facilitator stage the draft outcome 
documents from the 3 June to the 10 August ballooned in size; became increasingly littered 
by specific member state, or regional grouping language; and saw the standard of 
diplomatic drafting reduce considerably.1172 Moreover, contrary to the package approach 
Annan had hoped for – which theoretically should have contributed to some kind of 
bargaining dynamic – individual agenda items were dealt on an individual, disconnected 
basis which inevitably complicated the effort to develop an overall coherent document.1173 
This was certainly partly a product of the difficult set of relationships between states, and 
the agenda-related issues already described. But it was also a problem with the facilitation 
process itself. Reiterating what one official remarked, until early-August the negotiations 
were in essence ‘shadow-boxing’ ahead of real thing which began thereafter. This may not 
have been ideal, but was how the process in this case unfolded. In this respect, the required 
specificity and detailed member state engagement with R2P to the degree that would be 
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 Bolton submitted at least seven letters from the 29-30 August on the topics of R2P, the Peacebuilding 
Commission, UN Management Reform, the HRC, terrorism, development and the MDGs, see bibliography 
1172
 On US criticisms in early August see ‘Statement by Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Deputy United State 
Permanent Representative, on UN reform’, 2 August 2005 
1173
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010, 25 June 2010), see also NUPI (2006) 
‘A fork in the road or a roundabout?’ p54-55 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
277 
 
necessary was not forthcoming. It was always going to be a contentious issue, and one 
which would require careful crafting. But with the facilitator process as it was, and with R2P 
relegated in relative importance because of the scale of the agenda, the corresponding 
language lacked the specificity and qualifications necessary to gain the acceptance of those 
states outside the group of state supporters R2P could rely upon. As Malloch-Brown 
accepts, it is entirely fair assessment to say that the facilitated process was not creating 
‘clarity of outcomes’.1174 
 
This really changed after the intervention of Bolton and the move to a CG approach from 
the 29 August onwards.1175 Undoubtedly this phase brought many of its’ own problems, for 
instance resulting in the production of draft documents ‘scarred’ by the addition of 
numerous brackets and marginal notes, adding to the sense of confusion and 
disconcertment.1176 But the combination of continuing GA open-ended/plenary discussions 
to address less contentious issues, and a core group (CG) structure (initially composed of 30 
ambassadors, and a number of more informal sub-groups thereof) negotiating contentious 
issues on a line-by-line basis, meant the text would be more tightly crafted, and more 
representative of what states were willing to accept. Thus, within the process there was an 
important contrast between the drafts prior to the Bolton intervention (3 June, 22 July, 5/10 
August) and those developed thereafter (6 September, 12 September, 13 September). The 
latter documents – negotiated on the basis of the so-called ‘Ping 3’ draft of the 5/10 August 
– better reflected the nuances of potential agreement between states on R2P. To reinforce 
this point, it is revealing that an update sent on the 22 August from the UK Mission in New 
York to the FCO in London stated that with ‘15 working days to go’ the ‘real negotiations 
among key players start now’.1177 The phrase ‘real negotiations’ could not be more 
revealing. Rather than representative of any broad agreement it was understood by a 
leading UN member that negotiations relating to many key issues in the latest iteration of 
the outcome document had not ended but were actually moving towards an end-game 
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 Interview with Mark Malloch-Brown (telephone, 23 June 2010) 
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 ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the SG’, 29 August 2005 
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 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
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defined by greater emphasis on the detailed language of agreement.1178 Indeed, though this 
argument is consistent with Part 1’s explanation of the structured outcome in terms 
Bolton’s role in helping to spark the ‘inevitable’ shift from facilitation to greater line-by-line 
negotiation via the CG, it is suggested by some that in fact the intervention of Bolton served 
to unravel what had been ‘agreed’ previously. According to this position, R2P was one of a 
number of agreed issues which fell victim to the wider effects of the US position. Alex 
Bellamy expresses this kind of thinking: 
 
The sting in the tail came in Bolton’s proposed amendments to the wider UN reform 
project...The effect of...this...was to destroy consensus on the Ping document. 
Bolton’s intervention declared open season for other spoilers to reopen contentious 
issues. As John Dauth, Ping’s Australian facilitator, put it in late August, ‘everyone is 
trying to reopen issues’ that had been agreed over the previous month. The R2P was 
among them’.1179  
 
On the face of it, the observation that issues were ‘reopened’ appears to have some merit: if 
the US saw fit to express its policy positions on a host of issues, and dissatisfaction with how 
they appeared in the draft outcome, then surely it logically follows that a number of other 
states would follow suit? It is certainly true that some states sought to exploit the described 
shift, not least because a line-by-line process would inevitably have to involve some of the 
more hard-line (what some call ‘spoiler’) states.1180 It is also true that the provocative nature 
of Bolton’s intervention exacerbated the way some states would subsequently respond.1181 
But the idea Bolton’s actions ‘destroyed consensus’ – in other words implying that 
consensus did indeed exist – and therefore the implication that this included a reopening of 
agreement on R2P, is deeply problematic. Indeed, in a host of ways this position underplays 
the underlying dynamics of the overall process, and underplays a number of more specific 
factors relating to why the change to the CG described in Part 1 was both necessary and 
inevitable, even if the way it happened was unquestionably unfortunate. Most of these 
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 This is true whether or not they were aware of the core group idea at that stage. As officials involved made 
clear, they fully understood that the facilitation process had to come to an end in order to allow greater 
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 Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p86-7 (my emphasis) 
1180
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dynamics were addressed above, but, because this issue is so central to how we understand 
the formulation of R2P, the argument is worth reiterating. Not least because the picture is 
far more complex and nuanced than Bellamy implies. As this section explained, significant 
resentment towards the process was building prior to the arrival of Bolton, with NAM and 
G77 members particularly critical of what they regarded as unfair limitations on their ability 
to influence the direction of the negotiations. To repeat what one European official 
described, the facilitator stage provoked a perception that it served the interests of a well-
connected – predominately western – group of states, many of whom shared policy 
preferences of a more ‘progressive’ disposition.1182 Though leading to a rather curious 
alliance with some of the more hard-line UN member states,1183 the fact was, from the 
perspective of its own interests, the US agreed the process was not enabling clear policy-
lines to be incorporated into the text being formulated. In other words they believed the 
process was not producing documents that many states, could support because they did not 
contain enough language of actual consensual agreement.1184 Indeed, prior to Bolton’s 
arrival at the UN, his Deputy expressed a series of concerns relating to both the formulation 
of the draft document, and the way US ‘priorities’ were being addressed.1185 In this respect, 
US concerns were not a new development suddenly imposed upon the process by its 
abrasive newly arriving ambassador. Bolton’s apparently difficult personality and his well-
known neo-conservative leaning likely filtered into how he negotiated and dealt with 
colleagues, but the broad thrust of his approach was in tune with the preferences of the US 
administration.1186 As Bolton put it, his aim was to ‘find a new process that would allow the 
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 Private interview (22 October 2010): indeed, one official commented that at a meeting of the EU during 
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member governments to reach agreement on the specific words of whatever the Outcome 
Document turned out to look like’.1187  
 
In many respects this is what happened. Whilst the introduction of the CG, particularly 
coming so late in the process, led to some major difficulties in trying to arrive at consensus 
across such a vast agenda, it did at least enable states to address issues on a more language-
specific basis. As one Canadian official remarked, Bolton’s amendments though a ‘shock to 
the system’ and viewed as an attempt to ‘torpedo negotiations’, the reality was line-by-line 
negotiations were always going to have happen at some stage. Thus Bolton’s intervention 
‘merely kick started this process’.1188 But the CG was by no means a perfect innovation. It 
only dealt with the seven most contentious issues1189 – some of which occupied more time 
than others – and the line-by-line aspect of the negotiations certainly enhanced the ability 
of some states to be more difficult and destructive in their approach. But the most 
important point about this shift in the mechanics of the process was that it was not just 
necessary, but was a product of the weaknesses of the process prior to it. Quite obviously, 
this argument intensely complicates the misguided picture painted by Bellamy. The 
perception that existing consensus was destroyed, and that a reopening of already agreed 
issues was the key dynamic which followed the Bolton intervention, is representative of an 
overly simplistic understanding of the process. The story is vastly more nuanced than this. 
Because of the described problems with the facilitator process, a large number of states 
simply did not believe it was allowing them to influence the drafts in the way they wished, 
and nor was the process ensuring the draft text was crafted with the necessary precision.1190 
This could only be rectified if the process switched towards the formulation of specific 
language that states could actually agree to, rather than be perceived to agree with. This 
distinction is subtle, but absolutely central to the transition which took place. To paraphrase 
a common idiom, the devil would be in the detail. In R2P’s case, whether or not some hard-
line opponents would seize upon the chance to more directly project their hostility, the 
inclusion of R2P in the outcome document really depended upon its language being framed 
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and defined in such a way as to win over a far larger group of sceptical, concerned, or less-
enthusiastic states and to ensure clear red-lines of the P5 and UN membership in general 
were not crossed. Even if some states were willing to accept agreement in return for 
progress in their own priority areas (e.g. development), that did not provide open-ended 
scope for how R2P was defined. In one sense, Bellamy’s suggestion that ‘a broad consensus 
about the phrasing of the world’s commitment to the R2P [began] to emerge in early 
August’ is correct.1191 As shown below, the core elements of any potential agreement on 
R2P were broadly understood relatively early on: R2P would be about primary state 
responsibility; would speak to the legitimate concern of the international community in very 
limited circumstances, but would be tied to existing processes and imply no new 
obligations.1192 Even with the factors identified by the structured outcome enabling its path, 
without adherence to these key elements agreement on R2P would not have been 
achievable. The problem with Bellamy’s argument, however, is that by tying how R2P was 
formulated so closely to the perceived negative impact of John Bolton in ‘tearing [the 5/10 
August] consensus apart’,1193 he misrepresents the status of the draft outcome document at 
that stage. Any consensus which was understood between states as to what the R2P 
agreement should broadly look like was not ‘destroyed’ as Bellamy suggests. Why? Because 
the 5/10 August draft did not actually satisfactorily capture the language necessary to 
ensure the expression of R2P was defined according to these core elements. It was not that 
this draft did not address some of the core elements that would lead to agreement, but 
more that it only did so in imprecise terms. 
 
Put simply, whether Bolton had arrived or not, R2P in the 5/10 August draft would not have 
won the approval of states because it was not based upon consensus agreement. The 
language was too general, and crucially included some fundamentally 
challenging/problematic wording more demonstrative of a process which had involved too 
much shadow-boxing, and not enough close-quarter engagement. For instance: it included 
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references to ‘obligation’ in relation to measures short of Chapter VII; to ‘shared 
responsibility’ to take collective action; and a call for the P5 to ‘refrain’ from the use of the 
veto where genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity were concerned.1194 For 
various reasons, none of these were going to win the support of a majority of states. So the 
perception that R2P was ‘reopened’ is only sustainable if it is used to describe how the shift 
in the process led to a more detailed effort to define the language of R2P after the Ping 3 
draft of the 5/10 August. Unfortunately this is not what Bellamy is suggesting. The crucial 
distinction is that this was not a reopening of existing agreement/consensus but an 
‘opening-up’ of a process to enable greater emphasis on the detailed language of difficult 
areas. Indeed, this is testified by press conferences given by the facilitators of the process 
around the 5 August and by the abovementioned internal UK update of the 22 August.1195 
Speaking to the 5 August draft, the facilitators were clear in stating that it ‘represented a 
work in progress’, that ‘providing parameters’ for R2P was proving a ‘challenge’ and that the 
negotiations would continue to find ‘agreeable language...on matters relating to...[R2P]’.1196 
Meanwhile, as far as UK officials were concerned, in describing the ‘real negotiations’ as 
starting ‘now’ they believed agreement on R2P was ‘within reach’ but was dependent upon 
‘final negotiations supported by high-level lobbying in key capitals’ and that a ‘substantive 
result’ could be accepted by a majority of the NAM – where the most problematic resistance 
had come from – ‘subject to (potentially tough) negotiation of the fine print’.1197 Clearly the 
understanding was that that agreement did not yet exist, but subject to key conditions was 
achievable.  
 
Tracing R2P’s formulation around the core elements identified dominates the remainder of 
this chapter. But to fully understanding this formulation it has been just as necessary to 
understand the dynamics of the process, how they changed, and how they impacted upon 
R2P’s status and development. The emphasis on the characteristics of the process has 
clearly overlapped with elements of the argument in Part 1. But this section has sought to 
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emphasize just how vital it is we understand R2P’s agreed form in relation to the processes 
which enabled it to get to that point. In this regard, the change from a facilitator process 
based upon perceived consensus, to one with greater line-by-line negotiation through the 
introduction of a CG-structure, was one of the most significant direct changes to how R2P’s 
language was crafted. While R2P remained a diminished priority in the context of the overall 
agenda, as one of the seven priority areas for the CG to address the dynamics of how it was 
crafted would shift gear. The initial negotiating basis for this new phase of negotiation 
would be provided by the 5/10 August draft, and then most importantly the 6 September 
draft thereafter. In terms of how the introduction of the CG impacted upon the 
development of R2P, the dynamics underpinning its formulation were broadly united by a 
considerable tightening of language. Inevitably – as with any political agreement – the scope 
for alternative post hoc interpretations would be very real in this case. Considering what 
R2P was designed to address, and the political dividing-lines between states, unanimity of 
meaning in relation to a complex set of specific issues was always unlikely. Indeed, as 
argued above, the structured outcome meant the inevitability of this increased.1198 But, 
based on a detailed charting of the development of the R2P language, after the described 
shift the draft documents post-5/10 August (6, 12 and 13 September) would undergo a 
series of highly significant revisions. These changes reflected the shift to line-by-line 
multilateral negotiation.  
 
It would certainly be wrong to imply the process from the CG onwards was in any way clear, 
structured or satisfactory. The lateness of the transition to line-by-line not only blew Ping’s 
optimistic aspiration of arriving at ‘wide-ranging consensus’ by the end of July,1199 but threw 
the process into chaos. One effect of this was that the September drafts would become 
increasingly littered by bracketing, and as the process moved towards the opening of the 
Summit on the 14th there was real danger that any outcome might completely fall apart. 
Things were so perilous that a document, removed of all brackets and any bracketed text 
states could not agree to,1200 was only presented to ambassadors on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
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basis by Annan and Ping the day before the Summit was to begin.1201 Resultantly, many 
areas of the text were cut-out (disarmament and non-proliferation the most high-profile 
casualty) or brackets around areas which had remained subject to difficulties were removed 
and simply presented to those resistant to accept the draft or not. This coordinated effort to 
avoid the destruction of the entire document helped dissipate strong Indian resistance to 
the name, and ultimately the inclusion, of R2P. But this is only one aspect of the story of 
R2P.  
 
In another sense, the line-by-line approach – and increased bracketing of R2P which 
stemmed from it – was evidence of active negotiation to try and formulate a satisfactory 
outcome based on identifying those areas most resistant to agreement. Thus, the apex of 
R2P bracketing came in the 6 September draft as states began to zone-in on the more 
contentious issues of language.1202 In contrast to the facilitator-led process, unrealistic or 
more difficult references to the veto, to obligation, to international responsibility, and to the 
parameters of R2P were now subject to closer attention/engagement. In some cases, the 
solution would be easy to arrive at with others much more difficult. But more importantly, 
while the use of bracketing provided evidence of disagreement, they were also, 
paradoxically, evidence of a more concerted effort to arrive at more agreeable text, and 
thus were a by-product of a phase that was always going to be necessary, rather than 
necessarily representative of new areas of disagreement.  
 
The revisions R2P underwent are detailed below, but can broadly be described in terms of: a 
tightening of the text (through the removal of unacceptable language); a reiterated 
narrowing of its scope (to ensure clear definition of R2P’s parameters); and a restructuring 
of its presentation (to better capture the core elements for agreement). If one’s ideational 
preference is strongly supportive of R2P, the development of R2P during this period may be 
seen as a progressive weakening. However, this would be mistaken considering the 
extensive explanation of the politics behind the transition to the CG documented 
                                                          
1201
 This is picked up again below, but accounts of this confused last 24hours can be found in Bellamy (2009) 
Responsibility to Protect and Traub (2006) The Best Intentions, my account is also based upon numerous 
interviews including with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010), and private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 
2010, 22 October 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1202
 Note this was the first draft after the 5/10 August, so it is not surprising that the bracketing was most 
prevalent at this stage 
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throughout this chapter. There were very good reasons why R2P’s language changed as it 
did, and moreover considering its political prospects prior to the processes surrounding the 
Summit, that agreement was possible at all should been regarded with surprised realism 
rather than idealised disappointment. Indeed, much of this chapter has sought to explain 
the dynamics of how/why R2P developed as it did, and as rapidly as it did. In so doing, two 
dimensions were referenced as being particularly important. First, the structured outcome 
packaged a series of factors which show how the odds for R2P’s successful adoption were 
dramatically increased. Second, the formulation itself (the “what”) was defined in such a 
way as to ensure agreement could be achievable. The core elements of this are tracked 
below, and in so doing leads to some rather problematic questions about just how 
significant the R2P agreement really is. Such questions relate directly to how R2P was 
defined and framed and are additional to the questions raised more specifically in the 
context of the how/why explanation. It should be clear, however, that the relationship 
between the formulation and the structured outcome logic is intensely interconnected. Put 
simply, the process is at the heart of each and every dimension of the overall argument.  
 
Resultantly, the task of explaining R2P’s development is immensely complex.1203 The 
dynamics, dimensions, and layers presented throughout speak to a process not easily 
deconstructed. This complexity is, however, unavoidable. With many existing explanations 
of normative change rendered and applied in overly simplistic terms, and with many 
accounts of R2P over-optimistic in their outlook,1204 the process-driven hypothesis provides 
a stronger basis for understanding R2P’s form, and potential impact. Indeed, it is particularly 
interesting that despite the arguments around the structured outcome; despite immense 
pressures on states to agree an outcome;1205 despite the exhaustive advocacy efforts of 
Canada et al. and all that went before the negotiations began in April 2005, the culmination 
of all this was a mere three paragraphs, totalling three-hundred words in length.1206 But 
more problematic was that the content and tenor of these paragraphs was as blandly 
limited as they were. This is not to discredit the efforts of those supportive states who 
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 One ambassador described the negotiations as ‘intrinsically very difficult’, private interview (12 May 2011) 
1204
 Welsh (2010) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, Ethics & International Affairs, online edition 
1205
 Building expectations was of course part of the Annan/Malloch-Brown strategy, but their effect on those 
negotiating was well-articulated in interviews, see also ‘Statement by Ambassador Anne W. Patterson on UN 
reform’, 2 August 2005 and NUPI (2006) ‘A fork in the road or a roundabout?’ p46 
1206
 These paragraphs opened the chapter, and thus will not be repeated here 
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worked tirelessly to successful achieve the inclusion of R2P, but is to say that some of the 
limitations on how far states were willing to go were too significant to overcome. Many of 
these limitations were clear early on. Canada had altered its framing of R2P post-Iraq in 
response to fears it could lead to increasing interventions, and was fully aware of how 
difficult selling the idea would be. Indeed, other key supporters like the UK, Rwanda, the EU, 
New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa, and France were all sensitive to the concerns R2P 
provoked and sought to actively address them through intergovernmental negotiation.1207 
Alternatively there was an equally vociferous group of hostile opponents to R2P who 
repeatedly spoke against it. This included Egypt, Algeria, India, Pakistan, Cuba, Venezuela, 
Jamaica, Belarus and Iran. Russia was also generally opposed, and like China would have 
been more than happy to have seen no reference to R2P.1208  
 
Because of characteristics of the process – particularly the reduced place of R2P – this 
opposition was somewhat tempered, although no less real. But more significantly, even 
though China and Russia were deemed unenthusiastic, their political distaste for the idea 
did not lead them to seriously or ‘actively’ threaten its inclusion.1209 Certainly part of the 
reason for this was that both had bigger concerns elsewhere, notably in China’s case the 
negotiations around the HRC.1210 But more interestingly, the way R2P was framed and 
subsequently drafted, meant they had little reason to shift from grudging acceptance of its 
inclusion to outright opposition. It is important to recognise, however, that the position of 
both towards R2P was – according to one Canadian official – ‘consistently negative’ 
throughout. This matters because some have misunderstood how the shift to the CG after 
the intervention of Bolton impacted upon the positions of states, and China and Russia 
specifically. Perhaps inevitably – considering the described weaknesses in his account – 
Bellamy wrongly suggests that in late August China ‘signalled its change of heart on R2P and 
announced ‘deep reservations’’ and that Russia ‘followed suit and began arguing against 
                                                          
1207
 For examples of how key supporters framed R2P throughout 2005 and into the negotiations see: Canada 
(29 January, 20 April , 12 July), France (19 April, 12 July), UK (19 April, 29 April, 21 June), EU (19 April, 28 July-2 
August), New Zealand (28 July-2 August), all listed in bibliography 
1208
 Private interview (13 August 2010) 
1209
 Private interviews (31 March 2010, 3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
1210
 Private interviews (31 March 2010, 3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010) and emails (25 July 
2010, 25 July 2010): it is also worth repeating the point that officials interviewed were very clear that China at 
no stage altered its fundamental position on R2P, it may have spoken louder to its policy red-lines, but did not 
suddenly change its position 
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[R2P] itself’.1211 This is a wholly misguided ascription, symptomatic of a failure to fully 
appreciate how the dynamics of the process worked prior to, and thereafter, the Bolton 
intervention. It was not until the process opened-up with the commencement of line-by-line 
negotiations that the full extent of these negative positions were ‘fully articulated’.1212 
There was no change of heart. Their objections to R2P were well-understood throughout, 
but the transmission of them into the development of the draft text took on a different 
character only once the process changed. Moreover, this was not simply an issue exclusive 
to those of a hostile or less-enthusiastic disposition. As clearly expressed above, even the UK 
– one of the R2P’s most influential supporters during the ‘05 negotiations – had policy 
concerns which were anything but trivial in nature. In this respect, this explanation speaks 
to the value of the methodological approach, and the packaging of the empirically-driven 
findings afforded by the structured outcome. But returning to how the formulation helped 
deal with the divisions R2P was always going to provoke, in the case of China and Russia so 
long as R2P did not cut across their existing P5 prerogatives, or imply new obligations or 
automaticity, then their reasons for getting especially exercised were greatly reduced. In 
actuality, this was also broadly similar where the other P5 were concerned. The US wanted 
to ensure R2P was not a legal commitment, did not imply obligation and that any reference 
to responsibility vis-à-vis the role of the international community was not of the same 
character as that of an individual state. These policy lines were best expressed in Bolton’s 
30th August letter which closely mirrored where the agreement would eventually end-up.1213 
Meanwhile, the UK would most likely have accepted stronger language than ultimately 
realised, but this would still have been qualified by the same underlying foundations as the 
                                                          
1211
 Clearly my account is contrary to Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p87, and Traub (2006) The Best 
Intentions, p373 (Bellamy’s account is clearly influenced by Traub’s) 
1212
 Obviously this point is consistent with the argument throughout and is based upon a numerous interviews 
with centrally placed individuals. These individuals were explicitly asked about the suggestion of backsliding in 
the positions of Russia and China and were direct in stating clearly that this did not happen, that this was 
based upon confusion about how the process unfolded. The ‘fully articulated’ quote was made in a private 
email to the author, in a statement expressing clearly that there was no change in the position of these states 
(21 November 2011) 
1213
 Bolton ‘United States Proposals: Responsibility to Protect’, Letter to Ambassadorial Colleagues on the 
Responsibility to Protect, 30 August 2005. Indeed, Allan Rock described Bolton as ‘helpful and supportive’ on 
R2P, that even with the US making its position very clear discussing R2P with Bolton was not problematic and 
he was not going to prove an obstacle to agreement. Some also commented that the endorsement of R2P by 
the Gingrich-Mitchell Task force on the UN might have helped condition the US position, see (2005) American 
Interests and UN Reform, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace 
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other P5, even if the level of political commitment was undoubtedly greater.1214 The main 
underlying difference between the P5 related to the issue of authorisation; neither the US, 
nor the UK, wanted to rule out the possibility of action outside the SC, whereas China and 
Russia wanted to specifically guard against any language which might leave this open. Even 
France was seen as more sympathetic to the China/Russia position.1215 
 
This brief account of the P5 positions is not just about trying to understand where the five 
most powerful states in the UN system stood in relation to R2P. It is actually more revealing 
because it is one way of showing how key policy-lines filtered into, and shaped, the final 
outcome. The central challenge for those negotiating R2P was to overcome a series of 
dividing-lines which cut across the membership in various ways. This applied to supporters, 
sceptics and non-supporters alike. Each had their own red-lines and preferences for what 
agreement on R2P should look like – if it was to be agreed at all. It was the task of 
supporters to find ways to overcome such differences, while at the same time working to 
maximise the best possible outcome they could. From an advocacy perspective, this 
required a range of tools, strategies, forms of engagement, and carefully crafted framing 
tactics. From a negotiation perspective, this required an ability to draft effectively, a 
willingness to accommodate the positions and concerns of states, to adapt, to make 
changes and propose alternatives, to compromise including if necessary by diluting 
proposed language, and, if need be, to utilize strategic tactics and to directly challenge 
superficial or strongly resistant arguments.1216 In arriving at final agreement, all of these 
facets were deployed by those working in support of R2P. But as with any 
intergovernmental negotiation, what really matters are the individuals and states involved. 
Intergovernmental diplomacy is dependent upon individual agency. Although this complex 
process was subject to many structural factors, it was nevertheless an elite process involving 
senior representatives of individual governments. In this respect, the cause of R2P was 
greatly enhanced by the individuals, and state mechanisms behind them, fighting for its 
adoption. At the heart of this effort was Canadian ambassador Allan Rock. A politician by 
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 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
1215
 Private interview (3 August 2010): post-Iraq this was not be seen with any great surprise 
1216
 This included ‘making life difficult elsewhere’ in the negotiations if necessary, private interview 
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trade, his tireless, fair-minded, unwavering tenacious commitment to R2P,1217 allied to a 
strong sense of possibility and what was needed to get the job done, ensured he was a 
formidable player and an ‘immensely popular’ ambassador at the UN.1218 On an individual 
basis, no-one did more to ‘extract’ those three R2P paragraphs from such a chaotic, difficult 
process.1219 Indeed, as former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin suggested had it not 
been for the efforts of Allan Rock it is highly unlikely there would have been any agreement 
on R2P1220. Such an argument, while inevitably conditioned by the structured outcome, is 
entirely consistent with the emphasis on individual agency expressed throughout this thesis. 
The opportunities provided by the structured outcome depended upon their exploitation by 
key individuals involved in the process. Resultantly, Rock’s constant desire to explain, to 
reiterate, to address concerns, to win states over to the idea, meant his association with 
R2P would become extremely well-known. As Rock joked during interview: 
 
 Canada became highly associated with R2P, and when people saw me walking down 
 First Avenue in New York they’d say “Uh oh, here comes another blast on R2P, let’s 
 cross the street”.1221 
 
Of course, as Rock points out, the association was with Canada. The combination of years of 
advocacy and a clear choice to prioritize R2P during the early stages of the Summit process 
meant Canada was always the leading state sponsor. This prioritization nevertheless came 
at a cost. It meant that by putting most of their ‘eggs in the R2P basket’ Canada would have 
to accept less involvement in other areas of the negotiation.1222 The upside was that it had 
the effect of ensuring the cause of R2P had the full backing, influence and negotiating 
resources of the Canadian government. This included the full engaged support of Paul 
                                                          
1217
 Paul Martin in interview described Rock as an ‘idealist’ with a great interest in foreign affairs (telephone, 
27 January 2010). It is also worth noting that one of Rock’s closest friends during his time in Ottawa was Lloyd 
Axworthy 
1218
 Praise of Rock was unanimous and glowing amongst interviewees. Paul Martin described him as an 
‘outstanding ambassador’ and one of Canada’s ‘strongest ambassadors to the United Nations’ (telephone, 27 
January 2010), Mark Malloch-Brown described Rock as one of the few ‘heroes’ of the process (telephone, 23 
June 2010), while John Dauth pointed out just how rare it is for a politician to be a successful ambassador at 
the UN which Rock, in his view, clearly was (London, 25 May 2010) 
1219
 Interview with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010) 
1220
 Interview with Paul Martin (telephone, 27 January 2010) 
1221
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1222
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), this did not mean Canada was not involved in many 
other areas of the negotiations but that the prioritization of R2P inevitably impacted upon the extent of this 
involvement 
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Martin. Backing-up his advocacy of R2P to the HLP, when the negotiations neared their end-
point in early September, Martin would become personally involved on a bilateral basis to 
try and meet the criticism of some of the most resistant states.1223 That it was Canada who 
was leading on this issue also greatly helped its cause. Certainly its advocacy since 2001 
enhanced Canada’s credibility as having a unique expertise and knowledge of the issue, and 
was genuine in its support. But such credibility also stemmed from the fact Canada was not 
an especially ‘provocative’ advocate, but was seen in more ‘benign’ terms. This was a factor 
which helped prevent R2P from becoming a high-profile red-flag issue for a swath of states 
already ‘chronically infuriated’ by many other issues.1224 Had a state like the UK attempted 
to more directly lead on this issue, or had the US been more interested in the concept than 
it was, the negative connotations R2P had already taken on post-Iraq would have been more 
problematic. This is an interesting point, because despite taking on very different 
negotiating roles in relation to R2P, all three of these states were nevertheless critical to its 
agreement just as other states like China, Russia, South Africa and Rwanda were also 
critically important. But there is no doubt that Canadian leadership was, at all stages, central 
to its negotiation. During the early stages of the process, one clear advantage of Canada’s 
early prioritization of R2P proved to be particularly important. Because of a lack of energy 
and engagement around the process, coupled with an acknowledged less than clear strategy 
for proceeding towards the Summit,1225 a leadership and ownership vacuum emerged. With 
Canada’s early mobilization, this gave it an important opportunity to assume a leadership 
role in a way many others were unable or unwilling to do.1226  
 
This exploitation of a weakness in the process was a major upside of prioritizing R2P, and 
with Canada able to count upon the backing of a number of supportive states, actually 
served to enhance the difficulty of removing R2P in entirety from the negotiation package. 
                                                          
1223
 Interviews with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), Paul Martin (telephone, 27 January 2010) and private 
officials, see also Paul Martin (2009) Hell or High Water: My Life In and Out of Politics, Toronto: Emblem, 
pp.340-341 
1224
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), as Van den Berg comments, Canada has a ‘very good 
and positive reputation in the UN system’ (telephone, 18 October 2010) a point which was generally made in 
interviews, even if some commented on what they regarded as ‘huggy’ tendencies in aspects of Canadian 
foreign policy, private interviews (13 August 2010, and private) 
1225
 This is based on interviews including with Mark Malloch-Brown (telephone, 23 June 2010), see also Traub 
(2006) The Best Intentions, p335 
1226
 NUPI (2006) ‘A fork in the road or a roundabout?’ p51-2 
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The most supportive states have already been mentioned. But with ‘collective help’ so 
central to any normative development, it is necessary to explain why some mattered more 
than others. Of the Western states the general role of the UK was deemed highly significant. 
As a P5 member, its engagement in the negotiations was inevitably broader than that of 
Canada. This was especially true once it assumed the EU presidency in July. Its role though 
was significant directly in terms of the effort to agree R2P, and in terms of the ‘bigger 
picture’.1227 The UK may not have specifically led the negotiations on R2P but it was always a 
key ‘priority’ for the UK government.1228 Resultantly, UK officials were almost always 
present and active in R2P-related meetings and were directly involved in defining its 
language and formulating lobbying and framing strategies to overcome resistance. Aside 
from its P5 position, the EU presidency provided an additional boost – and responsibility – 
to its engagement in the negotiations. There were undoubted complications with 
formulating EU positions on specific items of the agenda, but in respect of R2P the EU’s 
support was strong and clear from the outset. As one ambassador remarked, EU states 
‘hammered’ R2P in meetings.1229  
 
But returning to the UK’s role more specifically, two interrelated points are particularly 
relevant to the overall picture of understanding R2P’s formulation. The first is that the UK’s 
commitment to R2P involved ‘high level lobbying in key capitals’ pursued on a ‘targeted’ 
basis. This included specific lobbying of the most difficult states – or ‘spoilers’ as the UK 
described them – up to the level of Ministerial engagement.1230 This lobbying was essentially 
predicated upon the core elements necessary for agreement outlined above, backed up by a 
series of corresponding frames designed to emphasis what R2P was, and what R2P was not. 
                                                          
1227
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 31 March 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1228
 As officials themselves acknowledge leading was very much Rock’s role, private interviews (22 October 
2010, 25 June 2010) see also ‘E-gram to FCO London regarding UK bilateral meeting with US State Department 
Representatives’ dated 3 May 2005 
1229
 Private interview (25 June 2010): See for example: ‘Statement by Mr. Hoscheit, Luxembourg, on behalf of 
the EU’, 6 April 2005, A/59/PV.85, ‘Statement at the Informal Thematic Consultations on Cluster III: Freedom 
to Live in Dignity, by Mr. Jean-Marc Hoscheit, Luxembourg on behalf of the EU’, 19 April 2005, Canada-
European Union Summit (2005) ‘Joint Summit Declaration’, 19 June 2005, ‘Statement by Mr. Hoscheit, 
Luxembourg on behalf of the EU’, S/PV.5209, 21 June 2005, p27, ‘Statement by Emyr Jones Parry, S/PV.5225, 
12 July 2005, p32, ‘Statement by Emyr Jones Parry, UK on behalf of the EU, at the informal meeting of the 
plenary to discuss the revised text of the Draft Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting’, 28 July-
2 August 2005, ‘E-gram to FCO London from UK Post regarding UK bilateral meeting held with host Nation: A 
UN Member State’, dated 16 August 2005 
1230
 ‘E-gram to FCO London from UKMIS NY: UN Summit: Outcome Document: SITREP’, 22 August 2005, private 
interviews (25 June 2010, 22 October 2010) 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
292 
 
In terms of the effort to gain agreement on R2P, generally speaking there was broad 
consistency in how these frames were deployed and articulated by R2P supporters during 
the process.1231 But the second point which derives from this, is that even though this 
framing, and the negotiation of the fine print, means it is possible to explain in more specific 
terms what the form of R2P agreed really was (and this itself is distinct from how many R2P 
advocates understand and describe it) there was, nevertheless, significant variations in how 
even the most supportive states viewed and understood the agreement. This applied to 
how R2P related to pre-existing policy-lines and frameworks, and more overtly to the almost 
immediate commencement of post-agreement contestation over what states had 
committed to. In many respects, these represent two sides of the same coin. How states 
understood/presented the agreement subsequently was always likely to be part-
conditioned by their own preferences. But this manifested itself in two principle ways. One, 
for some states, support of the agreement did not necessarily restrict them exclusively to its 
wording, or rather the specific commitment to the wording of R2P did not rule out 
alternative policy options even if those very options were explicitly bypassed by R2P. So for 
the UK, though it was committed to R2P’s core elements, its support remained influenced 
by the framework provided by Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech.1232 It might have failed to win 
any linguistic caveats which might have provided a foothold for future unilateral action à la 
Kosovo (i.e. without SC authorization), but that alone did not mean R2P overrode or ruled-
out possible action under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.1233 The enactment of 
R2P may have been exclusively tied to SC authority, but for a country like the UK their 
support did not specifically rule out the use of an alternative framework for the purposes of 
addressing an R2P situation. This point may run contrary to the momentum which 
specifically drove R2P towards agreement, but it nevertheless necessarily complicates our 
understanding of its meaning and development. Not least, because it speaks to the very 
issue which originally motivated Axworthy’s establishment of ICISS but which was left 
behind as the politics around R2P changed in response to the evident limitations of possible 
state agreement.  
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 As I explain below and see footnote 1284 
1232
 The UK’s prioritization to realize agreement on R2P was described as ‘consistent with’ Blair’s 1999 Chicago 
speech in (FCO) (2004) The United Kingdom in the United Nations, Command Paper 6325, London: TSO, p7 
1233
 This distinction was carefully, but clearly expressed in private interviews (2 August 2010, 13 August 2010). I 
also touch on this in relation to the core element of SC authority below 
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Second, the extent of some state’s commitment to R2P (and conversely for some their lack 
of support for R2P) led to statements after the agreement had been finalised which only 
served to confuse the agreed formulation, expose continuing disagreements over what the 
limited agreement really meant, and in some respects cloud the significant limitations 
inherent in the R2P paragraphs.1234 Indeed, much of this, it has to be said, stemmed mainly 
from how advocates (in a more general sense) have sought to portray the agreement and 
significance thereof. To some extent this has helped maintain a certain momentum around 
the idea of R2P since 2005. But more problematically, the repeated blurring of how the ‘05 
agreement was crafted has in other respects served to undermine the already limited, and 
shaky, normative foundations which underpin it. It is less clear just what the momentum 
around R2P is about, of, and for. This is a roundabout way of showing how despite the 
considerable efforts of key R2P supporters during 2005, there were not only important 
differences between them but that how R2P was subsequently presented has added to the 
sense of confusion and misunderstanding. It is therefore essential we ground our 
understanding of R2P in the processes leading to the Summit, including how supporters 
managed to facilitate agreement, and how major dividing-lines between all states were 
overcome. Indeed, by focusing on the detailed negotiation of R2P, it is hard to understand 
just how/why some states, and individual advocates from within public policy or academia, 
have managed to oversell the status and significance of the agreement in the way they 
have. That said, aside from the obvious explanation of ideational preferences conditioning 
one’s position, one of the most significant problems is that the kind of detailed analysis of 
its construction necessary to arrive at a more grounded perspective of R2P has been 
distinctly lacking. Certainly this has not been helped by the limitations in IR theory 
mentioned previously – limitations which do not necessarily lend themselves to the kind of 
questions relating to how and why R2P was agreed, what the form this agreement took, and 
from that what this means in terms of significance and status. 
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 An analysis of the Summit statements reveals numerous variations in how R2P was understood and 
articulated by states, see UN plenary records for the 14-16 September 2005, A/60/PV.2-A/60/PV.8 and indeed 
the subsequent GA Annual Debate on the theme ‘For a stronger and more effective UN: the follow-up and 
implementation of the High-level Plenary Meeting in September 2005’ from 17-23 September 2005, 
A/60/PV.9-A/60/PV.22 
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Linking these points to the efforts of key advocates may seem somewhat diversionary from 
the developing account of R2P’s detailed negotiation. But in actuality, whilst recognising the 
absolute centrality of key states during ‘05, it is also necessary to strip away some of the 
layers surrounding state support (and opposition) in order to recognise there was, and is, a 
subtle distinction between understanding an individual state position (i.e. a detailed unit-
level approach) and understanding how these individual positions – defined by a range of 
diffuse preferences, policy positions and red-lines – came together (or not) in the form of a 
system-level agreement through multilateral negotiation. There is, of course, an undeniable 
relationship between these two contexts and one should not read this in terms of an 
artificial separation between the two. But though it is essential to identify those differences 
between states which influenced the final agreement, including differences in emphasis 
even amongst the most supportive, and indeed to recognise that unit-level analysis can 
reveal how the diffusion of an international agreement can be distinctly filtered/altered by 
the domestic policy context (and all that encompasses), these have to be understood in the 
context of the overriding emphasis of this research: namely of understanding the 
construction and negotiation of R2P as an international-level normative development. 
Certainly understanding how an agreement like R2P is transmitted into a domestic policy 
context will be well-served by a unit-level approach. Such approaches offer a more specific 
perspective of the dynamics which underpin normative diffusion and internalization on an 
individual basis, particularly enabling one to consider the impact of norms and agreements 
on that country’s respective foreign policy. Indeed, there is real scope that a case-study 
driven unit-level analysis could complement the approach here, especially considering the 
implications of the structured outcome. A unit-level tracking of individual state positions 
could, for instance, include a fuller picture of engagement with R2P – perhaps including 
their 2005 negotiating strategy – and consider whether or not R2P is accepted, how it is 
understood, and its relative strength in the domestic context. It would also be entirely 
appropriate to consider, in a more focused way, how the strongest core element of R2P, 
namely primary state responsibility, resonates on an individual state basis. But such 
research agendas are most applicable to the post-agreement stage of the development of 
R2P. Why? Because any shift in the level of analysis towards a domestically-focused 
research agenda cannot occur in vacuo. The starting point has to be the international-level 
because any diffusion of R2P post-05 begins primarily from the international to the domestic 
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context. Without first understanding the construction of R2P which led to international 
agreement, there would be no basis for such a shift – what exactly would one be seeking to 
understand? This is why micro-driven analysis of R2P’s development is so crucial for 
determining what its collective meaning is, and thereafter what we might expect in terms of 
potential compliance. Moreover, it should not be lost that the idea of R2P emerged as a 
response to failings of the international community in collectively addressing mass atrocity 
crimes. International agreement on R2P was about trying to define what the role of the 
international community should be, and how it can better respond to, and prevent, such 
crimes from occurring.  And though, as it transpired, the principle constitutive focus of R2P 
was directed at the individual state responsibility, this actually proved to be the case 
because the collective will of states was more about limiting the international scope of R2P. 
This kind of perspective can only come from tracing its international development and the 
micro-processes of its negotiation and agreement, and it is this very tracing which provides 
a better sense of the form and parameters of R2P.1235 
 
Of course, as implied, these kinds of issues would be irrelevant had R2P not been agreed in 
2005. With Canada and the EU well-mobilized, and with key P5 members not exercised to 
the point of absolute opposition, its prospects were greatly enhanced. The combination of 
the structured outcome, the way R2P was specifically formulated, and the efforts of state 
supporters to overcome resistance are all part of the explanation. Crucially, however, in 
terms of the latter R2P was not a simply a predominately western-supported idea. It 
benefited from the ‘relative’ support of many African states, including most strongly South 
Africa and Rwanda.1236 To use Bellamy’s word, a shift in ‘attitudes’1237 had been developing 
within the region since the turn of the new Millennium, stimulated by the scars of the 
1990s. The African Union’s Constitutive Act (2000) captured key elements of this shift, 
including the most important provision under article 4(h) of ‘The right of the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave 
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 Indeed, any wish to understand the role of multilateral system in the operationalization of R2P depends 
upon a detailed analysis of how it was developed in this context 
1236
 The word ‘relatively’ was used by an official during a private interview and is important because despite 
general African support it was by no means regarded as being as strong as that of the Europeans, and 
moreover many African states held concerns which directly impacted upon the narrow formulation of R2P 
explained below (22 October 2010) 
1237
 Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p77 
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circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. Though the Act 
was notable for its antinomic contradictions1238 that its overall thrust was about Africa trying 
to take more effective ownership of its problems meant it represented a significant step 
towards potential redress of failings long associated with the region. By 2005 the AU would 
more explicitly articulate its support for R2P through its adoption of ‘The Ezulwini 
Consensus’.1239 The endorsement within this document may have been distinct to what ILF 
proposed – and thus the HLP and ICISS before that – but nevertheless because it was willing 
to refer to the language of R2P and countenance action for the purposes of protecting 
people by the international community, the way the R2P debate was subsequently framed 
aided its prospects for political agreement.  
 
In terms of overall leadership – or rather who was pushing most for the adoption of R2P – it 
was very much Canada and EU states which ‘did the running’1240. But within Africa, on an 
individual basis South Africa and Rwanda were particularly important for helping to shore-
up regional support and indeed support for R2P in general. South Africa’s ambassador 
Dumisani would emerge as a central figure in the negotiations as Chair of the CG, but his 
role throughout would be important to R2P.1241 Amongst African states, Dumisani was the 
leading figure in trying to reinforce and remind them that R2P was ‘about us...about the 
lives of our continent’ and not about the remote prospect of genocide in Western 
capitals.1242 As one official saw it, the sense R2P situations were most likely to happen in 
Africa persuaded a number of African states that some kind of international-level 
agreement on R2P may prove to be in their interest.1243 That said, African support was also 
possible because of real pressures exerted upon their position stemming from the regional 
provision for collective action in the Constitutive Act, and the legacy of the Rwandan 
                                                          
1238
 The most notable of these contradictions is article 4(g): ‘Non-interference by any Member States in the 
internal affairs of another’, African Union (AU) (2000) The Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted 11 
July 2000 
1239
 AU (2005) ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations (“The Ezulwini 
Consensus”), 7-8 March 2005 
1240
 Based on private interviews (22 October 2010, 13 August 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1241
 Despite the view of some that Dumisani’s personal ‘instincts’ lay elsewhere, private interview (22 October 
2010) 
1242
 Interview with Allan Rock: As Rock – who was personally present at one key meeting of African states – 
explained the gist of Dumisani’s ‘powerful intervention’ was that we are not ‘going to find blood on the streets 
of Toronto...so let’s not forget this is about us’. As Rock remarked, Dumisani’s interventions on R2P as ‘very 
effective’ (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1243
 Private interview (22 October 2010) 
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genocide. The combination of these factors made it more difficult for them to not support 
it.1244 On the latter, Rwanda’s strong support and advocacy for R2P gave it an ‘influential 
voice’ in the negotiations – not just regionally but across the membership more broadly. 
Indeed, recalling the Rwandan genocide was a strategy used by advocates in general, 
including Canada, in order to make it very clear what R2P was specifically designed to 
address and why therefore it really mattered. But the fact Rwanda itself was so committed 
to the idea meant there was an ‘unanswerable’ moral weight to R2P advocacy.1245 
 
The combination of these two elements helped the progression of R2P not least because 
they helped reconcile perceptions R2P was a predominantly western doctrine with African 
interests and sentiments. They made it more difficult to oppose the inclusion of R2P in some 
form, and made it easier for advocates to sell the idea to African states. Even though the 
Constitutive Act predated the development of R2P, and thus did not include it in that form, 
because it recognized the need for action in extreme cases advocates were better placed to 
argue that agreement on R2P was in effect about ‘going global’ with a concept the AU had 
to some extent ‘pioneered’.1246 Whether or not many African states truly believed in the 
idea of intervention captured by Article 4(h) that it existed meant advocates could argue 
R2P was not simply concordant with the essence of the article, but effectively an 
extrapolation of it to the broader international context. When combined with other key 
framing strategies, particularly those designed to emphasize R2P represented ‘nothing new’, 
supporters had powerful tools for countering potential hostility. Moreover, because the Act 
had been signed by states particularly hostile to R2P – notably Egypt and Sudan – the ability 
of them to ‘play games’ during the negotiations, was that much more difficult. Certainly 
there is no doubt that Egypt was one of the most hostile states towards R2P (and many 
other issues), and that it projected this hostility in a challengingly negative way.1247 But the 
effect of broad, albeit qualified African support for R2P; the strong committed support of 
Rwanda; and elements of prima facie consistency between R2P – as defined during the 
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 Private interviews (13 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
1245
 It was the ‘unanswerable’ case R2P supporters could repeatedly call upon, interview with Allan Rock 
(Ottawa, 11 June 2009). One UK official also suggested the Rwandan genocide, along with the Constitutive Act, 
made many feel ‘almost obliged’ to support the inclusion of R2P in the Outcome Document, private (22 
October 2010) 
1246
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1247
 Interviews with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), Dirk Jan Van den Berg (telephone, 18 October 2010), 
John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010) and private interviews (25 June 2010, 3 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
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negotiations – and the AU’s own Constitutive Act, all helped to mitigate the extent of this 
opposition. Indeed, peer pressure was a generally evident dynamic throughout the 
negotiations – especially as the pressure to agree something intensified as the Summit 
approached.1248  
 
But like the discussion relating to differences between supporters of the R2P idea, the 
extent of African support was also qualified and defined by a specific conception of what the 
form and scope of R2P should be. In the Ezulwini Consensus, the AU’s expression of R2P was 
revealingly about the use of force, but was framed more explicitly in terms of an 
empowerment of regional organizations to take action. Such action ‘should’ be with SC 
approval, but could also take place with post-hoc authorisation. Additionally, the AU 
position was underpinned by a clear recognition that even though each state had an 
‘obligation’ to protect their citizens, this should not be used as a ‘pretext to undermine the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states’.1249 These two elements would 
transmit into the Summit negotiations but not necessarily on a uniform basis. They 
manifested themselves differently according to the specific motivations, concerns and 
preferences of individual states. The inclusion of a reference to regional organizations in the 
outcome document was certainly strongly pushed by the AU. But for some states their 
concerns about the implications of R2P was more acute than others, and thus their 
motivation for specific language differed accordingly. So whereas including references to 
regional organizations was generally regarded by many states and advocates as ‘pragmatic’, 
the ‘right thing to do’ and an expression of something which ‘would happen anyway’1250 – 
not least because of an increasing regionalization of peace operations – for others its 
inclusion was more important as a way of safeguarding against unwarranted or unwanted 
interference.1251 Within the SC, China and Russia were strongly supportive of a provision for 
regional arrangements recognising the threshold for action would be higher as a result, thus 
solidifying their preferences for a package of measures which ensured there was no built-in 
automaticity to any action pursued for R2P purposes. A more cynical reading may, however, 
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 This pressure was even acknowledged by John Bolton (2007) Surrender Is Not An Option, p210 
1249
 AU (2005) ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations’ 
1250
 Private interview with author (3 August 2010) and interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1251
 As Bellamy points out for some states their main concern was to limit ‘council activism’ rather than accept 
a more ‘pro-active’ regional approach to protecting people (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p80-1, see below 
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see this support as less than a pragmatic recognition of geo-politics and more as a 
convenient way of avoiding/complicating the international role in R2P. Indeed, there are 
also similar concerns surrounding the operationalization of intervention under article 4(h) of 
the AU Constitutive Act and the reference to regional organizations in ‘05 formulation of 
R2P. With the international dimension of R2P qualified in important ways, it is important to 
consider how regionalism might impact upon the engagement and unity of the international 
community. Clearly, this is an example of how broadly accepted language can be 
underpinned by foundational fractures relating to the purpose of its inclusion, and once 
again emphasises why it is necessary to understand how numerous lines of demarcation 
were addressed through multilateral negotiation.  
 
Indeed, the reference to regional organizations was not just pragmatic but was one of a 
series of qualifications or ‘safeguards’1252 designed to reaffirm a continuing commitment to 
Charter principles in the context of real scepticism and unease about a proposed norm 
which some believed could lead to unjustified violations of them. But such safeguards raise 
new questions and concerns about what R2P meant and stands for. There was always going 
to be consequences down the line for/of a formulation which had to accommodate a range 
of alternative positions and preferences. This is certainly born-out by the approach adopted 
here. One of its principal advantages is that it has not only generated a new explanatory 
framework for capturing and understanding the dynamics underpinning R2P’s progression, 
but also ensures that how we understand its form is based upon the detailed political 
negotiations. The combination of these two dimensions is important for two reasons. First, 
because the structured outcome framework differs considerably in terms of its ‘fit’ with 
existing established explanations of normative change, it helps (or should help) dispel the 
misguided propensity to view such change in linear, progressive and predictable terms. 
Troublingly, this propensity has plagued the characterisation of R2P and its development up 
to, and since, 2005. Without a sufficiently sophisticated academic analysis of the processes 
leading to the ‘05 outcome, a more general sense of momentum around the phrase, along 
with the continuing (misguided) ideationally-driven interventions of key advocates, has 
merely served to confuse what R2P means, and what it represents in terms of the 
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 ‘Statement by Ambassador Allan Rock, Canada, at the informal thematic consultations of the GA, Cluster 
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development of international relations, and, more importantly, for protecting civilians. With 
the dynamics of the development up to 2005 anything but linear, progressive, or 
predictable, there is little reason to assume the dynamics of the post-agreement phase 
would not continue to be conditioned, qualified and shaped by those which propelled it to 
institutionalization. As already stated, in explaining the how/why, the structured outcome 
raises significant questions relating to the normative foundations underpinning the 
agreement; the extent to which it represents/signifies change; and therefore what 
operationalization we can really expect from an agreement subject to such questions. 
Second, not only were the dynamics of the agreement distinct, but so R2P’s form was based 
upon a complex effort to overcome multiple competing preferences and interests. Indeed, 
the progression of R2P post-05 was never going to unfold in a linear fashion precisely 
because the formulation of it was subject to so many concerns and competing viewpoints. 
The abovementioned propensity to overstate R2P’s development also stems from an 
insufficient emphasis on how these competing positions came together, or not, during the 
negotiations. Certainly this problem is partly symptomatic of a failure to apply the necessary 
tools for considering this dimension, and the dynamics which enabled the agreement. But it 
is also the result of advocacy – and appropriation. Advocates have tended to define R2P 
according to their own beliefs about its meaning and function which has distorted the more 
complex picture exposed by the negotiations, and by subsequent case-specific crises. Such 
advocacy is generally based upon a fallacy of wishful thinking. However strong one’s moral, 
ethical, ideational or even egotistically-driven convictions may be, they are never a sound 
basis for reason or logic. It is for this reason that the dividing-lines which required the 
introduction of specific safeguards and cognitive frames in order to develop a more 
acceptable form of words are not – however challenging to the positions of advocates – 
‘thrust aside’, but rather are central to the explanatory account of R2P’s meaning.1253 This 
effort to increase our understanding does complicate and confuse the picture in terms of 
potential compliance, but at least ensures any description of R2P is not driven by hope of 
what it should be, but rather by what is really is. In this respect, emphasising the dividing-
lines is important because, put simply, the summit agreement was a compromise 
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 This is taken from a quote by Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, Book IV, 108 (4): ‘their 
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aided/enabled by the specific characteristics of the process. Because of these factors the 
agreement was subject to a number continuing questions relating to R2P’s meaning and 
status as an international norm. When one understands the alternative positions which had 
to be bridged, and the ways the text attempted to do so, it is much more difficult to dismiss 
continuing opposition, debate or concern as simply the product of ‘misunderstanding’1254 or 
overly simplistic accusations of ‘buyer’s remorse’. While elements of both are likely, the 
issues facing R2P are considerably more fundamental, and relate directly to how it emerged 
and was negotiated.1255 
 
That said, with the right tools it is possible to arrive at a clearer understanding of final form 
of R2P and the more solid elements of the agreement. The lines of demarcation, the series 
of introduced safeguards, and the temporal evolution of the draft documents are all part of 
the explanation. What emerges is a picture of R2P which is far less significant – at this stage 
– than often portrayed. The agreement did set-out a broad potential agenda under the R2P 
label, and did realise a significant statement of primary responsibility (arguably the most 
‘value-added’ element of the entire endeavour). But in other ways the agreement poses 
more questions than answers to the issue of addressing mass atrocity crimes, the most 
fundamental of which are: what does it really change about the politics of this task, and 
what change – if any – does it really reflect? These are relevant questions particularly 
considering the oft-repeated references to a collective international R2P – the implication 
being that the agreement was clear about this dimension. In actuality, it was one of the 
most contentious and qualified areas of the text. The P5 was unwilling to accept any 
statement of responsibility/obligation, particularly as its authority was tied exclusively to 
collective action. Meanwhile, many states, especially those from within the NAM, worked to 
ensure that the international scope of R2P was heavily restricted. Indeed, it is most 
revealing, not least because it is so overlooked, that at no point in the R2P text does it refer 
to an “international R2P”, and only once in paragraph 139 (dealing with the role of the 
international community) is the phrase R2P used at all, and only then it is used to emphasis 
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 See Jennifer Welsh on Gareth Evans’ belief that opposition to R2P reflects ‘serious misunderstandings’, 
‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, Ethics & International Affairs, online edition 
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 The differences which existed between states were always inherent to the agreement with some 
addressed better than others, and some left purposefully unanswered or ambiguous in order to maintain a 
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continued GA consideration of it. Self-evidently this point is central to the question of just 
what are the characteristics of R2P as agreed in 2005, and therefore what are its 
characteristics as a norm? The core elements of the agreement were outlined previously, 
and will be unpacked in more detail here. But to do that it is worth 
emphasising/summarising some of the related characteristics which help portray the path to 
agreement, and additionally, why these were necessary. 
 
Most important for understanding the core elements which defined the outcome are the 
general ways the agreement was framed and broadly understood by those involved. Specific 
safeguards and linguistic changes were iteratively introduced to ensure these core elements 
were sufficiently defined in language, and to maintain many of the more significant policy 
red-lines. Although targeted lobbying meant there was differentiation in how R2P was 
packaged to individual states,1256 the formulation of the agreement was defined by some 
universally telling factors relating to what it was, and was not. The most important of these 
was the widespread recognition that the R2P text was a ‘political statement’. It had no legal 
status of itself, and nor did it alter any existing provisions, processes or responsibilities. This 
may appear obvious – after all a GA resolution has no formal/binding legal status. But this 
statement is more significant because the substance of the text – and our analysis of its 
political implications – flow from this starting point. Indeed, it is bound-up with how R2P 
was framed (and defined). Central to this was the idea R2P neither represented, nor was 
itself, a new obligation or innovation. Of all the factors relevant to the complex explanation 
of the processes leading to the agreement, this is the most important in terms of its specific 
formulation. Supporters proved able to successfully convince a large middle-grouping of 
cautious states R2P did not reopen or redefine the Charter; did not impose new 
obligation(s); was not about creating any new rights/responsibilities ‘from scratch’; but was 
about capturing what already existed in Charter or customary international practice. 
Furthermore, with R2P tied to the SC, emphasizing that R2P was not about adopting 
‘trigger(s)’ or about providing a ‘blanket cover’ for international action was equally 
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important for the P5 and a large majority of GA states.1257 The lack of 
operational/implementation automaticity was constantly emphasised, and the text 
specifically drafted according to this requirement. Thus, with R2P sold, defined and broadly 
understood as something which did not break new ground, it is ever more important to 
unpack its meaning as a political statement.1258 It was hoped that packaging existing 
individual state responsibilities, albeit in an arguably more directly pronounced way than 
ever before, and by speaking to the legitimate role of the international community in 
working to support individual states and in some extreme cases to take sterner action 
through the SC, the R2P agreement would help make the atmosphere for dealing with such 
crimes more receptive than had often been the case. This is certainly how individuals 
involved characterised the agreement.1259 These two dimensions were seen as potentially 
significant ‘go-to’ language for reminding states of their responsibilities and which may help 
change the ‘climate’ for international responses. But this change was more ‘cosmetic’ in 
political terms, than fundamental or catalytic.1260  
 
Indeed, this is unsurprising when one considers the (structured outcome) factors which 
helped propel R2P towards agreement, and when a focused analysis of its temporal 
formulation is applied. Because of member state divisions, the very nature of the 
intervention issue and the lack of momentum around the idea pre-2005, it was always 
doubtful that agreement would alter the fundamental politics of the debate. Crucially, the 
language of R2P was notable for what it did not do: it did not cut across existing P5 powers 
or oblige them to do anything; it did not significantly affect the balance between 
sovereignty and intervention; and did not change the existing legal framework. As one 
supportive individual involved in the negotiations suggested, both supporters and sceptics 
alike should concede that R2P ‘didn’t fundamentally change the international legal and 
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 This is based upon a number of private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010, 25 
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 It should be noted that this is obviously not the case for every state. As a reading of the World Summit 
leader’s statements shows, there was significant variation in how some states – particularly those most 
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more about winning the middle ground, and trying to arrive at a formulation which addresses many varied 
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didn’t really change anything’, based upon private interviews (3 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
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 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1260
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political balance on these sorts of issues’.1261 Inevitably, there are consequences which flow 
from this statement and the expanded argument thereof. Certainly concordance is often 
either necessary or beneficial for facilitating normative emergence and change. In this case, 
core framing was designed to show R2P was compatible and complementary with existing 
provisions and processes. So, for instance, by tying R2P to the SC they were able to argue 
R2P was not about expansion, but about recognising pre-existing authority to act under 
Chapter VII, in very limited circumstances where it really ought to be able to act, and which 
were also broadly consistent with emerging SC practice since the end of the CW. However, 
this being just one example of many ways R2P was crafted to guard against fear and 
scepticism by emphasising its fit with what already existed, leads to the previously-
mentioned question about what defines R2P as a norm. Though there are many elements of 
the agreement to unpack, it is hard not escape the conclusion that, at best, the agreement’s 
value-added will stem from its statement of primary responsibility and its contribution to 
the way subsequent responses to specific crises might be framed and structured. However, 
there were/are no guarantees associated with this. And because R2P represented very little 
in terms of political and normative change, how states subsequently dealt with a specific 
(R2P-relevant) crisis would remain subject to the same kind of politics and pressures that 
have always existed. But considering the intervention dilemmas which motivated ICISS’s 
development, that R2P was essentially agreed because it represented nothing new, surely 
means it a far less significant development than oft-portrayed. 
 
Moreover, since 2005 significant effort has gone into trying to defining a broad R2P 
operational agenda.1262 Whether or not this is what the R2P agreement demanded,1263 or 
that there are potential dangers of association between R2P and existing 
protection/prevention initiatives, there is no hiding from the crux issue of coercive 
intervention, and all the complex elements which flow from it. Indeed, if R2P was/is about 
trying to mobilize or catalyse international action, then the process leading to its agreement 
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provided ample evidence of why expectations for this dimension should be particularly 
heavily qualified. This is especially so if the reference point is an apparent ‘responsibility’ of 
the international community. Despite repeated protestations to the contrary, international 
responsibility was not simply purposefully diffuse, but was, in many respects, purposefully 
avoided. It was under-developed precisely because there was minimal buy-in to any attempt 
at agreeing, let alone assigning or specifying, a clear endorsement of an international R2P. 
This becomes clear in the tracking of the specific formulation of Paragraphs 138-140 below. 
But without wishing to entirely discredit the potential prospects of R2P, it is nevertheless 
worth keeping in mind that the intentions around R2P were that it would represent 
something more fundamental than what actually transpired. Unfortunately, since 2005 
troubling disconnects between expectation, and what we might reasonably expect from 
R2P, have opened-up and gathered momentum. Fuelled by advocacy, the tendency to 
overstate its development has relegated competing normative ideas – despite their 
continued strength and impact upon how we should understand R2P’s place in the complex 
web of international normativity; underestimated the continuing complexity of determining 
policy responses to specific situations; and all too often overlooked just what the processes 
leading to 2005 actually reveals about how the agreement relates to the first two and R2P’s 
‘operationalization’. Indeed, the overused propensity to seek and reference 
‘operationalization’ without a more nuanced appreciation of the politics involved is not only 
of itself damaging, but also compounds the potential damage to R2P’s future prospects each 
time a crisis comes along, or new effort to develop the concept is made, and exposes the 
controversies and limitations which defined its agreement.  
 
Interestingly, none of this was lost on those actively involved in crafting the R2P text. As one 
Canadian official commented, with the text the product of serious compromises, it was 
understood that its ‘practical consequences’ would take many years to take effect.1264 This 
was mirrored by other individuals involved. For instance, one emphasized the ‘fragility’ of 
the agreement, pointing to the inbuilt dilemma of its future use because of its ‘marginal’ 
impact upon the underlying politics. Essentially this meant if you deployed the language of 
R2P and it failed you devalue it, but if you do not deploy it for fear of the political and 
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practical consequences it raises the question of what is the point of having it at all.1265 Such 
questions were also buttressed by a straightforward recognition that however much they 
attempted to define an ‘R2P situation’ and the tools which might be applied to prevent it, at 
all stages R2P would depend upon political agreement as had always been the case prior to 
it.1266  
 
That said, because political consensus around the inclusion of R2P was difficult to extract, 
the crafting of the text took on far greater specificity as the process unfolded. Compared to 
the first draft on the 3rd June, the final outcome three months later was considerably more 
developed. This process was defined by a mix of dilution, conceptual narrowing and a 
tightening of language. From August onwards, R2P’s linguistic structure began to assume a 
more coherent shape, and the extent of specific changes began to reflect the need to 
overcome member state dividing-lines. Indeed, these dividing-lines underpin our 
understanding of why the drafts altered in significant ways during the six month process. In 
particular, they speak to the series of safeguards and specific qualifications introduced to 
accommodate firmly held red-lines, but also to help allay the many ‘middle-ground’ 
concerns which were arguably more important to address for an outcome to be achieved. It 
is worth reiterating the point that the 2005 negotiations represented the first time R2P was 
an actively discussed agenda-item within the UN system. Rather inevitably therefore, its 
definition was always going to be contentious, and resultantly limited to maintain sufficient 
state acceptance. The characteristics of the negotiation of R2P were well captured by van 
den Berg. As he explained, its path was defined by significant ‘shaping and reshaping of the 
text in order to make it palatable…to most member states’. This was backed-up by Rock’s 
similar, but more broadly contextual, summation:  
 
As January 2004 became September 2005 I went through a process in which some 
things were thrown overboard, others were diluted, still others were added that 
weren’t originally intended in order to meet opposition, dull the criticism, make the 
thing more attractive, increase our chances of getting it accepted.1267 
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The dynamics captured by Rock are evident from a micro-perspective of the textual changes 
made during the negotiations. Some of these changes were prima facie very small, but were 
all part of an overall effort to ensure R2P was defined in such a way so as to reduce the 
prospects of outright opposition to its inclusion.1268 Accordingly, unpacking the agreement 
reveals a number of interwoven layers. The first layer consists of the broad core elements of 
what the agreement should represent, which, as stated above, included: primary 
responsibility; the legitimate concern of the international community in very limited 
circumstances (the so-called four-crime formulation); a reiteration of existing processes; and 
no new obligations/responsibilities. The second layer relates more specifically to the three 
structural dimensions of R2P which built-upon these core elements. These consisted of: 
primary state responsibility; the responsibility of the international community to help, 
support and assist individual states in realising that responsibility and; a preparedness to 
take collective action through the SC should peaceful means be insufficient. Self-evidently 
these layers were heavily bound-up with the framing, advocacy and lobbying strategies 
deployed by supportive states. However, the structural dimensions are particularly 
important because they provided the framework from which the detailed language and 
safeguards stemmed. As already stated, it was not until August that the text began to take 
on the shape necessary to give meaning to the two layers described. But by the final 
outcome the language was significantly refined and tightened. Thus, it is the third layer 
where the real meat of the agreement can be found. Across each structural dimension a 
series of specific references, safeguards, inclusions (and deletions) were crafted and re-
crafted to ensure R2P’s substance matched how it was broadly framed. Some of these were 
evident in each draft outcome. For instance, collective action ‘through the SC’, the four-
crimes of ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’, primary 
responsibility, and references to regional organizations and 
diplomatic/humanitarian/peaceful means were consistent lines in each draft from June-
September. However, each of these would undergo significant specific and associated 
changes as the need to keep R2P conceptually narrow became increasingly acute. Indeed, 
the two most important aspects of this related to the parameters and authority for R2P’s 
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application. To keep the threshold-bar high, and the definitional scope of R2P ‘narrowly 
focused’,1269 the four-crime formulation be one of the primary mechanisms for addressing 
member state concerns. Moreover, aside from significant increased repetition of the four-
crime language, additional changes were introduced in parallel with the requirement for SC 
authority, but without treading on non-negotiable P5 prerogatives. These included 
introducing a higher test threshold of ‘manifest failure’ rather than ‘unable or unwilling’, the 
removal of any reference to veto-restraints, and a pragmatic (but significant) reference to 
the ‘case-by-case’ basis of SC decision-making which complimented regional 
consultation/cooperation. Furthermore, primary responsibility was strengthened to include 
the prevention of R2P-crimes. The international dimension was diluted to limit its 
responsibility, whilst at the same time its primary role of helping and assisting individual 
states to uphold their responsibility was strengthened. Finally, the agreement confirmed a 
clause locking-in future GA consideration of R2P.1270 
 
Charting the development of each and every specific piece of language would undoubtedly 
strengthen the picture and argument presented here. However, because of inevitable 
constraints, it would be impossible to include such an additional weight of narrative 
explanation.1271 Instead a briefer – but nevertheless committed – temporal account of the 
process from the initial draft in June, to the final outcome in September will provide a 
clearer sense of how the individual elements outlined developed into the overall 
composition of R2P. But to give full expression to this development it is vital that we situate 
                                                          
1269
 The full quote was as ‘narrowly focused as possible’, private interview (22 October 2010) 
1270
 Though the clause of GA consideration was evident in each and every draft, both its position, and whether 
or not it should be temporally qualified, was not determined until September, see Boxes 5.3-5.10 
1271
 It is important to note that an additional analysis of the key elements of the text and debates around R2P 
would require at least an additional twenty thousand words. In preparation for this chapter a series of 
documents were produced to enable a better understanding of the development of the text through the 
negotiations. This involved analysing the ‘form and framing’ of the agreement, and specific analysis of 
individual parts of the text which were evident during the negotiations. These included: the ‘four-crime 
formulation’; the reference to ‘case-by-case’; ‘refrain from the veto’; the phrase ‘R2P’; ‘through the SC’; 
‘prevention, incitement, international assistance/help’; ‘GA consideration’; ‘regional 
organizations/arrangements’ and ‘support for the UN Action Plan to Prevent Genocide/support for the mission 
of the UN Special Adviser’. An incomplete draft of the tracking-based analysis came to over twenty thousand 
words. Additionally, it is important to recognise that the research basis for this chapter, and these analyses, 
included over seventy thousand words of interview extracts; seventy thousand words of documentary extracts 
from relevant 2005 documents (including some released under FOI), and dozens of additional email exchanges 
designed to increase knowledge of very specific issues. A post-doctoral project would seek to incorporate this 
kind of rolling-narrative analysis into an expanded version of this chapter, likely in separately defined sub-
sections 
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it within a sketch of the principal dividing-lines, concerns, preferences and interests which 
underpinned, shaped and propelled the negotiations. It is these factors – defined by a 
combination of long-standing policy divisions, legacies and beliefs, and more immediate, 
negotiation-specific positions – which set the backdrop, tone and basis, for what followed, 
and ultimately for what was agreed. In this case, particularly striking was just how largely 
unchanged many of the key the policy divergences between states were. The legacy of past 
debates and past crises, exacerbated by the potent, toxic post-911 context and the specific 
legacy of Iraq, not only helped frame the subsequent negotiations, but had a more 
fundamental pre-structuring effect on the positions of states.  
 
The negotiations, not just around R2P, but in general, exposed what van den Berg 
insightfully characterises as the ‘self-propelling’ UN system which works to ensure 
‘traditional views remain intact’. Unsurprisingly, the negotiations were anything but 
transformational. Concomitantly, for all its ambitiousness, the reform agenda ran into the 
‘old reflexes’ held by many states.1272 Indeed, though the characteristics of the process 
helped dampen down the extent to which these disrupted R2P’s path, their effect on its 
shape and parameters are undeniable. These reflexes and legacies manifested themselves in 
numerous ways and for the first time since 1999/2000, states had an opportunity 
(unwanted for some) to give expression to them. But with all reflexes requiring a stimulus, 
R2P provoked specific concerns because it strayed onto objectionable territory for many 
states. Many of the most pronounced of these concerns stemmed from fundamental 
questions relating to sovereignty. Though R2P was about emphasizing individual sovereign 
responsibilities already expressed in existing legal instruments, the idea of expanding, 
transmitting, or assigning responsibility to the international community beyond existing 
Charter process and provision was an anathema for many.  
 
Thus, a series of more specific fissures relating to the potential consequences of R2P 
branched from this central question about its international dimension. In broad terms, the 
Canadian officials had identified three principal fault-lines, or to use Rock’s words ‘three 
categories of opponents’. These included those concerned for their own regime security for 
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 Interview with Dirk Jan van den Berg (telephone, 18 October 2010) 
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fear they may be next in line for intervention; those who, despite being ‘well-governed and 
well-intended’, were worried about ‘leaving…discretion whether to invade to a small group 
in New York dominated by a few powerful states’; and then thirdly the P5 powers who 
dislike ‘the idea of attaching conditions or criteria to what is now an unfettered discretion to 
decide what to do and when’.1273 Hence, there were many concerns about the impact of 
R2P on norms of non-intervention, non-interference, the UN Charter, territorial integrity 
and sovereign equality. For some, R2P was inconsistent and contradictory with such 
principles, and therefore undesirable, whereas for others R2P was unnecessary because 
sufficient scope for responding to mass atrocities already existed. In either case it was clear 
that any agreement of R2P would have to be carefully delineated. Additional offshoots of 
these concerns were equally problematic, and influential. With Iraq heightening long-
standing sensitivities around unilateralism, R2P drew concern about its relationship with 
humanitarian intervention and about its potential use as a pretext for abusive interventions 
contrary to R2P’s apparent intentions. Concern about the politicization of dealing with 
human rights issues, and the militarization of responses to them – especially by the most 
powerful states – were high-up the list of concerns expressed by states. Indeed, the 
high/narrow threshold of the agreement was supplemented with detailed references to the 
international community’s ‘soft side’ role in working to support individual states precisely 
because of fears relating to an accelerated shift towards military action as the default, or 
ultimately inevitable eventual response to a specific crisis.1274 Of particular concern was the 
potential slippery slope whereby R2P could be applied and then used to pursue military 
objectives driven not so much by the specific human rights abuses, but by strategic 
calculations relating to regime change. Moreover, nervousness about the relationship 
between R2P and the use of force was also a prescient reminder of the impossibility of 
detaching any crisis – however severe – from its political and strategic context. Here the 
doctrine of unintended consequences is an inescapable dilemma which was always likely to 
affect the future implementation and development of a norm like R2P.1275 Indeed, these 
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 Allan Rock (2005) ‘Reforming the United Nations: Canada’s Objectives for Change’, Notes for an address by 
Ambassador Allan Rock, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, 29 January 2005. These 
broad lines were certainly implicitly and explicitly backed-up in numerous interviews 
1274
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1275
 There is significant evidence that the use of R2P in the context of the Libya crisis of 2011 has indeed 
impacted upon the subsequent reaction of the SC to the crisis in Syria. But rather than portraying it as purely a 
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problems are about more than operationalization. They speak more directly to the very 
principle of R2P, challenging the teleological assumptions associated with an idea intended 
to address mass atrocities. Hence, in response to these kinds of practical and ethical 
debates, another dimension of the agreement was about ensuring R2P did not define any 
automatic triggers for action, and was thus always underpinned by the pragmatic case-by-
case qualification. Clearly many of these concerns were corollaries of each other, 
complicating the question of how R2P could help enable better responses to mass atrocities 
without setting-off alarm bells amongst those needed to accept agreement of it. Certainly 
underpinning these varied concerns were varied motivations ranging from genuine and 
reasonable scepticism, to more self-interested concerns for self-preservation. Indeed, it is 
important to not simply dismiss the range of concerns expressed as the product of 
misunderstanding, or cynical manipulation. Why? Because first, and most straightforwardly, 
it was these very concerns which led to a formulation focused on the ensuring the scope, 
parameters and clarity of R2P (which themselves were a constant concern) was narrow and 
tightly defined.1276 Second, concerns about the consequences of a norm like R2P were also 
bound-up with more fundamental questions about the nature and development of 
international society. In this regard, normative contestation was a far more prominent 
factor in the negotiations precisely because R2P provoked questions about its potential 
effect upon norms of non-interference/intervention and sovereign equality. The crafting of 
such a state-centric formulation was about trying to limit this effect. Many states were 
willing to accept individual responsibility because it reaffirmed state sovereignty and limited 
the role of the international community. And with many fearing R2P as a method for further 
advancing a power-based hierarchy in international affairs it is unsurprising that states 
would seek to assert those above-mentioned norms in response.1277  
 
Ironically, however, this led to an uneasy settlement whereby one of the principal means for 
limiting R2P was to tie any related collective action to existing processes through the SC. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
problem of implementation/operationalization, one should see both as more fundamentally exposing the basis 
and context of a norm like R2P 
1276
 This is particularly important because the result of this too often fails to match-up to the many 
assumptions about what R2P means 
1277
 Indeed as one prominent UN figure remarked in email, those suspicious of international action in favour of 
R2P will be more ready to proclaim their individual responsibility, if not necessarily implement it (private) 
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Despite a complex and ‘at times contentious’1278 relationship between the GA and the SC 
this approach was a necessary evil for fear of the consequences of leaving the question of 
collective action open and ambiguous. Thus, Welsh’s use of the idiomatic expression ‘better 
the devil you know than the devil you don’t’ is an entirely appropriate descriptor of the 
dynamics in this case.1279 However, the uneasy settlement this represented was about more 
than the GA-SC relationship. Tying R2P to the SC was but one measure designed to guard 
against the fears outlined above. It was complemented by the removal of any statement of 
an international-R2P, the introduction of ‘manifest failure’ to further tighten the four-crime 
formulation, and by other qualifications designed to ensure there was no automaticity or 
newly developed international obligations/responsibilities beyond helping states fulfil their 
own. The problem with all this, was that with states not wanting to see any expansion of 
Charter provisions and seeking to avoid the possibility of increased unilateralism, R2P was 
tied to the SC, which because of P5 opposition was itself unwilling to sign up to anything 
that might restrict or alter its pre-existing room to manoeuvre. Thus, from both the 
perspective of the GA and the SC the agreement was underpinned by consensus that R2P 
would not fundamentally change the status quo in terms of how the international 
community deals with specific crises. As stated, it was hoped that R2P as a political 
statement could ‘help in future debates on action at the hard end of the scale’ perhaps by 
making it ‘easier for the SC to fulfill its responsibilities and…promote burden-sharing’.1280 
But considering this chapter’s overall argument, this was optimistic at best. Moreover, 
although there was arguably no alternative to the SC (the consequences potentially far 
more damaging and politically impossible in any case) it did mean that the ICISS effort to 
elaborate on how action might be possible vis-à-vis the twin-dilemmas of Rwanda and 
Kosovo was left-behind by a political unwillingness to even consider the debate in this 
way.1281 Furthermore, compounding this uneasy mix were questions around R2P’s so-called 
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 David Malone (2007) ‘Security Council’ in Weiss, Thomas G. and Daws, Sam The Oxford Handbook on the 
United Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p118 
1279
 Welsh (2010) ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’, Ethics & International Affairs, online edition 
1280
 This was an argument made by a UK diplomat in an ‘E-gram to FCO London regarding UK bilateral meeting 
with US State Department Representatives on 29 April 2005’, 3 May 2005 
1281
 The impetus for the establishment of ICISS was not matched during the negotiations hence the direction of 
travel was overwhelmingly about limiting R2P’s scope impact rather than about genuinely debating how R2P 
might help address the problems which originally inspired it. It should be noted however that past events in 
Rwanda, Srebrenica were deployed by those involved in the negotiations, and supportive of R2P, to try and 
overcome differences between states, Private interviews, see also Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 
p13 
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‘emerging’ status as an international norm.1282 Accusations in this regard revolved around 
whether R2P had been sufficiently discussed and considered,1283 repeated suggestions 
throughout the process that it did not command broad understanding or support 
particularly because the idea of R2P was not created within the context of the GA.1284 
 
This summary of the key dividing-lines between states provides a revealing sense of the 
obstacles facing agreement on R2P. Crucially, they demonstrate why the agreement was 
predicated upon the core elements previously identified, exposing what was possible and 
what might be possible if the fine print was precisely dealt with. Inevitably some of these 
cross-membership dividing-lines were easier to address than others – either because some 
were more fundamental than others or because the state(s) involved in resisting the idea 
were especially intransigent. Indeed, the latter point is significant because there was a 
recognised need amongst key supporters that there was a distinction between overt 
hostility and genuinely held scepticism and fear. Allan Rock was particularly alive to this 
distinction recognising that ‘respect and patience’ was necessary just as much as the specific 
changes to address the concerns expressed by states.1285 Thus, in understanding the 
formulation it is vital to keep in mind that the effort to arrive at an acceptable solution 
depended upon a combination of form, framing and personal diplomacy. The process from 
April-September was about testing what consensus existed between states, and conversely 
the areas where consensus would be unachievable. In this regard the relationship between 
R2P’s evolving form, and the largely consistent frames deployed by supporters, is most 
important. As already stated, there was early diplomatic awareness of where common 
ground might lie as best-captured by an UK e-gram dated 3 May: 
 
I argued that there was some common ground between (the UK) and many other UN 
members: (i) that Governments were primarily responsible for protecting their own 
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 HLP (2004) A more secure world: Our shared responsibility, para.203 
1283
 Based on private interviews (3 August 2010, 22 October 2010) and: this line of argument was disputed by 
some supporters, see for instance ‘Comments by the New Zealand Representative, at the Informal Meeting of 
the Plenary of the High-level Meeting of the GA’, 28 July-2 August 2005 
1284
 Private interview (3 August 2010) 
1285
 Interview with Allan Rock: ‘I always felt that I had to show a great deal of respect and patience for these 
concerns among Ambassadors who were motivated in good faith’ recognising that if he was in their situation, 
in a world which was ‘vulnerable to global forces that favour the wealthy and the powerful I’d have hesitation, 
I’d want to define it as narrowly as possible, and that’s what we really tried to do, we tried to meet the 
genuine concerns of those who spoke in good faith’ (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
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civilians (ii) that there was a case for the International Community to act where 
Governments were incapable or unwilling to do so (iii) that, where tools at the 
disposal of the Security Council might be required (e.g. sanctions or use of force), 
these situations should be considered on a case-by-case basis – i.e. there could be no 
implied obligation to act.1286 
 
But even with these core elements pointing to where agreement might lie, consensus was 
‘difficult to extract’ at all stages of the process.1287 Quite simply the detailed language would 
affect the balance within, and between, each dimension. Therefore, the negotiations not 
only exposed the positions of states but also tested them as efforts were made to craft 
acceptable language. Consequently, the iterative production of the drafts should be viewed 
as an attempt to reflect perceived consensus1288 whilst also providing a basis for subsequent 
negotiation.1289 But with this difficulty, those attempting to facilitate R2P’s path needed to 
be flexible in their outlook, willing to accommodate change, and to back-up their support 
with carefully crafted cognitive frames. Apart from an early, limited and largely unsuccessful 
Canadian dalliance with human security as a way of selling R2P,1290 the frames deployed by 
advocates were consistently strong in projecting R2P as ‘pro-sovereignty’ norm which 
‘strengthened’ sovereignty rather than undermine it. This was consistent with the argument 
that R2P – either in terms of primary responsibility, or its qualified international dimension – 
represented nothing more than an extrapolation/reflection of pre-existing agreements. This 
was further reinforced by repeated assertions that aside from being primarily about 
individual states, R2P was about prevention, assistance and support rather than military 
intervention and/or unwarranted interference. Meanwhile, insofar as R2P was about 
enshrining the idea sovereignty could not be seen as an absolute barrier to international 
action – including under ChVII – repeated emphasis was placed upon the four-crime 
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 ‘E-gram to FCO London regarding UK bilateral meeting with US State Department Representatives’, 3 May 
2005 
1287
 This phrase is from Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes?, p13, see also Traub (2006) The Best 
Intentions, p359-366 
1288
 Albeit rather unsuccessfully as Part 1 of this chapter showed 
1289
 This is an important point relating to the misunderstanding of the process tackled especially in Part 1. 
There was no settled consensus about the form and content of the R2P section until the last moments of the 
process. For instance, as an update by the GA Spokesman made clear the draft of the 6
th
 September was both 
an attempt to reflect ‘the current state of play and…serve as a basis for further negotiations among Member 
States’, ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary-General’, 6 September 2005 
1290
 Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes?, p11-12, see also the use of human security in Canada’s (2005) 
‘International Policy Statement – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World’, 19 April 2005, p11 
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formulation to try to limit the possibility of R2P being used for other purposes.1291 Indeed, 
though this formulation was prevalent throughout the negotiations of the text, the amount 
of times it appeared increased from just one reference in the initial June 3rd draft, to a total 
of six by the 13th September. This repetition was fundamental to the effort of ensuring the 
definitional parameters of R2P were narrow with a ‘very high threshold’.1292 Ultimately this 
was about trying to ‘conceptually and politically insulate’ R2P from controversies around 
Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo.1293 Most significantly, any reference to R2P in the final text 
was always accompanied (read qualified) by the four-crime formulation. At no point did the 
phrase R2P stand alone, and even more revealingly, at no point was the R2P phrase used in 
relation to the role of the international community. Supporters had wanted the agreement 
to more directly state the international community had a R2P, but were unable to because 
of immovable NAM opposition to such an explicit statement.1294 It is vital this is not 
overlooked, not only because there are consequences which flow from this reality, but 
because there were political reasons why such an inclusion was unachievable. Thus, the 
overall effort was about trying to package R2P as a ‘self-evident’ political development 
which to block/oppose would represent an effective endorsement of such gross crimes of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing.1295  
 
Effectively there were numerous mutually-reinforcing framing narratives around R2P. It was 
primarily about individual states. Was narrow in its application/parameters, but also 
necessarily broad in the potential range of tools available to help support and assist states 
to realize their responsibility. All this was bound-together by a reiteration of existing 
processes. International responses prior to ChVII were to be pursued ‘through the UN’ or to 
‘support the UN’, with those towards the more coercive/non-consensual end of the 
spectrum firmly embedded within the auspices of the SC.1296 Finally, reference to any 
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 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
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 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) and private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 
22 October 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1293
 Private interview (22 October 2010) 
1294
 Private interviews, one individual close to the negotiations was very explicit about the lack of any 
statement of an “international responsibility to protect” (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010) 
1295
 Private interview (25 June 2010): this point was made on a number of occasions during interviews. It is also 
unsurprising therefore that running alongside this were numerous references to Rwanda and Srebrenica to try 
and bring states together on the inclusion of R2P, see Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes?, p13 
1296
 UN (2005) World Summit Outcome, paras.138-139 
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international responsibility was evident only in the pre-ChVII phase, and only then was 
assigned to the UN as an expression of a responsibility ‘to help’. By contrast ChVII measures 
were defined merely by a ‘preparedness’ to act collectively, and only on a case-by-case 
basis. These limitations were unsurprising because ensuring the character of the 
international dimension was distinct from that of the individual state dimension was a 
priority issue for many member states.1297 In light of the previously described divisions, this 
overall package was entirely necessary even if arriving at it was a complex affair. Indeed, 
from the outset the mere placing of the R2P section in the draft documents provoked 
concern. Through each draft R2P was situated in the section on ‘Human Rights and the Rule 
of Law’. This had the benefit of detaching it from the use of force paragraphs1298 but the 
reverse effect was that by situating it alongside the highly controversial human security and 
amongst human rights measures generally, concerns were raised that R2P would contribute 
to the politicization of international responses in this area.1299 This did not mean, however, 
that the parallel negotiations on the use of force paragraphs were realistically separate from 
R2P.1300 Aside from successful efforts to reaffirm pre-existing Charter provisions for 
addressing threats to international peace and security, the resulting paragraphs were 
revealing for the removal of any reference to the proposed criteria/principles for the use of 
force (Box5.1). It was certainly not surprising that within the negotiations they ‘flew very 
briefly and very weakly’.1301  
 
                                                          
1297
 This was most explicitly made by the US in Bolton ‘United States Proposals: Responsibility to Protect’, 
Letter to Ambassadorial Colleagues on the Responsibility to Protect, 30 August 2005 
1298
 The use of force paragraphs were situated in Part III of the draft outcome documents which were divided 
into four parts: I. ‘Values and Principles’; II. ‘Development’; III. ‘Peace and Collective Security’; and IV. ‘Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law’ 
1299
 See Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes?, p11-12 
1300
 In the final outcome document the use of force ‘under the Charter of the UN’ was dealt with in paras.77-80 
1301
 Private interview (13 August 2010) 
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As Dauth remarks, criteria were never a serious proposition from ‘day one’.1302 Canada 
expressed its support, including by explicitly tying the ‘effective implementation’ of R2P to 
agreement on guidelines.1303 But ultimately it did not overcommit to a proposal which 
revealed too many unbridgeable variations in the positions and underlying motivations of 
states. Consequently, negotiations around guidelines oft-described as a necessary 
addendum to R2P were of nominal substance. France and the UK were more flexible.1304 But 
by contrast, the remaining P5 were especially resistant to moves in this area, even if Russia 
attempted to appear ‘virtuous’1305 by expressing ‘on the whole’ support for the HLP 
guidelines so long as they did not ‘compromise the [SC’s] ability to take relevant decisions in 
specific decisions’.1306 Essentially this position was a product of political calculation (aware 
that they were not going to be accepted in any case) and enhanced sensitivity post-Iraq to 
limit any moves towards unilateralism.1307 In actuality, however, the differences between 
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 Interview with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010) 
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 Statement by Mr. Rock, Canada, 5225
th
 meeting of SC, 12 July 2005, S/PV.5225, p31, see also: Pierre 
Pettigrew (2005) Notes for an address to the 61
st
 Session of the Commission on Human Rights, 14 March 2005; 
Statement by Mr. Rock, Canada, 8 April 2005, A/59/PV.89, p27; Statement by Allan Rock, Canada, at the 
informal thematic consultations of the GA, Cluster III: Freedom to live in dignity, 20 April 2005.  
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 The UK was the most open in continuing its advocacy of the framework laid-down by Blair’s Chicago 
Speech, see (FCO) (2004) The United Kingdom in the United Nations, p63 
1305
 This was how one P5 official described the curious Russian position which was nevertheless far more 
nuanced than described by Bellamy (2009) Responsibility to Protect, p85 (email, 23 September 2011) 
1306
 ‘Statement by Andrey Denisov, Russia on the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change’, 31 January 2005, ‘at the informal UNGA meeting on the reports of the High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change and of the Millennium Project’, 22 February 2005, ‘Statement’, A/59/PV.87, 7 April 
2005; ‘Statement at informal UNGA consultations on the draft outcome document’, 22 June 2005 
1307
 Though often seen as being opposed to criteria because they might enable interventions rather than 
constrain them, apparent Russian support was about more than simple yes/no considerations. In this case, the 
overall context of Russia’s position was designed to safeguard against any further erosions to the authority of 
the SC. Thus it repeatedly argued force could only be authorised by the SC or under the right to self-defence 
Box 5.1: Criteria/guidelines for the Use of Force through each Draft Outcome Document 
 
3 June 2005: 47. We recognize the need to continue discussing principles for the use of force, as identified by the 
Secretary-General, and that such principles should be among the factors considered by the Security Council in deciding to 
authorize the use of force as provided under the Charter. 
 
22 July 2005: 76. We recognize the need to continue discussing principles for the use of force, as identified by the 
Secretary-General.  
 
5/10 August 2005: 56. We recognize the need to continue discussing principles for the use of force, including those 
identified by the Secretary-General.  
 
6 September 2005: 67. [We recognize the need to continue discussing [principles] [criteria for consideration] for the use 
of force, including those identified by the Secretary-General.] 
 
12 September 2005: 67. [We recognize the need to continue discussing criteria for consideration for the use of force, 
including those identified by the Secretary-General.] 
 
13 September 2005: Removed 
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the P5 are/were more subtle and indistinguishable than often-presented.1308 All, for 
instance, were united by unwillingness to countenance triggers, automaticity or any changes 
which might constrain or enable their existing scope of action. Hence the UK position was 
about aiding the decision-making process in the context of a continuing commitment to 
case-by-case responses. China and the US were the most openly opposed to criteria and for 
similar reasons if not necessarily similar motives. Both argued that criteria could not be 
developed ‘in the abstract’1309 whilst reiterating the SC’s pre-existing authority to determine 
an appropriate course of action in a specific case. China’s position was more acutely driven 
by a concern criteria might actually enable further subjectively-based interventions pursed 
outside the SC whereas for the US its opposition to criteria was consistent with a firm 
unwillingness to accept any constraints on its freedom to manoeuvre. There were also many 
other nuanced arguments both for and against criteria, with some of the more reasonable 
concerns/criticisms mirroring the previous analysis of ICISS’s proposals in this area.1310 But 
with the P5 positions as they were, with NAM opposition to even the 22 July proposal that 
states continue to discuss such principles, and with some GA positions only likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and in so doing sought to tie the proposed criteria to an effort to curb (US) unilateralism and the use of force 
in general. Indeed, Russia would even argue that the use of force section should be renamed ‘Principles on 
non-use of force’. So while it is very much open to question whether Russia really supported criteria – and very 
few really believed they did – it is nevertheless interesting to understand it in terms of the broader thrust of its 
efforts to narrow the scope of R2P, and to protect the prerogatives of the SC 
1308
 This is perhaps especially true when one compares Russia and the US where the differences are often 
excessively polarised in characterisation. As Greenstock commented, if you ‘scratch beneath the skins of a 
Russian and American at the same moment you find them equally resistant to being constrained or vulnerable 
to global governance or multi-lateral action’. In other words, whereas Russia may generally wish to diminish 
the prospects for international interventions, and block any proposed mechanisms enabling action outside the 
SC (which would diminish its influence as a P5 member) it does not necessarily follow that it will bind itself in 
such a way (Chipping Norton, 8 June 2010) 
1309
 This was a phrase used by the US, see: ‘United States Proposals: Responsibility to Protect’, Letter from John 
R. Bolton to Ambassadorial Colleagues on the Responsibility to Protect, 30 August 2005. Similarly, China argued 
that ‘it is both unrealistic and hugely controversial to formulate a “one-fits-all” rule or criterion on the use of 
force. Whether to use force or not should be decided by the Security Council in light of the reality of conflicts 
on a case-by-case basis’, ‘Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the UN Reforms’, 7 June 2005 
1310
 Unfortunately it is not possible to include a detailed analysis of the discussions around criteria/principles 
here. A four-thousand word analysis was drafted in preparation for this chapter and would be incorporated 
into a future extended publication of this thesis. However, in terms of discussion and member state comment, 
it is worth pointing out that documentary research revealed many countries expressed positions on the matter 
including: China (27 January), the USA (17 August), Russia (31 January, 22 February, 7 April, 22 June), Canada 
(29 January, 8 April, 20 April, 16 September), the EU (19 June), the Group of Friends for the Reform of the UN 
(6-7 May), San Marino (6 April), Liechtenstein (7 April), Poland (8 April), Malaysia (20 April, 1 July), the HSN (18-
20 May), Norway (21 June), the NAM (29 July), the DRC (16 September), Pakistan (6 April); Algeria (6 April); 
Chile (6 April); Singapore (19 April) Bangladesh (19 April), Sweden (19 April) (see bibliography) 
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exacerbate P5 resistance, any textual reference to them was gradually eroded until their 
complete removal on the 13 September.1311  
 
With states unable to agree to even continue discussing criteria, it was no surprise that a 
proposal for P5 veto restraint was equally resistant to political agreement.  
 
 
 
Unlike the criteria issue, this proposal was tackled within the direct context of the R2P 
section with associated language appearing in two drafts on the 5/10 August and the 6 
September. But rather than representative of consensus, or even discussion of the idea, 
these inclusions are more interesting for what they say about the process than the 
substance. Even with the HLP’s endorsement of the idea there was very little serious 
discussion not least because it was widely understood that the P5 would unanimously reject 
it. Indeed, as Rock commented, it was made clear to him ‘very early on’ by the US and the 
UK that the veto proposal was ‘not going to happen’.1312 There was some debate within UK 
policy-making circles about the idea, but ultimately the opposition outweighed any 
support.1313 Moreover, with China, Russia and the US ‘adamant’ there would be no 
                                                          
1311
 Box 5.1 shows how the text changed over the course of the negotiations. However, consistent with the 
arguments relating to the process through this chapter, it wasn’t until the 6 September that the draft reflected 
the true state of play in this area. The brackets denoted a lack of agreement about the entire sentence, and 
because of there was no consensus there was no option but to remove it from the final draft on the 13
th
 
1312
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010): this was confirmed 
in private interviews with relevant officials/diplomat (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010) 
1313
 Private interview with author (22 October 2010): Within the FCO, debate on this matter opened up 
differences (rather crudely) between legal advisers on the one side, and (some) policy-makers and special-
advisers on the other. The latter were apparently more receptive to the proposal, with the former apparently 
‘very conservative and very opposed’. But as a general policy the UK was always weighed against such a 
proposal, preferring instead to focus on achieving ‘consensus through negotiation’ as a 2008 R2P-related FCO 
project would put it. 
Box 5.2: The Veto Proposal through each Draft Outcome Document 
3 June 2005: No mention 
 
22 July 2005: No mention  
 
5/10 August 2005: 119/120. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in 
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
 
6 September 2005: [129. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in 
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.] 
 
12 September 2005: Removed 
 
13 September 2005: No mention 
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movement any supportive voices within the GA were swimming against an impossible tide. 
All three were ultimately willing to allow R2P through because the formulation was based 
upon principles which did not fundamentally alter the existing state of play. In this regard, 
they were unwilling to accept anything which might undermine their P5 prerogatives, or 
impose additional obligations or responsibilities upon them. For the US especially, agreeing 
to R2P was acceptable insofar as it did not materially increase or decrease its national ‘room 
to manoeuvre’.1314 Thus, on the record GA statements relating to the veto proposal are hard 
to come by with just a handful of states publically supportive of the idea.1315 Most vocally 
supportive were Switzerland, Peru and Costa Rica with all arguing the idea would strengthen 
the SC’s implementation of R2P.1316  
 
In these circumstances, the inclusion of standalone language inviting the P5 to ‘refrain from 
using the veto’ said more about the process than any emerging political traction amongst 
the constituency which ultimately mattered most for its agreement. In particular, the 5 
August language was fed-into the draft purely at the request of just one member state 
demonstrating the above-described weaknesses in the negotiation process even at this late 
stage.1317 Inevitably, this language provoked an immediate response as demonstrated by an 
internal FCO email sent on the 10 August. This communicated ‘concerns over the new 
language…on restraints on the veto’ pointing out that ‘other P5 will no doubt agree’.1318 
Even more inevitably, the language was thereafter bracketed in the 6 September draft and 
then completely removed by the 12 September.  
 
                                                          
1314
 Private interview (22 October 2010) 
1315
 That is, based upon the available records. Generally speaking there was differentiation as to what its 
purpose would be. On the one hand, a ‘like-minded liberal constituency’ were attracted by its application to 
extreme cases and because of a commitment to achieving a more rules-based international system regulating 
the use of force. Alternatively, there was another group whose attraction to the idea was based more on its 
potential to undercut/restrain a P5 prerogative and in so doing constrain the US. But these were very general 
positions. Private interviews: one official described the motives of the latter group as ‘less pure’ than the 
former (13 August 2010) 
1316
 See statements by Switzerland, 19 April and 20 September, Peru, 21 June, 12 July, 28 July, and Costa Rica, 
16 and 22 September. Additionally Latvia and Slovenia also spoke in favour of limiting the veto in the four-
crime cases, see 18 and 19 September respectively (full references in bibliography) 
1317
 ‘E-gram to FCO London from UKMIS NY: Third Draft of Outcome Document’, 9 August 2005: this was 
backed-up by interviews, although it was not possible to specify exactly which state (believed to be one of one 
of Switzerland, Peru or Costa Rica) who made this request. But it is a prime example of why understanding the 
process in the way presented throughout is the surest way of understanding the final outcome 
1318
 (FCO) (2005) ‘Internal FCO Email’, dated 10 August 2005 
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Thus, the veto proposals place in the August draft was symptomatic of problems with the 
process. More specifically, its inclusion occurred during the phase where the facilitated 
management of the negotiating drafts really began to unravel. As explained above, this 
unravelling was fuelled by accusations the process was elitist, lacked transparency, and was 
failing to adequately incorporate/accommodate member state positions. Resultantly the 
ballooning drafts would become increasingly defined by specific member state, or GA 
grouping, language and in many policy areas would lack the specificity necessary to 
represent consensus between states.1319 It was not until the Bolton intervention that the 
negotiations took on elements of line-by-line negotiation through the CG, complementing 
continuing GA plenary discussions composed (dependent upon the issue) of a variable 
geometry of interested delegations. All this, combined with R2P’s relegated place in the 
overall negotiation package, helps to explain why the effort to find ‘agreeable language’1320 
did not take on the required precision or intensity until mid-August onwards. Moreover, 
without wishing to return to the broader negotiating dynamics, there was a sense amongst 
many sceptics/opponents that Russia would drive the dilution and eventual deletion of R2P 
from the outcome.1321 Clearly the latter did not happen, but once the negotiations moved 
into the final phase – however difficult and contested that path was – Russia would be a key 
player in a concerted (and at times hostile) effort to ensure the language addressed many of 
the concerns of, and divergences between, member states. With the introduction of the CG, 
the series of proposed US amendments,1322 and the ‘diminishing distraction’ of SC-
reform,1323 the last two weeks would see a flurry of activity.  
 
Resultantly, many of the most significant changes to the text were made during the post-5 
August phase. Thus, the 3 June,1324 and 22 July drafts should be seen as early attempts at 
laying-down markers as to what the R2P section might look like, rather than anything more 
                                                          
1319
 It is for this reason the importance of understanding the iterative rolling drafts in the context of the 
characteristics and dynamics of the process is reiterated throughout this chapter – particularly in response to 
the limitations in existing accounts of R2P’s development 
1320
 UN (2005) ‘UN officials preview possible outcome of summit on development, UN reform’, 5 August 2005 
1321
 Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes?, p12  
1322
 As already stated, these amendments were first introduced into the process on the 17
 
August with the 
circulation of the US’ own version of the draft outcome document which was backed-up by the previously-
mentioned famed ‘Dear Colleague’ letters sent by John Bolton 
1323
 ‘E-gram to FCO London from UKMIS NY: UN Summit: Outcome Document: SITREP’, 22 August 2005 
1324
 A formal version of the 3 June draft was released on the 8 June, both are essentially the same, as are the 
drafts of the 5 August (informal) and 10 August (official version): No significant changes in either case 
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fundamental. Certainly compared to the 6, 12 and 13 September drafts they were 
significantly different in terms of their structure, length, detail, and caveats. That said, they 
did include language which would remain throughout; sow important seeds for future 
development of the section; and additionally included language which captured just why 
detailed negotiation would eventually be required. 
 
 
 
Notably, both drafts opened with a statement of individual state responsibility, albeit in 
more committal terms in the latter. With this dimension primarily what R2P was about, the 
associated language would be significantly developed thereafter this limited starting-point. 
Part of this strengthening and expansion would include the introduction of a more logical 
two-paragraph (individual state/international community) structure to the section from 6 
September onwards. Until then however, the two dimensions would sit together in a single 
paragraph. But if individual responsibility would be where the normative statement of R2P 
would be strongest, the international dimension would be consistently more problematic. 
Defining this partly in terms of encouraging and helping individual states ‘as appropriate’ 
was least problematic/controversial and significant for the way the first statement of the 
Box 5.3: R2P Extracts from the 3 June and 22 July Draft Outcome Documents 
3 June 2005: “Responsibility to protect” 
 
72. We agree that the responsibility to protect civilian populations lies first and foremost with each individual State. The 
international community should, as necessary, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility. The 
international community also has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means under 
Chapter VI and VIII of the UN Charter to help protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity. If such peaceful means appear insufficient, we recognize our shared responsibility to take 
collective action, through the SC and, as appropriate, in cooperation with relevant regional organizations under Chapter 
VII of the Charter.  
 
73. We support the implementation of the UN Action Plan to prevent genocide.  
 
74. We stress the need to continue consideration of the concept of R2P within the GA. 
 
22 July 2005: “Responsibility to protect” 
 
113. We agree that the responsibility to protect civilian populations lies first and foremost with each individual State and 
we accept that responsibility and agree to act in accordance with it. The international community, should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility. The international community, through the United 
Nations, also has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, including under Chapters 
VI and VIII of the Charter to help protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. In this context, we recognize our shared responsibility to take collective action, through the Security 
Council and, as appropriate, in cooperation with relevant regional arrangements, under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
should peaceful means prove insufficient and national authorities be unwilling or unable to protect their populations. We 
stress the need to continue consideration of the concept of the responsibility to protect within the sixtieth session of the 
General Assembly. 
 
114. We support the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan to Prevent Genocide and the work of the 
Secretariat to this end.  
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international community’s role was about working in support of the state. Indeed, a 
strengthened version of this statement would remain in such a position through each draft, 
clearly demonstrating one aspect of the core supportive element that R2P through the 
international community was to represent. 
 
 
 
Similarly there was a consistent place and acceptance of the international community’s soft-
side ‘responsibility’ in helping to protect populations – in accordance with ChVI and VIII1325 – 
from the four-crimes. However, it would be a mistake to see this as a prima facie 
expression/endorsement of an international-R2P. In reality, this sentence was a revealing 
example of the inability to include any direct phrasal reference to an international-R2P at 
any stage during the negotiations. It was a statement of a responsibility to help to protect, 
not a responsibility to protect – a subtle, but nevertheless fundamental distinction. In 
practical terms, diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means established a 
potentially broad spectrum of international responses. And as the drafts developed, this 
spectrum would be further expanded through the strengthening of additional references in 
relation to assisting individual states. But in normative terms, an early redline was imposed 
upon the draft which ensured the character, scope and application of R2P would distinctly 
differentiated across the two dimensions.1326  
                                                          
1325
 ‘In accordance’ with Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter would be introduced from 6 September; prior 
to that the language was ‘under’ or ‘including under’ Chapters VI and VIII, see Boxes 5.3-5.10 
1326
 Considerably more so than oft-presented 
Box 5.4: The 22 July Draft Compared with the 3 June 
Responsibility to protect 
 
72113. We agree that the responsibility to protect civilian populations lies first and foremost with each individual State. 
and we accept that responsibility and agree to act in accordance with it. The international community should, as 
necessaryappropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility. The international community, through 
the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, including 
under Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter to help protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. If such peaceful means appear insufficientIn this context, we recognize our shared 
responsibility to take collective action, through the Security Council and, as appropriate, in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations, under Chapter VII of the Charter. arrangements, under Chapter VII of the Charter, should peaceful 
means prove insufficient and national authorities be unwilling or unable to protect their populations. We stress the need 
to continue consideration of the concept of the responsibility to protect within the sixtieth session of the General 
Assembly. 
 
73114. We support the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan to Prevent Genocide.  
 
74. We stress and the need to continue consideration within the General Assemblywork of the concept of the 
responsibility to protectSecretariat to this end.  
 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
324 
 
 
This sentence would remain in each and every draft from June onwards, albeit with one 
small but significant alteration. The July draft immediately tightened the meaning of this 
limited responsibility with the insertion of the ‘through the UN’ phrase. This effectively 
meant insofar as responsibility was invoked it was assigned to the UN rather than the more 
generic ‘international community’.1327 It also represented one of the principal ways of 
ensuring R2P was tied to existing processes as supporters argued it would be. This was also 
the case with the unquestionably more controversial reference to collective action under 
ChVII. Despite many concerns, and some intense opposition, this reference was evident in 
each draft document. Supporters were especially loath to calls for this to be dropped 
because without it the benefit of having R2P would be open to serious question.1328 This 
was a ‘key feature’ which had to remain.1329 Unsurprisingly though, the pay-off was that its 
place would lead to more specific and general safeguarding. Any thoughts of complicating 
the statement, particularly to accommodate or leave open the possibility of action outside 
the SC were overcome by the imperative to craft language designed to appeal to the 
nervous/sceptical. The priority was to especially reassure China and Russia that R2P did not 
impose extra responsibilities or obligations on the SC, and to convince the US that it did not 
affect its existing manoeuvrability. Thus, UK consideration for the insertion of a ‘wherever 
possible’ caveat was a political non-starter.1330 The calculation was that it was better to have 
it this way than not at all.1331 But what it also meant was the references to ‘shared 
                                                          
1327
 See Jennifer Welsh (2006) ‘Conclusion’ in Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, p186 
1328
 This point was made in numerous interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010, 25 June 
2010). It was also often pointed out that this was also about acknowledging something which essentially 
already-existed in that the SC already had the authority to decide what constitutes a Chapter VII threat 
1329
 As a UK Mission update explained in early September ‘Key features look like being preserved, including 
recognition that the principal responsibility to protect populations lies with states, and that when populations 
are not being effectively protected the international community can take "collective action" through the UNSC 
(i.e. including use of force). The EU has argued, with support from (several other UN Member States) that the 
concept and in particular the last aspect should not be diluted’, ‘E-gram to FCO London from UNMIS NY: UN 
Summit Outcome Document – SITREP 4 September’, 5 September 2005 
1330
 Private interview (3 August 2010): the US also expressed a view that action ‘absent authorization by the SC’ 
should not be ‘precluded’ arguing the text ‘should not foreclose’ the possibility that there ‘may be cases that 
involve humanitarian catastrophes but for which there is also a legitimate for states to act in self-defence’ in 
‘United States Proposals: Responsibility to Protect’, Letter from John R. Bolton, to Ambassadorial Colleagues on 
the Responsibility to Protect, 30 August 2005 
1331
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 22 October 2010): one UK official pointed out that 
there was some sensitivity about defining R2P in a way which suggested Kosovo was wrong. They did not want 
to completely shut the door on similar action in extreme circumstances, thus the ‘wherever possible’ caveat 
would be about accepting the general rule that SC would be required, but that there were possible exceptions. 
However, even the French were seen as being unlikely to accept such a defined caveat and it was certainly not 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
325 
 
responsibility’ in this context were always highly optimistic. This would consequently lead to 
its eventual removal from a sentence which would undergo numerous associated linguistic 
changes.  
 
One major step in this regard was the July introduction of an ICISS-esque threshold-
transition with the language of ‘unwilling or unable’ – a necessary but ultimately insufficient 
attempt to define the high-bar narrow threshold for international action. This 
complemented the consistent reference to regional ‘cooperation’, and the situating of the 
purposefully qualifying sentence stressing the need for continued GA consideration of the 
idea after the sentence on collective action. It is telling that both references would be 
strongly embedded throughout, including when the draft became littered with bracketing 
from 6 September onwards. And although in substance both were very different, they were 
also united by a common purpose of assuaging member state concerns. Regional 
organizations may have been a pragmatic, process-oriented and contextually-aware 
inclusion but was also one measure designed to guard against fears of interventions 
pursued by the powerful against weaker states, or decisions made on an apparently rash 
basis.1332 Continuing GA consideration meanwhile was something supporters ‘wondered 
long and hard about’ but accepted was necessary to counter concerns the GA had not 
driven R2P’s development/creation, or had enough time to consider its potential 
consequences.1333 Locating it after the most contentious sentence in every draft from July 
was therefore no coincidence, but was carefully considered with these concerns in mind. 
Indeed, there was some debate as to whether the sentence should be temporally qualified 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
going to win the approach of China/Russia and the many sceptics within the GA who wished to limit 
unilateralism not potentially enable it. That said, it is important to recognise that while consensus around R2P 
was that authorisation for collection action was tightly tied to the SC this did not shut-down policy-options 
outside of R2P. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention for instance was described in both 
consistent/complementary as well as distinct terms to R2P, and would therefore remain a continuing policy-
option for those who had accepted its use in the past 
1332
 The place of regional organizations (referred to on 22 July as regional ‘arrangements’) was assured from 
the outset for reasons previously-identified. Indeed, the two references to Chapter VI and VIII ensured regional 
organizations/arrangements commanded a prominent and legitimate place in any further R2P-related 
processes/scenarios. This dimension was a key part of ensuring that regional organizations were involved in a 
problem before it got to the stage where further potential action may be necessary. As Rock points out this 
was entirely pragmatic, not least because it was the ‘right thing to do’ and would ‘happen anyway’ (Ottawa, 11 
June 2009). This, though, was reinforced by the second, more contentious element relating to possible SC 
authorised action under Chapter VII. Here the reference to regional organisations was especially vital and was 
included just as much to address or dampen down concerns regarding external interventions 
1333
 Private interview (3 August 2010) 
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as it was in the July draft1334 but instead of this it would be expanded to better reflect 
concerns relating to its implications (Box5.7). 
 
 
 
These measures were part of the overall effort to shape the text so to command wider 
acceptance (if not support), and convince states R2P did not depart from existing practice, 
process or provision. At this stage, however, the drafts were out-of-kilter with the individual 
and collective positions of member states. The 10 August draft captured an uneasy 
combination of under-development in some areas, over-development in others, and an 
overall lack of detailed specificity. Although it is true each draft was to provide a basis for 
further negotiations, the 10 August draft was symptomatic of a stalling process in danger of 
derailing completely. Its release came just ahead of the most significant change in the entire 
process which as explained above was precipitated by the breakdown of the facilitator 
process amid a raft of criticisms and amendments proposed by the US. The veto proposal 
was particularly symbolic of process-related weaknesses, compounding the surprising 
inclusion of ‘obligation’ at the expense of ‘responsibility’, the continued place of ‘shared 
responsibility’ in relation to collective action and a continuing lack of sufficient 
                                                          
1334
 NAM’s preference was to temporally qualify the statement by ‘within the sixtieth session of the GA’ in 
order to ‘reflect a sense of urgency’, see: ‘Statement by Malaysia, at the informal meeting of the plenary on 
the draft outcome document of high-level plenary’, 1 July 2005. With it ultimately not qualified in this way it is 
open to debate whether leaving it open-ended actually benefited the sceptical or opposing states more   
Box 5.5: R2P Extract from the 10 August Draft Outcome Document 
10 August 2005: “Responsibility to protect” 
 
119. We agree that the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity lies first and foremost with each individual State. We also agree that this responsibility to protect entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement. We accept that responsibility and agree to act in accordance with 
it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and 
support the United Nations to establish an early warning capability. The international community, through the United 
Nations, also has the obligation to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, including under Chapters VI 
and VIII of the Charter, to help protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. In this context, we recognize our shared responsibility to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter, and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities be unwilling or unable to protect their 
populations. We stress the need to continue at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly consideration of the concept 
of the responsibility to protect.   
 
120. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
 
121. We support the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan to Prevent Genocide and the work of the 
Secretariat to that end.  
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parameterization.1335 In this respect, the gap between the language and member state 
consensus was wider than at any point in the process.  
 
 
 
Conversely, the August draft introduced language which would remain thereafter. Drawing 
on language circulated by Rwanda on the 29th July, the primary state dimension was 
significantly expanded with the addition of prevention/incitement as an inevitable element 
of R2P. This was supplemented with the commitment to help the UN establish an early-
warning capability, thus strengthening the sentence on international assistance. The 
emphasis on such preventive measures was about placing squarely the R2P on individual 
states.1336 It helped reinforce the idea R2P was pro-sovereignty rather than pro-
interventionism. Unsurprisingly, prevention commanded wide support and was ‘securely in 
[the] text’ thereafter.1337 But within this, that the specific incitement reference remained 
was somewhat surprising. Apart from the open-ended addition of ‘through appropriate and 
necessary means’ from 6 September onwards, it would remain in place despite US calls for 
                                                          
1335
 The facilitators reported on the 5
th
 August (when the draft was initially circulated) ‘providing parameters 
for the concept of R2P was [proving a] challenge’, in ‘Press Conference on Summit Outcome Document’, 5 
August 2005 
1336
 Which was the element states were universally most able to clearly accept 
1337
 As quoted in ‘E-gram to FCO London from UKMIS NY: UN Summit: Outcome Document: SITREP’, 22 August 
2005 
Box 5.6: The 22 July Draft Compared with the 10 August 
Responsibility to protect 
 
113119. We agree that the responsibility to protect civilianprotection of populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity lies first and foremost with each individual State and we. We also agree that this 
responsibility to protect entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement. We accept that responsibility 
and agree to act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to 
exercise this responsibility. and support the United Nations to establish an early warning capability. The international 
community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibilityobligation to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, including under Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect civilian populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we recognize our shared responsibility to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council and, as appropriate,, under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, and in cooperation with relevant regional arrangements, under Chapter VII of the Charter, organizations, 
should peaceful means prove insufficientbe inadequate and national authorities be unwilling or unable to protect their 
populations. We stress the need to continue at the sixtieth session of the General Assembly consideration of the concept 
of the responsibility to protect within the sixtieth session of the General Assembly..   
 
114120. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
 
121. We support the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan to Prevent Genocide and the work of the 
Secretariat to thisthat end.  
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its deletion.1338 But considering Rwanda’s history with incitement prior to and during the ‘94 
genocide, combined with the effects of the structured outcome and the fact the US was 
generally supportive of R2P so long as more fundamental red-lines were not crossed,1339 this 
reference was ultimately not sufficiently provocative for the US to more vigorously pursue 
its deletion. 
 
But like the veto proposal, the August incitement reference was revealing for what it said 
about the process and how the drafts were being formulated. While it is important to 
acknowledge the ways this draft introduced some elements necessary for moving towards 
the final form of R2P, it was clear that to command broader acceptance it would have to 
undergo a process of more detailed diplomatic negotiation of the specific line-by-line 
language. Indeed, the US position on incitement was expressed after it first appeared in the 
5/10 draft because of the way it was fed into it through the facilitators. The US did so 
initially through the circulation of its own form of the draft document on the 17th and then 
in the R2P-specific ‘Dear Colleague’ letter of the 30th. These inputs came in the context of 
declining confidence/trust in the facilitator process as most vociferously expressed by the 
US and NAM. Thus, even though incitement would remain in the final outcome, this did not 
mean its initial inclusion was based upon pre-determined consensus. Rather, consensus 
                                                          
1338
 The US position was that the reference ‘raised a problem…because of our traditional approach under the 
First Amendment to our Constitution’, Letter from John R. Bolton, to Ambassadorial Colleagues on the 
Responsibility to Protect, 30 August 2005. The First Amendment (1791) reads: ‘Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances’. This traditional approach is significant in terms of how incitement relates to the power 
of government and the burden necessary to prove that inflammatory speech was intended to incite ‘imminent 
lawless action’. For the US, its position was thus likely directed by a concern that the formulation in the 
Summit draft was far too loosely defined to be consistent with its own approach. Indeed, the First Amendment 
speaks in prohibitory terms – i.e. to prohibit the ability of Congress to inhibit the rights within it. This has been 
backed-up by the US Supreme Court through its Constitutional assumption of freedom rather than restriction; 
see for instance 1969 Brandenburg vs. Ohio. A legitimate concern therefore was that the reference to 
incitement could be deployed by governments to actually shut-down freedoms of press and expression as part 
of its primary responsibility to address the crisis on the ground. Thus, preventing incitement could be seen not 
just as a way of preventing further atrocities, but also a potential tool for their continuation 
1339
 This was not a general approach of the US however. As Bolton writes he resisted pressure to outline US 
red-lines because he believed the outcome document also contained a ‘considerable amount of junk than 
might not violate US red lines, but that we should not accept substantively’ (2007) Surrender Is Not An Option, 
p204-5. This is perhaps one reason why even after the introduction of the Core Group Bolton was dissatisfied 
with the prioritization of seven issues as selected by Jean Ping, see: Reform the UN (2005) ‘Core Group 
Negotiations Begin with New Document Expected on September 6
th
’, 30 August 2005 
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would be determined once the process shifted towards an approach focused on extracting 
language which could more accurately reflect where consensus on R2P really lay. 
 
 
 
And so, resultant to the proposed US amendments and the introduction of the CG1340 the 
most intensive phase of the negotiations yielded the most significant, and voluminous 
changes to the R2P section (and the draft overall). From the third week of August until the 
last hours before the Summit was due to open, the negotiations took on a character which 
was almost ‘inhumane’ in its intensity, rigour and complexity.1341 Drafts on the 6th and 12th 
September would undergo dramatic changes, both compared to the 10 August and to each 
other. This was despite the fact R2P remained conditioned by the overall context. Even with 
its identification as one of the CG’s seven priority issues, it never commanded significant 
ambassadorial attention – a factor which helped diminish the potential for more concerted 
high-level opposition. Nevertheless, the differences around R2P were very real. The 
negotiations, pursued mainly in an R2P-focused sub-group and increasingly from the 1 
September on a bilateral delegation-to-delegation basis, zoned-in on all the major issues of 
                                                          
1340
 Which, as stated above, complemented continuing plenary and sub-group negotiations, it is also important 
to keep in mind the structured outcome points about the relative place of R2P in the negotiations because 
even though the intensity of them around R2P increased after the Bolton intervention it remained a less 
contentious issue which thus demanded relatively less dedicated ambassadorial time 
1341
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), similar points were widely made in interviews 
Box 5.7: R2P Extract from the 6 September Draft Outcome Document 
6 September 2005: “Responsibility to protect [civilian populations]” 
 
127. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. This responsibility to protect entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and should 
support the United Nations to establish an early warning capability.  
 
128. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with [Chapter VI and VIII of] the Charter, to help protect civilian 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, [we are prepared 
to take collective action] [we recognize our shared responsibility to take collective action], in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, under [Chapter VII of] the Charter on a case by case basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and [national authorities fail to 
protect their populations] [populations not be afforded protection]. We stress the need for the General Assembly to 
continue consideration of the responsibility to protect and its implications, bearing in mind the relevant provisions and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law [and the principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs of States]. [We note the importance of developing the capacity of States to exercise this responsibility and assist 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.] 
 
[129. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.] 
 
130. We fully support the mission of the UN Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide. 
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contention, exposing some of the differences between states as ‘fundamental’ in nature.1342 
Accordingly, the period from the shift in the process at the end of August, and the fourth 
draft set for the 6 September was helpful in a number of ways. First, it helped ‘clarify’ what 
the ‘key differences’ between states really were. In so doing, the heavily bracketed 6 
September draft at least provided a more solid ‘basis’ for the final week of negotiations.1343 
Second, this clarification emphasized just how much effort was still required: as one UK 
update commented on the 4th ‘no short-cuts [were] yet available’.1344 Finally, the 
clarification of differences resulted in the introduction of: a clearer, more logical paragraph 
structure; and through the introduction of bracketing saw the first real linguistic 
identification of the political boundaries which would define the R2P agreement. 
 
 
 
The introduction of the dual-paragraph structure was the most notable change from the 10 
August. It was consistent with the framing of R2P and necessary to delineate its scope and 
narrow political differences. Crucially, it was significant for modelling R2P as a state-centric 
                                                          
1342
 Reform the UN (2005) ‘Sub-Groups Report to Core Group on Status of Negotiations’, 3 September 2005 
1343
 ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman of the Secretary-General’, 6 September 2005 
1344
 ‘E-gram to FCO London from UNMIS NY: UN Summit Outcome Document – SITREP’, 5 September 2005 
Box 5.8: The 6 September Draft Compared with the 10 August 
 
Responsibility to protect [civilian populations] 
 
119. We agree that127. Each individual State has the protection ofresponsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity lies first and foremost with each individual State. We 
also agree that this. This responsibility to protect entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement., 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and agree towill act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and should 
support the United Nations to establish an early warning capability.  
 
128. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the obligationresponsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, including under Chaptersin accordance with [Chapter VI and VIII of] 
the Charter, to help protect civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. In this context, [we are prepared to take collective action] [we recognize our shared responsibility to take 
collective action,], in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, under [Chapter VII of] the Charter, on a 
case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and [national authorities be unwilling or unablefail to protect their populations.] [populations not be 
afforded protection]. We stress the need to continue at the sixtieth session offor the General Assembly to continue 
consideration of the concept of the responsibility to protect.   and its implications, bearing in mind the relevant 
provisions and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law [and the principle of non-
interference in internal affairs of States]. [We note the importance of developing the capacity of States to exercise this 
responsibility and assist those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.] 
 
120[129. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. .] 
 
121130. We fully support the implementationmission of the United Nations Action Plan to Prevent Genocide andUN 
Special Advisor for the workPrevention of the Secretariat to that end. Genocide. 
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agreement and for the way it helped define the prospective future sequencing of R2P. 
Indeed, from this structuring the specific language of each dimension and how they related 
to each other would also become clearer. Ultimately, the two paragraphs were designed to 
appeal to the sceptical/nervous and were sequential in that the placing of each sentence 
spoke to how R2P would broadly apply in practice. The first paragraph was explicitly ‘state-
centric’ and about ‘rallying to the primary responsibility’.1345 It was an acceptance of the 
responsibility of each individual state.1346 This was reinforced – in the same paragraph and 
in the first sentence of the second paragraph – by statements relating to how the 
international community will work in support of the state, and work to help protect civilians. 
This ordering was designed not only for practical reasons but to ensure R2P was not seen in 
terms of a straightforward, or immediate transition to coercive measures. Further 
emphasizing this point, the 6 September draft also introduced a bracketed reference to the 
‘importance of developing state capacity’ and for assisting states ‘under stress’ at the end of 
para.2. Revealingly this reference (which would remain in the final draft) was inserted after 
the sentences relating to collective action – thus ensuring the paragraph dedicated to the 
international dimension was bookended by an additional preventive-related statement. This 
meant any moves towards coercive collective action would occur if a series of prior 
measures progressing from the starting-point of an individual state’s responsibility failed to 
address the problem, and only then in limited, extreme cases and according to processes 
that were legally and legitimately defined.1347  
 
But despite this structural sequencing, the sheer volume of bracketing demonstrated not 
just continuing nervousness around the idea, but more fundamental points of difference. 
Unsurprisingly, these revolved around the nature and extent of R2P’s international 
dimension. A key part of the addressing some of these concerns would emerge during the 
final week as the long-standing concern about the parameters of R2P was more clearly 
addressed – the 6 September draft merely touched on this issue with the bracketed 
                                                          
1345
 Private interview (3 August 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1346
 This commitment was made in much stronger terms in the 6 September draft with the statement that 
states accepted the responsibility and ‘will’ act in accordance with it. This strengthened the previous language 
where states would ‘agree’ to act in accordance with it, see Box 5.7 and 5.8 
1347
 Of course this sequencing built-in a series of inevitable problems relating to achieving political agreement, 
not least whether primary state responsibility had indeed been exhausted. But nevertheless the priority was 
allaying concerns and avoiding defining triggers or a clear transition from primary to international 
responsibility 
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reference to ‘civilian populations’ in the R2P section title. This draft did, however, propose 
more politically realistic language for addressing those fundamental differences. Aside from 
the already-mentioned additions to the sentence on GA consideration and the bracketing of 
the veto proposal prior to its inevitable removal, the sentences on the soft-side and 
collective action role of the international community underwent significant changes. Though 
differentiated in substance, the controversy they provoked, and the extent of what states 
were willing to accept, both dimensions were underpinned by a widely held concern to 
ensure neither implied automaticity nor a responsibility of similar character to that of an 
individual state. This point was most clearly articulated by the US on the 30th August, but 
was a widely shared position.1348 Many of the changes thus flowed from this position. 
Accordingly, the first sentence of para.128 replaced ‘obligation’ with ‘responsibility’, added 
the word ‘appropriate’, and the phrase ‘in accordance with’ in place of ‘including under’. 
These changes were evidently designed to protect this position: appropriateness, however 
obvious, spoke to a need to ensure responses were driven by the specific circumstances 
involved; while ensuring soft-side measures were in conformity with the Charter 
strengthened the previous overly-ambiguous formulation. Meanwhile, the removal of 
obligation was the most significant change. States were willing to accept a responsibility to 
help as part of a more general acceptance that the international community should have a 
role to play in helping to address mass atrocities. But crucially this was about a broad 
willingness to accept R2P agreement as a political declaration, not a ‘legal undertaking’.1349 
Indeed, considering a central strategy for winning over sceptics was to convince them R2P 
was about capturing what already existed, and not about defining new obligations or 
responsibilities ex nihilo, this change was one of the least surprising.1350 
 
                                                          
1348
 Letter from John R. Bolton, to Ambassadorial Colleagues on the Responsibility to Protect, 30 August 2005 
1349
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1350
 As quoted earlier in this chapter, a UK bilateral meeting with the US State Department was clear that a 
core element of any agreement on R2P was that there could be ‘no implied obligation to act’. This was 
particularly strong in relation to collective action but was nevertheless a clear line which was not going to be 
crossed. Indeed, staying with the UK, the circulation of the 5 August draft immediately raised concerns in 
London at the use of the word ‘obligation’. An internal email read: ‘we would prefer "obligation" to revert 
"responsibility", as it was in an earlier draft. As R2P is still an emerging concept, we should not talk about 
obligations in a legal sense...We could possibly settle for "moral obligation", but not a legal one’, ‘Internal FCO 
Email’, 10 August 2005 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
333 
 
Consistent with this were the changes/proposed changes to the sentence on collective 
action. Much like the previous sentence, these were about further qualifying the 
international dimension vis-à-vis primary responsibility, maintaining the position that R2P 
did not expand upon existing international-related provisions, and did not imply 
automaticity. The latter of these was more directly addressed by the inclusion of the case-
by-case provision. Revealingly, this was the first reference to a caveat which was not just 
widely supported throughout, but was always understood as a core element of any 
statement on the international role in R2P.1351 Understandably, it was regarded as 
‘pragmatic’, the ‘right way forward’, and a necessary (but politically straightforward) 
element of what one ambassador described as the ‘hard-fought detail’.1352 It was especially 
important to the P5, with China most vociferously insistent,1353 but was also necessary for 
achieving acceptance from all sides of the spectrum for ensuring there were no built-in 
triggers or any obligation to act. It would remain up to the SC to determine according to 
each specific case. Indeed, with the SC central to collective action, the most significant 
associated change was the bracketing of the over-developed statement of ‘shared 
responsibility’ and the removal of the ‘unwilling and unable’ transitional threshold.1354 There 
was limited appetite for anything beyond acknowledgement of the SC’s pre-existing 
empowerment under ChVII – not from within the SC and certainly not from within the GA. 
Even then this provoked concern, with some more hard-line/opposed states wanting to 
avoid any reference to ChVII in the draft.1355 Rather, the sentence was about describing how 
the international community should act, not that it necessarily would or was obliged to. Any 
such action would be through the SC, according to case-specific circumstances, a defined 
threshold and clear parameters. Clearly, preparedness to act is a very different, greatly 
reduced statement compared to shared responsibility. But it did, nevertheless, reflect the 
political boundaries R2P had to navigate; ultimately satisfying the majority preference for 
                                                          
1351
 As referenced above a UK e-gram suggested that the case-by-case provision was one areas where there 
was ‘some common ground between [the UK] and many other UN members’ and meant there ‘could be no 
implied obligation to act’, ‘E-gram to FCO London regarding UK bilateral meeting with US State Department 
Representatives on 29 April 2005’, dated 3 May 2005 
1352
 Private interviews (3 August 2010, 25 June 2010) 
1353
 China’s position was articulated as early as the 27 January 2005, and was subsequently repeated publically 
on 19 April, in its (5) June position paper, on the 21 June and throughout the intergovernmental negotiations 
1354
 It is important to reiterate that bracketing [denoted disagreement/alternative proposed language] 
1355
 Hence at this point it would be bracketed as an area of contention although ultimately supporters were 
able to maintain the reference to Chapter VII 
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ensuring the character of each dimension was sufficiently differentiated. Accordingly, 
ensuring the threshold for determining when collective action might be necessary was kept 
high represented the third major change to the sentence in the 6th draft. As demonstrated 
by the two bracketed options there was no agreement of the specific language at this stage. 
1356 That said, the reference to national authorities ‘failing’ to protect was indicative of the 
direction necessary to ensure the overall formulation of R2P was as narrow, and tight as 
possible. Though the unwilling/unable language commanded support from a number of 
states the more significant middle ground – riddled with scepticism and nervousness – were 
more concerned to guard against unwarranted interpretation and abuses of R2P. And with 
this threshold one of the central determining factors (along with the four-crimes) for 
possible action there was insufficient willingness to accept language which spoke more to 
the motivation of individual states than to an evidence-based assessment of a specific 
situation.1357 
 
This issue would be addressed during the final frantic week of negotiation during which 
R2P’s language and parameters would undergo significant tightening as remaining sticking-
points were progressively addressed. The 6th September draft was, therefore, one of the 
most symbolic points in the whole process. It captured the impact of shift in the negotiating 
dynamics: highlighting where progress was being made and where it was still needed1358. 
Crucially it was seen as a step towards political acceptance of R2P1359. More interestingly, it 
was regarded by the UK as ‘protect[ing] most of the substance of [R2P]’ – a statement 
                                                          
1356
 See Box 5.7 
1357
 This was clearly expressed in interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010): The need to rebalance the 
formulation by eliminating any reference to motive was an important task during the final week. Explicit and 
implicit criticism of the unable/unwilling language was, however, oft-made after the publication of the HLP 
report; see e.g. statements by China, 27 January, 7 June, Russia on 31 January and 22 February, and South 
Korea, 19 April (see bibliography). See below in context of the resolution of this language issue with the 
inclusion of ‘manifestly failing’ from 12 September onwards 
1358
 Rather oddly, some accounts – most notably Alex Bellamy’s – seem to miss the significance of the 6 
September draft. Considering its place here, this omission undoubtedly has negative consequences upon how 
they account for the development of R2P. A stated above, this draft provided the ‘basis’ for the remaining 
negotiations 
1359
 A UK update of the 7 September remarked there were now ‘better prospects’ on R2P. It also provide a 
revealing insight into the effort to win over support describing how the sub-group chairs ‘wisely cut short 
discussion on R2P and have worked with key players, to bring together the supportive…with the – for different 
reasons – mildly sceptical or cautious. The resultant text is only slightly less good than in the previous version 
and should be difficult only for the most hardline’, ‘E-gram to FCO London from UKMIS NY, UN Summit, the 
final week’, 7 September 2005 
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particularly revealing for what it implies about what the substance of R2P really was.1360 The 
final week was a deeply difficult one for the negotiations overall. The push for significant, 
vast changes across the entire package stretched a multilateral process, already suffering 
from an acute lack of ‘lubrication’, close to breaking-point. Concern amongst Annan’s senior 
staff that the negotiations might collapse, or yield a heavily diluted outcome had been 
growing for weeks.1361 Annan’s rhetoric increasingly spoke to these concerns, imploring 
states to negotiate in a collective ‘spirit’ and not to squander the opportunity to improve 
the effectiveness of the UN.1362 But to achieve formal adoption of the draft document on 
the 13th, the final negotiations were intense, complex, confused, procedurally unsatisfactory 
and a stark reminder of the limitations of multilateralism when faced with contentious 
issues. However, as made very clear in the discussion of the structured outcome, the sheer 
volume of contentious issues was to R2P’s benefit. Though R2P would face an ‘unforgivably’ 
hostile last-gasp attack from India,1363 its progress during the 6th-12th September was 
notably more positive than many other areas of the text.1364 Intergovernmental diplomacy 
and CG/sub-group negotiations would intensify, and R2P would certainly be a part of these. 
But with other issues demanding more (ambassadorial) attention1365 and because the 
language of R2P was carefully delineated to avoiding tripping fundamental cross-
membership red-lines, its place in the outcome was far more assured.1366 
 
                                                          
1360
 …‘including the legitimate international role in R2P, including readiness to use force, if necessary’, ‘E-gram 
to FCO London from UKMIS NY, UN Summit, the final week’, 7 September 2005 
1361
 Annan for instance cut short his holiday to return to New York to support the negotiations, ‘Secretary-
General Returning to New York to Support Efforts to Ensure Successful Summit’, SG/SM/10064, 30 August 
2005, ‘Talks to produce UN World Summit document going to the wire, Annan says’, 7 September 2005 
1362
 See ‘Successful Outcome at September Summit will be success for all, Secretary-General says in Statement 
to Core Group’, SG/SM.10068, 31 August 2005, ‘Annan ‘very concerned’ accord may not be reached on World 
Summit document’, 9 September 2005 
1363
 Private interview (25 June 2010) 
1364
 A simple scan of the 12
th
 September draft reveals just how many differences remained. This was also borne 
out by interviews, and also reflected in an update provided by Reform the UN (2005) ‘UN Reform Negotiations 
See Progress but Obstacles Remain’, 9 September 2005 
1365
 R2P was discussed at ambassadorial-level through the core group on very few occasions. This is in contrast 
to a number of other issues, such as terrorism, disarmament and non-proliferation which were far more 
difficult to address as reflected in the final outcome 
1366
 Because R2P was defined predominately at working group level in order to ensure it was tightly crafted, 
the need to call upon ambassadorial attention was thereby reduced. In effect R2P benefited from a 
combination of limited capacity and time for it to be a priority issue for the ambassadorial Core Group and the 
fact that this meant by negotiating it at a lower level the language was closely defined to appeal to the sceptics 
and nervous. It is important to note however, that on the few occasions R2P was discussed at CG-level it 
received a much more difficult ride 
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The focus for R2P during this week was directed at resolving the points of contention 
leftover from the 6th September, and to fortify the language most notably through 
significant additional parameterization. The veto language was finally removed; the 
sentence on helping states build capacity was un-bracketed but strengthened to entail an 
intended international commitment; the reference to ChVII was similarly un-bracketed, but 
was included within the context of a firmer commitment that collective action, through the 
SC, would be pursued ‘in accordance with the UN Charter’; the sentence on GA 
consideration was grammatically improved; the bracketing around ChVI and VIII was 
removed, enhancing specificity around the use of diplomatic, humanitarian and peaceful 
means; while the largely insignificant references to ‘civilian[s]’ were deleted.1367 
 
More importantly, the draft deleted the bracketed reference to ‘shared responsibility’, 
settling on a preparedness to take action – a clear expression for ensuring R2P reaffirmed 
existing process/provision. The threshold language was also finalised with the introduction 
of the phrase ‘manifestly failing’. Consistent with the thrust of the previous draft, the 
intention was to define a higher threshold based upon available evidence (so a greater 
burden of proof) rather than subjective judgements relating to the political motives of a 
                                                          
1367
 See Boxes 5.9 and 5.10 
Box 5.9: R2P Extract from the 12 September Draft Outcome Document 
12 September 2005: [Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity] [Responding to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity] 
 
127. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The 
international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and should 
support the United Nations to establish an early warning capability.  
 
128. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared 
to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN 
Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to help states 
build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and 
to assist those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
 
130. We fully support the mission of the UN Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide. 
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government.1368 Ultimately, this would remain an issue dependent upon political 
agreement.1369 But the fact that it was necessary to elevate the bar was symptomatic of 
concerns to limit R2P’s potential impact on sovereignty, particularly from abusive or pretext-
driven interventions.1370 However, in the context of the described accumulation of 
safeguarding, and the inherent sequencing of the formulation, the potential impact was to 
make political agreement more difficult to attain not easier. In any case, manifest failure 
was the acceptable solution, and central to the overall formulation of R2P.1371 
 
 
                                                          
1368
 See Strauss (2009) The Emperor’s New Clothes? p17, based also on private interviews, with one official 
making clear that the phrase was about ensuring sceptical/nervous states were convinced that action would 
be based upon ‘clear evidence’ (3 August 2010) 
1369
 This was clearly expressed in an FCO project completed in 2008 which commented R2P ‘requires political 
agreement and not just concrete evidence proof’ in Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Strategy Report – Final 
Report, 2 October 2008, I am grateful to Andrew Rathmell for speaking to me about this project which he led 
(telephone, 12 January 2011) 
1370
 The most articulate concern around this issue was expressed by South Korea – a supporter of R2P, see 
‘Statement by Ambassador Kim Sam-hoon at Cluster II Informal thematic consultations of the GA’, 19 April 
2005 
1371
 It is thus hugely problematic, and hugely unfortunate, that the unable and unwilling formulation is 
regularly used by advocates, the media and some states to describe the meaning of R2P. Indeed, R2P suffers 
from a general lack of understanding which is likely to undermine its future development rather than aid it 
Box 5.10: The 12 September Draft Compared with the 6 September 
 
[Responsibility to protect [civilian populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity] 
[Responding to genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity] 
 
127. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. This responsibility to protect entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. 
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and should 
support the United Nations to establish an early warning capability.  
 
128. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with [Chapter VI and VIII of] the Charter, to help protect civilian 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, [we are prepared 
to take collective action] [we recognize our shared responsibility to take collective action],, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, under [Chapter VII of]in accordance with the UN Charter, including Chapter VII, on 
a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and [national authorities failare manifestly failing to protect their populations] [populations not be afforded 
protection]. from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the relevant provisions and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations and international law [. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs of States]. [We note the importance of developing theappropriate, to help 
states build capacity of States to exercise this responsibility andto protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out.]. 
 
[129. We invite the permanent members of the Security Council to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.] 
 
130. We fully support the mission of the UN Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide. 
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The 12th also maintained the separately numbered sentence relating to support for the 
UNSA for the Prevention of Genocide which first appeared in the previous draft.1372 This was 
an institutionally significant inclusion, not merely because it was included by R2P 
‘supporters’ in ‘the interest of providing more direct support for the office’1373 but because 
it has been subsequently used toehold for Secretariat developments.1374 Having been 
established by Annan in early 2004 it status, and operational and normative mandate was 
commensurate with its embryonic development.1375 As Méndez remarks, at that stage the 
Office was ‘experimental in nature’.1376 Thus, during 2005 officials involved with the Office 
met with the process facilitators to provide their perspective on the wording being 
discussed.1377 Accordingly, they expressed the view that the reference was potentially 
‘helpful’, mainly because the existing mandate for the Office was limited and had ‘created 
difficulties’ in respect of budgets, access to meetings and status.1378 The belief was that a GA 
resolution reference at this level would help address these issues in the future.1379 
Interestingly, however, though supportive of the reference there was also scepticism about 
potentially making the SAPG ‘responsible for implementing R2P within the UN’. Beneficially, 
the positioning and language of the sentence meant the Office was associated with R2P, but 
with sufficient ‘distance’ to help insulate its own mandate should R2P fail to ‘get off the 
                                                          
1372
 Prior to the 6 September the July and August drafts included a sentence outlining state support for the 
‘implementation of the UN Action Plan to Prevent Genocide and the work of the Secretariat to this end’ 
1373
 Based upon private emails (on 7 September 2011) 
1374
 The most obviously relate to the establishment of a Special Adviser on the R2P, and resulting changes to 
the office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide  
1375
 Annan announced details of the Special Adviser position in the context of his Action Plan to Prevent 
Genocide, see ‘Risk of genocide remains frighteningly real’, Secretary-General tells Human Rights Commission 
as he launches action plan to prevent genocide’, Press Release SG/SM/9245. I am also grateful to Edward 
Mortimer who kindly provided diary extracts relating to the context of these announcements 
1376
 Email from Juan Méndez (12 September 2011) 
1377
 Private emails to author (15 September 2011, 9 January 2012, 10 January 2012): they also cooperated 
closely with OHCHR officials on the text wording. Slovenian ambassador Roman Kirn was singled out as the 
facilitator particularly important for the negotiation of R2P 
1378
 The mandate at that stage was essentially the exchange of letters between the SG and the SC, see UN 
documents S/2004/567 and S/2004/568 
1379
 This was backed up by a Canadian official who commented that the hope was that by ‘naming the special 
advisor directly in a Summit level document, you bolster the case for providing [them] with a budget’, private 
email (7 September 2011) 
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ground’.1380 Equally, it left enough proximity for the Office to take some ‘initiative when and 
if deemed useful’.1381  
 
The most radical difference between the 6th and 12th drafts was the proliferation of 
references to the four-crime formulation. The latter added three additional references in 
the international-related paragraph, and a further one too one of the proposed section 
titles.1382 As Evans’ recognises, the four-crimes was important for giving the ‘impression of 
narrowness’. Indeed, although they are, to some extent, conceptually ‘muddled’ this was 
the intention of those negotiating R2P.1383 The repetition was about attempting to allay 
concerns relating to potential abuses/misuses of R2P by narrowing the space for alternative 
justifications to flourish.1384 From the outset the four-crimes was where R2P’s scope was 
set.1385 There was very little serious discussion regarding their substance either individually 
or as a collective. It was certainly recognised that three of the four were listed in the Rome 
Statute,1386 and that with ethnic cleansing the odd one out there was some inclination to 
question whether it was sufficiently clear to be included.1387 But this was never a serious 
debate, not least because there was a much stronger feeling amongst those actively 
negotiating (in favour) of R2P that the politics and recent history of the UN demanded an 
explicit reference to ethnic cleansing.1388 Thus, from two distinct perspectives the four-
                                                          
1380
 Private email (15 September 2011) 
1381
 Private email (15 September 2011): out of this developed the initial idea for a Special Adviser on R2P after 
an internal process designed to review UN capacity for R2P highlighted internal differences which also 
demonstrated that the SPAG was ‘not best placed to pull off the internal discussions and decision making’. Ed 
Luck was appointed the first SP on R2P on the 21 February 2008. It is important to note that there are risks of 
linking the work of the SAPG and SAR2P but these cannot be explored here  
1382
 See Boxes 5.9 and 5.10 
1383
 Interview with Gareth Evans (London, 25 May 2010) 
1384
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1385
 It should be noted that war crimes was not part of Annan’s ILF conception of R2P 
1386
 United Nations (1998) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 17 July 1998 
1387
 One interviewee involved in the discussions described this as legal ‘tiny-mindedness’ (22 October 2010) 
1388
 Private interview (22 October 2010): the most significant effort to change the formulation was made by 
the US. It sought to do so in two ways. First, the US argued for the inclusion of ‘other large-scale atrocities’ 
suggesting it to ‘avoid legalistic debates about whether a particular situation constitutes, for example, 
genocide’. Second, the US wanted to ‘clarify’ the inclusion of war crimes. Its position on this was somewhat 
unclear in that some of its proposals included reference to war crimes and others did not. But, the proposed 
inclusion of ‘other large-scale atrocities’ was also designed to make clear that the R2P text did not ‘cover all 
war crimes, but only those that are of sufficient scale to warrant such international attention’ pointing out that 
this was ‘in keeping with the approach in the Geneva Conventions themselves, which distinguish between 
“grave breaches” of the Convention, and other violations’. This was also a wholly understandable position. As 
Evans also pointed out in his observations, war crimes are capable of being committed by individuals, and can 
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crime formulation was helpful. It set the bar high and narrow – thus helping to limit 
concerns R2P could be used for other interventionist objectives – and ensured that a 
politically sensitive issue for the UN was acknowledged in relation to state responsibility and 
a qualified international role to respond. In truth though, the biggest concern was that the 
scope was not explicit enough in earlier drafts – particularly in relation to the international 
dimension. Therefore, the additional inclusions were about leaving little doubt about R2P’s 
meaning and application. Crucially, the use of the phrase R2P throughout this thesis, and in 
general, should actually be understood as a ‘R2P populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. The phrase R2P was never left standing 
alone, as demonstrated by the final section title which adopted the four-crime formulation. 
In this regard, the situating of the additional paragraph references were significant for how 
they impacted upon the substance of the sentence they amended. Most notable was the 
four-crime reference added to the increasingly convoluted/caveat-ridden sentence on the 
collective action. This was designed to tighten-up the potential use of enforcement 
measures by keeping the definitional application of R2P narrow by binding manifest state 
failure to the four-crimes and the four-crimes only.1389  
 
Compared to the machinations occurring elsewhere in the negotiations, the text of the 12th 
September had progressed to a form suitable to command broad acceptance. African 
support remained strong, complementing the strong support of Europe and Canada. 
Importantly, in terms of the fine print most of the major sticking points – so necessary to 
command NAM acceptance of a ‘substantive result’1390 – had been successfully addressed. 
Certainly in the context of the overall argument, future questions about the agreement’s 
meaning and significance would be unavoidable.1391 Nevertheless, even with the necessary 
structured outcome qualifications, and the post-05 gap between what states signed-up to 
and the perception of what they signed-up to, there should be little doubt that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
lack the ‘element of scale’. Nevertheless, no such change was made to the formulation in the subsequent 
drafts. Ultimately these changes were not made to the outcome, with the first particularly unsurprising 
1389
 See Boxes 5.9 and 5.10 the addition of the reference to the GA consideration sentence was also significant 
because it stated clearly that it was about a concept which applied in a very narrow set of circumstances, and 
was not to be expanded or left open to possible expansion. The final reference (5) within the R2P paragraphs 
came with the addition of the four-crimes to the sentence at the end of para.2 on building state capacity 
1390
 ‘E-gram to FCO London from UKMIS NY: UN Summit: Outcome Document: SITREP’, 22 August 2005 
1391
 Not least because of failures to adequately account for how R2P was agreed, and in what form, it is hoped 
this chapter will go some way to enhancing our understanding of the political negotiation of R2P 
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negotiation of R2P was one of the more successful areas of the text. The way differences 
were accommodated – with safeguards introduced and numerous changes made – was 
testament to the unwavering commitment and flexibility of key supporters. Through hours 
of negotiation, dozens of sub-group, regional and bilateral meetings, R2P arrived at a point 
in its development even the most optimistic supporter could not have predicted just months 
before.  
 
There was, however, one remaining sting-in-the-tail. Throughout the negotiations R2P was 
subject to repeated outright hostility from a group of states deeply inflamed by the prospect 
of agreeing even limited language. China and Russia were ‘consistently negative’,1392 
believing R2P to be unnecessary and undesirable but ultimately not sufficiently problematic 
to justify outright opposition.1393 By contrast, Egypt, Jamaica, Pakistan, Cuba, Syria, Algeria, 
Venezuela, Iran and India were vociferously hostile to its inclusion.1394 Here, as it had been 
throughout, personal diplomacy was necessary and important. The intervention of Paul 
Martin in the case of Jamaica, Pakistan, Algeria, Cuba and Chile helped address, to varying 
degrees, specific concerns.1395 The most potentially damaging intervention, however, came 
from India on the penultimate day of the process.1396 Although consistently opposed to the 
idea, and having invoked the issue of Kashmir to frame their concerns, their threat to block 
R2P altogether on account of opposition to the name/title was regarded with genuine 
shock.1397 It was for this reason that the two titles in the 12th draft were both bracketed, 
which ultimately meant the inclusion of the entire section was open to question. After what 
John Dauth described as a ‘celebrated showdown’ between Allan Rock and Indian 
Ambassador Nirupem Sen, Canada’s effort to find a workable solution involved a number of 
                                                          
1392
 Private email to author (21 November 2011) 
1393
 Although Allan Rock would personally visit both the Chinese and Russian delegations to discuss R2P, the 
Russian resistance was the most pronounced of the two. Indeed Allan Rock would personally challenge the 
Russian legal attaché to define the substance of their concerns as the process moved towards its endpoint  
1394
 These countries were identified in numerous interviews, as one ambassador commented with some 
understatement they were ‘not easy to carry’ (25 June 2010) 
1395
 Interviews with Paul Martin (telephone, 27 January 2010), Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009), and private 
(31 March 2010, 19 May 2009): it appears some of the resistance posed by Jamaica, Algeria and Pakistan and 
the generally sceptical rather than overtly hostile concerns of Chile was eased by the intervention of Martin, 
for a fuller account see: Paul Martin (2009) Hell or High Water, p338-341 
1396
 It appears that the Indian objection was made at a meeting of the Core Group of 15 on the 12
th
 September. 
The two bracketed options for the title in this draft were part of the effort to find a solution 
1397
 Interviews with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) and private individuals: one individual involved 
described the scale of India’s resistance as ‘tremendous’ (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 25 June 2010) 
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alterative headings some of which included dropping R2P altogether from the title (e.g. 
“Genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity”).1398 Two of the options 
were those bracketed in the 12th draft. But despite this effort, the difficulty was exacerbated 
because the Indian Ambassador, in what Rock believed was some form of 
‘gamesmanship’1399 failed to ‘level’ with his colleagues during a critical point.1400 Despite 
effort to establish whether he could accept Canada’s proposed alternatives, no substantive 
response was forthcoming. Sen was falling back on apparent ‘strict instructions’ from Delhi 
which meant he could not yet agree despite these instructions being revealed by diplomatic 
contacts as far less strict in reality.1401  
 
Clearly the Indian broadside was a major challenge. However, because of other dynamics at 
play, the R2P section would emerge unscathed with no removal of R2P from the section 
title. Here the bigger picture ensured any last-minute opposition would be dissipated by the 
introduction of a clean document only on the morning of the 13th. Recognising that 
something had to be done the Secretariat – under the instruction of Annan and Ping – had 
overnight pulled together the working text of the draft and removed all language deemed 
unachievable, made a number of alterations based upon previous and continuing 
discussions with member states, and removed bracketing around some issues which states 
had failed to reconcile1402. The result for R2P was the removal of the remaining bracketing 
around the title1403. The result for the overall negotiations was a text which was presented 
to states by Annan and asked to take-it-or-leave it. With world leaders arriving,1404 and no 
                                                          
1398
 Interviews with John Dauth (London, 25 May 2010), Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009): according to Traub 
five alternative names were developed, (2006) The Best Intentions, p385 
1399
 Interview with Allan Rock (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1400
 Private interview (25 June 2010) 
1401
 Private interview (13 August 2010): There is some confusion about whether UK Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw became directly involved with his ministerial counterpart. In any case the FCO was asked to make 
contact with the Indian government and it was during these contacts the UK established that Indian Capital-
instructions were not as clear or strict as they had been led to believe. Allan Rock also asked Paul Martin to 
become directly discussed the matter with his opposite number Manmohan Singh, with this unsuccessful 
because Singh was already travelling to New York 
1402
 Based on interviews but for a more detailed account see Traub (2006) The Best Intentions, p388-391 
1403
 The Indian delegation did not get back to Rock with an answer on the title so the decision was to ‘go with 
what we had’ and see if that was acceptable, interview (Ottawa, 11 June 2009) 
1404
 Knowledge that some 150 leaders would be attending the Summit was an important factor throughout the 
negotiations, but especially during the final week, private interviews (3 August 2010, 13 August 2010, 31 
March 2010), and ‘Remarks by Ambassador Anne W. Patterson, Acting US Permanent Representative to the 
UN, on UN Reform’, 16 June 2005 
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individual state willing to destroy the entire outcome, the GA duly accepted the adoption of 
the draft document1405 thus enabling the adoption of the Summit Outcome on the 16th. 1406 
 
  
                                                          
1405
 Draft outcome document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005, 
A/RES/59/314, 13 September 2005 
1406
 World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005 
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Conclusion 
 
Viewed through the prism of the NLC, and similarly broad frames such as that employed by 
the leading historians of R2P, the responsibility to protect could be considered an 
institutionalized norm moving towards general acceptance by the end of the 2005 World 
Summit. This thesis has attempted to challenge that reading of the normative development 
of R2P by conducting detailed research focused on the processes that led to the formation 
and development of the R2P negotiation structure and the eventual political outcome. The 
hypothesis that micro-process tracing would uncover a very different story to that portrayed 
in much scholarly literature has been sustained by evidence of continuing dissensus among 
those involved in its negotiation. That dissensus is evident in the failure of states to engage 
with the ICISS process, in the plurality of responses to the various international crises that 
framed the negotiation, and in the World Summit negotiations themselves which yielded a 
broad but normatively shallow agreement. Despite the significant investment by key 
entrepreneurs and governments and despite the considerable institutional support from the 
UK Secretary-General’s Office the thought that R2P is a new norm, that the argument has 
“been won”, or that consensus is now settled, is clearly overstated. The process leading to 
the adoption of the Outcome – which was not unanimous1407 – was a stark reminder of the 
limitations of multilateralism, but also a statement of its importance and possibility. In many 
respects the process was unsatisfactory: the scale of the agenda was essentially 
unmanageable; the lack of membership buy-in to the approach was palpable; the failings 
with the facilitated Summit process, leading to a major shift in the process just weeks before 
the world’s most powerful individuals were due to descend on New York, stretched already 
limited time and resources to breaking point. Considering how the process unfolded, it is 
not surprising that the last minute intervention of the Secretariat was required to undercut 
remaining hostility however undesirable, and symbolic, it was. Paradoxically, however, 
these factors were also to R2P’s benefit. Its negotiation certainly required extraordinary 
effort and dedication. Without the enormous commitment of selected governments and 
                                                          
1407
 Contrary to the oft-claimed unanimity Cuba and Venezuela adopted reserved positions, with both explicitly 
criticising R2P, see: ‘Statement by Venezuela’, A/60/PV.8, 16 September 2005, ‘Statement by Cuba’, 
A/60/PV.8, 16 September 2005. Too often however the agreement is described as unanimous, or as a clear 
acceptance by all UN members. This clearly was not the case, not just because of the reserved positions of 
Cuba and Venezuela but because how that unanimity is described in relation to R2P often overstates what 
many other member states believed they were signing-up to 
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individual ambassadors/officials, there would not have been any clear acceptance of 
primary responsibility nor the recognition that the international community has a legitimate 
role and interest in trying to address the causes and symptoms of extreme crises. This 
commitment was clearly evident in the extensive reconstruction of the negotiation of the 
language provided herein. But equally important were the set of factors captured under the 
umbrella of the structured outcome logic. Without these, the rapid, unexpected 
development of the “responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity” would surely not have been possible. Of course, one 
might argue this is an irrelevant counterfactual. That in any case there was agreement on 
R2P and that it is this recognition which really matters. But this would represent a major 
denial of the implications understanding the process has for understanding the nature and 
significance of the agreement. Indeed, there can be no sustainable separation between the 
factors which helped propel R2P towards agreement, and the form it eventually assumed. 
These dimensions not only enabled agreement, but also contribute[d] to qualifying its scope 
and meaning. Thus, though the effort to deconstruct and then reconstruct the negotiation 
process has been an inevitably complex, the rewards it yields have been multitudinous.  
 
Indeed, although the detailed account of the 2005 negotiation process is central to the 
overall thesis, the benefits of the adopted research approach are evident throughout. At 
each stage – from Axworthy’s willingness to lead on the issue of humanitarian intervention, 
through the changed political context precipitated by 9/11 and Iraq, and the difficult and 
unsatisfactory attempts to build support for R2P – the process-tracing methodology yielded 
numerous insights directly relevant to how we understand the agreement of R2P, and the 
development of international norms and agreements more generally. The findings are 
undeniably about the specific question of how and why R2P was agreed but the analytical 
weight of the thesis is, consequently, much deeper. It speaks, inter alia, to the importance 
of methodology, of grounding our insights in their proper historical context, and to ensuring 
empirical narrative is neither artificially separate from theoretical conceptualization nor 
defined by it.  
 
The net effect is that the overall approach contributes important arguments across three 
interconnected dimensions. First, the empirical tracing of R2P’s political development 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
346 
 
provides an important historical contribution to the existing literature. It is certainly the case 
that the findings confirm and reiterate, albeit in considerably greater detail, important 
facets of the story already prevalent in existing accounts. But the emphasis on detailed 
process-tracing also helped pinpoint where the empirical story offered new insights and/or 
departed from the established accounts of R2P’s development. Indeed, as a general 
principle, the approach was always about maintaining rigour so the story was full, 
convincing and credible and thus could stand alone on its own terms. Resultantly, the 
empirical chapters delved into the micro-politics surrounding the effort to build support for 
R2P, the persistent obstacles to its development, and the unexpected transformation in its 
political prospects with the establishment of the High-level Panel and the merging of the 
processes leading to the World Summit. The research approach, however, was never about 
detail for details sake. Rather, the detail gave weight to the overall thesis arguments and 
vividly showed just why the agreement of R2P should be considered in far less glowing 
terms than is often the case. The most obvious example in this regard was the clear 
demonstration of how the constitutive dynamics of the structured outcome affected the 
development of R2P and why it should affect (and qualify) our understanding of its status, 
significance and potential impact. But though the explanatory power of the structured 
outcome derives from its ability to explain the unexpected transition in R2P’s prospects, it 
was also clear that the structural characteristics which helped propel R2P towards 
agreement gain their meaning from the broader context in which they reside. In simple 
terms, the structured outcome was about packaging what changed for R2P considering the 
persistent underlying continuity of state opposition and indifference. Seen from this 
perspective, its conception depended upon tracing the entire process – from Axworthy’s 
response to the intervention issue, to the agreement of the World Summit Outcome. The 
fading-out of the humanitarian intervention debate, the obstacles manifest in the ICISS 
establishment processes, the inherent issues with R2P report, the changed political context 
and subsequent formulation of the Bush Doctrine leading to the Iraq War, and the 
seemingly paradoxical positive impact of the latter on R2P’s path to agreement, are all key 
elements of the broader context necessary to understand the conception and impact of the 
structured outcome. In each of these areas new or alternative arguments are made, with 
new details and insights introduced. But perhaps more important is how they are packaged 
to address the central research question. This is why the structured outcome is particularly 
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important to the overall picture. It derives from the process-driven methodology, but also 
speaks to limitations in key portrayals of R2P’s development, in pre-existing theoretical 
frameworks of normative development, and has consequences for how we understand the 
significance of the 2005 agreement.  
 
Indeed, the theoretical issues addressed by the thesis, and how its core arguments relate to 
the broader R2P policy debates, represent the second and third dimensions referred to 
above. As explained in the introduction and Chapter 1, the thesis makes some important 
claims about the importance of process and about how scholars should adapt their 
understanding of normative change. It also shows how the incorporation of a detailed 
understanding of process can provide a stronger basis for engaging with debates about the 
behavioural impact of norms and associated offshoots such as the political, ethical and 
normative implications of the agreement. More specifically, it is contended that a more 
detailed understanding of process has generalizable power as does – albeit in a considerably 
more qualified way – the concept of the structured outcome. Aside from the findings on R2P 
giving weight to these claims, the empirical findings also fundamentally question the 
amenability of a case like R2P to theoretical modelling. The findings question the extent to 
which one could, or would want to model such complex processes, and indeed whether it is 
possible to provide genuinely convincing theoretical models of normative change. Despite 
the original intention to use the Norm Life Cycle (NLC) as the theoretical framework its 
prominence and influence in the norm literature did not translate to its ability to account for 
the development of R2P. One could attempt to mould the story of R2P’s development to a 
pre-existing conceptual frame like the NLC but this would represent selectivism of the worst 
kind. Put simply, the empirical findings did not support the reducibility of the process in 
such a way. The dynamics which underlay R2P’s path to agreement were temporally and 
substantively distinct from those evident in, or implied by, the NLC. They thus required a 
distinct explanation. Hence, the alternative approach outlined in Chapter 1 was the 
introduction of a looser non-patterned conceptual framework designed to understand the 
specific development of R2P. Crucially, this framework was extracted from the empirical 
tracing rather than pre-determined in the abstract. This is not to say that it did not draw 
from pre-existing literature and concepts, but that their use was about serving a clear and 
specific objective.  
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In more precise terms, claims relating to the theoretical contribution of the research are 
necessarily varied. As already stated, the findings certainly take issue with the utility and 
desirability of non-case specific theoretical models or frameworks. It does not follow, 
however, that this undermines the importance of theorizing. Quite the reverse is true in 
fact. Addressing previously identified problems such as linearity and norm exogenization 
depend just as much on theorizing as they do upon empirical research. In order to advance 
our understanding of normative developments scholars need to continually refine the tools 
and concepts they use to explain such complex phenomena. The real issue is how this work 
is pursued. In this respect, the structured outcome may be R2P-specific in what it sets out to 
do but its development was also very much conceptual. It was developed to explain a vital 
change in R2P’s prospects despite the seeming lack of change to the normative terrain or to 
the willingness of states to embrace the idea. By contrast, a framework such as the NLC 
projects a more progressive, linear, unidirectional trajectory onto normative development 
than was sustained by the empirical testing of the research hypothesis in respect of R2P. 
Thus, it is entirely possible that as well as highlighting these kinds of weaknesses, the 
structured outcome may represent a small contribution to the process of refining the way 
scholars approach the study of negotiated international norms. Its applicability to other 
cases would inevitably be context-specific and distinctly defined, but it may help address 
and package the impact of structural factors on the negotiation of international agreements.  
 
This, however, is very much a small claim. The more significant claim is that the use of micro 
process-tracing can yield a more detailed understanding of potential compliance with 
international norms and agreements. In this case the empirical tracing has shown how this 
methodology can help mitigate theoretical pitfalls associated with broader frames, or 
abstract frameworks, and offers a more detailed, nuanced account of how R2P was agreed 
than currently available in the mainstream literature. In particular, the research approach 
helps mitigate the associated issues with exogenization by ensuring R2P’s meaning and 
status is not taken for granted. It also addresses the propensity to view normative 
development in linear terms and directly challenges advocacy-infused biases which bestow 
an assumed meaning and teleological progressivity upon R2P. But as the introduction made 
very clear, addressing the research question of how we could account for the 2005 
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agreement was about more than theoretical considerations, or a detailed historical account 
of its development and negotiation, or critiquing existing accounts or claims which were so 
obviously problematic. These are all undoubtedly essential elements, but they collectively 
speak to the bigger issue of what the overall approach, and specific findings, say about R2P’s 
status and significance within the context of broader policy debates. Here the findings of 
each chapter – and the conclusions drawn from them – do not add up to a positive picture. 
It is especially difficult to square the positive hype associated with the concept and the 
grand claims made by prominent figures like Gareth Evans with the explanation of how R2P 
was agreed presented throughout. Moreover, events since 2005 – most notably the on-
going catastrophe in Syria – have only added weight to the critical nature of the thesis 
findings.  
 
The most powerful concern with R2P is that it was (and remains) fundamentally non-
transformational. Not only did the processes reveal a lack of change, but they also exposed 
a lack of member state willingness to change. The Summit negotiations were the clearest 
expression of the limited nature of R2P but this process essentially gave full expression to 
the lack of transformational dynamics which underlay its path to agreement. This was 
borne-out by each stage of the story. As the prehistory showed, the pronounced public and 
private debate around the issue of humanitarian intervention reached its apex point at the 
end of the 1990s. But any sense of high-level political momentum which had built-up – not 
least because of the efforts of Kofi Annan and the UK government – quickly dissipated in the 
face of harsh political realities. This was further evidenced by the detailed tracing of the 
ICISS establishment process in Chapter 3. Axworthy’s unique political drive to respond in the 
way he did was all the more remarkable considering it operated against overwhelming 
indifference and lack of support for an initiative originally intended to be truly international 
in the state support it commanded. Significantly, this ‘fading-out’ of interest in the issue of 
humanitarian intervention preceded the shock of 9/11. The 9/11 terrorist attacks 
exacerbated the ‘fading out’ of interest in state willingness to discuss an idea related to 
humanitarian intervention but did not cause it. Inevitably, the ability to bring attention to 
the ICISS report was overwhelmed by other concerns in the post-9/11 context. As Chapter 4 
showed, terrorism – and crafting responses to it – dominated domestic and international 
agendas. The result of this was not only a more difficult environment for an idea attached to 
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a policy debate which was already subject to a lack of momentum, but the implementation 
of regressive policies which undermined the concern for human rights protection which R2P 
apparently spoke to. Unsurprisingly, Canadian officials were unable to achieve any real 
traction for the idea within the UN or any real momentum in the intergovernmental 
advocacy they undertook on behalf of their Government.  
 
Indeed, as Chapters 4 and 5 showed, the real and paradoxical change for R2P was 
precipitated by the Iraq War and specifically the breakdown in state relations it led to. 
Despite being oft regarded as a negative in terms of the development of R2P, Iraq actually 
represented the principle exogenous shock which enhanced R2P’s political prospects. It 
provided the impetus for Annan’s High-Level Panel (HLP) assessment of how existing 
international structures dealt with threats to international peace and security, and how they 
might be changed to address a raft of long-standing and emergent policy issues. In terms of 
the substance of R2P, the High-level Panel’s proposals were essentially unrealistic and 
detached from the consistent underlying political dynamics. Despite its bold assertions – 
particularly those relating to international responsibility – there had been no significant 
change to the priorities and preferences of states. The normative character which defined 
its proposals was out-of-kilter with the realities of international politics and represented a 
gross denial of the state of existing political consensus, or rather, existing political 
disagreement and disunity. This was ultimately confirmed during the World Summit 
negotiations. The negotiated formulation of R2P captured the lack of underlying change that 
was a consistent factor in the processes of its development. Indeed, the politics surrounding 
R2P’s desirability as a normative evolution in the nature of international responsibility was 
defined by continuity, not change. Disinterest, indifference and opposition to the idea of a 
collective international responsibility defined this continuity – hence the inability of R2P 
supporters to achieve any catalytic momentum which might yield more significant 
normative change. But ultimately, it was because of this lack of post-ICISS change that Iraq 
and the establishment of the HLP assumed the significance they did. The HLP became the 
institutional vehicle which helped propel R2P forward, and was the central ‘linking 
mechanism’ in the structured outcome explanation. In other words Iraq and the HLP helped 
explain the dynamics which did change in R2P’s favour. R2P was propelled by a series of 
factors relating to the design and effect of the negotiation process rather than any catalytic 
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bandwagoning momentum. As Chapter 5 showed, in many respects states were compelled 
to take a position on R2P which they otherwise would not have been so willing to make. The 
odds of some kind of agreement on R2P increased dramatically. That said, though the 
dynamics underpinning R2P’s path to agreement were altered and accelerated by the 
structural factors, the underlying politics of state reactions to R2P were much more 
consistent. Hence the Summit negotiations were about limiting its scope and recognising 
and reaffirming the status quo.  
 
Nevertheless, the structured outcome does more than account for how R2P was agreed. 
The way R2P was accelerated towards agreement certainly helps explain the limited nature 
of the agreement but it also has additional consequences for how understand the 
significance and status of R2P. Indeed, the rapid, unexpected speed of R2P’s development 
has only served to emphasize just how un-transformational the agreement was. Post-
agreement contestation and questioning should always be anticipated, but in this case once 
the structural factors which propelled it towards agreement were removed a reopening of 
contestation and debate was even more likely. This is because not only was the formulation 
about ensuring R2P represented ‘nothing new’ – thus ensuring state responses to specific 
crises would remain subject to the same politics and obstacles – but because getting to the 
point of negotiation was never underpinned by normative change of the kind necessary to 
catalyse a more significant change in state behaviour. Although there has been continued 
effort to attribute R2P’s existence – and the language of responsibility more broadly 
(despite pre-dating the R2P processes) – as evidence of changes to state behaviour and 
policy considerations, the picture is considerably more complex and considerably less 
positive. As stated earlier, the mere linguistic existence of R2P is not a sufficient reason to 
believe it has had any significant impact upon state behaviour/practice. Indeed, not only 
does the empirical tracing of the process challenge the idea that the agreement was going 
to positively impact upon state behaviour but complex cases in the period since 2005 – most 
notably Sri Lanka, Syria and Libya – have reaffirmed what the process-tracing always 
revealed. The gap between words and action is not just stark (perhaps more so than it has 
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ever been) but the selectivity, indifference and inaction which were key elements in 
provoking the development of R2P remain unaddressed.1408 
 
That R2P remains controversial is undeniable. Because of how R2P was agreed, because of 
the political connotations which continue to surround it, because each element of the 
limited agreement will inevitably remain subject to contestation and debate, its impact and 
utility is rightly open to question. Rather troubling, however, is that despite the numerous 
weaknesses identified by the process, and evident since 2005, – most notably the persistent 
underlying continuities in international responses to mass atrocities – the debate is now 
increasingly dominated and overwhelmed by the R2P label. Problematically, this dominance 
is despite R2P’s non-transformational nature; is to the detriment of other alternative policy 
avenues; and is arguably negatively impacting upon the ability of the UN to act in certain 
cases. The agreement’s limitations are so stark, the existing political context so continually 
resistant, the continuing failures of engagement so unchanged, that – to put it very simply – 
it cannot be ‘all or nothing’ for R2P. While the R2P lobby may continue to work to insulate 
the concept from harsh realities, academics and policy-makers should consider an 
alternative path. The debate needs to be re-energized in a way which is not beholden to, or 
dominated by, R2P. The lack of underlying change surely demands greater consideration of 
other alternative approaches for addressing the issues which motivated the development of 
                                                          
1408
 To be clear, selectivity and inaction are not necessarily always bad, or immoral. Addressing case specific 
crises inevitably means variation in responses are necessary and appropriate. Decision-making on any decision 
to act will always be bound-up with a range of considerations. Explaining non-action in particular is not always 
about cynical intentions or a lack of political will – the appropriateness of action exists in, and is defined by, 
this context. Moreover, as the empirical processes exposed, it would be a fallacy to think this can ever be 
edited out of the decision-making process. The political feasibility, let alone desirability, of greater specificity 
(for instance through the agreement of use of force criteria) was, and remains, an entirely unrealistic prospect. 
From a more general perspective, the consideration of ethical consequences needs to carry far greater weight 
in the debate about possible international action than is currently the case. As one wise former diplomat 
remarked 'feel good is much easier and more tempting than do good'. Indeed, future research would 
interrogate this thought based on the contention that insufficient time, resources, and attention are deployed 
in both the consideration and practical implementation of international responses. A central feature of such a 
project would focus on the consequences of both action, and inaction, without assuming one is necessarily 
more morally acceptable than the other. Similarly it would pay great attention to the importance of 
incorporating the temporal characteristics of a crisis, and of international engagement, into our analysis of the 
effectiveness and appropriateness of approaches utilized by international actors. It would also consider the 
political and practical consequences of the R2P agenda as it has developed since 2005. In this regard, the effort 
to emphasize the preventive dimension of R2P – in accordance with the three pillar approach crafted by Ed 
Luck – is arguably a misnomer which confuses the debate. Privileging the political continuity of R2P is 
intellectually weak if it means relegating or overlooking the more contentious aspects of the debate, most 
notably those relating to coercive measures, military action, and the lines relating to international 
responsibilities vis-à-vis sovereignty 
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R2P in the first place. In this respect, the empirical tracing of R2P’s development represents 
a major contribution in that it details and pinpoints the limitations of the 2005 agreement 
by showing how they reflected continuity in the politics which underpinned it. Because of 
this pinpointing the limitations and lack of change evident today comes as little surprise. It is 
also significant in that the research question was never framed by inherent support for R2P. 
As the research unfolded it was certainly framed by an increasing concern at the portrayal 
of R2P in mainstream debate, but the overriding objective was to account for the 
development of R2P in order to consider its status and potential impact in international 
affairs. It is because of this that the findings anchor the thesis in critical terrain. The debate 
surrounding mass atrocities is not about R2P. It is much broader, and much more significant 
than that. R2P may well eventually offer greater utility as a policy agenda but based on the 
findings here this would require a significant departure from the existing state of play, and 
more significant changes to international society. 
 
Difficult as it maybe for some to accept, understanding the origins and development of R2P 
and considering them in light of events since 2005, means it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that very little has changed in how the international community responds to (potential) 
mass atrocity situations. Although cases like Kenya (2007) and Libya (2011) have been held 
up as successful action influenced or motivated by R2P, its influence on the action taken by 
international actors is far less clear-cut than suggested by some.1409 There is no 
straightforward causal link between the mere existence of R2P and action potentially 
consistent with it. As demonstrated pre-R2P, the international community – and specifically 
the SC – have long had a range of tools at their disposal. The crucial point was that the kind 
of tools used, and the extent of their use, was dependent upon multilateral agreement. This 
is particularly relevant in the case of Kenya whereby the use of longstanding instruments of 
international engagement – most notably mediation – were attributed as a classic case of 
R2P in action. But as the prehistory showed, not only do such tools predate R2P but they 
have been deployed on a number of occasions by the international community in the effort 
to influence internal conflict situations relating to oppression or government negligence. At 
                                                          
1409
 See, for instance, Ban Ki-Moon’s comments in relation to the SC’s agreement of Resolution 1973 over 
Libya, in ‘Statement by the Secretary-General on Libya’, 17 March 2011, and Gareth Evans (2011) ‘End of the 
Argument: How we won the debate over stopping genoicde’, Foreign Affairs, December 2011, Ramesh Thakur 
(2011) ‘Libya: The First Stand or The Last Post for the Responsibility to Protect?’, e-IR, 13 March 2011 
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the heart of the humanitarian intervention debates, the issue was never that the 
international community was prevented from acting per se or indeed that it never acted in 
response to internal crises. The issue was that it too often failed to act effectively despite 
the ability to do so, including in circumstances which might reasonably have benefited from 
more concerted international action. In the case of Kenya, and especially that of Libya, there 
is minimal evidence to suggest that R2P significantly altered the nature of international 
action, or the impetus for it. Nor is there any reason to believe that the action that was 
pursued would not have been forthcoming had R2P not existed. Moreover, an analysis of 
each crisis would likely lead to more significant questions about the effectiveness of the 
preventive mediation in Kenya, and the limited military action in Libya. In the former, 
current concern about imminent risk of mass atrocities provokes questions about just how 
successful, speedy, and sustainable international action in 2007 really was.1410 Similarly, in 
the latter, aside from inevitable concerns about the long-term future of Libya and post-
conflict support by international actors, the unintended consequences of the crisis on the 
surrounding region threaten long-term stability and enhance the likely need for significant 
future redress.1411  
 
Problematically, however, there is a tendency amongst key advocates to selectively 
overstate R2P’s impact in such cases, and to conveniently plead mitigation for, or overlook, 
those cases where R2P has failed to catalyse effective international responses.1412 But such 
a strategy is both undesirable and unsustainable. The impact of R2P has been all too limited 
precisely because it was never designed to represent, nor provoke, significant change. 
Considering what is at stake, it would be quite wrong to privilege the concept’s preservation 
over the need to consider alternative strategies. This is all the more pressing considering 
how the agreement was crafted. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, the 2005 agreement was 
political in every way. It offered no new obligations or responsibilities and contained 
                                                          
1410
 On current concern about the situation in Kenya see the bimonthly bulletin by the Global Centre for R2P 
‘R2P Monitor’, Issue 7, 15 January 2013, pp.9-10, Serena Sharma’s forthcoming book should address questions 
relating to the events of 2007, in (2013) Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect: The Case of Kenya, 
Routledge 
1411
 The effect of the Libyan conflict has been particularly felt in the Sahel region with policy-makers seeking to 
understand the threat and potential consequences as a result. See for instance European Parliament (2012) ‘A 
Coherent EU Strategy for the Sahel’, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union 
1412
 Aidan Hehir makes a similar point in (2012) The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention, p11 
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numerous qualifying caveats designed to ensure existing processes and provisions were 
maintained. The agreement also maintained a distinct normative separation between the 
individual state and international dimensions of R2P. This is not to say that the language 
cannot offer a potentially useful way of framing individual state accountability. But R2P was 
intended to offer far more than this considering the origins of its creation.  
 
Indeed, understanding the formulation of the agreement is so crucial because it helps 
understand why international responses to crises in Sri Lanka, the DRC, Syria and Libya 
support the critical findings of this thesis. The agreement incorporated a pragmatic 
recognition that responses had to be case-by-case – there was no obvious (or desirable) 
doctrinal solution to the complexities of international responses, particularly those of a 
more coercive nature. This was necessary, and entirely acceptable, but it also reinforced the 
multiple political obstacles and talking-points which would have to be overcome by 
diplomacy for action to be realized. And, as the proposed options move towards the more 
coercive end of the spectrum so the challenges to agreement inevitably increase. But 
complicating this was that the case-by-case reference was embedded in broader set of 
qualifying caveats which themselves spoke to a range of distinct underlying motivations. The 
net effect of this effort to narrow and qualify the agreement was to arguably make political 
agreement even more difficult– not least because the emphasis on primary responsibility 
can provide a powerful avenue for the avoidance of action at the international-level. Such 
issues have been on display in relation to crises in the DRC, Syria, and Sri Lanka. In differing 
ways these have demonstrated R2P’s inherent weakness and failure to address the issues 
which had defined the humanitarian intervention debate. But at the heart of all has been 
the continued inability or willingness of the SC to effectively engage with a crisis or to agree 
potential solutions. The impact of R2P on the political process has also been clearly limited. 
For instance, in the 2009 case of Sri Lanka the loss of civilian loss and the alleged war crimes 
committed by the Sri Lankan government garnered a wholly inadequate response by the SC 
and international community more broadly. Moreover, the use of R2P – to pressure the Sri 
Lankan government or to catalyse international responses – was minimal to say the least. 
But on the few occasions when R2P was referenced its impact was essentially non-existent. 
Even more problematically its use was actually regarded in negative terms. As a recent UN 
Report explained:  
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[R2P] was raised occasionally during the final stages of the conflict, but to no useful 
result. Differing perceptions among Member States and the Secretariat of the 
concept’s meaning and use had become so contentious as to nullify its potential 
value. Indeed, making references to the Responsibility to Protect was seen as more 
likely to weaken rather than strengthen UN action.1413 
 
Interestingly, however, the Sri Lankan government was also defended, with some suggesting 
that its targeting of the Tamil Tigers was consistent with its R2P considering the history and 
record of the latter. 1414 This debate invoked the concerns raised in Chapter 4 as to what 
action is consistent with individual state responsibility and to what degree the framework 
provided by R2P can be appropriated as a mechanism to justify government action 
inconsistent with the objective of protecting civilians. Meanwhile, the recent (on-going) case 
of Syria has once again emphasized how challenging political agreement is, and how civilians 
continue to suffer as a result of an inadequate understanding of how to respond to intra-
state conflicts and the underlying inability of the international system to address them. The 
silence on R2P has also been undeniably deafening: a tragic indictment of just how little has 
changed. Indeed, rather than the positive implied by some, the 2011 Libyan intervention 
also spoke to the persistent obstacles to achieving political agreement within the SC, and 
reiterated some of the key concerns highlighted by the empirical tracing. In particular, 
concerns about the relationship between R2P and regime change remains an unresolved 
feature of the debate. This is despite the considerable effort to conceptually insulate R2P 
during the Summit negotiations by delineating its parameters, and qualifying its scope and 
application. Nevertheless, persistent concerns and suspicion relating to the motives of those 
either pushing for action or those arguing against it were all too prevalent over Libya, with 
China and Russia both especially animated by the potential precedential implications of the 
action.1415 And though the story of the intervention is far more complex than can be 
addressed here, that NATO (with Saudi Arabia and Qatar) expanded the limited No-fly Zone 
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1414
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12 June 2009 
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mandate laid-down by SC Resolution 1973 gave justified ammunition to those who doubted 
the intentions of the enterprise.1416 Unsurprisingly, this has contributed to exacerbating the 
already divided political climate, manifesting itself most clearly in the SC’s inability to agree 
numerous resolutions relating to the situation in Syria. But perhaps more fundamental was 
that the impact of R2P on the underlying politics was negligible, with the Libyan episode 
most revealing precisely because of the way it illuminated the lack of change, the limited 
scope of the agreement and the persistent obstacles to a more consistent and engaged SC. 
R2P did nothing to change the SC’s existing prerogatives and did not alter its pre-existing 
ability to act. In this case, the intervention was possible because of a convenient alignment 
of factors relating to the specific politics of the unfolding events.1417  There is limited 
evidence to believe R2P was the driving impulse to act. Resolution 1973 referred to the 
Libyan government’s primary responsibility but made no link to the action taken by the 
international community.1418 This is not to say that humanitarian concerns and the rhetoric 
of Muammar Gaddafi were not part of the justificatory mix, but they existed within a 
broader set of more significant factors. In this case, regional sentiment combined with the 
geostrategic importance of Libya, the proposed limited nature of the engagement, and the 
history of the Gaddafi regime were more significant factors in explaining both the action 
taken by NATO and the SC abstentions of the BRIC nations. Indeed, the five abstentions – 
including most notably by Russia and China – spoke to a desire for ‘distance’ between 
themselves and responsibility for the action and was thus hardly a convincing example of 
the supposed power or acceptance of R2P.1419 But perhaps more significant was that the 
Libya case demonstrated the SC’s ability to act if unique circumstances align but that the 
associated politics remain contested and hardly the basis to expect or anticipate future 
action. In the context of the immediate post-Cold War era, Resolution 1973 was hardly 
unique, and rather than solidifying or signifying R2P as a driving impulse, merely confirmed 
the status quo continuity which underpinned its development.1420  
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 Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011), 17 March 2011 , p1 see also Jennifer Welsh’s discussion of the 
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 See Simon Chesterman (2011) ‘”Leading from Behind”: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, 
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This status quo speaks to the continued predominance of ‘expediency’ over ‘humanitarian 
need’.1421 As the negotiations traced in 2005 clearly demonstrated, at the heart of the 
agreement on R2P was maintaining existing P5 prerogatives and explicitly avoiding any 
sense of obligation or acceptance of an international responsibility to protect. It is highly 
likely the SC will endorse action in the future consistent with the ethos of R2P or 
humanitarian intervention, but this is very different from a SC being driven to act by R2P 
and does little to address the issues and inactivity which motivated its development. The 
ability of the SC to be selective was always built-into the agreement, partly through 
pragmatism and, in the wider context of the linguistic caveats, as a way of guarding against 
the move towards an international system many states were simply unwilling to accept.  
 
In this regard, the foremost contribution of this research has been the detailed unpacking of 
the agreement to expose its constitutive core elements. Vitally, this unpacking was based 
upon an extensive charting and exposition of the formulation of the language based upon 
the development of the text, including the changes made, and why they were made. In 
particular, this exposition revealed pronounced differentiation between the two dimensions 
of R2P. Contrary to any alternative bold normative claims, there was no straightforward 
expression or acceptance of an international or collective responsibility to protect. There 
was an acceptance of a responsibility to help, and an acknowledgement that further 
measures by the international community may be necessary if the circumstances are 
extreme enough to warrant it, but only then within the parameters of legal process. In 
effect, this international dimension restated tools and processes already available to the 
international community, and particularly the SC (ones which have been progressively 
developing since the end of the CW). It was about capturing what already existed. Hence the 
agreements’ value-added should be understood more fundamentally in terms of the 
recognition of individual state responsibility rather than anything else. But to pre-empt an 
important – but ultimately futile – counterargument, one might ask what the difference is 
between what is described here and the idea the agreement was to use Annan’s words, 
‘acceptance of the responsibility by the international community to protect in situations 
                                                          
1421
 Hehir (2012) The Responsibility to Protect, p20 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
359 
 
where Governments fail, or are unable or unwilling to protect their own citizens’.1422 This, 
however, would be based far more upon ideational preference than on actual 
understanding of how and why the agreement was crafted as it was. It would have, and has 
had, the effect of raising/distorting expectations, of reawakening fears amongst the many 
nervous states about what the R2P is/was really about, and in so doing not just threaten its 
future development, but make future regression a more likely prospect. In any case, 
fundamentally it would misrepresent/overstate the extent of member state agreement. As 
shown throughout this thesis, the development of R2P into the negotiations was defined 
not by any bandwagoning dynamic but by a series of structuring factors.1423 Once part of the 
negotiating agenda, the dynamics shifted to an engagement designed to limit its scope, to 
speak to the nervous middle ground, to ensure it did not represent anything new or 
fundamentally alter existing interpretation of what the Charter already provided for. Such 
dynamics where matched by numerous amendments, changes and deletions designed to 
ensure the core elements of R2P were defined with sufficient precision to give them 
meaning, and limit the potential space for alternative interpretations. Attempting to dismiss 
the negotiated distinctions, subtleties, and changes identified here as mere semantics, 
should be pursued only at one’s peril. However frustrating it may be for some, the R2P of 
the Summit Outcome is not the R2P of the ICISS Report, of the HLP Report, of Annan’s ILF, or 
what some advocates wish it, and will it, to be. We should thus avoid characterising it as 
such or risk threatening its already questionable utility. But conversely, if we recognize R2P 
was sold, negotiated and agreed not as an ex nihilo agreement but as an extrapolation of 
pre-existing processes and provisions, we are not only better placed to unpack its core 
elements to understand future (domestic/international) compliance, but are also better 
equipped to develop a research agenda predicated upon the development of 
methodological tools applicable to all aspects of normative change and agreement. Indeed, 
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one of the principal revelations about this research has been that even with constructivism 
well-established in IR, understanding the formation, meaning and impact of inter-subjective 
meanings requires a more developed willingness to ensure that an engagement with 
process underpins all stages of the analytical endeavour. This requires commitment, as well 
as an epistemological and methodological tool-box commensurate with the underlying 
social process-driven ontology. But it is worthwhile. Moreover, to dispel an oft-expressed 
myth, process is not ignorant of outcomes: process is about outcomes. The distinction is 
that process helps guard against misguided or overly-optimistic assumptions of meaning too 
often used to prioritize impact. This is invaluable where R2P is concerned, and so, having 
developed such an approach here, the foundations of a more nuanced understanding of R2P 
and normative developments have been laid. The task now is to build on them.  
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Appendix 1: R2P from ICISS to World Summit 
 
“The Responsibility to Protect”: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (December 2001) 
 
SYNOPSIS 
 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: CORE PRINCIPLES 
 
(1) BASIC PRINCIPLES  
 
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection 
of its people lies with the state itself. 
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
repression or state failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or 
avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect. 
 
(2) FOUNDATIONS 
 
The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international 
community of states, lie in: 
 
A. Obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty; 
B. The responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the 
maintenance of international peace and security; 
C. Specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, 
covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; 
D. The developing practice of states, regional organizations and the Security Council itself.  
 
(3) ELEMENTS 
 
The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities: 
 
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of 
internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. 
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with 
appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and 
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.  
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full 
assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the 
harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.  
 
(4) PRIORITIES 
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A. Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: 
prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, 
and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.  
B. The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less 
intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive 
ones are applied.  
 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION 
 
(1) THE JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD 
 
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary 
measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human 
beings, or imminently like to occur, of the following kind:  
 
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the 
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed 
state situation; or 
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, 
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.  
 
(2) THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES 
 
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives 
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is 
better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and 
the victims concerned.  
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option 
for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with 
reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.  
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military 
intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection 
objective.  
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or 
averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequence of 
action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.  
 
(3) RIGHT AUTHORITY 
 
A. There is no better or more appropriate body that the United Nations Security Council to 
authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find 
alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security 
Council work better than it has.  
B. Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military 
intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally 
request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or 
have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter. 
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C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene 
where there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should 
in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might 
support a military intervention.  
D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their 
veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the 
passage of resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes 
for which there is otherwise majority support. 
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, 
alternative options are:  
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session 
under the   “Uniting for Peace” procedure; and 
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under 
Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the 
Security Council. 
F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to 
discharge its responsibility to protect in conscious-shocking situations crying out for 
action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency 
of that situation – and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer 
thereby.  
 
(4)   OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
 
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match. 
B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and 
unequivocal communications and chain of command. 
C. Acceptance of limitations, Incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the 
objective being protection of a population, not a defeat of a state. 
D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle 
of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law. 
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principle objective. 
F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.  
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“A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”: Report of High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change (December 2004) 
 
2. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and external threats 
 
193. In the case of a State posing a threat to other States, people outside its borders or to 
international order more generally, the language of Chapter VII is inherently broad enough, 
and has been interpreted broadly enough, to allow the Security Council to approve any 
coercive act ion at all, including military action, against a State when it deems this 
“necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”. That is the case 
whether the threat is occurring now, in the imminent future or more distant future; 
whether it involves the State’s own actions or those of non-State actors it harbours or 
supports; or whether it takes the form of an act or omission, an actual or potential act of 
violence or simply a challenge to the Council’s authority. 
 
194. We emphasize that the concerns we expressed about the legality of the preventive use 
of military force in the case of self-defence under Article 51 are not applicable in the case of 
collective action authorized under Chapter VII. In the world of the twenty -first century, the 
international community does have to be concerned about nightmare scenarios combining 
terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and irresponsible States, and much more besides, 
which may conceivably justify the use of force, not just reactively but preventively and 
before a latent threat becomes imminent. The question is not whether such action can be 
taken: it can, by the Security Council as the international community’s collective security 
voice, at any time it deems that there is a threat to international peace and security. The 
Council may well need to be prepared to be much more proactive on these issues, taking 
more decisive action earlier, than it has been in the past. 
 
195. Questions of legality apart, there will be issues of prudence, or legitimacy, about 
whether such preventive action should be taken: crucial among them is whether there is 
credible evidence of the reality of the threat in question (taking into account both capability 
and specific intent) and whether the military response is the only reasonable one in the 
circumstances. We address these issues further below. 
 
196. It may be that some States will always feel that they have the obligation to their own 
citizens, and the capacity, to do whatever they feel they need to do, unburdened by the 
constraints of collective Security Council process. But however understandable that 
approach may have been in the cold war years, when the United Nations was manifestly not 
operating as an effective collective security system, the world has now changed and 
expectations about legal compliance are very much higher. 
 
197. One of the reasons why States may want to bypass the Security Council is a lack of 
confidence in the quality and objectivity of its decision-making. The Council’s decisions have 
often been less than consistent, less than persuasive and less than fully responsive to very 
real State and human security needs. But the solution is not to reduce the Council to 
impotence and irrelevance: it is to work from within to reform it, including in the ways we 
propose in the present report. 
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198. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are 
concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of 
authority but to make the Council work better than it has. 
 
3. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, internal threats and the responsibility 
to protect 
 
199. The Charter of the United Nations is not as clear as it could be when it comes to saving 
lives within countries in situations of mass atrocity. It “reaffirm(s) faith in fundamental 
human rights” but does not do much to protect them, and Article 2.7 prohibits intervention 
“in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any State”. There has been, as a 
result, a long -standing argument in the international community between those who insist 
on a “right to intervene” in man –made catastrophes and those who argue that the Security 
Council, for all its powers under Chapter VII to “maintain or restore international security”, 
is prohibited from authorizing any coercive action against sovereign States for whatever 
happens within their borders. 
 
200. Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Genocide Convention), States have agreed that genocide, whether committed in time of 
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent 
and punish. Since then it has been understood that genocide anywhere is a threat to the 
security of all and should never be tolerated. The principle of non -intervention in internal 
affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities, such as large -scale 
violations of international humanitarian law or large -scale ethnic cleansing, which can 
properly be considered a threat to international security and as such provoke action by the 
Security Council. 
 
201. The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, 
Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of 
sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider 
international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the “right to 
intervene” of any State, but the “responsibility to protect” of every State when it comes to 
people suffering from avoidable catastrophe — mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by 
forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there 
is a growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility 
to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to 
do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community — with it 
spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and 
rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting the cessation of 
violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such 
measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it 
needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort. 
 
202. The Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective in 
dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. But step by 
step, the Council and the wider international community have come to accept that, under 
Constructing the Responsibility to Protect: Marc Pollentine 
418 
 
Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to 
protect, it can always authorize military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is 
prepared to declare that the situation is a “threat to international peace and security”, not 
especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved. 
 
203. We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility 
to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last 
resort, in the event of genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious 
violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved 
powerless or unwilling to prevent. 
 
B. The question of legitimacy 
 
204. The effectiveness of the global collective security system, as with any other legal order, 
depends ultimately not only on the legality of decisions but also on the common perception 
of their legitimacy — their being made on solid evidentiary grounds, and for the right 
reasons, morally as well as legally. 
 
205. If the Security Council is to win the respect it must have as the primary body in the 
collective security system, it is critical that its most important and influential decisions, 
those with large-scale life -and-death impact, be better ma de, better substantiated and 
better communicated. In particular, in deciding whether or not to authorize the use of force, 
the Council should adopt and systematically address a set of agreed guidelines, going 
directly not to whether force can legally be used but whether, as a matter of good 
conscience and good sense, it should be. 
 
206. The guidelines we propose will not produce agreed conclusions with push - button 
predictability. The point of adopting them is not to guarantee that the objectively best 
outcome will always prevail. It is rather to maximize the possibility of achieving Security 
Council consensus around when it is appropriate or not to use coercive action, including 
armed force; to maximize international support for whatever the Security Council decides; 
and to minimize the possibility of individual Member States bypassing the Security Council. 
 
207. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security 
Council should always address — whatever other considerations it may take into account 
— at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy: 
 
(a) Seriousness of threat. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and 
sufficiently clear and serious, to justify prima facie the use of military force? In the case of 
internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large -scale killing, ethnic cleansing or 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended? 
 
(b) Proper purpose. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is 
to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be 
involved? 
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(c) Last resort. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been 
explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed? 
 
(d) Proportional means. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military 
action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question? 
 
(e) Balance of consequences. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being 
successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to 
be worse than the consequences of inaction? 
 
208. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in 
declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. 
 
209. We also believe it would be valuable if individual Member States, whether or not they 
are members of the Security Council, subscribed to them. 
 
… 
 
256. …We see no practical way of changing the existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a 
whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the 
institution in an increasingly democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to 
matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members, 
in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in 
cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that under any 
reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto.  
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In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of Kofi 
Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations (March 2005) 
 
E. Use of force 
 
122. Finally, an essential part of the consensus we seek must be agreement on when and 
how force can be used to defend international peace and security. In recent years, this issue 
has deeply divided Member States. They have disagreed about whether States have the 
right to use military force pre-emptively, to defend themselves against imminent threats; 
whether they have the right to use it preventively to defend themselves against latent or 
non-imminent threats; and whether they have the right — or perhaps the obligation — to 
use it protectively to rescue the citizens of other States from genocide or comparable 
crimes. 
 
123. Agreement must be reached on these questions if the United Nations is to be — as it 
was intended to be — a forum for resolving differences rather than a mere stage for acting 
them out. And yet I believe the Charter of our Organization, as it stands, offers a good basis 
for the understanding that we need. 
 
124. Imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51, which safeguards the inherent right of 
sovereign States to defend themselves against armed attack. Lawyers have long recognized 
that this covers an imminent attack as well as one that has already happened. 
125. Where threats are not imminent but latent, the Charter gives full authority to the 
Security Council to use military force, including preventively, to preserve international peace 
and security. As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against humanity, are 
they not also threats to international peace and security, against which humanity should be 
able to look to the Security Council for protection? 
 
126. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but 
to make it work better. When considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of 
military force, the Council should come to a common view on how to weigh the seriousness 
of the threat; the proper purpose of the proposed military action; whether means short of 
the use of force might plausibly succeed in stopping the threat; whether the military option 
is proportional to the threat at hand; and whether there is a reasonable chance of success. 
By undertaking to make the case for military action in this way, the Council would add 
transparency to its deliberations and make its decisions more likely to be respected, by both 
Governments and world public opinion. I therefore recommend that the Security Council 
adopt a resolution setting out these principles and expressing its intention to be guided by 
them when deciding whether to authorize or mandate the use of force. 
 
IV. Freedom to live in dignity 
 
… 
 
129. When it comes to laws on the books, no generation has inherited the riches that we 
have. We are blessed with what amounts to an international bill of human rights, among 
which are impressive norms to protect the weakest among us, including victims of conflict 
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and persecution. We also enjoy a set of international rules on everything from trade to the 
law of the sea, from terrorism to the environment and from small arms to weapons of mass 
destruction. Through hard experience, we have become more conscious of the need to build 
human rights and rule-of-law provisions into peace agreements and ensure that they are 
implemented. And even harder experience has led us to grapple with the fact that no legal 
principle — not even sovereignty — should ever be allowed to shield genocide, crimes 
against humanity and mass human suffering. 
 
130. But without implementation, our declarations ring hollow. Without action, our 
promises are meaningless. Villagers huddling in fear at the sound of Government bombing 
raids or the appearance of murderous militias on the horizon find no solace in the 
unimplemented words of the Geneva Conventions, to say nothing of the international 
community’s solemn promises of “never again” when reflecting on the horrors of Rwanda a 
decade ago. Treaties prohibiting torture are cold comfort to prisoners abused by their 
captors, particularly if the international human rights machinery enables those responsible 
to hide behind friends in high places. A warweary population infused with new hope after 
the signing of a peace agreement quickly reverts to despair when, instead of seeing tangible 
progress towards a Government under the rule of law, it sees war lords and gang leaders 
take power and become laws unto themselves. And solemn commitments to strengthen 
democracy at home, which all States made in the Millennium Declaration, remain empty 
words to those who have never voted for their rulers and who see no sign that things are 
changing. 
 
131. To advance a vision of larger freedom, the United Nations and its Member States must 
strengthen the normative framework that has been so impressively advanced over the last 
six decades. Even more important, we must take concrete steps to reduce selective 
application, arbitrary enforcement and breach without consequence. Those steps would 
give new life to the commitments made in the Millennium Declaration. 
 
132. Accordingly, I believe that decisions should be made in 2005 to help strengthen the 
rule of law internationally and nationally, enhance the stature and structure of the human 
rights machinery of the United Nations and more directly support efforts to institute and 
deepen democracy in nations around the globe. We must also move towards embracing and 
acting on the “responsibility to protect” potential or actual victims of massive atrocities. The 
time has come for Governments to be held to account, both to their citizens and to each 
other, for respect of the dignity of the individual, to which they too often pay only lip 
service. We must move from an era of legislation to an era of implementation. Our declared 
principles and our common interests demand no less. 
 
Embrace the “responsibility to protect’ as a basis for collective action against genocide, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and agree to act on this responsibility, 
recognizing that this responsibility lies first and foremost with each individual State, whose 
duty it is to protect its population, but that if national authorities are unwilling or unable to 
protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect civilian populations, and that if 
such methods appear insufficient the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take 
action under the Charter, including enforcement action, if so required. 
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A. Rule of Law 
 
… 
 
134. Nowhere is the gap between rhetoric and reality – between declarations and deeds – 
so stark and so deadly as in the field of international humanitarian law. It cannot be right, 
when the international community is faced with genocide or massive human rights abuses, 
for the United Nations to stand by and let them unfold to the end, with disastrous 
consequences for many thousands of innocent people. I have drawn Member States’ 
attention to this issue over many years. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the 
Rwandan genocide, I presented a five-point plan to prevent genocide. The plan underscored 
the need for action to prevent armed conflict, effective measures to protect civilians, 
judicial steps to fight impunity, early warning through a Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide, and swift and decisive action when genocide is happening or about to happen. 
Much more, however, needs to be done to prevent atrocities and to ensure that the 
international community acts promptly when faced with massive violations.  
 
135. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently 
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with is 16 members from all around 
the world, endorsed what they described as an “emerging norm that there is a collective 
responsibility to protect”. While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I 
strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to 
protect, and, when necessary must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with 
each individual State, whose primary raison d’etre and duty to protect its population. But if 
national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility 
shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to 
help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods 
appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under 
the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required. In this case, 
as in others, it should follow the principles set out [above].  
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2005 World Summit Outcome: 
 
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity 
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility 
and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. 
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be 
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for 
the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also 
intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention of Genocide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
